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Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis is about the rights and liabilities arising under English and Chinese law in 
respect of the carriage of dangerous cargo. It is noted that the danger in dangerous 
cargoes was not necessarily something in the goods themselves, but might well lie in the 
way they were packaged, looked after or transported. Accordingly, the responsibilities 
and liabilities of the various parties with regards to the carriage of dangerous cargoes 
are usually intertwined and complex. 
 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyse and evaluate the dangerous cargoes liabilities in 
English and Chinese law, by providing suggestions for existing problems in each 
country based on three sources: contract, tort and statute. Moreover, the chain of 
causation and concept of remoteness has particular importance in order to establish 
liability and decide which type and what amount of damage is recoverable.  
 
This thesis compares both countries’ liability regimes and how to secure compensation 
for its victims, and the restoration of the environment, with reference to the EU 
Environmental Liability Directive and relevant international conventions. The author 
draws her final conclusions from four important issues: (1) the meaning of dangerous 
cargo, the packing and handling; (2) the scheme of liability; (3) the channelling of 
liability; and (4) the type of recoverable damage. 
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Chapter 1 Meaning of Dangerous Cargoes 
1.1 Introduction 
This thesis is about the rights and liabilities arising under English and Chinese law in 
respect of the carriage of dangerous cargoes. In the past, much research was undertaken 
on the public law aspect of how to prevent, reduce and control marine pollution.1 
However, preventing dangerous cargo from causing harm is only the first step. If such 
cargo does cause harm, a more challenging question is how to allocate risks (civil 
liability) and provide adequate compensation (private law). Hence this thesis will focus 
on the private law aspect for the carriage of dangerous cargo by sea. 
 
During hundreds of years, the transportation of dangerous cargo (e.g. gun powder) has 
always been a problem: after all, most of the seminal English cases2 on the subject 
come from the nineteenth century. Since World War II the carriage of oil, chemicals and 
other hazardous products has increased significantly. This has created a new and ever 
greater risk of injury to persons and damage to property, but in particular of damage to 
the maritime environment. According to IMO criteria, more than 50% of packaged 
goods and bulk cargoes transported by sea today can be regarded as dangerous, 
hazardous or harmful to the environment in at least some way.3 There are several 
factors that have led to a substantial increase in the carriage of dangerous cargo.  
 
One factor is that some commodities are no longer available in sufficient quantities and 
have been replaced by synthetic equivalents. The production of synthetic materials often 
necessitates the use of dangerous substances.  
 
                                                       
1
 See Appendix II. For example, MARPOL 1973/78, ISM Code, Intervention Convention 1969, OPRC Convention. 
2
 For example, Brass v Maitland [1856] 6 E & B 470; Mitchell Cotts & Co v Steel Bros & Co Ltd [1916] 2 K.B. 610; 
Ingram & Royle Ltd v. Service Maritimes du Treport [1913] 1 K.B. 538; Ministry of Food v Lamport & Holt [1952] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 371; General Feeds Inc. v. Burnham Shipping Corporation (The Amphion) [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 101; 
The Athanasia Comninos [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. p277; The Fiona [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 257, QB; [1994] 2 Lloyd’s 
Rep. 506, CA; Losinjska Plovidba v. Transco Overseas Ltd. (The Orjula) [1995] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 395 and The Giannis 
NK [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 337 
3
 See “IMO and dangerous goods at sea”, May 1996, p1, 
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D7999/IMDGdangerousgoodsfocus1997.pdf 
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The second related factor is the development of new technologies. This has led to an 
increase in the production of dangerous goods that are transported by sea, which in turn 
has led to the development of new types of packaging,4 e.g. anti-oxidant treated 
fishmeal.  
 
The third factor is a tendency towards the specialisation of ships and their consequent 
growth in size. For example, a few years ago the main bulk of chemical products were 
carried in packaged form or in general cargo ships. Today there are a multitude of cargo 
ships in operation: chemical product carriers, container ships, vessels carrying bank 
containers, ro-ro vessels loading tank vehicles, lash ships, and bulk carriers. As a result, 
there are many problems related to both of safety and pollution. These problems take on 
new dimensions with the specialisation of ships, their growth in size, and the rapid rise 
in the use of dangerous cargoes.5 
 
The responsibilities and liabilities of the various parties with regard to the carriage of 
dangerous cargoes are complex. There is no all-embracing solution to the legal 
problems in this area, therefore this thesis will present and analyse different solutions to 
dangerous cargo liabilities. First, since the definition of dangerous cargo is not 
straightforward, the following three examples of different substances will be categorised 
to determine its dangerousness.  
(i) Nuclear materials are very dangerous and they can be categorised as 
ultra-hazardous. As a result they are always kept and handled under the 
strictest and tightest controls that for all practical purposes they do not pose 
much danger. The owners and users of these substances are singled out as 
those liable for what may happen (i.e. the operator).  
 
(ii) Crude oil is not an especially dangerous substance. However when it escapes 
from its containers the oil may well create an environmental disaster. The 
                                                       
4
 Cleopatra Elmira Henry, The Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea—The role of the International Maritime 
Organization in International Legislation, (1985) Frances Printer, London, at 93. 
5
 See Buschmann, C.H., The Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea: A Review, in “Proceedings of the 6th 
International Symposium on the Transport of Dangerous Goods by Sea and Inland Waterways”, 13 to 17 October 
1980, Tokyo, Japan, pp1-9 
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very fact that the oil is carried by ships threatens the marine environment. 
The carrier rather than the owner of the cargo suddenly is brought into focus 
and is strict liable for damages caused, e.g. under 1969 CLC or 1992 CLC. 
 
(iii) Certain chemicals can normally be innocuous, but may become dangerous 
under special circumstances. For example, when stowed together with some 
other chemicals in the same container or at a certain temperature, a chemical 
reaction will be initiated causing an explosion or fire. Here the sensitive 
issue is how to pack the chemicals and how to stow them 
 
From this short list, the cases of nuclear materials have been well covered by 
international regime and stringent precautions are always in place, therefore the 
possibility of incidents is very low.6 For the cases involving crude oil, the very 
successful and widely accepted oil pollution conventions solve most of the problems in 
claims of damage from oil pollution. The most interesting and important issues are 
related to the type of dangerous substances. Hence special attention will be given to the 
miscellaneous category (iii) in this thesis. 
 
Once oil and nuclear cargoes are discounted, the first major difficulty consists in saying 
what is meant by “dangerous cargoes” and how they differ from other. Therefore, 
chapter 1 will focus on the definition of dangerous cargo. 
 
Chapter 2 is a brief introduction to contract, tort and statute law as three sources of 
liability in China and England. 
 
Chapter 3 demonstrates tort liability in respect of the carriage of dangerous cargoes in 
China and England. The former is based on statute law relating to tort liability. The 
latter is focused on the tort of negligence. Also the strict product liability in both 
                                                       
6
 See discussion in section 5.2.2.1. For example, Convention relating to Civil Liability in the Field of Maritime 
Carriage of Nuclear Material (NUCLEAR) 1971, http://www.imo.org/home.asp The 1971 Convention provides that a 
person otherwise liable for damage caused in a nuclear incident shall be exonerated for liability if the operator of the 
nuclear installation is also liable for such damage by virtue of the Paris Convention of 29 July 1960 on Third Party 
Liability in the Field of Nuclear Energy; or the Vienna Convention of 21 May 1963 on Civil Liability for Nuclear 
Damage; or national law which is similar in the scope of protection given to the persons who suffer damage. 
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countries and the strict liability under the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher7 are examined. A 
comparative analysis on the difference of tort liability in respect of dangerous cargo in 
China and England is emphasized.  
 
Chapter 4 addresses the contractual liability arising from the carriage of dangerous 
cargo. A comparative analysis is undertaken between Chinese and English law with 
regard to the shipper’s liability to the carrier, the carrier’s liability to the shipper and 
whether third party B/L holders can incur liability in respect of the shipment of 
dangerous cargo. Furthermore, a critical analysis is undertaken on the topic of whether 
the joint causation between the carrier’s liability and the shipper’s liability bars the 
carrier’s claim. 
 
Chapter 5 gives an overview of the international liability conventions, such as the CLC, 
the Fund Conventions and the HNS Convention 1996. Also a detailed comparative 
analysis is undertaken on the difficulties of ratifying the HNS Convention and why 
neither China nor the UK has yet to ratify it. Moreover a penetrating analysis is given 
on why China has not ratified the Fund Convention/ Protocol. Finally, the EU 
Environmental Liability Directive 2004/35 is discussed and evaluated; and a case law 
analysis is undertaken in respect of the decision of the ECJ on the Erika spill. 
 
Chapter 6 is devoted to the central issue of liability - causation and remoteness. In the 
UK these two issues are frequently dealt with together when deciding upon the types of 
damage and the amount of damages that are recoverable. In contrast, China does not 
have the rule of remoteness, but theoretically the recoverable damages under the rule of 
“proximate cause” are just as extensive as those applied in the U.K. 
 
Chapter 7 is focused on the shipper’s liability under the new Rotterdam Rules 2009 in 
relation to the carriage of dangerous cargo, as well as dealing with the mechanism for 
proportionate allocation of liability between the shipper and the carrier. Also whether 
the transfer of obligations from shipper to third parties is possible under the Convention 
                                                       
7
 (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330. 
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is discussed. Moreover, effort is particularly spent on comparing the shipper’s 
obligations under the Rotterdam Rules with existing English and Chinese law. 
 
Chapter 8 is the final conclusion. It takes an overview of the different approaches to 
allocate risks arising from the carriage of dangerous cargo and demonstrates solutions to 
the complex liability issues regarding the following four issues: (1) the substance, the 
packing and handling; (2) the scheme of liability; (3) the channelling of liability; and (4) 
the type of recoverable damage. 
 
In addition, there is the importance of geographical considerations when determining 
issues of civil liability. For example, where a ship explodes and kills the crew on the 
High Seas, the law of flag8 is the decisive factor.9 If the explosion of dangerous cargo 
occurs on board an English vessel,10 the crew members’ families will be able to take 
proceedings before the English Courts11 and their tort claims will be subject to English 
Law. In this case, the various Conventions adopted by the U.K. will be applicable to that 
case, such as the Law of Sea 1982.12 However, the CLC/Fund and HNS will not apply 
since their geographic scope is limited to territorial waters and EEZ.13 Considering the 
word limit and the scope of the thesis, procedural laws14 will not be discussed in detail. 
Instead, the focus will be on the substantial laws relating to dangerous cargo liability.  
                                                       
8
 Law of flag means the law of the port at which the ship is registered.  
9
 North and Fawcett (editors), Cheshire and North’s Private international law, (13th ed. 2004), Oxford University 
Press, p. 662 
10
 There is a more complicated situation, and a detailed analysis is clearly beyond the scope of this thesis, for 
example the plaintiff brought an action in England, but the law of flag is in a foreign country. For specific discussion 
on this issue, see Cheshire and North’s Private international law, op. cit p. 663. 
11
 The High Court has jurisdiction to entertain an action in respect of injurious acts done on the High Seas, even 
though both the litigants are foreigners, See The Tubantia [1924] p.78 
12
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS) 1982, see full text at 
http://www.globelaw.com/LawSea/lsconts.htm For jurisdictional rights of a coastal state in terms of control of 
vessel-source pollution in EEZ, see Art. 56 of LOS Convention. Regardless of the practical rationale for restricting 
liability for high seas pollution damage to its impact on national interests, the LOS Convention affords states on the 
right of intervention on the high seas in the case of maritime casualties threatening harmful pollution (Art. 221(1)). 
More radically, the right of port states to take legal proceedings against visiting vessels alleged to have illegally 
discharged oil outside the states’s own maritime zones, including the high seas (Art. 218(1)). See Michael Mason, 
Civil liability for oil pollution: examining the evolving scope for environmental compensation in the international 
regime, Marine Policy 27 (2003) 1-12, p.7. Farkhanda Zia-Mansoor, International Regime and the EU developments 
for preventing and controlling vessel-source oil pollution, (2005) European Environmental Law Review, p.169  
13
 See discussions in section 5.2.1.3 
14
 For those interested in Private international law, see Morris, The conflict of laws (6th ed. 2005) London: Sweet & 
Maxwell; Smith’s Conflict of laws, (2nd ed. 1999), Cavendish Publishing. For interests particularly relating to 
maritime torts, see Cheshire and North’s Private international law,pp661-664; for the traditional English jurisdiction 
rules relating to maritime claims see pp 325-332 
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1.1.1 An Introduction to the Approach of Chinese Law 
China’s shipping capacity developed significantly in last two decades, going from 995 
ships totalling 6 million gross tons in 1980 to 3,175 (16 millions tons) in 1998.15 The 
annual growth rate is about 13% in number of ships and 7.7% in tonnage, which is 
much higher than the world average of 1.1% and 1.3% respectively.16 With 18,000 km 
of coast17 and 85% to 90% of its foreign trade carried by sea, according to a survey of 
the major ports18 of China in 1996, the total export and import volume in these ports 
amounts to 851.52 million tonnes.19 The significance of shipping to the Chinese 
economy is thus obvious, as it has been for thousands of years.20 
With the increase of international trade and commerce in China and more and more 
ships calling at Chinese ports, the number of maritime dispute continues to increase. 
Nowadays, although a few are settled by way of mediation or arbitration, litigation is 
still the prevailing method of maritime disputes resolution in China. To cope with 
increasing pressure from shipping and trade, China has passed more than 20 
maritime-related laws, the most significant being the Maritime Code 1992 and the 
Maritime Procedure Law (MPL) 1999. Chinese legislation on dangerous cargo liability 
includes laws, regulations and rules,21 such as MEPL 1982, ARPMPV 1983, MTSL 
1983; the Civil Law 1986, Maritime Code 1992; PQL 1993, RADCP 2003; ARSSDCV 
2003 and Port Law 2003.22 
China has also recently ratified many international maritime conventions and some are 
                                                       
15
 Lloyd’s Register: World Fleet Statistics and Statistical Table (annum). Ships referred to are those being more than 
100gt and registered outside the countries are not included. China had 378 ships (above 1,000 gt) registered under 
open registry (UNCTAD: Review of Maritime Transport, 1997). 
16
 Li, KX and Wonham, J., Who is safe and who is at risk: a study of 20-year-record on total accident loss in 
different flags (1999) 26(2) Maritime Policy & Management, 137, at 139. 
17
 China faces the Pacific, the Buo Sea, the Yellow Sea, East China Sea and the South China Sea, through which 
China is linked with the Japanese Sea and Indian Ocean. 
18
 China is blessed with many natural harbors and ports. There are 700 ports along the Chinese coast, of which at 
least 50 are of international standard. 
19
 Beijing Asia-Pacific Economic Research Centre (ed.), Ocean China (in Chinese), China International Broadcasting 
Press, Beijing 1997, p.114. 
20
 See generally, Mo, Shipping Law in China, (1999) Hong Kong: Sweet & Maxwell Asia, p.2. 
21
 In China, only the National People’s Congress (NPC) and its Standing Committee have the competence to make 
laws. Regulations are made by the State Council, and measures and rules by ministries. That means “law” is the first 
level legislation, “regulations” second level and “measures / rules” third level. 
22
 See details in section 3.2, sections 4.2.2; 4.3.2  
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relevant to dangerous cargo liability, such as the Law of Sea Convention 1982,23 
MARPOL 73/78 (Annex I/II/III/V), the London Convention 1972, the Intervention on 
High Seas Convention 1969 (73 Protocol), the CLC 1969 (1992 Protocol),24 ISM Code, 
IMDG Code, the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (LLMC) 
1976,25 and the International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and 
Co-operation (ORPC) 1990.26 According to Chinese law, international conventions 
joined by China operate as part of Chinese law. That means Chinese registered vessels 
are expected to comply with not only domestic laws and regulations, but also the 
international conventions that China has signed. 
However there were no specialised maritime courts in China until 1984. Having realised 
that maritime cases involved lots of foreign-related issues and should be dealt with by 
judges familiar with relevant laws and with the practice of international shipping, on 
14th November 1984, the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress 
authorised the Supreme People’s Court of the PRC to establish some specialised 
maritime courts in certain coastal cities dealing purely with first instance maritime 
cases.27 Courts were duly established in Guangzhou, Dalian, Shanghai, Qingdao and 
Tianjing and later in addition at Wuhan on the Yangtze River, Haikou, Xiamen, Ningbo, 
and Beihai. Thus today there are 10 maritime courts in China, each having a designated 
geographic jurisdiction.28 Appeal lies to the relevant provincial high court; and because 
under the PRC law only one appeal is allowed, this appeal is final. In recent few years, 
there has indeed been a dramatic increase in maritime cases.29 
China is not a common law country. PRC courts, including the maritime courts do not 
                                                       
23
 In May 1996 China ratified the LOS Convention. See also Chapter 9 Marine Jurisdiction over Vessel-source 
Pollution in the EEZ, in Zou Keyuan, China’s Marine Legal System and the Law of the Sea, Martinus Nijhgoff 
Publishing, Leiden/ Boston, pp 224-241 
24
 See details in sections 5.2.1.2 and 5.2.1.3 
25
 See section 5.2.3.2 
26
 See Appendix II  
27
 Li, Henry, The Maritime Courts of the PRC and the Roles of the Maritime Lawyers at 
http://www.hkmla.org/events/Henry%20Li.pdf 
28
 See general information about ten maritime courts and their relevant provincial high courts (in Chinese) at 
http://www.ccmt.org.cn/hs/intro/indexall.php 
29
 In 1998, there were 5,166 maritime related cases filed with maritime courts (compared with that in 1990, total 951 
cases. See (in Chinese) National Bureau of Statistics of China, the PRC: China Statistic Yearbook (1999). During the 
last 20 years, 50,000 cases were filed with the 10 maritime courts, 12% of them involved foreign elements. See Li, 
“The Maritime Courts of the PRC and the Roles of the Maritime Lawyers” at 
http://www.hkmla.org/events/Henry%20Li.pdf 
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recognise stare decisis30 and as befits a civil jurisdiction, rely heavily on codified laws. 
As a result the most significant source of maritime rights and liabilities in the PRC is 
the Maritime Code 1992.  
 
Theoretically judges must always draw their decisions from codified law, though they 
may of course have some latitude in interpreting it, thus giving rise on occasion to 
differing decision on issues of the same kind from court to court, or even from case to 
case in the same court. Subject to this, however, judges have no authority to make law 
as a matter of constitutional principle. If an issue does arise as to the correct application 
of law or statute in a trial, a decision was made by the Standing Committee of the 
National People’s Congress in 1981 that the Supreme Court should make the 
interpretation.31 Following this decision, the Supreme Court has made a lot of replies to 
its lower courts at their request and in addition issued a number of circulars or notices 
on particular issues. These replies, circulars and notices, although not technically 
binding law, are in practice respected by all judges in the country and applied in trials. 
1.1.2 The Approach of English Law 
The English common law is a system whereby judges have a large influence in making 
law, by referring to past judicial decisions (stare decisis), where legislation does not 
provide an answer to the legal question at hand. By expanding upon and reinterpreting 
old decisions, judges develop the Common law gradually. A decision of the highest 
appeal court in England and Wales, the House of Lords, is binding on every other court 
in the hierarchy, and they will follow its directions. 
 
In England, claims for compensation for pollution will either be based on the common 
law or on relevant legislation. In practice, legislation is far more important in this area, 
as it is in China. The English common law has difficulty fitting marine pollution into its 
traditional categories of torts. For example, Lord Denning in Southport Corp. v. Esso 
                                                       
30
 [Latin: to stand by things decided]; A maxim expressing the underlying basis of the doctrine of precedent, i.e. that 
it is necessary to abide by former procedures when the same points arise again in litigation. 
31
 Li, The Maritime Courts of the PRC and the Roles of the Maritime Lawyers, at 
http://www.hkmla.org/events/Henry%20Li.pdf 
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Petroleum,32 after rejecting both trespass and private nuisance as potential bases for 
liability, settled on public nuisance as the most appropriate ground. However, public 
nuisance required the claimant to show that he had suffered some “greater damage or 
inconvenience from the oil than the generality of the public”,33 which often proved 
impossible.34 Consequently, the tort of negligence35 gradually emerged as the usual 
ground of liability for marine pollution in the common law. 
 
In U.K., the legal regime, both in civil and criminal cases, has been developed by this 
country and the international community to deal with marine pollution in details, both to 
prevent pollution and to secure compensation for its victims and the restoration of the 
environment. The U.K. marine oil pollution legislation closely follows international 
developments. 
 
With regard to pollution liability and compensation, the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 
gives the force of law in the UK to the CLC 199236 and the Fund Convention 1992.37 
Oil pollution from ships other than those contemplated by CLC 1992 is also covered.38 
The same statute, as amended in 1997, also provides for statutory effect to be given to 
the HNS Convention 1996 in the UK.39 In respect of environmental damage, the cost of 
any reasonable measures of reinstatement actually taken or to be taken is 
compensable.40 Limited recovery for loss of profits is also possible.41 Penal sanctions 
                                                       
32
 [1954] 2 Q.B. 182 at pp. 195-202, [1954] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 446 at pp. 455-458 (C.A.), reversed on other grounds, 
[1956] A.C. 218, [1955] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 655 (H.L.). 
33
 Ibid., Q.B. at p. 197. 
34
 See Marsdon on Collisions at Sea, 13th ed., § 10-79, §10-83 
35
 See discussion in section 3.1.2. 
36
 Merchant Shipping Act 1995, U.K. 1995, c.21, Part VI (Prevention of Pollution), Chapter III (Liability for Oil 
Pollution), comprising sects. 152-171 of the statute. Originally, the CLC 1969 was given force of law in UK by the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1974, U.K. 1974, c. 43. See the text of the 1992 CLC in Tetley, International Maritime and 
Admiralty Law, 2002, op. cit., Appendix “K”, p. 757. 
37
 Merchant Shipping Act 1995, Part VI (International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund), comprising sects. 172-182 
of the statute. Originally, the Fund Convention 1971 was given effect in the UK by the Merchant Shipping Act 1974, 
UK 1974, c. 43. See the text of the 1992 Fund in Tetley, International Maritime and Admiralty Law, 2002, op. cit., 
Appendix “L”, p. 775. 
38
 Merchant Shipping Act 1995, sect. 154, See particularly sect. 154(5), defining “ship” for purpose of that section as 
including a vessel which is not seagoing. Under Article I, 1 of the 1992 CLC, “Ships” means any sea-going vessel 
and any seaborne craft of any type whatsoever constructed or adopted for the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo, 
provided that a ship capable of carrying oil and other cargoes shall be regarded as a ship only when it is actually 
carrying oil in bulk as cargo and during any voyage following such carriage unless it is proved that it has no residues 
of such carriage of oil in bulk aboard. 
39
 See the Merchant Shipping and Maritime security Act 1997, U.K. 1997, c. 28, sect. 14 and Schedule 3, adding to 
Part IV of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995, Chapter 5 (Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances), and 
comprising sect. 182A-182C, and Schedule 5A. 
40
 Merchant Shipping Act 1995, sect. 156(3)(b). 
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for pollution are also provided for, include fines, costs and expenses which, if unpaid, 
can result in the levying of discharge on the ship and its equipment.42 
 
U.K. legislation dealing with the prevention of marine pollution from ships is contained 
in Chapters I and II of Part VI of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995.43 Dangerous goods 
and marine pollutants are stipulated by the Merchant Shipping (Dangerous Goods and 
Marine Pollutants) Regulations 1997.44 English statute law on dangerous cargo liability 
is discussed in Chapter 1. 
 
In respect of the marine environment protection from ship-source pollution, the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1995 empowers the U.K. Government to enforce MARPOL 
1973/1978,45 the 1973 Protocol to the Intervention Convention,46 as well as the OPRC 
Convention 199047, and the Law of the Sea Convention 1982.48 However, by August 
2009,49 the ORPC-HNS Protocol 200050 has not been given the force of law in UK.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
41
 Merchant Shipping Act 1995, sect. 156(3)(a)(b). Note that Scottish courts have held that marine oil pollution 
claims for economic loss are not per se inadmissible, provided that the damage is not too remote from the cause. But 
where the loss is a contractual, relational loss only and the claimant has no proprietary or possessory interest in the 
damaged property, such recovery is not normally granted in the UK. See Landcatch Ltd. v. International Oil Pollution 
Compensation Fund, [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 316 (Ct. of Sess); P. and O. Scottish Ferries Ltd. v. The Braer 
Corporation and others, [1999] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 535 (Ct. of Sess). 
42
 Merchant Shipping Act 1995, sect. 131 (3), providing for fines of up to £250,000 on summary conviction and other 
fines for conviction on incident. 
43
 The current Regulations relating to the prevention of oil pollution are the Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Oil 
Pollution) Regulations 1996, SI 1996/2154. These regulations came into force on 17 Sep. 1996. These Regulations 
were amended by the Merchant Shipping (Prevention of Oil Pollution) (Amendment) Regulations 2004, SI 2004/303, 
which effect from 8 March 2004. 
44
 SI 1997/ 2367. These Regulations, which came into force on 1 November 1997, refer to the 1994 Edition of the 
IMDG Code. This Code contains requirements to be satisfied for the carriage of dangerous goods and marine 
pollutants. By virtue of the amendment to Chapter VII of the SOLAS 1974 Convention adopted on 24 May 2002, the 
IMDG Code became mandatory for ships of states party to the Convention which effect as from 1 January 2004. 
45
 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973, adopted at London, November 1973 and 
its 1978 Protocol, adopted at London, February 17, 1978 (together known as “MARPOL 1973/1978”), Annex I of 
which (Prevention of Pollution by Oil) came into force October 2, 1983, with other Annexes and Protocols coming 
into force at later dates. See details in Chapter 8. 
46
 The Protocol relating to the High Sea in Cases of Marine Pollution by substances other than Oil, adopted at 
London on November 2, 1973 and in force March 30, 1983. 
47
 International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Responses and Cooperation (the OPRC Convention), 
adopted at London, November 30, 1990 and in force May 13, 1995.  
48
 Adopted at Montego Bay, Jamaica, December 10, 1982 and in force November 16, 1994. See particularly arts.194 
(duty to prevent, reduce and control pollution of marine environment), and the specific provisions on pollution from 
land-based sources (art. 207), seabed activities (art. 208), dumping (art. 210), vessels (art. 211), the atmosphere (art. 
212) and enforcement measures (art. 213-222). 
49
 See the specific information at http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D26103/status-x.xls  
50
 Protocol on Preparedness, Response and Co-operation to pollution Incidents by Hazardous and Noxious 
Substances, 2000 (OPRC-HNS Protocol), adopted at London, on March 15, 2000 and in force on June 14, 2007. Up 
to July 31, 2009, there are 24 contracting states. http://www.imo.org/home.asp.  
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1.2 What Makes a Cargo Dangerous? 
The definition of dangerous cargo is very important not only in the context of 
international safety regimes like SOLAS,51 but also in the interpretation of contracts 
and in setting liability in tort. This section deals with the development of the concept of 
dangerous cargo in the context of international safety regimes like SOLAS and the 
IMDG Code. It also deals with statutory definition in the United Kingdom and China. 
Further more, the common law definition, i.e. case law, includes the interpretation of 
carriage contracts. We will point out the differences between statutory definition and 
common law definition. But what is “dangerous”?  
 
Danger is a difficult concept because goods may be dangerous even if they do not look 
it or the problem may lie not in the nature of the goods themselves but in the 
surrounding environment. The definition of dangerous cargo is not as straightforward as 
one would think. For instance, it may be thought inaccurate to categorise grain as a 
dangerous cargo; nevertheless, a hazardous situation might well arise if grain shipped in 
bulk is allowed to overheat in transit. Similarly, liquids which are otherwise safe may 
nevertheless create problems if permitted to leak from their containers and damage other 
cargo.52  
 
In addition, certain chemicals under normal conditions can be innocent, but may change 
to be hazardous under certain circumstances, e.g. where residues of oil-yielding pulses 
and seeds are exposed to heat or damp, they are apt to detonate or combust. Again, 
gorgonzola cheese is not dangerous in itself, but would no doubt damage chocolate if 
stowed next to it.53 LNG,54 conversely, is flammable but can be carried safely in 
suitable facilities, where the necessary skills and level of care are employed. 
 
Cargo can be politically or hygienically dangerous if the political or local factors which, 
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 Numerous provisions regarding safety of ships carrying dangerous goods are contained in Chapter VII of SOLAS 
1974. These safety provisions are clearly relevant to issue of marine pollution prevention from these dangerous 
substances. 
52
 See Seller J in Ministry of Food v. Lamport & Holt [ 1952] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 371 at p382. 
53
 The Thorsa [1916] p. 257, 1916 WL19134 (CA), where chocolate was tainted by the later loading of a cargo 
cheese and it was held that the ship was not unseaworthy when the chocolate was loaded. 
54
 Liquefied natural gas 
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when combined with the characteristics of the goods, caused their seizure, delay or 
expense, e.g. contraband, and smuggled or black-listed goods.55 In The Giannis NK,56 
a cargo of ground-nut became dangerous since it was infested with the Khapra beetle 
and the public authority required that all the cargo be dumped at sea. Other cargoes can 
be handed to the carrier for transportation but they are politically dangerous, such as in 
The Domald57 and Mitchell Cotts & Co v Steel Bros & Co Ltd.58 Indeed, it may be 
argued that it is not goods as such that are dangerous or not dangerous, but rather the 
hazards that their carriage may cause during the voyage.59  
 
And it may be further argued that we should move from the idea of “dangerous” to 
“hazardous” substances. The phrase “hazardous and noxious” has been used in the 1996 
HNS Convention.60 The label “dangerous” implies perhaps the idea that the substance 
itself has an inherently dangerous characteristic such as, for example, nuclear material 
or nitroglycerine. And it may exclude a substance the danger in regard to which lies in 
its escape (such as oil).61 “Hazardous” is therefore to be preferred in the convention. 
 
In addition, the substance of the hazard may simply be the likelihood of economic loss 
through delay or property loss through damage to the ship or other cargo. The idea of 
“dangerous” may impart the thought of damage to property or more seriously, personal 
injury or at the most serious damage to property, but the category has been extended in 
English law even to include “unlawful merchandise”— the only defect in which was the 
lack of a license to land.62 
 
It has been said that “less dangerous goods are more dangerous than the very dangerous 
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 See Mustill, Carrier’s Liability and Insurance, in Gronfors, Kurt (ed.), Damage from Goods, (1978) at 76 
56
 [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 337. 
57
 [1919] 1 Ll. L. Rep. 621, by reason of the seizure in prize of various parcels of fruit and sulphur laden on board the 
Swedish steamship Domald, the vessel was detained at Kirkwall and Liverpool, and she incurred in addition various 
expenses. The said cargo was ordered to be discharged because of some suspicion attaching to the shippers or 
consignees by the British Authorities 
58
 [1916] 2 K.B. 610, The shippers of a cargo of rice upon a vessel they had chartered for a voyage to Piraeus knew 
that the rice could not be discharged there without the permission of the British Government, unfortunately  without 
the permission the vessel was delayed. 
59
 Wilson, John F. Carriage of Goods by Sea, (2004: 5th ed.), Harlow: Pearson/Longman, p. 33. 
60
 International Convention on Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of 
Hazardous and Noxious Substances by Sea, 1996, which was adopted by the IMO on 3 May 1996. 
61
 Jackson, D.C. Dangerous cargo: a legal overview in “Maritime Movement of Dangerous Cargoes—Public 
Regulation and Private Liability”, Papers of a one day seminar, Southampton University 11th September 1981. 
62
 E.g. Mitchell Cotts v. Steel [1916] 2 K.B. 610 
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goods”63 simply because in the case of very dangerous goods, everyone appreciates the 
danger and special precautions are taken. As with the grain, therefore, it is the situation 
in which the goods are placed rather than the inherent nature of themselves. 
 
Considering the scopes of definition, what is chosen to be used in my thesis is a wide 
one. So far as the following reasons are concerned, I use “dangerous cargo” rather than 
“hazardous substances” and “unlawful merchandise”. 
 
First, “dangerous cargo” not only includes “physically dangerous” but also the cargo 
which is unlawful or likely to subject the ship to delay, detention or seizure.64 So the 
scope of “dangerous cargo” is much broader than “unlawful merchandise”. 
 
Secondly, “dangerous cargo” is relating to a category of goods rather than a factor 
involved in the “hazard”. My thesis focuses on a category which will cause potential 
scale of damage and need special rules to liability as between carrier and shipper or as 
regards either and third parties. That category is different from normal goods. On the 
other hand, the “hazard” is an element extraneous to the goods and the consequences of 
the hazard little removed from the normal run, therefore the “hazard” becomes a factor 
rather than a category attracting special rules.65  
 
Nonetheless, the definition of dangerous cargo is a very important issue at common law, 
particularly in the context where a duty of the shipper arises in contract and tort not to 
ship dangerous cargo without notifying the carrier in advance. It also arises when 
interpreting the bill of lading and charterparty clauses referring to dangerous cargoes. 
As statutory regulation increased, cargoes regulated might well come to be regarded as 
dangerous at common law. 
 
However, no definition of dangerous cargo is provided by the common law and two 
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 See Mustill, Michael J. Carrier’s Liabilities and Insurance, in Kurt Gronfors (editor), Damage from Goods (1978) 
Gothenburg: Esselte stadium, 75-77 
64
 Cooke, J, Kimball, J, Young, T, Voyage Charters 2nd ed. (1993) LLP, at 113. 
65
 See Jackson, D.C., Dangerous cargo: a legal overview in “Maritime Movement of Dangerous Cargoes—Public 
Regulation and Private Liability”, Papers of a one day seminar, Southampton University 11th September 1981. 
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alternative approaches to the concept are possible. One is the traditional view that 
dangerous cargoes are regarded as a category, the extent of which is developed by 
precedent or statutory regulation. Certainly lots of substances such as explosives and 
radioactive materials are inherently unsafe, and it is easy to compile a substantial list on 
this basis. Then the statutory regulation defines “dangerous cargo” by reference which is 
classified in the list such as the IMDG Code, the Blue Book66 and the National 
Standard GB12268—A List of Dangerous Goods.67  
 
On the other hand, the courts have defined the concept in far wider terms to embrace 
cases in which the danger is to be found in the surrounding circumstances rather than in 
the inherent nature of the goods themselves.68 That is the amazing part of the case law. 
As a civil law background student, while reading the cases about dangerous cargo and 
seeing the development of judgments in United Kingdom, I for the first time recognised 
how important case law is. 
1.2.1 Statutory Regulation 
Statutes have from time to time been framed to control the shipment of certain classes 
of goods. Statutory obligations may be imposed on shippers and carriers in regard to 
“dangerous goods”. It should be noted that the provisions must be viewed in the context 
of their purpose. What is “dangerous” in one context may not be so in another. 
 
Before the analysis of the different statutes and regulations concerning dangerous goods, 
it is important to give a historical background, concerning the development of the 
different regulations related to how the definition of dangerous goods has changed. 
                                                       
66
 The United Kingdom Department of Transport publishes its recommendations for the transportation of dangerous 
cargoes in its “Blue Book” i.e. the 1978 Report of the Department of Trade’s Standing Advisory Committee on the 
Carriage of Dangerous Goods in Ships, which was published by HMSO (“Code for portable tanks and road tank 
vehicles for the carriage of liquid dangerous goods in ships”). 
67
 A substantial list of dangerous cargo promulgated by Ministry of Communications of P.R.C., it is in conformity 
with “Recommendation on the transport of dangerous goods 1988” 5th ed., by United Nations Committee of Experts 
on the Transport of Dangerous Goods. 
68
 Wilson, John F, Carriage of goods by sea, 5th ed., p. 33. 
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1.2.1.1 The Evolution of Dangerous Goods Regulation 
Statutory regulation starts with ideas largely of prevention, though it may then go on to 
create civil liability as well, either directly, or through extending the category of cargoes 
regarded as dangerous at common law. The history of the carriage of dangerous goods 
by sea is as old as mankind itself. But because so few dangerous goods were carried by 
sea until the latter part of the nineteenth century, special regulations had not been 
considered necessarily.69 Chinese law did not have specific legislation on dangerous 
cargo until 1980s.70 
 
In the U.K., the first traceable reference to regulations dealing with dangerous goods in 
maritime law was the British Merchant Shipping Act 1854.71 The new provision in 
MSA1894 was s.301.72 Section 301 was entitled “Dangerous Goods and Carriage of 
Cattle”. Under this section, an emigrant ship was prevented from going to sea if she 
carried “an explosive or any vitriol, lucifer matches, guano or green hides or any article 
which, by reason of the nature, quality and mode of stowage is likely to endanger the 
health or lives of the passengers or the safe of the ship”.73  
 
Sections 446-450 of the MSA 189474 were focused on the shipper’s obligations to 
notify the shipowner of dangerous goods. The provision imposed direct criminal and 
civil sanctions on the shipper for breach.75 Section 446 provided that every shipper is 
bound to mark the nature of the goods distinctly on the outside of the package and to 
give the master or owner of the vessel notice.76 This provision was based on “aquafortis, 
vitriol, naphtha, benzene, gunpowder, lucifer-matches, nitro-glycerine, petroleum, any 
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 Cleopatra Elmira Henry, op. cit. p93 
70
 The relevant legislations include MEPL 1982, ARPMPV 1983, MTSL 1983; Maritime Code 1992; RADCP 2003; 
ARSSDCV 2003 and Port Law 2003. For the whole names of these legislations, see Abbreviations. 
71
 See s.329 of the MSA 1854, which was the predecessor of 446-450 of the MSA 1894. Section 329 of MSA 1854: 
Provisions to prevent the taking dangerous goods on board without due notice. 
72
 Cleopatra Elmira Henry, op. cit. p93. See also Carver’s Carriage by Sea, 13th ed., Vol. 2 (1982) London (Stevens 
& Sons), at 1114. 
73
 Wilson, John F., Carriage of Goods by Sea, 5th ed., p. 32. 
74
 S.446: Restrictions on carriage of dangerous goods. S.447: Penalty for misdescription of dangerous goods. S.448: 
Power to deal with goods suspected of being dangerous. S.449: Forfeiture of dangerous goods improperly sent or 
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explosives within the meaning of the Explosives Act 1875, and any other goods which 
are a dangerous nature.”77 
 
On its own, the provision presented the classic issue of whether the general catch-all 
phrase at its end is governed by the goods specifically listed. If those can be said to 
from a group of common definition it may be argued that the generality might be 
limited by the common denomination.78 But we are saved from such a task by a later 
statutory provision, such as in the Merchant Shipping Act (dangerous goods) 199579 
and the Merchant Shipping Regulations (dangerous goods and marine pollutants) 
1997,80 as a result all the substances listed in the rules applying the IMDG Code are 
“dangerous goods” within this definition.  
 
On 15 April 1912, the Titanic, on her maiden voyage to the United States, after a 
collision with an iceberg, sank in the North Atlantic and more than 1500 lives were lost. 
Although that did not raise issues of dangerous cargo directly (the Titanic is a passenger 
ship), governments agreed that a conference should be convened in 1914 to consider 
safety of life as regards sea matters. 
 
In the first Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS 1914), “the carriage of 
goods which by reason of their nature, quality and mode of stowage” were likely to 
endanger the lives of the passengers or the safety of the ship, was in principle forbidden. 
However, the decisions as to which goods were “dangerous” were left to the 
Contracting Governments.81 
 
Although SOLAS 1914 never entered into force, the principle of relying on national 
administrations and competent authorities to decide on the definition and treatment of 
dangerous goods was established and, unfortunately, resulted in the development of 
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many diversified regulations and practices which are still in force in some countries. 
They are, in particular, embedded in national, regional or individual out-of-date port 
regulations.82  
 
The same approach was taken at the SOLAS Conference of 1929, in article 24 of which 
“Dangerous Goods” are mentioned together with “Life-Saving Appliances”.83 The 
carriage of goods liable to endanger the safety of the ship was still forbidden, but it was 
still left to individual administrations to consider the dangers and take appropriate 
precautions.84 The 1929 Convention entered into force in 1933.  
 
In 1914 and even in 1929, the types and amounts of dangerous cargoes transported by 
sea were comparatively small. But by 1948, when the third SOLAS Conference was 
held, the traffic had grown considerably and more and more cargoes were being 
transported which could be considered dangerous. This led to a radical rethinking, and 
as a result, a new chapter VI was added to the 1948 SOLAS Convention, dealing with 
the “Carriage of Grain and Dangerous Goods”.85 However, the conference did not come 
into force until 1958. In the United Kingdom, Merchant Shipping (Safety Conventions) 
Act 1949, s.2386 gave effect to matters relating to dangerous goods agreed at the 
SOLAS Convention 1948. 
 
From the evolution of the statutes, we can see, the early laws and conventions actually 
forbade the carriage of dangerous goods as a matter of principle. The dangerous 
character of a cargo was made to depend upon its nature, quantity or mode of stowage. 
Owing to these criteria, the definition of dangerous goods was a broad one. 
 
Further, considering the first two SOLAS conferences, because each Administration was 
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invited to determine its own list of dangerous goods and the precautions to be taken in 
packing and stowage, the consequence could only be a myriad of different rules and 
practices.87 
 
Thirdly, the early versions of SOLAS probably did not foresee the rapid increase in the 
production and transport of chemicals. The development of new technologies has 
increased the production of new chemicals. These chemicals, rather than presenting a 
threat by their nature, quantity or mode of stowage, are dangerous by virtue of their 
properties. This introduces a new criterion for the evaluation of dangerous goods.88 
 
Finally, the increase in the production of chemicals resulted in an expansion, not only of 
carriage by sea, but of transport by all modes, requiring some degree of collaboration 
and harmonisation of the rules and standards governing these modes. 
1.2.1.2 Safety Conventions—SOLAS 1960 and the 
IMDG Code 
The International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code was worked out by the 
International Maritime Organisation (IMO) at the request of the 1960 SOLAS 
conference.89 A resolution adopted by the 1960 Conference said the proposed code 
should cover such matters as packing, container traffic and stowage, with particular 
reference to the segregation of incompatible substances. 
 
Chapter VII of the revised 1960 SOLAS Convention, which entered into force on 26 
May 1965, dealt exclusively with the carriage of dangerous goods. Chapter VII of 
SOLAS 1960 was replaced by Chapter VII of SOLAS 1974.90 Revised chapter VII of 
the 1974 SOLAS Convention, as amended in 1994, applies now to all ships to which the 
                                                       
87
 Cleopatra Elmira Henry, The Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea, op. cit. p94 
88
 Ibid, p95 
89
 Resolution 56, adopted at the 1960 SOLAS Conference, recommended that the Governments should adopt a 
uniform international code for the carriage of dangerous goods by sea which should supplement the SOLAS 
regulations and cover such matters as packing, container traffic and stowage, with particular reference to the 
segregation of incompatible substances. 
90
 The substance of its provisions has remained unchanged.  
  29
SOLAS regulations generally apply and, in addition, to cargo ships of less than 500 tons 
gross tonnage. The 1974 SOLAS Convention91 came into force on 25 May 1980. 
 
Regulation 1 of part A92 of chapter VII prohibits the carriage of dangerous goods by sea 
except when they are carried in accordance with the provisions of the SOLAS 
Convention. It requires each Contracting Government to issue, or cause to be issued, 
detailed instructions on safe packing and stowage of dangerous goods which shall 
include the precautions necessary in relation to other cargo.93 In a footnote, reference is 
made to the more detailed provisions of the IMDG Code. 
 
Resolution 56, adopted at the 1960 SOLAS Conference, recommended that 
Governments should adopt a uniform international code for the carriage of dangerous 
goods by sea which should supplement the SOLAS regulations. In response to this 
request, the Maritime Safety Committee (MSC) established a Working Group on the 
Carriage of Dangerous Goods (CDG) to prepare such a code.94 By November 1965, 
good progress had been made in preparing such a code and the resulting document 
became known as the International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code. While 
the Code is closely linked to the provisions of Chapter VII of SOLAS, it is a separate 
instrument.95 It was adopted by the fourth IMO Assembly in 1965.96 
 
A list of dangerous goods is contained in the IMDG Code. If the carriage involves a sea 
carriage then the IMDG Code applies. The provisions of the IMDG Code are organised 
in five volumes devoted to the description of over a thousand substances classified as 
                                                       
91
 It has been ratified by 158 States, representing 98.8% of world merchant shipping (by 30 Sep. 2007). It applies to 
China and United Kingdom with effect from 25 May 1980. See details at 
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D20098/status.xls 
92
 The other six regulations in Part A of Chapter VII of the SOLAS Convention 1974 cover in general terms the 
packaging, marking, labelling and placarding of dangerous goods, the documents to be provided, stowage and 
segregation, and the reporting of incidents. 
93
 Ibid. 
94
 Cleopatra Elmira Henry, The Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Sea, op. cit., p. 100. 
95
 As to the relationship between the IMDG Code and SOLAS Convention, although IMDG Code supplements the 
SOLAS Convention, the Code adopted by IMO Assembly does not form part of the SOLAS Convention and 
consequently, does not possess the legal force of the latter. Each country remains free to adopt the Code or refuse to 
do so. The actual Code itself is an act of IMO. While closely linked to the provisions of Chapter VII of SOLAS, it is a 
separate instrument. It is an act of the Organization, not of the Contracting Parties to SOLAS. Its validity and legal 
force are to be determined by the law relating to acts of international organizations. 
96
 See “IMO and dangerous goods at sea”, May 1996, p3, 
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D7999/IMDGdangerousgoodsfocus1997.pdf 
  30
dangerous. Volume I contains a general introduction to the Code while volume II, III 
and IV contain detailed technical information on specific dangerous goods which are 
divided up into nine different classes. Volume V is a Supplement to the Code.  
 
Each class is preceded by an introduction which describes the properties, characteristics 
and definitions of the goods and gives detailed advice on handling and transport, e.g. 
stowage and segregation. That is the degree to which such goods should be kept 
separated from other dangerous cargoes, or other goods, transportation by ship, 
including separation from special spaces or areas in ship. The class introduction also 
gives information concerning procedures which should be followed during loading and 
unloading.97 
 
Since its adoption by the fourth IMO Assembly in 1965, the IMDG Code has undergone 
many changes, both in appearance and content to keep pace with the ever-changing 
needs of industry. Amendments to the IMDG Code originate from two sources; 
proposals submitted directly to IMO by Member States and amendments required to 
take account of changes to the United Nations Recommendations on the Transport of 
Dangerous Goods98 which sets the basic requirements for all the transport modes.99 
From 1 January 2001 the Code followed the form of the UN Model Regulations (“the 
Orange Book”).100 The UN Model Regulations are currently in their fifteenth edition101 
and the basis of specific modal regulations for air, sea, rail, inland waterway and road.  
 
The current version of the IMDG Code is Amendment 33 which came into force on 1 
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January 2008 on a mandatory basis. 102  The Code, as it now stands, forms an 
increasingly complete and valuable source of information on all aspects related to the 
transport of dangerous goods. It enacts regulations relating to the carriage of such goods 
on board container ships, ro-ro vessels, lash carriers and portable tanks. In addition, it 
contains separate recommendations for medical first aid on board as well as for the safe 
handling of dangerous goods in ports and harbours. Also, there is a recommendation on 
emergency procedures to be carried out in case of an accident on board involving a 
particular dangerous commodity.103 
 
Although it is mainly designed for mariners, the Code affects industries and services 
from the manufacturer to the consumer. It provides manufactures, shippers and packers 
with advice on terminology, packing and labelling. The Code is therefore a practical and 
readily accessible source of information.104 From the development and the practical 
value of the IMDG Code, we can see the Code has provided an international “public 
law” framework of some details, linking precautions to various particular substances. 
That development may form not only the basis for “public” liability but a guide to civil 
liability. 
 
Other than SOLAS, there is another international convention adopted by IMO with 
reference to the carriage of dangerous cargo, i.e. MARPOL 1973/78.105 Annexe III to 
the MARPOL Convention contains general requirements relating to the prevention of 
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pollution by harmful substances carried at sea in packaged form or in freight containers, 
portable tanks or road and rail tank wagons. The basic requirements set by the Annexe 
are to be supplemented by governments which, by virtue of wording similar to Chapter 
VII of SOLAS, must issue or cause to be issued detailed requirements on packing, 
marking and labelling, documentation, stowage, quantity limitations, exceptions and 
notifications. Further, Resolution 19 of the 1973 MARPOL Conference recommends 
that IMO adopt more detailed recommendations on the subject.106 Basic principles are 
also formulated for packaged substances which are considered to present a serious 
hazard to the marine environment.107  
 
The intention of MARPOL is to provide a uniform basis for national regulations which 
Annexe III of MARPOL requires to be developed. Meanwhile, the provisions of 
MARPOL reflect the fact that the IMDG Code was not formulated to take account of 
pollution of the marine environment as such. On the other hand, the HNS Convention 
1996108 is intended to deal with liability and compensation for massive or catastrophic 
damages caused by dangerous cargo concerned.  
 
Except for the IMDG Code, as to the technical standards to be complied with by ships 
carrying dangerous substances: see the International Bulk Chemical Code (IBC Code) 
which is mandatory under both MARPOL 73/78 and SOLAS,109 the Code for the 
Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Dangerous Chemicals in Bulk (BCH 
Code)—the predecessor of the IBC Code, 110  and the International Code for the 
Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquefied Gases in Bulk (IGC Code).111  
 
Insofar as these codes are adopted by national legislation, they will create a liability 
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framework based on the duties of shipper and carrier. The authority of the IMDG Code 
is chapter VII SOLAS 1960 which simply prohibits the carriage of dangerous goods 
except in accordance with the rules of the convention. Such a prohibition may be 
translated into national law in various ways. It appears in English law 112  as a 
declaration that the carriage of such goods is “unlawful” unless it complies with the 
rules as adopted in the United Kingdom.113 
 
In the U.K. the statutory definition of “dangerous goods” has been originated in the 
implementation of the international conventions such as SOLAS 1960 and the IMDG 
Code. Currently, this definition is given by the Merchant Shipping Act (dangerous 
goods) 1995114 and the Merchant Shipping Regulations (dangerous goods and marine 
pollutants) 1997.115 
1.2.1.3 National Laws—United Kingdom 
“Dangerous goods” are defined under S. 87 (5) of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 are 
those designated as such by safety regulations.116 The current safety regulations are the 
Merchant Shipping (Dangerous Goods and Marine Pollutants) Regulations 1997.117 
The Regulations apply to ships carrying dangerous goods in bulk or packaged form and 
marine pollutants in packaged form.118 
●The Merchant Shipping Act (MSA) 1995, s.85119 
S. 85 empowers the Secretary of State to make such safety regulations as he considers 
appropriate for the security and the safety of United Kingdom ships and the safety and 
health of persons on board them and for giving provisions to international agreement to 
that end.120 Inter alia, he may in particular provide for: the packing, marking, loading, 
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placing, moving, inspection, testing and measuring of cargo.121 
 
Section 87 contains supplementary provisions as to dangerous goods concerned in 
section 85. S. 87 (1) states that: where dangerous goods have been sent or carried on 
board of a ship, then any court that have admiralty jurisdiction may declare the goods to 
be forfeited. The circumstances in which the court may do so include: 
-    Where the goods are not marked as required by safety regulation, 
-    Where no notice has been given as required by safety regulation 
-    Where goods are falsely described, or 
-    Where there is a false description of their sender or carrier. 
 
●The Merchant Shipping Regulations (MSR) 1997122 
The extant safety regulations are the Merchant Shipping (Dangerous Goods and Marine 
Pollutants) Regulations 1997, which came into force on 1 November 1997. These 
Regulations apply to United Kingdom ships wherever they may be and to other ships 
while they are within the United Kingdom waters.123 “Dangerous goods” are defined 
here as:124 
…goods classified in the IMDG Code or in any other IMO publication referred to in these 
Regulations as dangerous for carriage by sea, and any other substance or article that the shipper 
has reasonable cause to believe might meet the criteria for such classification… 
 
It should be noted that MSR 1997 has changed its definition of “dangerous goods”, and 
the shipper’s liability is heavier compared with the revoked clause in MSR 1990 which 
provided “any other substance or goods the properties of which might be dangerous if 
that substance or those goods were carried by sea” instead of the above underlined 
clause in MSR 1997.  
 
After defining “dangerous goods” as those classified in the IMDG Code and other 
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specified IMO publications, the regulations proceed to formulate a detailed code for 
their documentation,125 marking,126 packing127 and stowing.128  
 
On the other hand, some legislation, unlike that based on SOLAS and the IMDG Code, 
is entirely nationally based. For example, in the United Kingdom, the control of 
dangerous goods carried by ships within harbour areas is governed by the Dangerous 
Substances in Harbour Areas Regulations 1987.129 The Merchant Shipping (Control of 
Pollution by Noxious Liquid Substances in Bulk) Regulations 1996,130 apply to ships 
carrying in bulk dangerous or noxious liquid substances. They apply to United Kingdom 
ships wherever they may be and to other ships when in United Kingdom waters.131  
1.2.1.4 National Laws—P.R.C. 
Chinese legislation on dangerous cargo includes national laws, regulations adopted by 
the Ministry of Communications of PRC (hereafter MOC) and some specific rules. 
Some of them are general legislations on safety of transport or the prevention of 
pollution and it is rare to see any specific definition of dangerous cargoes. Others focus 
on the carriage of dangerous cargoes where the definition of dangerous cargo is 
described in a particular clause. Since 1982, more than twenty national laws and 
regulations relating to dangerous cargoes which are promulgated by Chinese 
government,132 but only two of them gave a specific definition and both of them were 
promulgated by MOC. They are the most popular references used by Chinese maritime 
courts for disputes involving the concept of dangerous cargo. 
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●Regulations on Dangerous Goods in Waterway Transportation 
(1996)133  
It was promulgated by MOC on November 4, 1996, in conformity with 
“Recommendation on the transport of dangerous goods” (Orange Book). 134  The 
structure and contents of the regulations are similar to the IMDG Code. But it only 
applies to domestic transport. It covers the transport of dangerous goods and marine 
pollutants in packaged form, dangerous chemicals in bulk, liquid gas in bulk, liquid 
chemicals in bulk either on board ships or in port areas. It also includes “emergency 
procedures for ships carrying dangerous goods” and “the medical first aid guide for use 
in accidents involving dangerous goods”. Dangerous cargoes are defined in Article 3:135 
Any goods with an inflammable, explosive, corrosive, noxious, hazardous or radioactive nature, 
which are dangerous in water transportation or are likely to injure people or damage property 
during the loading and discharging or storage, are classified as dangerous goods. According to 
People’s Republic of China GB 6944 (“National standard on classification and numbers given 
to names of dangerous goods”) and People’s Republic of China GB 12268 (“National standard 
on names of dangerous goods in table format”), dangerous goods are divided into nine classes: 
Explosives; Compressed gases and liquid gases; Flammable liquids; Flammable solids; 
Oxidising substances and organic peroxides; Poisonous and infection substances; Radioactive 
materials; Corrosives and Miscellaneous dangerous substances and articles. 
 
The above definition is very similar to that in the following regulations. 
●Regulations on Administration of Dangerous Cargoes at Port 
(RADCP) 2003136 
The RADCP was promulgated by MOC, effective on 1 January 2004, and by Articles 
15-17 are related to the supervision and controlling the transport of dangerous cargoes 
in harbour. At the same time, it replaces “1984 Interim Regulations Administration of 
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Dangerous Cargoes at Port”137 and regulates the loading and discharging, barge, storage, 
package and consolidation of dangerous cargoes. Dangerous cargoes are defined as:138 
…cargoes classified in the National Standard GB12268—A List of the Names of Dangerous 
Goods139 or the IMDG Code, and replaces of an inflammable, explosive, corrosive, noxious, 
hazardous or radioactive nature, as dangerous in water transportation or are likely to injure 
people or damage property during the loading and discharging or storage, and need special 
safety rules (translated by author from Chinese). 
 
From the way of definition of dangerous cargo given by national statutes, we can see in 
both China and U.K., dangerous cargoes are regarded as a category, the extent of which 
is developed by statutory regulation based on a substantial list. Then the statutory 
regulation defines “dangerous cargo” by reference as which is classified in the list such 
as the IMDG Code or relevant national standards. There is no substantial difference of 
the statutory definition in P.R.C. and that in the U.K. 
1.2.2 The Meaning of Dangerous Cargo Developed in 
English Case Law 
Following the idea that the dangerousness is not necessarily a quality inherent in goods 
themselves but rather in the circumstances of their transportation,140  the English 
courts,141 found inadequacies in the statutory definition, which would lead to a single 
classification based on the goods themselves rather than a more flexible one based on all 
the surrounding circumstances. In particular they have broadened it so as to cover two 
new situations.  
 
There is no separate discussion on Chinese cases, since Chinese maritime courts do not 
recognise stare decisis, but rely heavily on codified law, i.e. Maritime Code 1992. 
Indeed, under a civil jurisdiction, judges have no authority to make law or give a 
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broader interpretation of the meaning of dangerous cargo than the statutory definition. 
 
Firstly we will discuss the situation where the danger is to be found in the surrounding 
circumstances. Considering the nature of dangerous cargo, certainly a number of 
substances such as explosives, corrosive substances and radioactive materials are 
inherently unsafe, and it would not be difficult to compile a substantial list including 
petrol, caustic, soda, arsenic and other obviously dangerous cargoes on this basis. On 
the other hand, there is no doubt that many substances are obviously safe without 
needing special stowage, packaging and precautions during the voyage. For example, a 
huge volume of textiles are transported by surface from China to all over the world and 
millions of hi-tech electronic products are transported from west to east. It is not very 
common to find dangerous cargo cases in these areas.  
 
However, between these two categories, a number of substances, although without 
inherent dangerous nature, they are relatively dangerous in certain circumstances, such 
as the cargoes need special marking and stowage requirements or particular precaution 
by the carrier. 
  
In Micada Compania Naviera S.A. v. Texim (The Agios Nicolas),142 a clause of the 
charter of the Agios Nicolas provided that “no live stock nor injurious, inflammable or 
dangerous goods (such as acids, explosives, calcium carbide, ferro silicon, naphtha, 
motor spirit, tar, or any of their products) to be shipped”.143 Although the vessel was 
chartered for the carriage of iron ore, iron ore concentrate was loaded, the moisture 
content of which was such that it required the fitting of shifting boards. These were not 
fitted.144 
 
Donaldson, J., finding that the charterers were liable, held that the iron concentrate was 
dangerous. Donaldson J. stated that the cargo loaded in the vessel was, by reason of this 
moisture content, a dangerous cargo and that the carrier was not aware, and could not 
                                                       
142
 [1968] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 57 
143
 Ibid. 
144
 Girvin, Stephen D., Shipper’s liability for the carriage of dangerous cargo by sea, [1996] L.M.C.L.Q. 494 
  39
reasonably be aware, of the dangerous nature of the cargo at the time of loading.145 The 
danger consisted in the fact that the cargo was not what it seemed to be, it was “a wet 
wolf in a dry sheep’s clothing”. And there was nothing to put the carrier on notice that 
the cargo was something radically different from that which it appeared to be. Again, 
Donaldson J. stated that in those circumstances it seems that the cargo was dangerous 
beyond all arguments.146 
 
In the “Athanasia Comninos”,147 two vessels were damaged by an explosion caused by 
the ignition of methane emitted from cargoes of coal.148 The emission of methane is a 
well known hazard of the carriage of coal and explosions can generally be avoided if the 
carrier takes suitable precautions. The question was there to determine whether the 
cargo was in fact dangerous as coal is not classified by the regulations as a dangerous 
cargo in itself. Mustill J. reviewed that, in approaching such cases it was important to 
remember, when trying to find a test which identify those cargoes, without specific 
warning as to their characteristics, whose shipment would be a breach of contract, that 
“we are here concerned, not with the labelling in the abstract of the goods as 
“dangerous” or “safe”, but with the distribution of risk for the consequences of a 
dangerous situation arising during the voyage”.149 
 
In the circumstances he held the cargo was dangerous. “While it is impossible to 
categorise coal as either inherently safe or dangerous, the carrier was liable for the 
damage because in contracting to carry goods which possessed the attributes of the 
goods as described including the capacity to create danger”.150 
 
In General Feeds Inc. v. Burnham Shipping Corporation (The Amphion), 151  The 
Amphion was chartered to General Feeds on the Gencon form for the carriage of bagged 
fishmeal to China. This cargo ignited during unloading. Bagged fishmeal is known to be 
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hazardous because of the potential for heat build-up and is listed as such under Class 9 
of the IMDG Code. The hazard could be reduced, though not eliminated, by 
anti-oxidant treatment and the cargo was expressly described in the charterparty as 
“anti-oxidant treated bagged fishmeal”.  
 
Evans, J., confirmed the finding of the arbitrators that, while the shipowners might have 
accepted the risk of overheating occurring in “properly treated cargo”, properly handled, 
they had not accepted the risk from fishmeal “not properly treated.”152 The charterers 
were therefore held to be in breach of contract. 
 
In Ministry of Food v Lamport & Holt, 153  the plaintiffs were the owners of a 
consignment of maize shipped in the lower hold of the defendants' vessel; they were 
also the owners of a cargo of tallow shipped in the tween deck, over the maize in the 
same vessel; on arrival it was found that some of the maize had been contaminated by a 
leakage of tallow.  
 
Sellers, J. held that the defendants had not, knowing the nature of the tallow, taken 
adequate steps to protect the maize, that the tallow, which was in casks, was not 
improperly or insufficiently packed and that the exemption clause in the bill of lading of 
the maize, exempting the defendants for loss incurred owing to leakage or breakage, did 
not protect the defendants from liability for damage caused by the leakage of tallow. He 
also dismissed the defendant's counterclaim against the plaintiffs as owners of the tallow, 
holding that the defendants had full knowledge of everything material regarding the 
tallow, and therefore needed no warning of its possibly dangerous nature.  
 
From what has been discussed above, we can see that although some substances (e.g. 
tallow) do not have an inherently dangerous nature, they may create problems if 
permitted to leak from their containers and damage other cargo.154 Therefore, goods 
may be qualified as dangerous if they have the capacity to create danger by interaction 
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with their environment during their carriage. In addition, the distinction between the 
cargo and the situation also emphasises the differing responsibilities among the owner 
of cargoes, shippers, consignees, carriers and operators of facilities used in the carriage 
of cargo. If the danger of a substance lies in its inherent nature or packing, the 
responsibility is linked to its manufacturer, shipper and user. If the danger lies in its 
escape, must be at least linked to the carrier or the operator of facilities, because it is the 
carriage that lies at the root of the dangers.155 This is even more so when a substance 
becomes “hazardous” only if certain conditions exist, e.g. a particular temperature or 
method of stowage. 
 
There should be a distinction between the shipments of goods which are physically 
dangerous and that which are only “legally” dangerous, i.e. give rise to delay, detention 
or seizure. At the first sight, it seems to be an artificial limitation of the types of 
situations, in which the class of cargo requires disclosure of its “dangerous” qualities. 
However, if “legally dangerous” is accounted, the concept of dangerous cargo is 
potentially wider. For further discussion relating to “legally” dangerous cargo, please 
see Chapter 4.156  
1.3 Concluding Remarks 
In the U.K., restrictions on the goods which a charterer or cargo-owner may ship are 
imposed by the common law, the terms of contract and statute. The common law 
principle that a term will be implied into the contract of carriage that the shipper will not 
ship dangerous cargo, unless the shipowner knew or should have known of the danger 
was established in Brass v Maitland. 157  However, common law or contractual 
provisions must obviously give way to overlapping statutory provisions and in any 
event it may well be preferable in practice to base a claim on a statutory ground, 
whether it is brought by a carrier suing under the Hague-Visby Rules158 or a third party 
suing for breach of statutory duty. However, where the statutory provision is 
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inapplicable, the common law will continue to make a shipper liable, such as with 
“legally” dangerous cargo which is not dangerous under a statute (e.g. Art. IV r6 of the 
Hague-Visby Rules), but the shipper will still be liable at common law. 
 
In the P.R.C., dangerous cargoes are regarded as a category, the extent of which is 
developed by statutory regulation based on a substantial list, such as national standards 
under GB 6944/GB12268. Considering the “statutory definition” which is relating to 
“physically” dangerous cargoes, there is no substantial difference between China and 
UK. However, regards to the “legally” dangerous cargo, there is a big difference. In 
England, it is covered by the common law. In China, there is no relevant definition of 
“legally” dangerous cargo. As a civil law country, China relies heavily on codified law 
and does not recognise stare decisis. 
 
What is covered in my thesis is a wide definition of dangerous cargo with a focus on the 
area of carriage by sea. For further research study, I define dangerous cargo as:159  
Merchandise classified as dangerous for which stringent regulations exist regarding its 
acceptance procedure, packaging, stowage, documentation, and conveyance for both local 
and international transits by sea, including “physically dangerous” and “legally dangerous”. 
There are some nine classifications of dangerous goods for international transit in IMDG 
Code. The regulations documentation, acceptance procedures, packaging, and stowage 
arrangement are laid down by IMO instruments.  
 
After discussing the meaning of dangerous cargo, we need to come back to the 
international conventions. In the words of Tetley, “if the elusive dream of safer ships 
and cleaner seas is to come true on all the oceans of the planet in the twenty-first 
century, in the field of marine pollution control, as in other areas of contemporary 
maritime law, international thinking and solutions remain of paramount importance”.160 
This must also include carriage of dangerous cargoes.  
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Chapter 2 A Brief Introduction—Tort, 
Contract and Statute Law as Three 
Sources of Liability 
2.1 Introduction 
The responsibilities and liabilities of the various parties with regard to “dangerous” 
cargoes are usually intertwined and complex. Although vessel owners, time charterers 
and charterers are usually the primary parties in disputes concerning “dangerous” 
cargoes, many others may also involved, such as suppliers, shippers, manufacturers of a 
product shipped, barge owners, surveyors, stevedores and of course their insurers.  
 
Most dangerous cargo disputes involve a contractual background. They may, for 
example, consist of a claim by a vessel owner against a shipper for damage to his vessel 
by dangerous cargo, or a claim for cargo damage which is lodged by the charterer 
and/or cargo interests against the vessel. For example, if cargo overheats, the other 
cargo interests will no doubt claim for delay (such as demurrage or hire payments) and 
the extra expenses in cooling the cargo, seeking a port of refuge, discharging the hot 
cargo and contributing to general average.  
 
However there are also vital questions of extra-contractual responsibility that arise here: 
What is the direct obligation in tort of the shipper to third parties, such as seamen, 
stevedores and owners of other cargo? In addition, manufacturers or sellers may be 
liable, either on a strict product liability theory or for negligence in not supplying 
correct handling procedures in respect of chemicals or other potential harmful cargoes. 
This is particularly relevant where there is a danger of interaction between such cargoes 
and other materials also being carried. 
 
Clearly, a bare statement as to a shipper’s rights and liabilities in respect of the shipment 
of dangerous goods would be patently simplistic and inaccurate, especially since 
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different legal regimes, with different provisions, apply to such shipments. Particular 
issues may, of course, be determined by specific statutory or contractual provision.1 
Before discussing statutory provisions and relevant tort law principles, it is appropriate 
to cover the general contractual and tortious liability. 
2.2 The Relation between Contractual and Tortious 
Liability 
Liability in contract is usually strict2  and covers nonfeasance and misfeasance.3 
Generally, both shipper and carrier’s liabilities are specified in the contract of 
affreightment and the HR, HVR or Hamburg Rules are incorporated into that contract. 
Under these rules, the shipper’s liability is strict for shipment of dangerous cargo 
without notifying the carrier in advance. 
 
Considering the carrier’s liability to the shipper, under Art III of HR and HVR, the 
carrier has a stringent obligation to provide a seaworthy ship and properly carry, keep 
and care its cargo. If the carrier fails to use ordinary skill and care, and to provide the 
special facilities ordinarily required for the cargo, he will be liable for the resulting 
damage. The courts, therefore, in the final analysis must decide whether the cargo loss 
or damage results from: (a) a lack of due diligence to make the vessel seaworthy; (b) 
improper care of the cargo or (c) one of the exculpatory exceptions protecting the carrier, 
e.g. inherent defect of the cargo under Art. IV r.2 (m) of HVR.  
 
If there is no contract between the victim and the defendant, there can of course still be 
a liability in the tort of negligence. But such a liability, even if established,4 is often less 
claimant-friendly than an action in contract. Most liability in tort depends on proof of a 
failure to take reasonable care; tort generally only covers misfeasance; and, at least as 
far as negligence is concerned, recovery for pure economic loss is awkward.5 A good 
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example is provided by The Gudermes,6 where, obiter, Hirst J was of the view that 
transhipment costs incurred as a result of the shipowner’s failure to heat a cargo of oil 
so that it was in a condition in which it could be discharged into the receiver’s pipeline 
were not recoverable in tort, but could be recovered in contract. 
2.3 Tortious Liability in English Law and Chinese Law 
In England, under tort law, the basis of liability for damages caused by the carriage of 
dangerous cargo, most commonly lies in the tort of negligence. Examples include 
cargoes that are incorrectly manufactured, labelled, packaged, handled, inspected or 
stowed. If in the case of manufacturers or importers, issues may also arise of strict 
products liability. Also the strict liability under the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher7 can not 
be ruled out. 
 
Chinese tort law was codified in the Civil Law,8 including fault-based liability and 
strict liability. Generally, the dangerous cargo liability involves someone’s fault, but 
considering dangerous cargo incidents, strict liability can be imposed on those who 
engage in extra hazardous activities,9 and those who violate environmental protection 
legislation,10 even though who do so without fault. In addition, strict product liability is 
set out in the Product Quality Law11 under which a producer shall be liable for personal 
injury or property damage caused by a defect in its product. Furthermore, Chapter VIII 
of the Maritime Code covers collision of ships which relates to fault-based liability in 
tort.12 Chapter VIII, however, neither covers the liability of cargo-owners nor anyone 
other than those in charge of the ship itself. 
                                                       
6
 [1991] 1 Lloyd’s Rep., p 456. 
7
 (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330. 
8
 General Principles of The Civil Law of People’s Republic of China, adopted by the sixth National People’s 
Congress on 12 April 1986 and came into force on 1January 1987. 
9
 Article 123 of the Civil Law 
10
 Article 124 of the Civil Law 
11
 The PRC Product Liability Law was adopted at the 30th Session of the Standing Committee of the seventh 
National People's Congress on February 22 1993 and effective as of September 1, 1993, and revised at the 16th 
Session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress on July 8, 2000. 
12
 It may be applicable to dangerous cargo incidents if the damage to a ship is caused by a combination of collision 
and un-notified dangerous cargo. 
  46
2.4 Contractual Liability in English law and Chinese 
Law 
In England, at common law, the shipper has an impliedly contractual obligation not to 
ship dangerous goods without first notifying the carrier of their particular characteristics 
so as to give the latter a chance to refuse the cargo or to undertake sufficient precautions 
to carry them. A particular cargo may be dangerous, despite the fact that cargoes of its 
type are not usually so regarded. If its own particular characteristics, including where 
relevant its own packaging, endanger the ship or other cargoes on board, the cargo can 
be regarded as dangerous under the English common law. 
 
China is officially not a member of the Hague, Hague-Visby or Hamburg Rules 
communities; nevertheless much of the Chinese law consists mainly of international 
conventions and international shipping practices. The shipper’s liability in respect of 
carriage of dangerous cargo is covered by Chinese Maritime Code, Article 68, which is 
effectively Article 13 of Hamburg Rules. Accordingly, a shipper is under a duty to 
ensure dangerous cargoes are properly packed, distinctly marked and labelled. He must 
also notify the carrier in writing of the cargo’s proper description, nature and any 
precautions that must be taken. The shipper is strictly liable to the carrier for any loss, 
damage or expense resulting from such shipment. 
2.5 Liability under Statute Law 
Under English statute law, The Merchant Shipping Act 1995 gives the force of law in 
the UK to the CLC 199213 and the Fund Convention 1992.14 Oil pollution from ships 
other than those examined by CLC 1992 is also covered.15 The same statute, as 
amended in 1997, also provides for statutory effect to be given to the HNS Convention 
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1996,16 if and when it should be ratified by the UK.  
 
In addition, regarding the EU Environmental Liability Directive 2004/35, England has 
compiled by issuing the Environmental Damage (Prevention and Remediation) 
Regulations 2009 (EDPR England)17 which came into force on 1 March 2009. In Wales 
the EDPR Regulations 2009 (Wales)18 came into force on 6th May 2009. There are 
separate regulations for Scotland19 and Northern Ireland,20 which entered into force in 
June 2009 and July 2009.21 
 
Chinese legislation on dangerous cargo includes international conventions, national 
laws, regulations adopted by MOC22 and some specific rules. According to Chinese law, 
any international conventions it has joined operate as part of Chinese law.23 China 
adopted CLC 1992 on 5th January 1999 and it came into force in China on 5th January 
2000.24 China does not adopt Fund 1971 (nor 1992 Protocols), but both Hongkong and 
Macau are parties to CLC 1992 and Fund 1992. In addition, some national laws are 
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general legislation on safety of transport or the prevention of pollution, e.g. MTSL25 
and MEPL,26 and others focus on the carriage of dangerous cargoes, e.g. RADCP27 and 
ARSSDCV. 28  Most of these national laws are about criminal liability and 
administrative penalties. Strictly speaking they only indirectly impacts on dangerous 
cargo liability, thus only a fraction of this legislation which relating to civil liability will 
be discussed in this thesis e.g. MEPL 1982 (revised 1999). But the shipper or carrier’s 
civil liability is mainly stipulated in Maritime Code 1992 which will be discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4.29 
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Chapter 3 Liability in Tort in England and 
P.R.C. 
Actions in tort in respect of the carriage of goods by sea have always been possible with 
regard to the law as we know it now. But, most of the early cases concern claims by 
cargo owners rather than against shippers of dangerous cargoes.1 The first editions of 
both Carver and Scrutton, dated 1885 and 1886 respectively make it clear that carriers 
may be liable in tort as well as in contract.2  
 
In addition, the Hague-Visby Rules, 3  the Hamburg Rules 4  and the Multimodal 
Conventions,5 apply when there is a contract of carriage and responsibility is normally 
decided on the basis of breach of that contract. However, they do not exclude the action 
in tort. Suit has been permitted in both contract and tort and in many jurisdictions these 
two claims may be asserted in the same action.6  
 
Compared with English tort law, the discussion of Chinese tort law is very brief in this 
chapter, because Chinese maritime courts do not regularly admit claims on the basis of 
tort or contract, but prefer—as befits a civil law jurisdiction—to rely on particular 
legislative provisions. 
3.1 Tort Liability in English Law 
Tort actions are of course particularly relevant where the claim is by the carrier but the 
defendant is not a party to the contract of carriage, or alternatively where the claimant is 
someone other than the carrier. As to the former, for example, a claim may be made by 
the carrier (whose vessel has been damaged) against a third party other than the shipper, 
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 Classic English common law theory is that only the owner of the goods may sue in tort or in delict. The Wear 
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such as a manufacturer, packer or handler of goods. Conversely the shipper may be sued 
by a third party other than the carrier with whom he is in contractual privity, such as a 
person on board the carrying vessel or a stevedore, longshoreman or owner of other 
property damaged. Normally liability here can only be in delict or tort,7 although some 
third party might be able to sue as a third party beneficiary of the contract of carriage.8  
 
If cargoes are incorrectly manufactured, labelled, packaged, handled, inspected or 
stowed, it may give rise to negligence liability; if in the case of manufacturers or sellers, 
issues may arise about strict products liability. Also the strict liability under the rule of 
Rylands v. Fletcher9 can not be ruled out (for the modern view, refer to Cambridge 
Water).10 All these may apply to the case of dangerous cargo. 
3.1.1 How Far Can Tort Liability Be Negatived by 
Contract? 
In England, a tort duty can always be negatived by contract. In certain circumstances, 
cargo claimants might ignore the provisions of a contract and instead sue a carrier’s 
employee or sub-contractor directly in tort where loss or damage to cargo resulted from 
their negligence. Under the doctrine of privity of contract, the latter are not parties to 
that contract, so they cannot rely on the protection afforded by the terms of the contract 
such as exceptions and limitation of liability provisions.11 Such result is undesirable 
and there is the danger that the carrier’s employee or subcontractor would lose the 
protection afforded by the terms of that contract and the relevant provisions of the HR 
and HVR.12  
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When faced with the dilemma, the courts have used considerable ingenuity in devising a 
variety of strategies to extend the protection afforded by the terms of the contract of 
carriage to litigants who were clearly not parties to it. These include bailment on terms, 
the Himalaya clause,13 and most important—the 1999 Act where the defendant can be 
regarded as a third party beneficiary of the contract under the Act. 
3.1.2 Negligence 
Most commonly, the basis of liability in tort for damages from the carriage of dangerous 
cargo lies in the tort of negligence. The elements of a maritime negligence cause of 
action are essentially the same as land-based negligence under the common law. In 
summary they are these: 
(1) A duty, recognised by law, requiring conformity to a certain standard of conduct for 
the protection of others against unreasonable risks. This is commonly known as the 
“duty issue”.14  
(2) Failure to conform to the required standard of care or, briefly, breach of that duty. 
This element usually passes under the name of “negligence”.15 This judgment is 
made by reference to the conduct of the reasonable man. This test is naturally an 
objective one and consequently is not affected by the individual characteristics of 
the personalities.16  
(3) A reasonably close causal connection between the offending conduct and the 
resulting injury; this element is called “proximate cause” or “remoteness of 
damage”.17 It is based on the principle that no liability attaches in respect of 
consequences of the action that could not have been foreseen by a reasonable man.18  
(4) Actual loss, injury, or damage suffered by the plaintiff. The burden of proof of these 
elements is on the plaintiff.19 It is essential for the plaintiff to show that the damage 
was caused by the action of defendant.  
(5) The absence of any conduct by the injured party prejudicial to his recovering in full 
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15
 Ibid. 
16
 M. Forster, The Law relating to Transport of Dangerous Wastes—United Kingdom, European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Loughlinstown House, Shankill, Co. Dublin, Ireland. 
17
 Schoenbaum, Thomas J., Admiralty and Maritime Law, (2001: 3rd ed.), St. Paul, Minn., p. 109. 
18
 Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Engineering Co. Ltd. (The Wagon Mound) 1961 A.C. 837. 
19
 Schoenbaum, op. cit., p109. 
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for the loss he has suffered. This involves a consideration of two specific defences: 
contributory negligence and voluntary assumption of risk.20  
 
Where a claim for damages is made based on the negligence of the carrier or his 
servants, it might be advantageous to sue an agent or servant of the carrier who was 
personally responsible for the loss and the tortious action might provide an effective 
remedy, considering a right of recovery in tort free from the exceptions and limitations 
of liability provisions contained in the bill of lading or other contracts.21 Again, many 
bill of lading contracts include an express provision entitling the contractual carrier to 
sub-contract the whole or part of the carriage. Where the goods are damaged or lost 
while in the possession of the sub-contractor, the bill of lading holder may prefer to sue 
such sub-contractor in tort rather than to rely on his remedies against the contractual 
carrier if the latter results in a worse financial situation. Nonetheless, the carriage 
contract can prevent this today if the defendant can be regarded as a third party 
beneficiary of the contract under the 1999 Act. 
 
Sometimes, there is no negligence on the ship’s part and therefore no basis for holding 
the shipowner liable. Here injured third parties may have to pursue their remedies 
elsewhere. For example, an explosion on board a ship damages buildings and harbour 
installations, and if the explosion was caused by the spontaneous heating of dangerous 
cargo not duly disclosed by the shipper, there arises the question whether injured parties 
can raise claims directly against the shipper? According to the general rules of tort, the 
third party must prove the fault of the shipper but he has also to establish the chain of 
causation.  
 
In the situation that a casualty22 has occurred without the carrying ship’s fault, the 
results of which would be aggravated by the presence of undeclared dangerous cargo. 
When damages or costs are caused partly or totally by the carriage of dangerous cargo, 
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 Fleming, op. cit. p116. 
21
 Wilson, Carriage of Goods by Sea, (2004: 5th ed.), p.143 
22
 When two ships are involved in a collision and the HNS Convention applies, the vessel owners are held jointly and 
severally liable for the damages resulting from the release of the hazardous substance and such damage is not 
reasonably separable . Nothing in this article shall prejudice any right of recourse of an owner against any other 
owner; see HNS Convention, Article 8, para1& para3. 
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is it possible for the victims to raise claims in tort against the owner of dangerous cargo? 
To answer this question, we need to discuss the liability in “negligence”, particularly, 
two elements involved in this matter: the chain of causation and the concept of 
foreseeable damage.  
 
As a feature of both tortious and contractual liability, causation and remoteness can be 
vital in claims of damages from the shipment of dangerous cargoes. We will discuss 
them in a separate chapter,23 as an important approach of establishing liability.  
 
As we know, “the three questions, duty, causation and remoteness, run continually into 
one another” and “are all devices by which the courts limit the range of liability for 
negligence”.24 Generally, “duty” is unlikely to be a problem: anyone owes a duty to 
prevent physical damage to property that may be foreseeably damaged by his 
carelessness. Remoteness and causation may be an issue.25 On causation, the only 
problem is that the defendant’s negligence combines with a non-cautious event to cause 
the damage. But provided the negligence is a substantial cause, that is never presented a 
difficulty: the defendant is liable in full. Before going into any further discussion, we 
shall take a look at the duty issue involved in the carriage of dangerous cargoes. 
3.1.2.1 Duty Issue 
This section considers the defendant’s duty to exercise care in respect of the carriage of 
dangerous cargo. There are three related issues will be analysed separately with regard 
to the shipper’s or the carrier’s duty of care. First, the existence of a duty: whether the 
defendant owes any duty of care?26 Secondly, the extent of the duty: to whom and for 
what loss does that duty extend?27  Thirdly, the standard of duty: what specific 
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 See 0 Causation and remoteness of damages 
24
 Lamb v. Camden LBC, [1981] QB 625, 636, it was observed by Lord Denning. 
25
 I will deal with them separately in Chapter 8  
26
 Negligence does not entail liability unless the law exacts a “duty” in the circumstances to observe care. “A man is 
entitled to be as negligent as he pleases towards the whole world if he owes no duty to them” (Le Lievre v. Gould 
[1893] 1 QB 491 at 497 per Lord Esher MR) 
27
 A duty of care exists when injury is foreseeable or when contractual or other relations of the parties imposed it. 
See Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law, 3rd ed. (2001), St. Paul, Minn., p. 111. 
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obligations are imposed?28 
 
Regards to carriage of dangerous cargo, both under common law and statutory 
provision,29 the shipper (or manufacturer, packer, handler) must correctly mark and 
pack hazardous materials and provide warnings about the hazardous characteristics. 
Breach of that duty, e.g. failed to provide notification (or warning) to the carrier and 
other persons involved in the transportation, or violated any laws or regulations 
applicable to the transportation, would result in the shipper or third party being held 
liable for damages caused to a carrier (he is not in contractual privity with), given that 
failure to observe the relevant code, or violation of the relevant rules and regulations, 
would be powerful evidence of fault at common law. 
 
On the other hand, carriers also have a duty to exercise ordinary care to ensure the 
safety of hazardous materials during transportation. Where some third parties suffer loss 
or damage caused by the carriage of dangerous cargo, the carrier could be liable in tort 
of negligence for lack of due care of the goods by himself, his agents or his servants.30 
3.1.2.2 Duties Owed by Shipper and Others 
The notion of duty can be used in a specific sense that there is a duty of care in a 
particular care the harm in question must have been foreseeable to the individual 
claimant.31 In the words of Lord Oliver: “it is not a duty to take care in the abstract but 
a duty to avoid causing to the particular plaintiff damage of the particular kind which he 
has in fact sustained.”32 Considering dangerous cargo claims, the duty of care of a 
shipper (or packer, seller, manufacturer) can only be owed to foreseeable claimants.33 
In addition, the damage must be the foreseeable consequence of the negligent act and 
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 Negligence may be established by showing that the defendant breached a standard of care established by statute or 
regulation. 
29
 Hague/ Hague-Visby Rules, Article IV rule 6. 
30
 Carver’s Carriage by Sea, 13th ed., Vol. 1 p. 421. 
31
 Jones, Michael A., Textbook on Torts, 8th ed., 2002, Oxford University Press, p.31. Duty determines whether the 
type of loss suffered by the claimant in the particular way in which it occurred can ever be actionable. 
32
 Per Lord Oliver in Caparo Industries plc v. Dickman [1990] 1 ALL ER 568, 599. 
33
 See, for example, Hay or Bourhill v Yong [1943] AC 92. The duty is owed not to the world at large (as a duty in 
criminal law would be), but only to an individual within the scope of the risk created, that is, to a foreseeable victim. 
See Lunney and Oliphant, Tort Law- Text and Materials, (2007: 3rd ed.), Oxford University Press, p. 129. 
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the burden of proof falls on the claimant.34 This section is mainly about shipper’s duty 
of care under English law, but some American cases will be referred to while under the 
same rule35 of English law.  
 
Considering the carriage of dangerous cargo, the initial heavy burden falls on shippers 
to properly prepare hazardous materials for transport and to warn of any unforeseeable 
consequences to all those who assist in the transportation. It is the shipper that knows 
the most about the material being shipped and, therefore should have the initial and 
higher burden to provide the information relevant to any hazardous materials.36 The 
shipper must use reasonable care to warn of the dangerous characteristics of the cargo to 
all those who assist in their transportation.  
 
Where the damage caused by dangerous cargo is capable of giving rise to a shipper’s (or 
manufacturer, distributor, seller etc) liability in negligence, the defendant may be held 
not liable by convincing he does not owe a duty of care to the particular claimant, if the 
claimant is unforeseeable. This leads to a question: to whom the duty of care is owed? 
Who can be regarded as a foreseeable claimant? 
 
Practically, there is no doubt that the people who work with dangerous cargo during the 
transportation can be foreseeable claimants, such as a carrier and his crew, stevedores 
and longshoremen. Or there is a sufficiently proximate relationship between the 
defendant and the claimant, such as other cargo owners on the same ship claimed for 
their cargo damages caused by undisclosed dangerous cargo.  
 
Nonetheless, some claimants may be regarded as unforeseeable by the negligent 
defendant. Suppose, after an explosion on board caused by defective package of 
dangerous cargo, the contaminated vessel berthed in a port far away from business areas. 
However, even after seeing the obvious notice board to stop people entering into that 
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 This requires the existence of a link of causation between the breach of duty and the damage. 
35
 So far as “shipper’s duty of care” is concerned, the American tort rule is pretty same as English rule. So I refer to 
some American cases here. 
36
 See Hazardous Materials Regulations, 49 C.F.R. §§171-180 (1994), at §176.24 
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area, a stranger was still curious to know what happened and walked very close to the 
vessel. Consequently, he was injured by the noxious materials around the vessel. In the 
author’s opinion, the defendant shipper could not reasonably foresee the stranger’s 
injury. Accordingly, he should not be responsible for that.  
 
Or suppose, the explosion occurred off shore and the claimant was on another ship 10 
km away from the explosion. He claimed to be injured by the noises from explosion. 
Obviously, the claimant was a long way away and was not within the area of potential 
danger arising as the result of the explosion. Therefore the claimant was unforeseeable 
and the defendant owned no duty to him.37 
 
In addition, an essential requirement of negligence is the “foreseeability of the damage”. 
Damage of an unforeseeable kind will be regarded as “too remote” and therefore not 
actionable.38 Suppose, during the discharge, acid leaked out from a container with 
hazardous chemicals inside. The carrying vessel and some nearby containers were 
contaminated. During the investigation, it was found that the leaking acid from 
container was due to the negligent package by the shipper. The port authority stopped 
the process of discharge. The vessel and contaminated containers had to be cleaned up 
first. The carrier must submit all relevant documents to the customs again and wait for a 
permission of re-entry to port. After all the documentary work, the delivery of cargo was 
seriously delayed. Some cargo owners on the same ship, claimed for loss and damage of 
their cargoes; others claimed for economic loss through delay of their cargoes due to the 
contamination caused by dangerous cargoes.  
 
A question arises here: will the negligent shipper be responsible for the cargo damage 
and consequential loss resulting from delay? There is no doubt that the cargo damage 
and other physical loss to be compensated, including physical damage caused by delay, 
e.g. when food produce deteriorates. The difficult question is the indirect or 
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 Regarding the unforeseeable claimant who was a long way away from the defendant’s motor cycle incident, 
therefore the defendant owned no duty and was not guilty of negligence in relation to the claimant’s injury, see Hay 
or Bourhill Appellant; v Young Respondent, [1943] A.C. 92 
38
 Jones, Textbook on Torts, (2002: 8th ed.), Oxford University Press, p.37. 
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consequential loss or damage (e.g. loss of market) caused through “delay”. 
 
At common law, damage has not ordinarily been awarded for economic loss without 
physical damage except in rare cases of reliance,39 and in cases of fishermen claiming 
for pollution of public fishing waters.40 In English law no duty of care is owed to those 
who are exposed to pure economic loss (as distinct from consequential economic loss 
resulting from damage or personal property).  
 
In the author’s opinion, the shipper’s responsibility should be limited to the consequent 
loss or damage which must be “reasonably” foreseeable, e.g. liability in respect of cargo 
delayed because of the presence of dangerous cargo on board. If timely delivery is 
relevant to the value of cargo on board, during the period of delay, the average price of 
the claimant’s products dropped 50% on the local market of destination, this damage is 
foreseeable. Nonetheless, no liability should be held for the pure economic loss caused 
through delay.   
 
In addition, breach of shipper’s duty is concerned with the standard of care that ought to 
have been adopted in the circumstances.41 In the American case of Borgships,42 the 
court concluded that the shipper’s compliance with the Hazardous Materials 
Regulations (HMR)43 still did not meet the shipper’s duty to warn as a matter of law. In 
Borgships, Inc. v. Olin Chems, Group,44 the defendant shipper delivered to the plaintiff 
carrier a quantity of SDIC45 for shipment to Spain. The description of the SDIC 
contained in the bill of lading stated it was "non hazardous." During the voyage, some 
of the containers fell overboard in rough seas and the remaining containers were welded 
to the deck. They caught fire while being detached from the deck in port and the carrier 
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 See for example, Hedley Byrne & Co. v. Heller & Partners Ltd., [1964] A.C. 465, [1963] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 485 
(H.L.). 
40
 See, for example, Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501 F. 2d 558, 579, 1975 AMC 413, 435 (9 Cir. 1974). This case is 
discussed in the following subsection. 
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 Jones, Textbook on Tort, (2002: 8th ed.), Oxford University Press, p. 31. 
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 Borgships, Inc. v. Olin Chems, Group, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3065, at 11 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1997) 
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 Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR), 49 C.F.R. §§171-180 (1994). The HMR specify requirements for the 
safe transport of hazardous materials in commerce by rail car, aircraft, vessel, and motor vehicle. 
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 Borgships, Inc. v. Olin Chems, Group, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3065, (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 19, 1997), at 9-10  
45
 Sodium dichloroisocyanuric acid salts dihydrate ("SDIC") 
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was heavily fined.46 
 
The plaintiff carrier brought its claims based on the defendant shipper’s failure to warn 
of the hazardous natures of SDIC.47 The court held48 that because the shipper's 
compliance with Department of Transportation regulations did not satisfy, as matter of 
law, its duty to warn, the carrier stated a claim under COGSA, 46 U.S.C.S. § 1304(6). 
The court found that shipper had a duty to warn the carrier of the foreseeable hazards 
inherent in the cargo of which the carrier could not reasonably have been expected to be 
aware.49 That means the shipper owned a duty to warn the carrier as a matter of law.  
 
When analysing the shipper’s obligation to third parties that cause the action of 
negligence, we can start first with an examination of the standard of care or what 
conduct amounts to negligence. On principle, the level of care required limited to failure 
to avoid foreseeable dangers, e.g. shipper’s failure to warn of harm that is reasonably 
foreseeable. But, it can be demanding in practice. For instance, to the shipper, only 
observing relevant regulations is not enough. Moreover, the shipper and others (e.g. the 
distributor or manufacturer) must use reasonable care to warn of the dangerous 
propensities of his goods to all those who assist in their transportation.50 Indeed, 
compliance with one specific regulation does not mean as a matter of law that shippers 
have met their entire pre-shipment duties. Especially if the cargo has dangerous 
characteristics with potential serious consequences that are not likely foreseeable by 
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 As a result of the fire and the emission of noxious fumes, the local fire brigade, the Port Authority for the Port of 
Barcelona, as well as the shipyard authorities and owners and operators of nearby restaurants fined plaintiff in the 
amount of approximately $ 180,000.00. The carrier alleged damages in the amount of $ 180,000.00 as a result of 
defendants' negligence 
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 Specifically based on tort of negligence that the shipper "was careless, negligent, and reckless by failing to warn" 
the carrier of the dangerous qualities of the SDIC. Pursuant to the Hazardous Material Transportation Authorization 
Act ("HMTAA"), the Department of Transportation ("DOT") has promulgated regulations listing those materials 
deemed hazardous for purposes of the HMTAA and thus subject to the HMTAA labelling requirements. 49 U.S.C. §§ 
1501 et seq.; 49 C.F.R. §§ 171.1 et seq.. Although the regulations list "dichloroisocyanuric acid salts" as hazardous, 
the regulations specifically exclude SDIC from the list of hazardous materials: "The dihydrated sodium salt of 
dichloroisocyanuric acid is not subject to the requirements of this subchapter." 49 C.F.R. § 172.102. The International 
Maritime Dangerous Goods [*3]  Code also excludes SDIC from its requirements for the regulation of hazardous 
materials. IMDG, p. 5147, Amdt. 25-89 
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 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3065, at 7-9 
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 The court so held despite the fact that Department of Transportation regulations and the IMDG Code specifically 
excluded the substance from the list of hazardous chemicals and despite the fact that the bill of lading did not define 
the scope of the shipper's duty to warn the carrier. The court concluded that the shipper's negligence needed to be 
ascertained before a finding of contractual liability could be made. The plaintiff has properly alleged a claim of 
negligence based on a failure to warn theory. Therefore, defendants' motion with respect to plaintiff's second cause of 
action is denied 
50
 Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, (1988: 3rd ed.), International Shipping Publications, p. 468. 
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carriers and any third parties who assist in its transportation, shippers were in breach of 
their duties to warn of the dangerous propensities and would be held liable either in 
contract or in tort of negligence. 
 
In an American case of Inomar Compania Naviera, S.A., v. Olin Corp.,51 defendant 
Olin shipped Chlorine, a highly flammable substance.52 Olin met those requirements 
e.g. Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR),53 and the shipowner duly noted the 
presence of the chlorine on its required hazardous manifest.54 When a fire erupted in 
the area where the chlorine was stored, causing substantial damage to the vessel and 
other cargo, the shipowner sued Olin for failure to properly warn it of all of the dangers 
of chlorine.55 
 
An investigation determined that a reaction between the chlorine and sawdust left in the 
area by longshoremen caused the fire.56 The District Court found that, despite its 
compliance with the HMR, Olin was 85% responsible for the damages due to its 
negligence in failing to give the stevedore adequate warning. The stevedore was 
assigned the other 15% of liability.57 Olin appealed. 
 
The Fifth Circuit reversed and remanded the case, providing the district court with the 
following guidance on the “sufficiency of warning” issue: “Olin, as the manufacturer of 
[the chlorine], had a duty to warn [the stevedore] and the [shipowner] of the foreseeable 
hazards inherent in the HTH shipment58 of which the stevedore and the ship’s master 
could not reasonably have been expected to be aware.”59 
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 Inomar Compania Naviera, S.A., v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 897, 900, 1982 AMC 1489 (5th Cir. 1982) 
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 Chlorine is subject to extensive regulation by the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR), 49 C.F.R. §§171-180 
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 Ibid. at 904. See also Harrison v. Flota Mercante Grancolombiana, S.A., 577 F.2d 968, 977, 1979 AMC 824 (5th 
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The Appellate court agreed that Olin had complied with the HMR60 and gave the 
stevedore and shipowner some warning, but it was not necessarily enough.61 The Court 
reminded the District Court that “the sufficiency of Olin’s warning can only be assessed 
in the light of the knowledge and expertise of the ship’s master, its first mate62 and the 
stevedore.” 
 
In certain circumstances, third parties’ duty (e.g. distributor, seller or manufacturer), 
may have a duty to warn of danger same as that of the shipper. For example, The seller 
or supplier has a duty to warn of dangers of the product and he must exercise reasonable 
care to inform those who may use or come into contact with the product.63 We will 
discuss it in a separate section:64 a manufacturer’s (or seller’s) duty to warn of danger 
may relate to strict product liability. 
 
However, they may negligently pack, label or produce dangerous cargo. It is not 
obvious that a person who negligently labels a noxious substance as “safe” should be in 
any different position from the person who negligently manufactured and put into 
circulation a noxious substance, when the consequences of the negligence may be 
identical.65 Therefore, in many situations, what has been discussed about the shipper’s 
duty is applicable to the manufacturer or seller. 
3.1.2.3 Carrier’s Duty of Care in Relation to Cargo 
A carrier has a duty to ensure the safety of carrying dangerous cargo during the voyage. 
A foreseeable claimant includes a third party who suffered personal injury from the 
release of dangerous cargo, such as a person passed by the carrying vessel or a 
stevedore, or longshoreman working on board. They might choose to sue the carrier 
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 Olin placed cautionary yellow labels on each drum and making the required statements on the bills of lading 
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 Inomar Compania Naviera, S.A., v. Olin Corp., 666 F.2d 897, 900, 904. Based on its conclusion that “the findings 
do not indicate what [the stevedore] knew or should have known about stowing this particular cargo”. It directed the 
District Court to inquire as to “what knowledge, aside from that disclosed by the labels and the bill of lading, the 
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 Strict product liability will be discussed in English law and Chinese law separately, see sections 0 and 3.2.5 
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 Tan Keng Feng (1996) 112 LQR 209 
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who has breached its duty of care in negligence. 
 
If shipper fails to provide any notice, a carrier’s breach of its duty to exercise ordinary 
care may constitute a superseding cause (e.g. unseaworthiness) or a contributing cause 
(e.g. negligent care of cargo) to any damages resulting from its acceptance of the 
hazardous material cargo.66 If the damage to the third party is caused partly by the 
negligence of the carrier in failing to take proper precautions and partly by the 
negligence of the shipper, both are liable in full, with contribution between them.  
 
Generally, English and American tort law regarding the carrier’s duty of care on cargo 
have similar rules. There is no “duty of care” in Chinese tort law. In this section, the 
discussion may mention US case, but only on the question whether it might inform 
English Law.  
 
Assuming a shipper provides appropriate notice and warnings, the carrier has a duty to 
exercise a much higher degree of care in loading, stowing and caring for dangerous 
cargo. Without notice, the level of duty for cargo is much lower. For example, 
considering a modern containership, without notice from the shipper, it is unrealistic to 
expect containership operators to know or to “ascertain” knowledge of the 
characteristics of the hazardous cargo they are asked to carry. Hence, a carrier is less 
likely to be held at fault if the undisclosed dangerous cargo is carried in an opaque 
container. However, there may be plenty of other situations where the paperwork tells 
the carrier that something might be wrong, for example by looking through relevant 
documents provided by the shipper including (1) a full and complete set of dangerous 
cargo manifests for dangerous goods to be loaded with the shipper’s declaration and 
container packing certificate (multimodal dangerous goods form) attached, and/or (2) a 
Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS),67 together with a certificate of Inspection of 
Packing for Dangerous Export Goods. 
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 Edgcomb, John D., The Trojan Horse Sets Sail: Carrier Defenses Against HAZMAT Cargoes, (2000-2001) 13 
U.S.F..Mar.L.J. 31, at 43. 
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 Most commonly, the MSDS is used in the shipment of dangerous cargo. Also the Intertanko has taken the initiative 
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Surely, the duty of care and potential liability increases once the carrier has some 
knowledge regarding the hazardous materials in its possession. In Colormaster Printing 
Ink Co,68  a freight consolidator failed to placard the shipping container holding 
poisonous gas or provide the required written notification to the carrier. However, 
employees of the freight consolidator and the carrier did discuss, via telephone, the fact 
that the tow gas cylinders were going to be placed in a shipping container and loaded 
aboard the vessel.69 The court concluded the carrier had a duty to take measures that 
would safeguard against [the shipper’s] negligence in light of the appreciable risk of 
harm arising from failure to adhere to the federal regulations… The fact that the carrier 
knew that the shipper would be delivering hazardous cargo for shipment gave rise to a 
duty to guard against foreseeable risk that shipper would deliver hazardous cargo 
unlabeled.70 The court, however, assigned only 5% of liability to the carrier and 85% to 
the freight consolidator.71 
 
In summary, carriers need only exercise ordinary care for cargo as required by 
regulations (e.g. HR/HVR) until the carrier either receives actual notice of hazardous 
material or until the carrier should have known about hazardous materials, such as 
through leaking barrels. At that point, the carrier owes a higher duty of care given the 
foreseeable damages that could result from a breach of that duty. For example, if a 
shipper complies fully with the notice provision under HR/HVR, then the carrier will 
have a very high duty of care towards that cargo and will be held liable for any resulting 
damages, unless that damage was deemed unforeseeable even with proper notice and 
warnings. Accordingly, the carrier will be liable for third parties’ property damage, 
including another ship damaged in an explosion, or damaged cargoes in another ship (in 
dangerous cargo incident).  
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 Colormaster Printing Ink Co. v. S.S. Asiafreighter, 1991 U.S. Dist. Lexis 4644, at 17 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 9, 1991). 
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 Ibid., at 21-22 
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In addition, the same burden shifting applies to the relationship between a shipper and 
its freight forwarder. The freight forwarder does not have an affirmative duty to 
discover dangerous cargo, if he is unaware the need for special handling of the cargo 
and the shipper is aware of: (1) the unusually sensitive nature of the cargo and (2) the 
foreseeable damages to it. Instead in Tenneco Resins, Inc. v. Atl. Cargo Servs,72 the duty 
was held on the shipper itself to ensure that appropriate labelling and handling 
instructions are given to the carrier.73 Tenneco, of course, was 20 years ago: today one 
perhaps wonders whether a forwarder could escape liability for simply forwarding a 
cargo whose characteristics it knew nothing about without making any checks at all. In 
the author’s view, regards to shipper’s liability, if a pack, seller or manufacturer can 
have the same duty of care as the shipper, why not the forwarder? Consequently, if third 
parties (stevedores, longshoremen) claim for damage caused by undisclosed dangerous 
cargoes, they may sue the forwarder in negligence instead of the shipper.  
3.1.2.4 Extent of Duty—Recovery of Economic Loss 
In the law of negligence the courts have generally held the wrongdoer liable for all 
foreseeable physical injury or damage caused by his fault, but it has long been thought 
unacceptable, for policy reason, to treat foreseeability as a sufficient ground for 
extending his liability to all economic consequences which might flow from his action. 
Some form of limitation has been thought necessary in order to avoid “opening the 
floodgates” to a deluge of potential claims.74 For reasons of legal certainty the courts 
have tended to favour an arbitrary but tolerably clear distinction between economic loss 
flowing from physical damage to the claimant’s property, which in general has been 
held recoverable, and on the other hand pure economic loss, which in general has been 
treated as too remote.  
 
In respect of claims from dangerous cargo, the type of economic loss involved 
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reductions in profits or earnings sustained by claimant. These have taken many forms, 
including pollution-related losses and delay the carrying vessel, and various parties who 
may suffer delay or other forms of loss when a port area is affected by dangerous cargo 
casualty; or reduced catches of wild fish by fishery as well as when a whole business is 
affected, e.g. by oil/chemical pollutions caused to a seaside resort, where tourists stay 
away for a whole season, including those by the owners of hotels, restaurants, shops, 
and other tourist establishments for loss of bookings and trade.  
 
In England, in The Orjula,75 the plaintiff claimed as bareboat charterers of the vessel 
Orjula, operating a liner service, carrying drums of chemicals in containers. The 
shippers packed the drums of acid on defective staging. Consequently, the staging 
collapsed, the drums were punctured and leaked, damaging the containers in which they 
had been placed. When The Orjula called at Rotterdam, two containers were found to be 
leaking acid. The first defendant appears as named shipper in the bill of lading. The 
second defendant is the supplier the drums of chemicals to the first defendant.  
 
It was held by Mance J. that a duty of care was owed by the defendants in respect to the 
damage to the containers, but not to the damage to the drums themselves as the staging 
and the drums counted as a single item for product liability purposes. The alleged 
contamination from the chemicals contained in the drums constituted physical damage 
to the vessel so the plaintiff would be entitled to claim in tort against the second 
defendant for the alleged negligence in the stowage of the containers.76 As a result, the 
cost of the clean-up operation, which would otherwise have been considered as pure 
economic loss, was recoverable, either as consequent upon physical loss, or as incurred 
in mitigating loss. However, for pure economic loss not connected to physical damage 
was irrecoverable, such as the costs of transhipment to the destination of Benghazi were 
treated as pure economic loss unrelated to the leaking acid.  
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Most interestingly, in respect of decontaminating the containers and drums, Mance J. 
thought it arguably in law that the plaintiff could claim for his loss even if it was 
regarded as entirely economic loss. The imposition of a duty of care in respect of 
economic loss in The Orjula was effectively not governed by the principles laid down in 
Murphy v Brentwood D.C.77 Indeed, The Orjula may well fall into a different factual 
category, which was outside the scope of Murphy. 
 
In Murphy, the House of Lords concerned with a claim by a subsequent purchaser of a 
house against a consulting engineer, who was engaged by a local authority pursuant to 
its statutory duties and whose carelessness had led to the house being constructed with 
defective foundations. It was concluded that neither the builder nor the consulting 
engineer or local authority would, absent special circumstances, own any duty of care to 
a purchaser in respect of any defect which was discovered before the stage when it 
caused any actual injury to person or damage to property, other than the defective house 
itself. Any diminution in value of the property in consequence of the defect, and any 
expense incurred in putting the defect right so that the property could be safely used, 
constituted pure economic loss not recoverable in tort. The House of Lords concerned a 
fact of matter was that the defects in the property, once detected, could no longer cause 
damage. Also the purchaser had a choice either to repair the property or to abandon or 
discard it as useless. Accordingly, his claim was regarded as being for pure economic 
loss and was irrecoverable in tort. 
 
However, Mance J. pointed out what made The Orjula different from Murphy was that 
there was no choice for the plaintiff (bareboat charterer) to abandon the containers at sea 
or on land.78 Moreover, the containers and drums would remain positively dangerous 
unless preventive measures were taken to neutralise the danger by the plaintiff. Indeed, 
on arrival at Rotterdam the Dutch authorities had understandably insisted that the 
plaintiff bore the expense of dealing with operations of decontamination, recontaining 
and restowing effected in Rotterdam. That means the plaintiff was forced to take 
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positive step to alleviate the danger. Therefore the plaintiff may arguably have a claim 
in tort against the second defendant who negligently stowed them on the vessel, even if 
the loss was regarded as entirely economic. It should be noted that Mance J. decided 
merely that the imposition of a duty of care (owned the second defendant to the plaintiff) 
in respect of economic loss was arguable in law, and it had not been established.79 Thus 
it remains to be seen whether it will be accepted by other courts. 
 
Here a question arises: does a shipper owe a duty in tort to a charterer to take care not to 
expose the charterer to liability? In the following case, the court thought arguably the 
answer was “Yes”. In Virgo Steamship Co SA v Skaarup Shipping Corp (The Kapetan 
Georgis),80 a shipment of coal was loaded onto a vessel, which was owned by Virgo. 
An explosion occurred and caused damage and loss of life. The explosion was caused 
by the ignition of an explosive mixture of gases emanating from the coal and air.  
 
The vessel was under time charter to S, which in turn had entered into a voyage charter 
with B which in turn had entered into a sub-voyage charter with O. Devco, a Canadian 
company, was the shipper of the coal. Virgo brought an action against S and B for 
damages for loading dangerous cargo. S issued a third party notice against Devco 
alleging that the cargo was shipped pursuant to a contract between them containing a 
Canadian statutory clause that the shipper of dangerous goods should be liable for 
damages arising out of the shipment, so that S was entitled to a contribution from Devco 
under the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 . Alternatively, Devco, as shippers of 
the cargo, owed S a duty of care in common law to take reasonable care that the cargo 
shipped aboard was not dangerous, and that in breach of the above duty Devco 
negligently shipped an excessively gaseous cargo, thus giving rise to a liability in tort. 
Devco submitted that the claim in tort was for pure economic loss since S had no 
proprietary interest in the vessel as a time charterer. It was held that S had a good 
arguable case in tort both in law and in fact where the claim was part of a chain 
originating from a claim for physical damage. As we can see, damages to compensate 
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for pure economic loss can be claimed, despite the general rule to the contrary, where it 
is claimed as part of a chain which originates from a claim for physical damage. 
 
In addition, if the claimant has a claim for property damage, he automatically gets 
consequential loss flowing from that property damage. Suppose, the shipper did not 
notify the carrier and the carrier was unaware of the dangerous nature of cargo as 
compared to regular cargo. During the loading of cargo, the dangerous cargo started a 
fire and an explosion followed on board, causing damages not only to the carrier’s ship 
but also including the delay to next voyage, as well as cost resulting from cleaning, 
repairing and charges of custom documents. From the economic loss rule discussed 
above, we can see that the carrier has suffered physical damage which could entitle it to 
claim in respect of the vessel. Based on this, the carrier could recover other economic 
loss as part of a chain which originates from a claim for physical damage. 
3.1.2.5 Generalities Affecting the Duty of Care 
In the case of either of loss of, or damage to goods, an action of tort can be brought only 
by the owner of those goods,81 including a pledge of the bill of lading,82 or by a bailee, 
in or entitled to possession of them.83 In the case of Margarine Union v. Cambay 
Prince,84 Roskill J held that an action in negligence would not succeed unless the 
plaintiff was, at the time of the commission of the tort, the owner of the goods in 
question or the person entitled to immediate possession of them. This approach was 
confirmed again by House of Lords in The Aliakmon85 who restored the full vigour of 
the principle laid down in the former case. In the latter case a cargo of steel suffered 
damage in transit due inter alia to negligent stowage at a time when the risk but not the 
property in the goods had passed to a c. & f. buyer. Lord Brandon denied the buyer any 
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remedy in the tort of negligence on the ground that he was not the owner of the steel at 
the time the damage was inflicted.86 
 
Accordingly, the duty of care owed in tort to the buyers could not be equated to the 
contractual duty of care owed to the shipper; and to impose on a shipowner a duty of 
care to others than the owners of cargo would deprive him of the protection of the 
Hague Rules.87 The identity of carrier issue is of particular importance to the combined 
transport operator who assumes responsibility for the actions of all sub-contractors and 
will wish to ensure that the cargo owner cannot avoid the web of contractual provisions 
by suing outside of the bill.88 
3.1.3  Strict Liability under Rylands v. Fletcher 
The carriage of explosives, radioactive materials and certain dangerous chemicals can 
be categorised as “ultra-hazardous” or “extra-dangerous” activities. In England, this 
area of law is governed by the rule established in Rylands v. Fletcher,89 for the modern 
view, refer to Cambridge Water.90  
 
The rule under Rylands v. Fletcher91 is the most-often quoted example of strict liability. 
It states that an occupier of land who brings onto it anything likely to do damage if it 
escapes, and keeps that thing on the land, will be liable for any damage caused by an 
escape.92 For the purpose of applying this rule, “escape” means escape from a place 
where the defendant has occupation of or control over as opposed to a place which is 
outside his occupation or control.93 Although the strict liability rule in Rylands was 
rejected by the High Court in Australia in Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty 
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Co,94 in England the House of Lords re-assured the rule after the Transco case95 in 
2003. 
 
The author in favour of the “escape” is interpreted under the wider rule in Rylands. It is 
concerned with the escape of dangerous things from the defendant’s land or control 
rather than restricted to the escape from the defendant’s land and the adverse effects on 
the claimant’s land.96 As we can see, this rule might be applicable to cases where 
dangerous cargo is released from a vessel or has escaped from a place controlled or 
occupied by a shipper, forwarder, seller or manufacturer. Here a question arises: is there 
any fundamental difference between the dangerous cargo that escaped from the ship and 
those that escaped from land under the rule of the Rylands? 
 
In Rylands v. Fletcher, the defendant occupied land near to where the plaintiff operated 
a coal mine.97 The defendant employed an engineer and a contractor to construct a 
reservoir on his land.98 The water from this reservoir permeated the old coal shafts 
beneath and flooded the plaintiff's mine.99 Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that he had 
employed apparently competent persons and had taken no part in the work himself, the 
defendant was held responsible for all direct consequences from the escaping water 
regardless of whether he was negligent or not. 
 
As the author understands, this case refers to dangerous things escaping from land (or 
“non-natural use” of land100), but it is not necessary to restrict the rule to the limitation 
that both the plaintiff and the defendant must have an interest in the land. The real 
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meaning of this rule relates to the “escape from the defendant’s control”.101 It could 
also be the control of a ship rather than land. Put another way, we can regard a ship e.g. 
a giant modern container ship, as a big piece of floating land. If the water is polluted by 
leaking dangerous cargoes, it should not be treated differently between chemicals that 
leaked from a container on board a ship which is near the harbour and the same 
chemicals that leaked from a warehouse in the harbour. Accordingly, it is possible to 
apply the rule of Rylands to dangerous cargo incidents that occurred off land.  
 
In addition, to succeed in finding someone strictly liable under the rules in Rylands v 
Fletcher102 in the context of dangerous cargo incidents, it would be necessary to 
establish that the carriage of dangerous cargoes was an unnatural or exceptionally 
hazardous activity. The ultra-hazardous activity is possible to be established, if carriage 
of cargo which is ultra-dangerous, such as dynamite (or other explosives), or 
extra-hazardous chemicals, then the cargo escaped from the vessel in heavy seas and 
resulted in pollution of the environment, starting fire and explosion on board, and 
noxious fumes which injured persons nearby. 
 
However, as regards the application of this rule to dangerous cargo incidents, the real 
problem is how to deal with the apparent requirement in Rylands: there must be an 
escape from the defendant’s property? Suppose, for example, a shipper puts dangerous 
cargoes on ship, then the cargoes escape from the ship and result into pollution. One 
interesting point is the ship is neither owned nor possessed by the shipper, therefore any 
escape will be from the shipowner’s property, not the shipper’s. We can see in practice 
the shipowner is likely to be the only Rylands defendant.103 Then the question is: will 
he be liable under the rule of Rylands? As the author understands, it will depend on 
whether the shipowner knows the danger. If he does, surely he will be liable under the 
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Rylands rule. If he does not (e.g. undisclosed dangerous cargo shipped by the shipper), 
as discussed in the following case, it is unlikely for him to be held liable, since there is 
no foreseeable damage as required in the Rylands rule.  
 
In Cambridge Water,104 the House of Lords held that liability under Rylands v. Fletcher 
only arises where the damage suffered by the claimant was foreseeable.105 However, it 
does not mean that the manner of the escape must be foreseeable.106  Since the 
defendant could not at the relevant time have reasonably foreseen the damage in 
question might occur, the plaintiff’s claim for damages under the rule in Rylands v. 
Fletcher must fail.107  
 
Here a question arises: will the requirement of foreseeability prevent a claimant from 
succeeding in a dangerous cargo incident? In the author’s opinion, if the dangerous 
cargo has been noticed to the shipowner, the requirement of foreseeability would be 
unlikely to prevent claims for property damage and personal injury caused by dangerous 
cargoes, 108 because such incidents normally involve fire, explosion, serious 
contaminations and the resulting damages are very obvious. In any event, pure 
economic loss is not recoverable under the rule of Rylands. However, if the shipowner 
does not know about the dangerous cargo on board, the requirement of “foreseeability” 
will be a trouble. For instance, the shipper shipped dangerous cargo without disclosure 
and the shipowner does not know the dangerous cargo exist on board at all. Surely, the 
shipowner can not foresee any damage may be caused by dangerous cargo. In practice, 
the majority cases relating to “undisclosed” dangerous cargoes, therefore it is rarely to 
see the rule in Rylands to be applied to dangerous cargo cases.  
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In Cambridge Water,109 it was argued before the House of Lords, even if foreseeability 
of damage was required by the authorities, their Lordships should extend Rylands so as 
to make it a tort of strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities. This was rejected by 
Lord Goff for a number of reasons, perhaps the most telling being the failure of the Law 
Commission to recommend any proposals to implement strict liability for 
ultra-hazardous or especially dangerous activities. 110  The Law Commission had 
expressed doubt on the desirability of adopting a strict liability rule for ultra-dangerous 
activities.111  
 
As the author understands, the major concerns are the uncertainties inherent in the 
concept of “ultra-hazardous activity” which would make such a rule too difficult to 
apply. For example, how is it possible to distinguish between 
dangerous/extra-dangerous activities (which may cause harm even if carefully 
conducted) and ordinary activities (which are safe if carefully carried out)? Indeed, it is 
not easy to draw the line. Accordingly, Lord Goff considered that judges should not 
proceed down a path where the Law Commission had feared to tread.112  
 
The author would argue that as a matter of justice, those who undertake dangerous 
activities (rather than the victim), should bear the risk of resulting damages, irrespective 
of whether negligence can be established.113 Furthermore, strict liability is consistent 
with the “polluter pays” principle in the area of environmental liability. Most of the case 
law on Rylands v Fletcher deals with environmental questions. It is obvious that strict 
liability may provide a better incentive for avoiding environmental harm from 
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dangerous activities than a fault-based liability regime. Particularly in the case of 
dangerous cargo pollution, strict liability may help to ensure prompt and sufficient 
controls of pollution. Considering the damages and costs from dangerous cargo 
incidents may be enormous, internalising the costs of dangerous activities promotes 
economic efficiency by encouraging the operator to minimize those costs. 
 
Another reason given by Lord Goff is in respect of damages caused to the environment, 
the increasing recognition of environmental problems together with national and 
international legislation made the extension of a common law remedy to cover this kind 
of damage less impressing.114 In view of the volume and quality of legislation being put 
in place in relation to the environment, he considered that developments in this area 
should be left to Parliament rather than the common law.115  
 
However, the author believes that before the environmental legislation is integrated and 
sufficient, Rylands v Fletcher is still significant to dangerous cargo incidents where 
strict liability would play an important role in the sphere of “dangerous activities”.116 
For example, on an international scale, both the HNS Convention 1996117 and the Basel 
Protocol 1999118 on Liability and Compensation have not come into force. In Europe, 
the Lugano Convention119 was thought to be too wide and some provisions too general 
to ensure legal certainty, therefore it is not yet in force. The Directive on Environmental 
Liability (2004/35/EC) seems to be successful, but it is a Directive on public liability 
and does not really cover civil liability. In the UK, strict liabilities have been created by 
statute against a backdrop of the existing common law. Examples are section 209 of the 
Water Industry Act 1991, which imposes strict liability on water undertakers, and 
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schedule 2 of the Reservoirs Act 1975, which assumes strict liability in the 
circumstances of Rylands.120 As we can see, the strict liability rule in Rylands still has a 
role to play in dealing with environmental problems, particularly before the relevant 
international and national legislations can be developed into a consummate scheme.  
 
However, an important and surprising decision given by the High Court of Australia in 
Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Co121 rejected the rule in Rylands, in favour 
of fault-based liability.122 A question arising here: will the House of Lords follow the 
Australian example and abolish the rule in Rylands; or retain the rule while giving it as 
much certainty as possible? The answer can be found in the Transco case 2003.123 It 
was not surprising to see that the House of Lords chose the latter. There were a few 
reasons for not abolishing the rule given by Lord Bingham in Transco. The most 
convincing one probably is “there is a category of case, however small, in which it is 
just to impose liability without fault. An example is Cambridge Water if the damage had 
been foreseeable”.124 Another reason is “stop-go” and is generally a bad approach to 
legal development.125 The House of Lords, therefore, preferred to follow the lead taken 
in Cambridge Water.  
 
We can see the re-assurance of strict liability rule in Rylands has vital meaning to 
dangerous cargo cases. That means if the shipowner engaged in “ultra-hazardous” 
activities with proper notice about dangerous cargo, he may be held liable for resulting 
damages, even if he took every reasonable precaution to prevent damages or 
environmental pollution from occurring. Furthermore, in the author’s view, it is a 
reasonable step to extend the rule in Rylands so as to make it a tort of strict liability for 
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ultra-hazardous activities such as that in the U.S.,126  particularly considering the 
environmental legislation is not yet integrated and sufficient in this area. Moreover, in 
comparison with Chinese law, under Article 123 of the Civil Law 1986, it is possible for 
the carrier to be strictly liable for carriage of ultra dangerous cargoes. I will discuss it in 
detail in sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. 
3.1.4 Strict Product Liability  
Liability for defective products (“product liability”) is shared by contract and tort law.127 
Strict product liability is the norm and does not require privity of contract between the 
manufacturer (or seller) and the injured party because the manufacturer (or seller) has a 
duty to supply to the public at large, a product that is safe and free of defects.128 
 
Until the European Community Directive 83/374/EEC was implemented, it would be 
possible to say with a certain degree of jurisdiction that England had no “product 
liability law”, but only laws relating to liability for defective products. 129  The 
shortcoming of the traditional Donoghue v. Stevenson130 cause of action is the need to 
prove fault.131 Contemporary demands for stronger consumer protection have now 
promoted a new model of strict tort liability for injury from defective products.132 The 
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 As Fleming notes, “after an at first cool reception, strict liability is now generally applied to abnormally 
dangerous activities; that is those with inherent risks that cannot be eliminated by the exercise of reasonable care. See 
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 John G Fleming, The Law of Torts, 9th ed., p. 530. 
128
 Tetley, op. cit. p470. 
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same extent as it had done in the United States: essentially the non-contractual liability for defective products in 
England was still an aspect of the general law of negligence. See the Lord Criffiths, M. C. and Peter De Val and R. J. 
Dormer, Developments in English Product Liability Law: A Comparison with the American System, presented at 
Admiralty Law Institutes Symposium: Product Liability in Admiralty, (1988) 62 Tul. L. Rev. 353. 
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 [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.). In this case, a woman consumed ginger beer which contained the decomposed remains of 
a snail, and brought suit against the manufacturer. The Court ruled that a manufacturer owes a duty of care to the 
ultimate consumer of his product where the product reaches the consumer in the same form in which it left the 
manufacturer, and is sold with the knowledge that the absence of care in the production of the product will result in 
an injury to the consumer’s life or property. 
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 The injured consumer is in a singularly disadvantageous position in carrying the burden of proof. See Fleming, 
The Law of Torts, 9th ed., p. 551. 
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 Strict products liability is a relatively new doctrine in the law. It developed out of a series of law review articles in 
the 1950s in the United States, and rapidly gained currency in many state courts around the country in the 1960s and 
1970s. In 1965, the American Law Institute adopted the Restatement (second) of Torts. Section 402a of the 
Restatement (second) of Torts (1965); Rest Torts: Product Liability (third) was promulgated in 1997. The evolution of 
American doctrine is described by Stapleton, Product Liability (1994) chapter 2. The strict product liability rule is 
spreading to other countries For example, China, Israel, Japan and Australia. See Trade Practice Act Part VA (1992). 
For its history see Harland, 17 Syd L Rev 336 (1995). It is not, however, to New Zealand or Canada: Boivin, 33 Osg 
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strict product liability has been adopted by statute in the EC,133 consequently the UK 
has a strict product liability regime. 
 
With regard to the carriage of dangerous cargo, most commonly the product liability 
relating to the responsibility of the manufacturers and of various sellers in the chain of 
sale to third parties with whom they have not necessarily contracted,134 e.g., a duty is 
imposed on manufacturers or importers135 to correctly label and packing hazardous 
cargoes and to assist masters with proper notification of the dangerous properties. 
However, with all best intentions, mistakes will occur and cargoes are often incorrectly 
labelled or packaged, and manufacturers or importers are liable for damages caused by 
the inherent nature of dangerous cargoes.  
 
In practice, uncertainties may arise where, contrary to IMDG requirement, 136 
manufacturers provide trade names and formulations of the product on a Material Safety 
Data Sheet (MSDS). Whenever possible in these circumstances, manufacturers should 
be contacted for supplying the correct UN number and their assistance and guidance on 
the correct handling procedures and any hazards which may arise that are not otherwise 
clearly identified.137 Accordingly, they could be responsible for the personal injury and 
certain damages138 caused by the dangerous characteristics of their products. 
 
In England, strict product liability is implemented by Part I of the Consumer Protection 
Act 1987. Section 2(1) states that when any damage is caused wholly or partly by a 
defect in a product, every producer of the product “shall be liable for the damage” and 
section 2(2) and 2(3) make four categories of person liable: producers, those who hold 
                                                                                                                                                                  
H L J 487 (1995). 
133
 Product Liability Directive 1985. As implemented in the UK by the Consumer Protection Act 1987. See Howells, 
Comparative Product Liability (1993); Waddams, Products Liability (3rd ed. 1993). 
134
 Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, (3rd ed.1988), International Shipping Publications, p. 469. 
135
 It should be noted that the sellers are not liable under strict product liability: only the manufacturers and importers 
are. The seller’s duty to label, etc. is an aspect of negligence, not strict liability. 
136
 An IMDG Code listing will be the first indication of the general nature of dangerous substances being carried on 
the vessel. The surest way of obtaining reliable information about a relatively pure material is to identify its UN 
number. Full details of its hazards can then be obtained by seeking advice from experts or by reference to databases 
and technical literature. 
137
 Foster, Chris, Understanding the Danger, The Maritime Advocate, Issue 17, pp38-40. 
138
 In England, damage to other goods of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or household use. See also 
Section 5(3) of 1987 Act. 
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themselves out as producers, importers and suppliers.139 The persons entitled to be 
claimants are not specified in the Act, and consequently, it seems that anyone suffering 
damage of the kind covered by the Act, as a result of a defect in a product.140   
 
In England, the 1987 Act only covers losses for which protection is personal injury (or 
death) and damage to other goods of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic 
or household use.141 It does not cover damage to or loss of the defective product itself.  
Suppose flammable chemicals are insufficiently packaged by the manufacturer, during 
loading the chemicals, a few packages broke and started a fire on board, as a result some 
stevedores and longshoremen were injured. Or a private beachfront house was damaged 
by an explosion caused by these chemicals. The manufacturer could be held liable for 
any personal injuries and damages to the beachfront house. 
 
It should be noted that there is a big difference between English and Chinese law as to 
which kind of property damage is compensable. Under section 5(3) of 1987 Act, 
commercial entities cannot sue at all. If “other property” is in a commercial use, then 
the damage cannot be indemnified, such as the seismic equipment installed on a 
chartered vessel142 was not for private use and the damage could not be indemnified by 
the manufacturer of the defective vessel and equipment under 1987 Act. This excludes 
damage to business property such as a vessel. However, the property in commercial use 
is compensable under Chinese Property Quality Law 1993.143  
 
Suppose, in England if a defective dangerous cargo started an explosion and the 
carrying vessel was damaged,144 the shipowner would not have a right to sue the 
defective product manufacturer based on strict product liability, but can choose tort of 
negligence and prove the fault of manufacturer. However, if the dangerous cargo 
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 Generally, the supplies are not liable at all unless they fail to say where they got the goods from. This is same as 
that under Chinese Law. 
140
 Clerk and Lindsell on Torts, (18th ed., 2000), London: Sweet & Maxwell, p553. 
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 In the case Nico Supply Ships Associates v. General Motors Corp., 876 F.2d 501,1989 AMC 2358 (5th Cir. 1989), 
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 For detail, see section 3.2.5 
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exploded in a harbour and some private houses on land (e.g. beachfront houses) were 
damaged, the house owners could claim for indemnity from the dangerous cargo 
manufacturer under 1987 Act. We must admit that the scope of compensable damage 
under American law145 is much broader than that under English law. In other words, 
except for personal injury or property for private use, the 1987 Act is a dead letter. 
 
In summary, with regard to a strict product liability in the case of dangerous cargo, it 
covers the responsibility of manufacturers, importers, wholesale or otherwise, to third 
parties' damage and personal injury in the chain of sale. Reviewing relevant legislation, 
government regulations and judicial decision, there is a tendency of strict liability since 
contemporary demands for stronger consumer protection have promoted to a new model 
of strict tort liability for injury from defective products. Nonetheless, it is not yet clear 
what impact the theory of strict product liability will have on shipboard claims of 
dangerous cargo casualties in English jurisdiction.146  
 
Surely, for a vessel in commercial use, a shipowner can sue under Chinese law (or 
American law) for his vessel damaged by dangerous cargo, but cannot under English 
law. The author thinks the difference reflects the direction of the development of strict 
product liability. In England, the scope of recoverable damage under the 1987 Act 
should be revised and extended to properties in commercial use. Obviously, insurance 
companies would benefit from it since most claims for damage to commercial property 
are brought by them. 
3.1.5 Joint and Several Liability 
Tort liability may be relevant in other situations where two or more people are liable to 
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 Commercial entities can sue under American law. See East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 
476 U.S.858, 106 S. Ct.2295, 90 L.Ed. 2d 865, 1986 AMC 2027 (1986), where (USA) the Supreme Court recognised 
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 It has shown a possibility for victims to claim for indemnity on strict product liability in some reported maritime 
cases in the US 
  79
the same person for the same damage. Joint liability147 covers a variety of situations, 
including agency,148 vicarious liability,149 and concerned action,150 in which several 
persons are imputed by a tort as joint tortfeasors. Such concurrent tortfeasors are 
regarded as “joint” when there is concurrence not only in the casual sequence leading to 
the single damage, but also in some common enterprise; they are “several” or 
“independent” when the concurrent is exclusively in the realm of causation.151  
 
It is a general principle of English law that any person whose tortious conduct causes 
damage to another may be held liable for the full loss incurred by the injured party. This 
remains the case even though a particular defendant’s contribution to the damage was 
manifestly smaller than that made by others.152 Where this occurs, there is provision for 
the defendants to contribute among themselves to ensure that each bears the appropriate 
part of the cost of compensating the plaintiff. The two related topics of joint liability and 
contribution in tort are governed by the Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978.  
 
The Civil Liability (Contribution) Act 1978 allows tortfeasors who are jointly liable for 
tortiously caused damage to a particular victim to seek a contribution that will apportion 
the liability between themselves. The result of the two rules of joint liability and 
contribution is that the law does not compel a plaintiff to collect his damages from 
different defendants according to their share of responsibility for the damage, but it 
allows the liability of one defendant to be redistributed to others who are jointly 
responsible for the damage.153 Under section 2(1) of the Act the amount of contribution 
to be made by one tortfeasor to another is “such as may be found to be just and 
equitable”. 
 
According to the agreement or legal provisions between the parties, the defendants 
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 For a discussion of the distinction between joint and several tortfeasors see Clerk & Lindsell on Torts (18th ed.), 
para. 2-53 et seq. 
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 Eg Palmer v Blowers (1987) 75 ALR 509. 
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 The Koursk [1924] P 140 at 155. 
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redistributed the compensation among themselves to ensure that each bears the 
appropriate part of the costs. Generally the relevant provisions in the Civil Liability 
(Contribution) Act 1978 come into effect when parties to an action settle it prior to the 
trial. Joint liability is a fundamental rule of English law that is firmly based on the full 
compensation theory, although the rule has vocal critics.154 
 
In this section we will briefly discuss “several tortfeasors” where tortfeasors have many 
separate causes of action but they are liable for same damage. Then focus on the 
vicarious liability with regard to the carriage of dangerous cargoes. 
3.1.5.1 Several (or “Independent”) Liability 
Where several persons are liable in tort for the same damage, the general rule is that 
they are liable in solido. That is, each can be sued for the full amount of the claimant’s 
loss and it is not open to any individual defendant to negative or reduce his liability on 
the basis that there were others whose fault also contributed to the damage. In so far as 
the burden of liability is to be apportioned, this is done by reference to the principles of 
contribution. 
 
Due to several defendants’ negligence, cargoes became dangerous in the surrounding 
circumstances, and the claimant was working in that dangerous situation, accordingly 
was injured. Those careless tortfeasors would be held several liable for the victim’s 
injury. In Beazley v D. McCarthy & Sons and Vokins & Co., Ltd.,155 a barge was loaded 
with timber from a steamship. Stevedores were engaged in stacking timber on the barge 
in charge of lighterman. Loading continued under instructions of lighterman despite 
protests by stevedores that further cargo would make the barge unstable. The victim 
stevedore was employed by the first defendants and lost his life by drowning when he 
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 Bodies representing professional persons, particularly those in the construction industry, have argued that it is 
unfair that their indemnity policies should underwrite the liabilities of those with whom they are involved. It is argued 
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fell from the top of a load of timber.156 
 
It was held that the accident was due to the overloading of the barge (stacked too 
high157); both the stevedores and the lightermen were responsible, the stevedores for 
their failure to provide a safe system of working, and the lightermen for their failure, as 
invitors, to see that the barge was reasonably safe for the work to be done upon it. Two 
defendants, as several tortfeasors, found equally to blame.158 
 
A straightforward example of the application of joint liability in the context of 
dangerous cargo is the American decision in Harrison v. Flota Mercante.159 In this case, 
a shipper was aware of the danger from inhaling industrial chemicals, but failed to put 
adequate printed warnings on the containers. Some of the containers ruptured during 
loading. The stevedore’s supervisors read the warning label, but failed to provide 
protective equipment to the persons cleaning up the spill. The shipper, carrier and the 
stevedore’s supervisors were all held liable when those persons were injured, subject to 
contribution inter se.160 
3.1.5.2 Vicarious Liability 
There may be vicarious liability, when a party’s negligence is based on the negligence 
of his employees who are actually dealing with the cargo,161 so far as acting in the 
course of their employment. There is normally no liability for independent contractors, 
except for undertaking dangerous activities.162 If no contract was involved or the 
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 For example negligence in labelling, packing, handling, carrying or discharging dangerous cargo. 
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 For example, a person who undertakes dangerous activities is under a non-delegable duty such as Rylands v. 
Fletcher. There was possible liability for independent contractors and this was assumed to be the law regarding 
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existing contract no longer precludes an action in tort, the responsible person will be 
liable for the loss or damage in an action in tort by the owner of the goods.163  
 
Tort liability is relevant in claims for damage caused by dangerous cargo, where some 
third parties outside the ship, suffer loss or damage caused by the dangerous cargo 
where the shipowner itself is not negligent, but there is fault on its employees.164 The 
shipowner may be vicariously liable for the fault of his employees. For example, a 
shipowner may be jointly responsible with his master for an act of carelessness 
committed by the master, e.g. flammable materials exploded by reason of lack of 
reasonable care by the master; or the master failed to devise a proper stowage plan for 
dangerous cargo in a hold. 165  
 
Supposing there was a vessel with hazardous chemicals on board, one seafarer, without 
proper training, negligently doing ventilation and starting a fire in hold, consequently 
the ship was badly damaged. The vessel encountered heavy weather at sea and a number 
of containers were lost overboard including several containers with hazardous chemicals 
inside. Owners of an adjacent fishery suffer loss and damage as a result of this 
contamination. In this case, the shipowner should be vicariously liable for damages 
caused by his incompetent crew. 
 
The employers may, in certain circumstances, be liable for the fault of their employees, 
but only if the tort is committed during the course of their employment. This condition 
will be satisfied if the tortious act is authorised by the employer and falls within the 
“course of his employment”.166 Thus liability will arise if the employee is performing 
duties authorised by his employer, even if it is carried out in a manner which the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
independent contractors in Midland Silicones v. Scruttons [1962] A.C. 446. 
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employer would never have approved,167 or the employee does his job in a prohibited 
fashion.168 For example, an employer may be liable for damage inflicted by a fire 
started by a match thrown on the floor by an employee who was smoking while 
unloading a cargo of petroleum spirit.169 As another example, even though an employer 
may have given written safety instructions for handling dangerous cargo to his 
employees, if the seafarers made mistakes on ventilation that resulted in very high 
temperatures in the hold, the employer is still liable for his employees’ action. 
 
In some circumstances, however, the employer can escape liability if the negligence or 
carelessness of the employee amounts to a separate act or the purpose of the employee’s 
activities at the relevant time was unconnected with his employer’s business, the 
employer would not be liable.170 
 
Suppose, a ship was chartered under NYPE 1993, but the charterer devised an improper 
stowage plan for dangerous cargo. The master was negligent in relying on that plan to 
stow dangerous cargo. Consequently, damages were caused by the improper stowage. In 
assessing the master’s negligence of control or supervision of the stowage of dangerous 
cargo in tort, it might be thought that a court would take account of the obligations 
under the relevant provisions of the contract, e.g. Cl.8 of the NYPE which gave the 
charterers power to give stowage orders. As we know, most time charters provide that 
the master shall be under the orders and directions of charterers as regards employment 
of the vessel, agency and other arrangements; and the charterers shall indemnity the 
owners against any consequences or liabilities that might arise from complying with 
such orders and directions.171 Hence, no vicarious liability of the shipowner for the 
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master’s negligence,172 instead the charterer should be responsible for it. 
 
As a general rule, an employer bears no liability for the negligence of his independent 
contractor. Persons damaged by such work must seek redress directly from the 
contractor173 and the employer is not liable for the negligence or other faults of that 
contractor. However, this principle is subject to modification when a duty is laid upon 
the employer by legislation that to achieve a certain level of safety or to ensure certain 
things are done.174 In some cases, courts have held these duties to be absolute and 
therefore non-delegable.175 Although the duty is described as “non-delegable”, this 
does not entail that the duty “is incapable of being the subject of delegation, but only 
that the employer cannot escape liability if the duty has been delegated and then not 
properly performed”.176 But the result is that a person subject to a non-delegable duty, 
will be liable for a narrow range of conduct of his independent contractors than would 
be the case in relation to vicarious liability for the acts of an employee.177 
 
From the very origin, in Rylands v. Fletcher,178 vicarious liability was imposed for 
independent contractors.179  Subsequently this was extended to all projected work 
involving high risk calling for special precautions. 180  A number of cases have 
developed from this result by saying that a person who undertakes dangerous activities 
is under a non-delegable duty.181  
 
So far as dangerous cargo liability is concerned, the general principle in tort is that the 
shipowner is liable for the acts of its own employees (e.g. the crew), but not for those of 
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independent contractors. However, there would be liability of the shipowner in tort to a 
third party, e.g. a cargo owner whose cargo was damaged by the independent contractor, 
if the shipowner had the right to control the manner of the work, as opposed to being 
able to give general directions. For example, the master may give general directions to a 
crane driver (employed by the stevedore) where cargo is to be deposited in a hold, this 
does not necessarily mean that the shipowner is vicariously liable if the crane driver 
drops the cargo too quickly.182 The situation will be different if the shipowner had the 
right to control the manner of the work of the stevedores, e.g. the master has the right to 
order the stevedores not to use hooks which were damaging bagged chemicals.  
 
Alternatively, supposing it is the shipper’s responsibility to up-load cargoes and he has 
the right to control the manner of the stevedore’s work. Due to the negligence of some 
stevedores, a package of chemicals was broken which subsequently started a fire. Even 
though these stevedores were employed by company A, and company A was an 
independent contractor of the shipper, the shipper should not escape from liability. Both 
the shipper and company A should be held liable for all damages and personal injury as 
a result of the fire. 
 
Finally, the employer may incur liability for personal negligence in connection with the 
employment itself; for instance, if he carelessly entrusts the work to an incompetent;183 
or if he, unlike the contractor, knows that there is risk of harm unless special precautions 
are taken and fails to give instructions accordingly;184 or if he either authorises the 
commission of an unlawful act or employs a contractor to do something which 
necessarily involves violation of another’s rights.185 In all these cases, of course, the 
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employer’s liability rests on his own default, not the contractors.186 
3.1.6 Defences and Relief from Liability 
A number of defences which are generally available to answer tort claims such as 
contributory negligence, consent of the plaintiff to the act complained of, exclusion of 
liability by contract, notice, etc and intervening acts of third parties.187 Contributory 
negligence is a partial defence and the others provide a tortfeasor with a complete 
defence.188 
3.1.6.1 Contributory Negligence 
“Contributory negligence” can be defined as “the plaintiff’s failure to meet the standard 
of care to which he is required to conform for his own protection and which is a legally 
contributing cause, together with the defendant’s default, in bringing about his 
injury”.189 Here “negligence” is used in a sense different from what it bears in relation 
to a defendant’s conduct. It does not mean conduct fraught with undue risks to others, 
but rather failure on the claimant to take reasonable care of himself in his own 
interests.190  
 
Suppose, during the discharging of dangerous goods, a stevedore refuses to wear the 
protective clothing provided and recommended for use by the shipowner. The stevedore 
would be likely to be found to have contributed to any injury he suffers as a result of 
physical contact or contamination with the undisclosed dangerous goods.191 The failure 
of the stevedore to take care of himself negated the liability of the shipper had fault on 
providing sufficient information about the dangerous nature to persons involved in the 
transportation. Another example, the defendant shipper X’s dangerous cargoes are 
shipped on board, consequently result in explosions. The carrier who has reason to 
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know of the danger but nevertheless carries the goods: the other cargo owner who 
knows that X’s cargo is dangerous but say nothing to the carrier etc. Both carrier and the 
other cargo owner have contributory negligence to their own loss. 
 
In such a case the damages recoverable by the plaintiff will be reduced under the 
provisions of the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945.192 Section 1 (1) of 
the Act provides that, where a person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault 
and partly as a result of the fault of another, that person may still recover damages, but 
the award shall be reduced by such amount as the court thinks is just and equitable 
having regard to his responsibility for the damages.193  
 
Here a question arises: whether “contributory negligence” applies to all tort liability? 
Certainly it operates as a defence to the tort of negligence, but its application to other 
torts and to other forms of civil liability is not always so clear.194 According to Prof. 
Tettenborn, as regards torts, there is no doubt that contributory negligence applies to all 
torts—strict liability or otherwise—except for those involving knowing wrongdoing 
such as deceit or trespass.195 Briefly, contributory negligence applies to all the torts that 
are likely to be involved in dangerous cargo cases. Regarding contractual liability (not 
tort), in the author’s opinion, contributory negligence does not apply to strict liability.196 
 
Broadly speaking, the law relating to contributory negligence is similar to that relating 
to negligence simpliciter.197 For instance, the standard of care to be applied to claimants 
is objective,198 so “a person is guilty of contributory negligence if he ought reasonably 
to have foreseen that, if he did not act as a reasonable, prudent man, he might hurt 
himself; and in his reckonings he must take into account the possibility of others being 
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careless”.199 In addition, Contributory negligence is a partial defence: it reduces the 
value of, but does not extinguish, the plaintiff’s claim.200  
 
Suppose, for example, at collision, vessel A with dangerous cargo on board is damaged 
as a result of the negligent navigation of vessel B. If the master of vessel A takes an 
unreasonable measures to plug up a small hole on the hull (e.g., by using a nearby 
package of chemicals likely to catch fire in contact with water), any resulting explosion 
is likely to be regarded as partly the fault of the owners of vessel A. 
 
If the claimant’s contributory negligence is going to increase the loss caused by 
defendant, it will be treated the same way as negligence contributing to the accident. 
Imagine, for example, a container of dangerous cargo on deck, misdescribed by the 
shipper A, explodes and sets fire to a container containing paper materials under deck, 
incorrectly packaged by the shipper B. Although shipper B’s incorrect package did not 
help to cause the accident, it increased the consequence of an accident caused wholly by 
the dangerous cargo misdescribed by shipper A, so shipper B’s negligence amounted to 
contributory negligence and the award of damages to shipper B should be reduced. 
 
In addition, a manufacturer or seller may be able to reduce damages by establishing that 
the claimant was guilty of contributory negligence.201 For instance, the negligence of 
stevedores who failing to use proper equipment to load cargoes in the hold, injured by 
the leaking chemicals insufficiently packed by the manufacturer. Since, the substandard 
packing did not conform to the relevant provisions of the IMDG Code, the manufacturer 
should be held liable, but only for those damages that were not caused by the fault of 
the stevedore himself. Another example, a manufacturer (or seller) did not label his 
dangerously explosive cargo properly on the containers, and a careless carrier stowed 
the containers very close to a hot bulkhead resulting in enormous explosions and the 
vessel was damaged seriously. The carrier’s negligent stowage was contributing to the 
accident and his award of damages should be reduced. 
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3.1.6.2 The Consent of the Plaintiff 
Consent, or as it is sometimes known, “assumption of risk” or “volenti non fit 
injuria”,202 provides a complete defence to a tort action in respect of all forms of tort 
liability.203 A defence of consent may result from an express agreement to run a risk or 
be implied204 from the plaintiff’s conduct.205  
 
In a civil action, the defendant may set up the defence that the plaintiff voluntarily 
assumed the risk of, e.g. discharging dangerous goods in a manner less safe than 
recommended by the relevant code of practice. If such a consent is valid, it may have 
the effect of entirely relieving the defendant from liability.206 In practice, however, this 
result may be difficult to achieve. In order to establish this defence, the defendant must 
show that the plaintiff, who had freedom of choice in the matter and knowledge of the 
risk, not only consented to run the risk of the tort207 but also by accepted doing so he 
was waiving his rights to bring an action.208 Thus, merely because the plaintiff allows a 
carrier to discharge dangerous cargo on his premises, he does not thereby agree to 
deprive himself of a remedy should any damage arise from the shipowner’s carelessness. 
Hence this is likely to be regarded as a contributory negligence case. 
 
In a more pertinent case, if the carrier is not told about the dangerous nature of a cargo 
but takes it on board knowing what it is, here a question arises: has the carrier consented 
to any subsequent risks arising from the carriage of dangerous cargo? Assuming that the 
carrier knew of the existence of dangerous cargo, the mere fact of his agreement on 
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carrying it will not necessarily imply his acceptance of all subsequent risks.209 The 
mere knowledge of danger is not enough, and the claimant’s consent will not inferred 
from his knowledge alone.210 In addition, there is no express or specific implied waiver 
of claim from the carrier in respect of damages caused by dangerous cargo.211 The 
author, therefore, is unable to accede to a suggestion that the carrier’s conduct of 
carrying the dangerous cargo is necessarily to be taken as to consent to waive any claim 
in advance insofar as any compensation relating to dangerous cargo.212  
 
A second form of defence based on express consent is the exclusion of liability by 
contract, notice, etc. At common law, it is possible for liability in tort to be excluded by 
contact, notice or otherwise. In the term of contract, theoretically a shipper might 
persuade a carrier to waive, e.g. shipper’s duty not to ship dangerous cargo, but the 
author suspect it is very unlikely as a matter of business practice.  
 
Nonetheless a cargo owner’s duty of warning can be discharged by notice. For instance 
a barge carries hazardous petrochemical mixtures which has permanent placards placed 
on the vessel’s main deck and hold stating the hazardous nature of the cargo. A worker 
had read the notice and enters the hold without adequate breathing apparatus. Thus the 
cargo owner’s duty of warning had been discharged and was not liable for the death of 
the worker caused by the fumes of the petrochemical mixture.213 
 
A point which must be appreciated is that notices may be drafted to perform a variety of 
different functions. Some will purport to exclude liability or to deny the existence of a 
duty of care. Others may merely warn of risks, in which case they will not provide a 
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complete defence but may mean that the defendant’s duty has been discharged, or if less 
effective, give grounds for a plea of contributory negligence.214 That is to say, in the 
absence of an express exclusion of liability through contract or notice it is much more 
likely that the courts will use contributory negligence to apportion the loss.215 
 
However, in a commercial context the exclusion clauses have become more unusual 
since the passing of the Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977. The Act provides that a person 
cannot by reference to any contractual provision or to a notice (whether general or 
specific) exclude or restrict his liability for death or personal injuries resulting from 
negligence.216 Even in respect of other forms of loss (such as property damage or pure 
economic loss), such exclusions will only take effect insofar as they are reasonable.217 
Furthermore, the Act reproduces in statutory form the principle that the awareness of the 
defendant that such a term or notice exists is not to be interpreted as a voluntary 
acceptance of any risk.218 Also the Act only imposes these restraints in respect of 
business liability.219  
 
In the author’s view, however, the exclusion of risks arising from the carriage of 
dangerous cargo will be regarded as unreasonable. As a result, is it unlikely to see any 
party to exclude their liabilities by contract or notice. Nonetheless, the ability to use 
exclusion clauses and notices can obviously produce unfair results. Certain statutory 
controls therefore exist in order to redress the balance between the parties. However, the 
controls are not comprehensive and, as a result the common law rules may still operate 
occasionally.220 
3.1.6.3 Defences in Products Liability 
Last but not least, there is one defence effectively peculiar to product liability. A seller 
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or manufacturer of a product may avoid liability by giving a sufficient warning to alert 
the user of a foreseeable peril and enable him to avoid it. This principle is especially 
applicable to certain products, which, by their nature, cannot be made safe for their 
ordinary and intended use, and as such, the inherent nature of the product is unsafe. The 
adequacy of the warnings is tested on grounds of reasonableness in view of the danger 
created, and in this respect, the liability of the manufacturer or distributor may be said to 
rest on negligence.221 There would appear to be no duty to warn a person who has 
actual knowledge of the danger. 
 
For example, in the American case of Martinez v. Dixie Carriers, Inc.222 a manufacturer 
was exonerated from liability for the death of a worker caused by the fumes of a 
petrochemical mixture that had been carried by a barge, because the hazardous nature of 
the cargo was stated on permanent placards placed on the vessel’s main deck and on a 
warning card in the vessel’s tube. The adequacy of these warnings was bolstered by a 
finding that the hazards associated with the chemical were within the crew’s knowledge 
and professional expertise. In addition, the manufacturer’s duty to give warning is 
limited; it must be given to persons whose injury is foreseeable.223 However, when 
warning is given only to some but not all of the dangers of a product, the requirement of 
adequate warning is not satisfied.  
 
Where a manufacturer gives adequate warning to the injured party about the dangerous 
nature of the product prior to the accident, and provided there are no defects in design or 
manufacture, an action in strict products liability will not be held, because the 
manufacturer or seller will have discharged his duty to the public to provide a safe 
product.224 Where the product is particularly dangerous, the mere attachment of yellow 
hazardous material labels may be insufficient warning; the adequacy of the warning is 
dependant on the injured parties’ knowledge of the hazardous product.225 
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3.2 Tort Liability in Chinese Law 
The section dealing with Chinese tort law is brief, because Chinese maritime courts do 
not regularly admit claims on the basis of tort or contract, but prefer to rely on particular 
provisions of a statute law, such as the Maritime Code 1992.226  
 
Chinese tort law was codified in the Civil Law227 effective January 1, 1987. Prior to its 
adoption, provisions on tort law could be found in customary law and various selected 
statutes, such as the Patent Law and — more significantly, in the context of this 
thesis—the Environment Protection Law. Although the 1982 Constitution contains an 
outline of basic rights and freedoms, these rights are broadly worded and offer little by 
the way of concrete legal protection. The Civil Law was adopted in part to clarify and 
systematise the principles of civil liability for torts. 
 
Under Chinese law, tortious actions are divided into two types. One is the general 
tortious action (fault-based tort liability); the other is the special tortious action (strict 
tort liability).228 Based on civil law theories and the General Principles of Civil Law,229 
the five elements of a general tortious action are summarised as:230 (1) actual loss, 
injury, or damage; (2) a reasonable close causal connection between the offending 
conduct and the resulting injury; (3) breach of a statutory duty; (4) fault and (5) the 
liability of persons with capacity (either naturally or legally competent). A dangerous 
cargo claim may therefore be brought in tort if packing, labelling or carrying of 
dangerous cargo constitute fault and contributed to injury or damage. 
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Most commonly, the dangerous cargo liability is involving someone’s fault. For 
example, in order to avoid any carrying/ handling surcharges and other important/ 
export tariffs, the shipper purposely does not declare dangerous cargo.  Or if the 
incompetent crew handling dangerous cargo on board, contributing to stowage and 
segregation of dangerous goods are failing to satisfy IMDG standards. Or lack of IMDG 
knowledge leading to deficient labelling, marking and placarding of freight containers. 
Consequently, if dangerous cargo incidents result in damage to cargoes on the same 
vessel or personal injury to a third party, the claimant will be able to sue in tort in 
respect of “someone’s fault”. In contrast to English law, there is no such thing as “the 
tort of negligence” in Chinese Law. 
 
In China, the special tortious actions defined and affirmed by law are all based on strict 
liability. They are covered by eleven Articles of the General Principles of Civil Law,231 
e.g. motor vehicle accident liability, environmental pollution liability, product liability, 
liability for ultra-hazardous activity, liability for damage caused by animals, or by 
objects. 
3.2.1 Tort Liability under the Civil Law 1986 
In 1986 the 6th National People's Congress enacted the General Principles of Civil Law 
of the People's Republic of China (hereafter Civil Law). It contains 156 articles and the 
objective is to protect the lawful civil rights and interest of citizens, legal entities, and to 
regulate civil relations.232  
 
Article 106 of the Civil Law identifies two types of tort liability, one based on fault and 
the other on strict liability. Paragraph two provides: “Citizens and legal persons who 
through their fault encroach upon state or collective property or the property or person 
of other people shall bear civil liability”. Although this provision does not distinguish 
between intentional and negligent conduct, it does emphasize the concept of fault. The 
Civil Law does not, however, define fault. Therefore we must look to Chinese 
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jurisprudence to fill in this gap. Traditionally, fault has been defined by reference to a 
person’s state of mind 233  and generally includes both intentional and negligent 
behaviour.234 Practically, breach of statutory obligations and failure to act in accordance 
with an accepted industry practice or profession can be considered negligent. 
 
Paragraph three of Article 106 contains the provisions on strict liability: “Civil liability 
shall still be borne even in the absence of fault, if the law so stipulates.” There are at 
least seven Articles in the Civil Law that trigger strict liability.235 The Law does not 
clearly indicate all the circumstances under which the principles of strict liability apply, 
however, liability without fault is imposed, for example, on those who engage in extra 
hazardous activities,236 those who violate environmental protection legislation,237 and 
those who furnish substandard products.238 The Civil Law contains no definition of 
substandard product, although presumably one would have to show a defect, injury, and 
a causal connection in order to establish strict liability. 
 
The Civil Law addresses the joint liability of tort-feasors.239 If an infringement of an 
individual’s rights occurs as a result of the actions of more than one person, joint 
liability is imposed.240 If a person without capacity or with a limited capacity causes the 
injury, his or her guardian is legally responsible. This civil liability may be reduced, 
however, if the guardian has done his or her duty under the guardianship. 
 
As regards contributory negligence, Chinese tort law, like English law, adopts 
comparative negligence principles.241 Article 131 states: “If a victim is also at fault for 
causing the damage, the civil liability of the infringer may be reduced.” The reduction 
of liability in his manner is a characteristics feature of comparative negligence. For 
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example, during the shipment of dangerous cargoes, if the shipper is responsible for the 
improper packing and labelling and the carrier breaches his duty of care of cargo, in this 
situation, risks divided between shipper and carrier based on their fault. That is to say, 
the comparative negligence principle is used for apportionment of liabilities here.  
 
Generally, the Civil Law does not contain a separate chapter that deals with tort law. 
Rather, tort law principles are generally interspersed throughout the Civil Law and 
sometimes it combines contractual liability and tortious liability in one chapter. But 
there is one exception is Section 3 of Chapter VI242 which particularly dealing with 
tortious liability. Section 3: Civil Liability for Infringement of Rights.243  
 
Considering tortious liability from the carriage of dangerous cargoes, under section 3, 
there are three articles which are relevant: Article 122 on product liability; 244 
Article123 on liability for ultra-hazardous activity;245 and Article124 on environmental 
pollution liability.246 All of these are based on strict liability, although the provisions of 
laws are not very specific, particularly those on product quality and environmental 
protection.247 Article 123 particularly relates to dangerous cargo liability, where the 
defendant’s operations involving combustibles, explosives, highly toxic or radioactive 
substances or high-speed means of transport will be regarded as ultra-hazardous activity, 
he will be strictly liable for the damage. However, if it can be proven that the damage 
was deliberately caused by the victim, the defendant shall not be liable. An interesting 
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question arises: should the strict liability rule under Article 123 be applicable to 
shipowners who carry ultra hazardous cargoes by sea?  
 
Although there have been no reported cases in respect of marine transportation under 
Article 123, as the author understands, it is likely for Chinese Maritime Courts to 
interpret the words of “defendant’s operations” with a broader meaning and include 
shipowner’s carriage of ultra-dangerous cargoes by sea. Particularly, if the cargoes are 
“combustibles, explosives, highly toxic or radioactive substances”, surely the 
shipowner’s operations (e.g. carrying cargoes in heavy seas) will be regarded as 
“ultra-hazardous activities”. Furthermore, the author suggests that Article 123 should be 
restricted to the situation where the shipowner is aware of dangerous cargo on board, 
because without knowing such a danger is on his ship (e.g. undisclosed dangerous 
cargo), it would be unfair for the shipowner to have strict liability for any damage 
caused by dangerous cargoes. This issue need be clarified by Chinese legislators in the 
draft Civil Code. 
 
Compared with English law (e.g. the rule of strict liability in Rylands), we can see there 
are significant difference as to “ultra-hazardous activities”. In England, the Law 
Commission has rejected the approach to extend the strict liability rule in Rylands to 
ultra-hazardous activities.248 In China, it is possible for the shipowner to be held strictly 
liable for carrying ultra-dangerous cargoes under Article 123, but there are no other 
specific provisions on the application of strict liability to “ultra-hazardous activities”. 
Accordingly, Article 123 is far too general and need to be clarified.  
 
With regards to environmental protection, pollution liability is a tort of strict liability249 
and it does not necessarily involve someone’s fault. However, if someone has fault in a 
case of pollution caused by oil leaking or escaping, the party engaged in loading and 
unloading of oil will be held liable for the pollution caused by his negligence. In The 
Water Supply Company of Guangzhou v. Yuexin Shipping Service Company Ltd of 
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Zhaoqing Municipality,250 the plaintiff was responsible for supplying domestic water to 
the Municipality of Guangzhou. The defendant was using the Navy Pier without 
approval from the relevant authority to supply fuel to the Steel Plant of Guangzhou in 
1997. A large quantity of heavy oil escaped from the hose and spilled into the water. The 
defendant’s employee took no measures to deal with the pollution or reported the 
incident. As a result the escaped oil fouled the plaintiff’s water pipes and immobilised 
its operations for 4 days. 
 
The Maritime Court of Guangzhou and the Provincial Supreme Court on appeal held the 
defendant liable under Article 26 of the MEPL1982,251 Article 41 (1) of the Law on 
Prevention and Control of Water Pollution, Articles 124 and 131 of the General 
Principles of Civil Law 1986,252  though subject to a 20 per cent deduction for 
contributory negligence of the plaintiff for failing to install devices to prevent oil from 
leaking into its pipes. 
3.2.2 Draft Civil Code as it Affects Dangerous Cargo 
With the rapid development of the Chinese economy within the last two decades, the 
Civil Law 1986, is now outdated and needs to be clarified, simplified, and improved. 
China restarted the civil codification process in 1998, producing the first draft civil code 
on 17 December 2002.253 
                                                       
250
 The first instance before Guangzhou Maritime Court, (1997) Guangzhou-maritime-No.63-3; on appeal before 
Guangdong People’s High Court, (1998) Commercial Court- No. 15. The case was reported in Vol 37 (1998, No.3), 
Maritime Trial (in Chinese), pp.45-49. The case is not directly related to the maritime law, but the maritime court in 
China has jurisdiction to deal with such disputes. This is one of the few reported cases in China where a private party 
has sued another private party for the marine pollution caused by discharging of oil. In Chinese legal system, most of 
the stipulations in domestic laws are principled outlines or administrative in nature without providing a sufficient 
guidance in trials of civil cases in respect of oil pollution damage. Accordingly, most cases will be settled through 
negotiation or mediation with the help from competent authority based on relevant administrative rules. It is expected 
a new regulation will be implemented in 2010/ 2011with the title of “China’s Prevention and Control of Marine 
Pollution from Ships Regulation”. Hopefully, with some specific stipulations covering the issue of civil liability and 
compensation in oil pollution, more cases relating to oil pollution damages will be solved in trials based on this new 
regulation. However, by the time of writing this thesis, the detailed requirements under the new Regulation have yet 
to be revealed. 
251
 Article 26: “No vessel shall discharge oils, oily mixtures, wastes and other harmful substances into the sea areas 
under the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China in violation of the provisions of this Law”. See the discussion 
of MEPL in section 3.2.4 
252
 Article 124 of the Civil Law: “Any person who pollutes the environment and causes damage to others in violation 
of state provisions for environmental protection and the prevention of pollution shall bear civil liability in accordance 
with the law”. Article 131 of the Civil Law: “a victim is also at fault for causing the damage, the civil liability of the 
infringe may be reduced”. 
253
 It was provided by the Legislative Affairs Commission (LAC) of the National People’s Congress, which is the 
legislative office in charge of drafting a comprehensive new civil code for China. The draft code affirms, modifies, 
and elaborates existing rules based on experience since the last promulgation.  After some internal debate, the 
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In the last twenty years, with the exception of the General Principles of Civil Law, 
China has formulated separate laws on contracts, hypothecation, copyright, trademark, 
patent, marriage, adoption and inheritance. Some of these254 were incorporated into the 
draft civil code with no change. According to the draft, victims whose civil rights were 
violated are entitled to seek moral compensation. 
 
With regard to tort liability law, under Part VIII of the draft Code,255 it expands the 
1986 version's thirty four articles to the current sixty eight articles which state the basic 
principles of tort liability. The draft is divided into chapters on general provisions, 
compensation for harm, defences, motor vehicle accident liability, environmental 
pollution liability, product liability, liability for ultra-hazardous activity and liability for 
damage caused by animals or facilities etc. The draft Code provides broad guidance but 
deference is afforded to the more specific provisions of laws such as those on product 
quality and environmental protection.  
 
In addition, a separate Chapter VII of Part VIII is covering “Liability for 
Ultra-hazardous Activity” including 12 articles. Special attention will be given to 
Articles 45-47, 49 and 50 which are particularly relating to dangerous cargo liability.  
 
Under Art 46,256 as the author understands, there are two liabilities: (1) the cargo 
owner’s (and relevant persons’) liability; (2) the carrier’s liability. Regards to the former, 
if the injury or damage is caused due to the highly dangerous nature of the products 
while in transport, the manufacturer, owner, possessor, or manager shall bear joint tort 
                                                                                                                                                                  
government decided to follow a step-by-step legislative process, in which laws are researched, revised, and ratified 
individually, rather than attempting to legislate all areas of the civil code at the same time. LAC has set a goal of 
finishing the entire civil code by 2010. 
254
 For example, the existing laws on contract, marriage, adoption and inheritance were all incorporated into the draft 
Code with no change. 
255
 See the text of the draft Code (both in Chinese and English) at Conk George W., People's Republic of China Civil 
Code: Tort Liability Law. Private Law Review, Vol. 5, No. 2 (The 10th Issue), 2005, Peking University Press, pp. 
77-111. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=892432 
256
 Article 46: “Among owner, possessor, or manager transporting combustibles, explosives, poisons, radioactive 
material and other things of highly dangerous nature, if due to the matter’s dangerous nature damage is caused to 
another, the owner, possessor, or manager shall bear joint tort liability. On the basis of principles in the law of 
contract regarding the bearing risk, any party who actually satisfied the liability, may recover compensation from 
other parties. If an ultra hazardous material, due to its dangerous character, cause damage while in transport, a 
transporter who cannot show himself to be without fault in the occurrence of the injury shall bear joint tort liability.” 
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liability, and they are strict liable, pure and simple. The only defence is they can prove 
the injury is due to the victim’s intentional act or force majeure.257 Regards to the latter, 
e.g. transporter (carrier), his liability is based on fault, thus he can exonerate himself by 
showing that he wasn’t at fault in the occurrence of the damage.258  
 
If unused dangerous products (e.g. never used & not being used at the moment of 
incident) caused damage while in storage, the owner and any warehouseman/ bailee, 
shall each bear joint liability (see Art 47).259 In the author’s view, this liability is strict 
as well. 
 
Under Art 49,260 if a third party’s fault results in damages from dangerous materials, the 
innocent operator of dangerous cargo is entitled to recoup the costs from the third party 
after paying compensation. For example, if ship A carried dangerous cargoes on board 
and then collided with ship B due to the fault of ship C, resulting in serious damage to 
ship B, since A and B were both innocent, ship B, after paying compensation, had the 
right of indemnification from third party ship C. 
 
In the situation of the irresponsible dumping of hazardous materials, liability is covered 
by Art 50. It states: “if abandoned or lost ultra dangerous material due to its hazardous 
nature causes injury to another, the owner or the one who abandoned it bears tort 
liability”. Suppose dangerous cargo dumped by the carrier without good reason and 
causes damages, personal injury or pollution, the cargo owner or the carrier shall be 
held liable under the draft Code. 
 
                                                       
257
 Article 45: “If manufacturing, processing, use or employment of combustible explosive, toxic, radioactive things 
of great danger, which because of their hazardous character cause injury to another, the owner, possessor, or manager 
shall bear tort liability; but if that owner, possessor, or manager can prove/show the injury is due to the victim’s 
intentional act or to force majeure, he shall not bear tort liability.  
258
 See Article 46.  
259
 Article 47: “When not in use, but while in possession of combustibles, explosive, toxic, radioactive, etc. highly 
dangerous materials, that dangerous character does harm to another the material’s owner shall bear tort liability. 
When not in use, but another stores combustibles, explosives, toxics, radioactive and other such highly dangerous 
matter, which because of its dangerous character cause damage, the warehouseman/ bailee and other owner shall bear 
the joint liability. If different owners store highly dangerous materials at the same place, which, because of their 
dangerous character cause injury to another, and one cannot show that the damage is not due to his own product, the 
warehouseman/ bailee and the owner shall each bear joint liability.” 
260
 Article 49: “In case a third party’s fault results in an ultra hazardous materials use/employment causing injury to 
another, the ultra hazardous material operator, after paying compensation, has the right of indemnification from the 
third party.” 
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As we can see, in contrast to the 1986 codification, the draft Code has dramatically 
improvement including substantial changes with specific provisions in those areas 
affecting cargo such as product liability. Moreover, the draft Code emphasizes the 
protection of environment, which is particularly important in respect of the carriage of 
dangerous cargo by sea. 
3.2.3 Tort Liability under the Maritime Code 1992 
There is no separate chapter on tort liability under Maritime Code, but Chapter VIII261 
cover collisions of ships as regards fault-based liability in tort. This chapter derives 
from the 1910 Collision Convention, like the English s.187 Merchant Shipping Act 
1995. 
 
Art 169(1) of Maritime Code provides “if the colliding ships are all in fault, each ship 
shall be liable in proportion to the extent of its fault; if the respective faults are equal in 
proportion or it is impossible to determine the extent of the proportion of the respective 
faults, the liability of the colliding ships shall be apportioned equally”. 
 
As to the extent of liability, Art 169 (2) states that, the ships in fault shall be liable for 
the damage to the ship, the goods and other property on board pursuant to the 
proportions prescribed in the preceding paragraph. Where damage is caused to the 
property of a third party (e.g. cargo on the damaged vessel), the liability for 
compensation of any of the colliding ships shall not exceed the proportion it shall bear. 
It should be noted that the proportionate recovery for cargo on a colliding ship is same 
as that under the U.K., e.g. Merchant Shipping Act 1995, s. 187 (1); as well as all other 
states party to the Collision Convention 1910.262 No doubt, Art 169 (2) is applicable to 
third party’s property damage, e.g. cargo on board. 
 
Under Art 169 (3) the ships in fault shall be joint or severally liable to a third party if 
                                                       
261
 Articles 165-170. 
262
 See Collision Convention 1910, Art 4, para.2. See also U. Drobnig & K. Zweigert, International Encyclopedia of 
Comparative Law, (37th ed. 2001), 4-11 p. 74 
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they have caused loss of life or personal injury to the third party.263 In addition, if a ship 
has paid an amount of compensation in excess of the proportion prescribed in paragraph 
1 of this Article, it shall have the right of recourse against the other ship(s) in fault. 
 
An interesting question arises: does Art 169 apply to a third party’s pollution damage 
caused by both-to-blame collision? For example, when ship A (70% fault) collided with 
ship B (30% fault), dangerous chemicals leaked from ship A and polluted third party C’s 
fishing pond (e.g. fish died or devalued by pollution and C’ costs on cleaning up). 
 
As we know,264 the environmental liability (for pollution damage) is strict (e.g. Art 124 
of the Civil Law 1986),265 but Art 169 of Maritime Code is applicable to fault-based 
liability. In the author’s opinion, if we choose a broader meaning for the third party’s 
“property damage” under Art 169 (2) e.g. including those property (at harbour) damaged 
by collision. The “pollution damage” is still out of the scope of Art 169 (2). Therefore, 
Art 169 (2) is not applicable to C’s environmental pollution damage.266  
 
Instead, the Marine Environmental Protection Law 1999 (hereafter MEPL), 267 
specifically Arts 90-92 are referring to environmental pollution. Under Art 90 of MEPL, 
“whoever causes pollution damage to the marine environment shall remove the 
pollution and compensate the losses”.268 Accordingly, it is the polluter who has strict 
liability. Since chemicals leaked from ship A, so ship A should be liable for the pollution 
damage to C. That means ship A takes the primary responsibility and compensates C’s 
damage. Then he has a right of recourse from B to the proportion of loss represented by 
B’s fault with regard to both-to-blame collision (e.g. A-70% and B-30%).  
                                                       
263
 With regards to damage to the ship caused by a combination of collision and un-notified dangerous cargo in 
English law, see the discussion in section 6.1.3.1 
264
 See discussion in section 3.2.2 
265
 Article 124 of the Civil Law 1986: “Any person who pollutes the environment and causes damage to others in 
violation of state provisions for environmental protection and the prevention of pollution shall bear civil liability in 
accordance with the law”. Thus the environmental damage is not relating to fault, but based on strict liability. 
266
 For example, the oil pollution caused by collision is out of the account of Article 169 of the Maritime Code, see 
Xu Zengcang, Law application in the compensation of oil pollution caused by both-to-blame collision (in Chinese), 
(2003) Maritime Law Review, Vol. 9, p. 234. See also Si Yuzhuo, Maritime Law, (2003), Law Press. China, p. 255 
267
 For details of MEPL 1999 see section 3.2.4 
268
 In addition, under Article 90, “in case of pollution damage to the marine environment resulting entirely from the 
intentional act or fault of a third party, that third party shall remove the pollution and be liable for the compensation”. 
See full text of MEPL at http://www.asianlii.org/cn/legis/cen/laws/meplotproc607/ (accessed on 29/07/2009) 
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Considering third party’s damage caused by collision, we can see the pollution damage 
is different from the property damage (e.g. cargo on the damaged vessel).269 Only third 
party’s property damage can be covered by Art 169 (2) of the Maritime Code. That is to 
say, Art 169 limits the liability of a ship to the proportion of the loss represented by its 
fault at the collision. However, this provision does not cover the strict liabilities 
discussed in the Civil Law 1986 (or draft Code 2002), including environmental 
pollution liability. 
 
3.2.4 The Marine Environmental Protection Law 1982 
(revised in 1999)270 
The legal framework for the protection of the marine environment in China is based on 
the Marine Environmental Protection Law of the PRC 1982 (hereafter MEPL),271 and 
the regulations 272  made in pursuance of MEPL, and the relevant international 
conventions273 signed by China.274 Since China’s economy has developed rapidly and 
continuously and the conflict between environment and development is becoming ever 
more prominent, MEPL 1982 was revised in 1999.275 MEPL 1999 contains 10 chapters 
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 See Zhao Linyue and Si Yuzhuo, Research on Some Issues Concerning the Trial of the Cases of the Third Party 
Property Damage caused by both-to-blame Collision, (in Chinese), (2004) Maritime Law Review, Vol. 11, p. 96. 
270
 It was adopted at the 24th Session of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress on August 
23, 1982 and effective as of March 1, 1983, and revised at the 13th Session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth 
National People's Congress on December 25, 1999. It came into force on April 1, 2000. See the English translation of 
MEPL 1999 at http://www.chinamining.org/Policies/2006-07-18/1153190362d5.html (accessed 10-08-2010) 
271
 MEPL 1982 was adopted at the 24th Session of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's Congress 
on August 23, 1982 and effective as of March 1, 1983, and revised at the 13th Session of the Standing Committee of 
the Ninth National People's Congress on December 25, 1999. It came into force on April 1, 2000. See the English 
translation of MEPL 1999 at http://www.chinamining.org/Policies/2006-07-18/1153190362d5.html (accessed 
10-08-2010) 
272
 For example, (1) the Administrative Rules for Preventing Marine Pollution Caused by Vessels, promulgated on 29 
December 1983 and effective from the same day; (2) the Rules for Administering Marine Environmental Protection 
in the Oil Exploration and Exploitation at Seas, promulgated on 29 December 1983 and coming into force on the 
same day; (3) the Administrative Rules for Dumping of Wastes at Seas, promulgated on 6 March 1985 and coming 
into force on 1 April 1985; (4) the Administrative Rules for Controlling Environmental Pollution Caused by Vessel 
Dissembling, promulgated on 18 May 1988 and effective on 1 June 1988; (5) the Administrative Rules for Preventing 
and Controlling Marine Pollution Caused by Offshore and Coastal Engineering and Construction Projects, 
promulgated on 25 June 1990 and coming into force on 1 August 1990; (6) the Administrative Rules for Preventing 
and Controlling Marine Pollution Caused by Land-Based Pollutants, promulgated on 22 June 1990 and effective on 1 
August 1990. 
273
 For details see Section 1.1.1 
274
 On the other hand, in order to implement the relevant international treaties and to avoid potential conflict between 
MEPL 1999 and the international treaties, the MEPL especially provides that, in case of any discrepancy between the 
MEPL and the provisions of international treaties ratified or acceded to by China, the provisions of such treaties 
should prevail, except for those provisions for which China has made reservations (Article 97 of the MEPL). 
275
 It was revised by the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress and came into force on April 1, 
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with 98 Articles.276 In comparison, the old MEPL has only 8 chapters with 48 Articles. 
 
The MEPL applies to China’s internal waters and territorial sea, and all other sea areas 
under the Chinese jurisdiction.277 While the wording “internal waters and the territorial 
sea” is clear, the term “other sea areas under Chinese jurisdiction” seems to refer to the 
sea areas beyond Chinese territorial sea but within China’s potential exclusive economic 
zone (EEZ) and continental shelf before China declared its EEZ in 1996. 
 
There are many clauses in the revised MEPL that are borrowed from or drafted in 
accordance with the international treaties to which China is a party. For example, Article 
39 of MEPL, which prohibits the transfer of hazardous wastes in China’s jurisdictional 
wasters, reflects China’s commitment to abide by the 1989 Basel Convention.278 Also 
the definition of “Pollution damage” in MEPL is largely based on the definition of “the 
pollution of the marine environment” under the LOS Convention,279 though with some 
different expressions, as following:280 
Any direct or indirect introduction of substances or energy into the marine environment, which 
results in such deleterious effects as harm to marine living resources, hazards to human health, 
hindrance to fishing and other legitimate activities at sea, impairment of quality for use of sea 
water and degradation of the environmental quality. 
 
MEPL provides three kinds of liabilities, i.e. administrative liability,281 civil liability282 
                                                                                                                                                                  
2000. 
276
 These articles are divided into ten chapters. Chapter 1 General Provisions; Chapter 2 Supervision and 
Administration of the Marine Environment; Chapter 3 Marine Ecological Conservation; Chapter 4 Prevention and 
Control of Pollution Damage to the Marine Environment by Land-based Pollutants; Chapter 5 Prevention and Control 
of Pollution Damage to the Marine Environment by Coastal Construction Projects; Chapter 6 Prevention and Control 
of Pollution Damage to the Marine Environment by Marine Construction Projects; Chapter 7 Prevention and Control 
of Pollution Damage to the Marine Environment by Dumping of Wastes; Chapter 8 Prevention and Control of 
Pollution Damage to the Marine Environment by Vessels and Their Related Operations; Chapter 9 Legal Liabilities; 
Chapter 10 Supplementary Provisions. 
277
 Article 2 of MEPL 1999. 
278
 China ratified the Basel Convention on 17 December 1991. 
279
 China ratified the Law of the Sea (LOS Convention) in 1996. 
280
 Article 95 (1) 
281
 For example, the Harbor Superintendent has the right to order a law-breaker to remedy the damage caused and 
imposed a fine.  
282
 For example, all violators will be held strictly liable for any damage incurred to the Chinese marine environment, 
except those caused by “act of war”, “irresistible natural calamities” or “negligence or other wrongful act on the part 
of the departments responsible for the maintenance of beacons or other navigational aids in excercising their 
functions”. Article 43 of MEPL. 
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and criminal liability.283 The main difference between the new MEPL and the old one is 
that the Chapter on liability has been greatly expanded from the original 4 clauses to 25 
clauses, and accounts for over 22% of the total provisions of the MEPL 1999 (Arts. 
73-94). It provides for strict liability and the “polluter-pays” principle with more 
detailed and precise stipulations than in the MEPL 1982: 
1. More administrative punitive measures are added; 
2. Punishment for damaging the marine ecosystem is strengthened; 
3. Civil liability compensation for marine environmental damage is also 
strengthened.284 
 
Considering carrier’s dealing with dangerous cargoes during the voyage, although 
dangerous goods may be landed, destroyed or made harmless by a carrier under Article 
68 of the Maritime Code 1992, the carrier must ensure that the goods are dealt with 
without incurring penalties under Chapter 7 of MEPL 1999: Prevention and control of 
pollution damages to the marine environment by dumping of wastes.285 
 
For example, waste can only be dumped at sea after the State competent authority has 
examined and approved an application to do so.286 Dumping of waste into the sea is 
controlled in accordance with the categories and quantities of the wastes. The list of 
permitted types of waste shall be worked out by the State competent authority.287 Any 
conditions annexed to a permit must be followed and a written report subsequently 
supplied to the relevant department.288 The incineration of waste at the sea is forbidden. 
Disposal of radioactive waste at sea is also forbidden.289 
 
Prevention and control of vessel-source pollution are covered by Chapter 8 of MEPL 
                                                       
283
 For example the environmental crimes, ranging from causing pollution accidents, illegal import of hazardous 
solid wastes, illegal catching of acquatic products, to illegal catching and selling of endangered wildlife, illegal 
mining and illegal logging. See Articles 41, 42 and 44 of MEPL 1982. See also Article 338-346 of Criminal Law of 
the PRC. 
284
 See Zhang Haoruo, “Explanation on the Revised Draft of the Marine Environmental Protection Law of the PRC”, 
Gazettee of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China (in Chinese), 
1999, No. 7, p. 677 
285
 Articles 55– 61 
286
 Article 55 
287
 Article 56 
288
 Articles 59, 60 
289
 Article 61 
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1999.290 Vessels must possess certificates and documents for the prevention of pollution 
to marine environment and make factual records in conducting pollutant discharging 
and other operations. 291  Vessels must be equipped with corresponding pollution 
prevention facilities and equipment. 292  Vessels shall comply with the provisions 
provided in the marine traffic law and regulations and prevent maritime accidents of 
collision, running on rocks, stranding, fire or explosion, etc.293  
 
Considering liabilities arising out of the carriage of dangerous cargoes, under Article 67, 
vessels loaded with cargoes with pollution damage may enter or leave port or conduct 
loading and unloading operations only after obtaining approval from the competent 
authority. In loading and unloading oil, and other toxic and harmful cargoes, the parties 
concerned with the vessel and the port should comply with relevant operation rules and 
regulations of safety and pollution prevention. If shipping cargoes without distinct 
pollution danger, the assessment should be made in advance.294 Generally, failure of 
complying with Articles 67 and 68, give rise to penal liabilities (warnings, fines etc)295 
and in very serious circumstances, they affect criminal liability.296 It is very clear that 
the legislation wants serious accidents with grave consequences to be punished through 
criminal sanctions. 
 
In addition, if vessels are subjected to maritime incidents causing or being likely to 
result in major pollution damages to the marine environment, the State competent 
authority has powers to take compulsory measures to avoid or decrease pollution 
damage. If the maritime incidents occurred at the high sea resulting in consequences of 
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 Articles 62 -72 
291
 Article 63 
292
 Article 64 
293
 Article 65 
294
 Article 68 
295
 Chapter 9: Legal liability, Articles 73-94. For example, under Article79, “those who, in violation of the provisions 
of Paragraph 2 of Article39 of this law, transfers dangerous wastes through the sea areas under the jurisdiction of the 
People’s Republic of China, shall be ordered to have the vessel illegally transporting dangerous wastes withdrawn 
and sailed outside the sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China, and fined not less than 
RMB50,000 yuan and no more than RMB500,000 yuan by the State competent authority being in charge of maritime 
affaires.” 
296
 Article 91: “Those who cause serious consequences of heavy losses of public and private property or human 
injuries and deaths of persons by major marine environment pollution accident, shall be investigated and imposed 
upon criminal responsibility by law”. Article 94: “Any person in charge of marine environment supervision and 
administration who abuses his power, neglects his duty or engaged in malpractice for personal gains to result in 
pollution damage to the marine environment, shall be given administrative penalties by law. If the circumstance 
constitutes a crime, he shall be investigated and affixed for criminal responsibility by law.” 
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major pollution damage or threat to the sea areas under the China’s jurisdiction, the 
State competent authority shall have the power to take corresponding measures 
necessary for pollution damages which have caused or are likely to cause.297 As we can 
see the nature of public law is always shown in this law in relation to environmental 
liability. 
 
Besides administrative measures taken by a range of different authorities under the 
MEPL, civil liability is not excluded, but the law itself makes a general statement under 
Article 90: Persons polluting the marine environment must repair the damage and 
compensate for losses incurred.298  If pollution damage is caused entirely by the 
intentional act or fault of a third party, third party should be liable for the compensation. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that even the administration is encouraged to claim 
civil compensation from the polluter for certain damages suffered by the State (Art. 90 
para.2).  
 
Article 90 of MEPL is stipulated in accordance with Article 124 of the General 
Principles of Civil Law (GPCL).299 Article 124 provides that “any person who pollutes 
the environment and causes damage to others in violation of state provisions for 
environmental protection and the prevention of pollution shall bear civil liability in 
accordance with the law.” Article 124 is regarded as the legal basis of strict liability 
applicable to environmental torts under the basic law of GPCL. Indeed, both articles 
identify the civil liability for pollution damage and they are the principal sources for 
civil liability in pollution damage cases. Article 90 is regarded as more specific than 
Article 124, thus it is often referenced by Chinese judges as a legal basis in trials of civil 
cases involving pollution damage.  
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 Article 71 
298
 Article 90: “Those who cause pollution damage to the marine environment shall eliminate the damage and 
compensate the losses; in case of pollution damage to the marine environment resulting entirely from the intentional 
act or fault of a third party, third party shall eliminate the damage and be liable for the compensation. If the State 
suffers heavy losses from the damages to marine ecosystems, marine aquatic resources and marine nature reserves, 
the departments invested by this law with the power of marine environment supervision and administration shall, on 
behalf of the State, put forward compensation demand to those who are responsible for the damages”. 
299
 Article 124 of the GPCL provides that “any person who pollutes the environment and causes damage to others in 
violation of state provisions for environmental protection and the prevention of pollution shall bear civil liability in 
accordance with the law.” 
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In the author’s view, both Articles are far too general in nature and need to be clarified. 
Also the words of Article 90 need to be rephrased. For example, regarding the second 
part of the first sentence, there is a conflict of Article 90 with the basic rule of polluter’s 
strict liability for pollution damage under MEPL and GPCL, because the polluter can be 
exempted from strict liability due to the “fault” of third party under this Article. The 
wording of exemption from liability should be rephrased. One suggestion is: Chinese 
legislators could borrow the words from Article III 2 (b) of CLC 1992, which is much 
better phrased. It provides: “No liability for pollution damage shall attach to the owner 
if he proves that the damage was wholly caused by an act or omission done with the 
intent to cause damage by a third party”. In China, the strict liability for pollution 
damage has been established under Article 42 of 1982 MEPL300 and Article 106 (3)301 
of GPCL. Exemption from the strict liability is covered by Article 92 of MEPL 1999302 
which is similar to Article III 2 (a), (c) of CLC 1992.303  
 
No doubt, Article 90 needs to be clarified, rephrased and interpreted by Chinese 
legislators. At present, it can only be used as principled outlines without providing a 
sufficient guidance in trials. While the application of international conventions (e.g. 
CLC 1992) is restricted in certain aspects (only apply to cases involving international 
elements in mainland China), the handling of case relating to the liability and 
compensation for pollution damage is still lacking a sound legal basis in China.  
 
The author must admit that China’s legislation regarding the determination of liability 
for pollution damage (private law) is quite deficient, and the prevention of pollution and 
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 Article 42 of the MEPL 1982 provides that “units or individuals who have suffered damage caused by marine 
environmental pollution shall be entitled to claim compensation from the party who caused the pollution damage…” 
Although this particular Article was not copied into MEPL 1999, but there is no doubt that the civil liability stipulated 
under Article 90 of MEPL 1999 is interpreted as “strict liability” in trials. 
301
 Article 106 (3) of the GPCL clearly provides a strict liability by stipulating “civil liability shall still be borne even 
in the absence of fault, if the law so stipulates.” 
302
 Article 92 of MEPL 1999 provides “Those who causes pollution damage may be exempted from the liability if 
the pollution damage to the marine environment by any of the following circumstances can not be avoided, despite of 
prompt and reasonable measures taken: (1) War; (2) Natural calamities of force majeure; (3) Negligence of other 
wrongful acts in the exercise of functions of competent authorities responsible for the maintenance of light-towers or 
other navigational aids”. 
303
 Article III 2 of CLC 1992 provides: “No liability for pollution damage shall attach to the owner if he proves that 
the damage: (a) resulted from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a natural phenomenon of an 
exceptional, inevitable and irresistible character, or (b) was wholly caused by an act or omission done with the intent 
to cause damage by a third party, or (c) was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful act of any 
Government or other authority responsible for the maintance of flights or other navigational aids in the exercise of 
that function. 
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environmental protection is mainly based on public law. Accordingly, it is difficult to 
find a sound legal basis to decide an individual case involving pollution damage. 
Chinese legislators are expected to make some updated and specified domestic 
legislation (regulations and rules) in pursuance of GPCL and MEPL in this area. 
3.2.5 Strict Product Liability under the Product Quality 
Law (PQL) 1993 
Strict product liability is set out in the PRC Product Quality Law ("PQL")304 and is 
strict in the sense that liability is determined without consideration of fault.305 Under 
Article 41 of the PQL, a producer shall be liable for personal injury or property damage 
caused by a defect306 in its product307 if three elements are proved: (1) a defect in the 
product; (2) injury to a person, or damage to property other than the defective product; 
and (3) causation between the defect and injury or damage.  
 
The strict liability is not applicable to sellers of defective products unless the seller fails 
to identify the producer.308 Otherwise, a seller will only be liable for injury or damage 
caused by a defective product if his fault contributed to the defect. This is same as that 
under English law, such as Article 3(3) of the 1985 Directive (85/374/EEC) and the 
Consumer Protection Act 1987, s. 2(3).  
 
Failure to warn may constitute negligence and give the injured party a claim in tort. 
Article 27 provides that products whose improper use is likely to cause the products 
themselves to be damaged or to endanger personal safety and/or the safety of property 
should carry a warning mark or a warning in Chinese. It is a statutory obligation for the 
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 The PRC Product Liability Law was adopted at the 30th Session of the Standing Committee of the seventh 
National People's Congress on February 22 1993 and effective as of September 1, 1993, and revised at the 16th 
Session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress on July 8, 2000. 
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 Except for strict product liability, product liability in China can be based on another two grounds: (1) fault-base 
tort liability under the general rule of tort in the Civil Law 1986; (2) contractual liability. See details at 
http://www.iclg.co.uk/index.php?area=4&country_results=1&kh_publications_id=58&chapters_id=1500; See also 
Zimmerman, James M., Chinese Law Deskbook: A Legal Guide for Foreign-Invested Enterprises, (2005) 2nd ed., 
Chicago, Ill.: ABA Section of International Law.  
306
 Under Article 46, “defect” is defined as an unreasonable danger existing in the product that threatens the safety of 
a person or property, or a product’s non-conformity with applicable State or industry health and safety standards. 
307
 Under Article 2, “products” are defined as products available for sale following processing or manufacture. 
Primary agricultural products do not therefore fall within the definition. 
308
 Article 42 of the PQL 
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producer to warn against improper use. The content of the warning depends on how the 
product is expected to be used. If both end user and intermediary have a chance to use 
the product, the producer has the obligation to warn both the end users and the 
intermediary.309 As the author understands, other persons involved in the assistance of 
transportation or storage of products (e.g. stevedores, carrier, longshoremen and 
warehousemen) have the same protection as the user under the PQL.310 
 
Article 43 provides that a manufacturer and a seller are both liable when a product with 
an inherent defect causes personal injury or damage to property. If the claimant could 
not establish which of several possible producers manufactured the defective product, 
the legal position is that the producers should be jointly and severally liable to the 
injured party unless they are able to prove the injury is not attributed to them.311 This 
means that the claimant may claim full compensation from any one of them. The person 
who has paid compensation shall have the right of recourse against the other person(s) 
in fault.312 Suppose the manufacturer had produced defective chemicals. After leaving 
the loading port, in heavy weather, the defective chemicals exploded. The claimant 
carrier’s vessel was seriously damaged. He had a choice to sue either manufacturer or 
seller. Both of them shall be jointly liable for the damage concerned. 
 
Under the strict product liability regime, recoverable damages include personal injury, 
and damage to property,313 and also a liability for death.314 It should be noted the 
damage to property under PQL subject to all property, including “commercial property” 
and this is a significant difference from English law in which commercial entities 
cannot sue at all (s. 5(3) of Consumer Protection Act 1987).315 Nonetheless, the damage 
to the product itself is not recoverable in either Chinese or English law. 
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 There is no principle of “learned intermediary” in Chinese law 
310
 See Articles 41-44, the claimants are not limited to the user. 
311
 Article 4 of the Interpretation of Several Issues Relating to the Application of Law in Trials of Personal Injury 
Claim Cases, issued by the Supreme Court on May 1, 2004. 
312
 Article 43. 
313
 Article 44. 
314
 Under Art 44: “In the case of death, the tortfeasor is also liable for the annuity for those persons to whom the 
injured party owed a duty of maintenance”. 
315
 See discussions in section 4.2.2.2. 
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3.2.6 Defences to Liability 
Both the Civil Law and the Draft Code provide similar defences from liability. Art 107 
of the Civil Law excuses citizens and legal persons from liability when the damage to a 
party is caused by force majeure.316 Also, Art 167 of Maritime Code states “neither of 
the parties shall be liable to the other if the collision is caused by force majeure or other 
causes not attributable to the fault of either party or if the cause thereof is left in doubt”.  
 
Suppose with undisclosed dangerous cargos on board, the carrying vessel collided with 
another vessel as a result of the heavy weather. Both vessels sunk with total loss. If the 
collision was not attributable to the fault of any shipowner, and in any event it was 
unrelated to the dangerous cargo, accordingly the shipper should not be liable to the 
other shipowner’s damage. However, with regard to the carrying vessel’s damage, the 
shipper has strict contractual liability317 due to his failure to disclose dangerous cargos.  
 
In addition, “emergency action” may become a defence to liability. Article 129 of the 
Civil Law provides318 “in the case of danger arising from natural causes, one who takes 
emergency action to avoid or reduce the harm bears no tort liability or may bear 
appropriate tort liability.” However, if the emergency action is inappropriate or exceed 
the limits of necessity causing unwanted damage, the emergency actor shall bear 
appropriate tort liability. Under Article 131 of the Civil Law,319 the tort liability of the 
tortfeasor may be reduced, when the victim is also at fault for the occurrence of the 
damage. However, if the emergency was created by the defendant’s own negligence, in 
the author’s view, he can not benefit from this defence. 
 
Whether the emergency action is appropriate (or unnecessary) will depend on the fact of 
the case. For instance, if a shipper’s dangerous cargo caused a fire in harbour and some 
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 Force majeure is defined as an unforeseeable, unavoidable and unsurmountable objective conditions. For example, 
under Article 45 of Chapter VII of Part VIII (Draft Code): “If manufacturing, processing, use, or employment of 
combustible explosive, toxic, radioactive things of great danger, which because of their hazardous character cause 
injury to another, the owner, possessor, or manager shall bear tort liability; but if that owner, possessor, or manager 
can prove/show the injury is due to the victim’s intentional act or to force majeure, he shall not bear tort liability.” 
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 See Article 68 of Maritime Code, Art IV r6 of HR/HVR. For details see section 4.2.2.2 
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 It is Article 22 of Chapter III Defences in Part VIII of the Draft Code 
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 Same words in Article 24 of Chapter III Defences in Part VIII of the Draft Code. 
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longshoremen started fire fighting with CO2, however after putting out the fire, they 
used more CO2 on other containers (owned by the same shipper) and these containers 
were obviously safe. As a result, the cargoes inside were contaminated by the enormous 
amount of CO2. Accordingly, longshoremen are responsible for the undue damage. 
 
Practically, when a dangerous cargo claim is in tort, the defendant has the following 
defences (1) the damage or injury is due to the victim’s intentional act or to force 
majeure; (2) the defendant has no fault in the occurrence of the damage; (3) the 
claimant or a third party contributed to the claimant’s injury or damage. As we can see, 
the actual results of defences under Chinese tort law are similar to that under English 
tort law, although they are expressed in different ways. 
3.3 Analysis and Comparison 
Tort law has played a growing role between private individuals in China. However it is 
very rare to see maritime claims based on tort liability,320 due to the fact that Chinese 
maritime courts do not regularly admit claims on the basis of tort or contract, but prefer 
to rely on particular provisions of a statute law. 
After China changed to a market-oriented system, efforts to modernise Chinese law 
accelerated. The General Principles of the Civil Law has played an important role 
during the reform of Chinese society, but needs to be revised and updated.321 The draft 
civil code is expected to fill in gaps in current civil legislation322 and offers basic 
regulations on almost every activity that a corporation may take.323 It also offers 
guidelines in respect of the individual.324 Therefore, the Chinese civil law is still in the 
process of development. 
On the one hand, the principles of tort law in China have a lot in common with English 
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 For example, cases involving collisions are related to negligence of tort, but the courts prefer relying on Article 
273 of the Maritime Code 1992. 
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 There are lots of loopholes such as the lack of a clear definition of privacy and basic regulations on environmental 
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 It was said by Wang Liming, a civil law professor with People University of China. 
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tort law. Both Chinese and English tort law have two types of liability: one is 
fault-based liability; the other is strict liability. In China, both the Civil Law 1986 and 
the draft Civil Code briefly address the joint liability of tort-feasors. The meaning of 
joint liability has also been discussed in English law. Chinese law adopts comparative 
negligence principles, and it is same as the contributory negligence in English law. 
 
On the other hand, there are significant differences of tort law between two countries. 
For example, Chinese law has not introduced an occupant’s or vicarious liability. That 
means it is uncertain what liability the carrier has with regard to the tortious actions that 
its employees commit during the course of employment but outside of the navigation 
and management of the vessel.325 Nor is it clear what the carrier’s liability is with 
regard to any tortious action of a third party committed against the navigation and 
management of the vessel. It is expected that Chinese court would somehow hold the 
carrier liable to any tortious action that its employees commit during the course of 
employment.  
 
Moreover, there is no relevant rule of “duty of care” in Chinese tort law, it is expected 
that the Chinese court might impose a duty on the carrier and its employees to prevent 
any third party from interfering with the navigation and management of the vessel and 
to avoid the loss and damage to the goods caused by such interference. 
 
Considering the extent of duty of care, in England it is unlikely to impose a duty of care 
on the defendant not to cause pollution-related loss in the absence of physical damage 
(e.g. pollution damage to fishing pond).326 In contrast, there is no “duty issue” in 
Chinese tort law, but theoretically (pure) economic loss is possible to be recovered 
under Article 106 of Civil Law, if the defendant has fault and it is a proximate cause of 
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 Under Article 51 of the Maritime Code 1992, negligence of the shipmaster, seamen, pilot or other employees of 
the carrier in the navigation and management of ship is a common ground for the carrier to claim exemption. This 
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 Following the decision in Murphy v Brentwood District Council [1991] 1 A.C. 398 HL, the scope for imposition 
of a duty of care not to cause economic loss was severely fettered. 
  114
the economic loss.327 
 
It is good to see that the provisions of the Draft Code on liability for ultra-hazardous 
activity are more clarified, specific and in detail. With regard to the carriage of 
dangerous cargo, various parties’ liabilities, such as cargo owner, shipper or carrier may 
be covered by the relevant provisions of the draft code, while they are regarded as 
owner, operator, bailee or manufacturer etc, and in certain situations it is strict tort 
liability. However, most commonly the defendant’s act constitutes fault and contributed 
to injury or damage, he has therefore fault-based tort liability. 
 
Under the PQL 1993, the strict product liability is not applicable to sellers, unless the 
seller fails to identify the producer.328 Otherwise, a seller will only be liable for injury 
or damage caused by a defective product if his fault contributed to the defect. This is 
same as English law. However, an important difference is the commercial property is 
recoverable under PQL but not in the Consumer Protection Act 1987. 
 
With regard to collisions involving undisclosed dangerous cargo, the Chapter VIII of 
Maritime Code, like English s.187 MSA, derives from the 1910 Collision Convention 
and provides fault-base liability and each ship shall be liable in proportion to the extent 
of its fault. If the damage is not reasonably separable based on the degree of fault on 
each party, the shipper and carrier should be jointly and severally liable for all damage. 
However, in respect environmental pollution damage caused by both-to-blame collision, 
in the author’s view, the above rule (based on fault) is not applicable, since “pollution 
damage” is different from property damage in both countries, and surely “pollution” 
always related to strict liability. 
 
Furthermore, the re-assurance of strict liability rule in Rylands has vital meaning to 
environmental liability in England. The author argued that the rule in Rylands should be 
extended, so as to have a strict liability tort regime for ultra hazardous activities, 
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particularly considering the environmental legislation is not yet integrated and sufficient 
in this area. Unfortunately, there is no relevant rule or case law in China, as the strict 
liability rule in Rylands in England. But protection of environment has been emphasized 
by Chinese codified laws,329 and the strict tortuous liability regarding environmental 
pollution is under Article 124 of the Civil Law 1986. 
 
Moreover, regarding “ultra-hazardous activities”, there is a significant difference 
between two countries. In England, the Law Commission has rejected the approach to 
extend the strict liability rule in Rylands to ultra-hazardous activities.330 In China, 
according to Article 123 of the Civil Law, the shipowner can be held strictly liable for 
carrying ultra-dangerous cargoes. Furthermore, at English Common Law, the 
application of Rylands rule is restricted to foreseeable damage. Also “escape” from 
defendant’s property is a condition. If the shipowner is unaware of any dangerous 
cargoes on his ship, he will not be held strictly liable under the rule in Rylands.331 But 
in China, there is no specific restriction on the application of strict liability under 
Articles 123 and 124. In the author’s view, these provisions under Civil Law are far too 
general and need to be clarified, particularly considering the Chinese Maritime Code 
does not have any provisions regarding strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities. Also 
there is no relevant principle of remoteness of damage in Chinese tort law.  
 
Finally, the defences to liability in Chinese tort law including force majeure, 
“emergency action”, victim’s intentional fault and comparative negligence etc. 
Obviously, they have very different names from English law. But as the author 
understands, the practical results of implementing them in both countries are similar. 
Nonetheless in China these defences are implemented strictly according to codified laws 
and the scope of defences are relevant narrow. Comparatively in England there is 
enormous case law to apply and overall, the defences in English law have broader 
meaning in practice, and are more powerful than that in Chinese law. 
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Chapter 4 Liability in Contract Law in 
England and P.R.C. 
4.1 Introduction 
Most dangerous cargo disputes involve a contractual background. They may, for 
example, consist of a claim by a vessel owner against a shipper for damages to his 
vessel by dangerous cargo, or a claim for cargo damage which is lodged by the charterer 
and/or cargo interests against the vessel.  
 
For instance, if dangerous cargo overheats on board, the other cargo interests will no 
doubt claim for delay (such as demurrage or hire payments) and the extra expenses in 
cooling the cargo, seeking a port of refuge, discharging the hot cargo and contributing to 
general average.1 First, they may raise contractual claims against the carrier who has 
the responsibility to deliver cargoes in the state in which he received them.2 Secondly, 
the carrier may raise contractual claims against the shipper of the dangerous cargo, 
based on insufficient packing and labelling, or improper notice. Thirdly, the carrier may 
be liable to the shipper for damage to the dangerous cargo, if he does not exercise care 
and due diligence of the cargo. Fourthly, there is a possibility for the shipper to be liable 
to other cargo interests on the basis of the contract of affreightment.3 
 
Generally, there is freedom of contract in carriage contracts, but there are exceptions. 
The risks associated with the carriage of goods by sea and, more especially, those 
associated with the carriage of “dangerous” goods have to be apportioned, like all other 
aspects of the contract of carriage, between two interests: the carrier and the shipper. 
The carriage conventions, e.g. Hague Rules (HR), Hague-Visby Rules (HVR) and 
Hamburg Rules deal specifically with liability issues between two parties. These rules 
are often incorporated into the contract of affreightment. The vast majority of maritime 
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 Bulow, Lucienne Carasso, Dangerous cargoes: the responsibilities and liabilities of the various parties, [1989] 
L.M.C.L.Q. 346 
2
 Alternatively, they can claim in tort against the owner of the dangerous cargo. 
3
 Considering the issue of third party beneficiary’s right, the important legislative initiative embodied in the Contract 
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 will be discussed in this chapter, particularly in relation to contracts for the 
carriage of dangerous cargo. 
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jurisdictions have adopted and abided by HR or HVR. China does not adopt or abide, at 
least in pure form, any of them but instead, adopts a slightly pick-and-mix attitude 
between them. Consequently, the discussion on Chinese contract law is brief, since 
many liability issues covered by the Chinese Maritime Code are similar to that of the 
English contract law, e.g. they both apply the essential principles of HVR so far as 
carrier’s liability is concerned. Of course, the differences between them will be pointed 
out. 
 
In addition, there is a special clause4 in a bill of lading or a “clause paramount”5 
included in a charterparty6 that deals with the transport of dangerous cargo and they 
have the purpose of clarifying the allocation of risks and of making the shipper’s 
warranty absolute as a matter of contract. Furthermore, even in the absence of such a 
clause, at English common law there is an implied contractual obligation that the 
shipper will not ship dangerous goods whose characteristics the shipowner could not be 
expected to know or to discover by reasonable diligence.7 The shipper will be strictly 
liable for any damage resulting from his shipment.8 
4.2 The Liability of the Shipper to the Carrier 
4.2.1 English Law 
Considering the liability of the shipper to the carrier for damage caused by dangerous 
cargo, first, there is an implied warranty 9  and on occasion, indeed, an express 
provision 10  in contract law against shipment of dangerous cargo; secondly, the 
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 For example clause 19 of Ellerman East Africa/Mauritius Service Bill; clause 19 of P & O Nedlloyd Bill, Clause 22 
of Mitsui OSK Lines Combined Transport Bill 1992 and clause 4 of FIATA (FBL). 
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charterer has a greater discretion as to the cargo to be shipped and where it is more usual to find a clause expressly 
prohibiting the shipment of certain goods. 
7
 See Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading, 20th ed., 1996, p.105. 
8
 The Giannis NK, [1998] A.C. 605; [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 337, a cargo of ground-nut was infested with khapra beetle. 
The vessel was prevented by port authorities in the Dominican Republic and in the US from discharging the cargo. 
The infested groundnut together with the cargo of wheat was dumped at sea. It caused delay and other costs. 
9
 For example, at English common law, there is an implied obligation that the shipper will not ship dangerous goods 
without notifying the carrier in advance. 
10
 The contracting parties could make express provision for the consequences of the shipper’s failure to notify the 
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Hague-Visby rules might provide some parallel liability; thirdly, the Hamburg Rules 
make this liability explicit. 
 
It is clear that the shipper’s liability, whether under an express clause or by virtue of an 
implied term, essentially concerns undisclosed dangers. This can be avoided by 
disclosing to the carrier the dangerous nature of the goods. As for standard cargoes, 
provided that the cargo is adequately labelled and described in the shipping documents, 
generally the carrier will be able to discover its characteristics by referring to the IMDG 
Code. However, the IMDG Code is not always correct11 and not always up-to-date.12 
Despite the information available from the IMDG Code, the shipper may incur liability, 
for example, if the contents of the containers are inadequately described, or if the goods 
involve some special hazard that is different from those which a carrier of similar 
cargoes would normally foresee and guard against.13 If dangerous materials are not 
listed in the IMDG Code, the carrier needs special instructions from the shipper, and the 
shipper will be liable if he does not provide adequate ones. In addition, depending on 
the terms of the contract, the shipper or charterer may be liable for inadequate packing, 
marking or stowage14 of hazardous goods.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
carrier of the dangerous character of the cargo shipped. For example clause 19 of Ellerman East Africa/Mauritius 
Service Bill; clause 19 of P & O Nedlloyd Bill, Clause 22 of Mitsui OSK Lines Combined Transport Bill 1992 and 
clause 4 of FIATA (FBL). 
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 For example, some of the materials listed as being subject to spontaneous combustion do not spontaneously ignite, 
e.g. wet cotton is listed at page 4229 under UN number 1365, it does heat when wet to about 60°C but does not 
progress to ignition. See Watt, etc., Know Your Cargo, P&I International, May 1999, p.104. 
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 This affects the shipper’s liability to give sufficient notice about the dangerous nature of cargo to carrier. 
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 The Atlantic Duchess, [1957] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 55, 95. The same would apply where the hazard is of a foreseeable 
type, but is sufficiently different in degree to amount to a difference in kind. See The Athanasia Comninos & Georges 
Chr. Lemos, [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 277, 283; The Amphion, [1991] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 101, 104-105. 
14
 A number of charterparty forms express clauses dealing with dangerous cargo, e.g. Lines 21-22 of the Baltime 
form and Clause 4 of the NYPE 93 form. Charterers will be in breach if they load cargo falling within such clauses or 
if they fail to treat it before shipment in the manner stipulated by the contract. In the absence of express provision, the 
obligation to load, stow, trim and discharge the cargo is at common law on the owners: see The Filikos [1983] 1 
Lloyd’d Rep. 9. Line 78 of the New York Produce Form has the effect of shifting from the owners to the charterers 
the primary responsibility for loading, stowing and trimming the cargo: see Court Line v. Canadian Transport (1940) 
67 Ll.L.Rep. 161. The NYPE 1993 emphasises the transfer of this primary responsibility by providing, in Lines 103 to 
105, that “all cargo handling” is to be at the “risk” as well as at the expense of the charterers. In addition, under most 
standard forms of time charter, and many types of voyage charter, the loading and stowage of cargo is carried out by 
the charter or his stevedores under the supervision of the master. Unless the contract otherwise provides, the master is 
not responsible for bad stowage save to the extent (if any) that he ought to be aware that it affects the safety of the 
vessel, or that he intervenes to direct to the manner of the stowage. See Canadian Transp. Co. v. Court Line, Ltd., 
[1940] A.C. 934, 952 (H.L.)  
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4.2.1.1 Liability for Legally Dangerous Cargo 
At common law, the shipper may incur liability for “legally” dangerous cargo. For 
example, the shipments of goods which are not physically dangerous to vessel or other 
cargo, but only “legally” dangerous, i.e. give rise to delay, detention or seizure.  
 
In Mitchell, Cotts v. Steel,15 the court extended the shipper’s obligation of notice to 
cases where the goods themselves were in no way physically dangerous. The charterers 
loaded a cargo of rice on board the Kaijo Maru and sent her to Piraus, knowing that the 
cargo could not be discharged there without the permission of the British authorities. 
The arbitrator found that at the time that Piraus was fixed as the port of delivery, the 
charterers had not communicated the permission requirement to the shipowners; 
furthermore, they had not obtained the requisite permission. 16  As a result, the 
shipowners did not know and could not have reasonably known that permission was 
needed to discharge the cargo of rice at Piraus. Damages were awarded against the 
charterers for the delay caused.  
 
In the view of Atkin J the loading of unlawful cargo which may involve the vessel in the 
risk of seizure or delay “is precisely analogous to the shipment of a dangerous cargo 
which might cause the destruction of the ship”.17 Accordingly, a cargo will be legally 
dangerous since it is subject to the public law restriction. That is to say “goods may be 
dangerous if owning to legal obstacles as to their carriage or discharge they may involve 
detention of the ship”.18 However, the principle in Mitchell Cotts did not operate 
independently of legal obstacle. Indeed, in Transoceanica v HS Shipton,19 the court 
rejected an argument that a grain cargo containing stones was legally dangerous merely 
because the stones might clog up the discharging apparatus and thus cause delay. In this 
case, the barley loaded on board contained a quantity of sand and stones. The ordinary 
method at destination for discharging grain in bulk was by employing pneumatic suction 
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 [1916] 2 KB 610 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. p 614 
18
 This principle regarding legally dangerous cargo is shortly summarised in Scrutton at Article 53, page 100. 
19
 [1923] 1 KB 31 
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pumps. The stones in the barley caused the suction pump choked and the discharge was 
thereby delayed for a day and a half. It was held by Mccardie J that there was no 
warranty that this barley was capable of being handled and unloaded expeditiously and 
effectively by the machinery and appliances in the ordinary use at the port of 
discharge.20 Accordingly, the shipper was not liable for the extra time lost in the 
discharge.  
 
Generally, a shipper’s liability for shipping “legally” dangerous cargo subject to the 
principle in Mitchell Cotts, and it is governed by common law. A question arises: will a 
legally dangerous cargo is regarded as dangerous for the purpose of Art IV r6 of Hague 
Visby Rules? This is a tricky question. In the author’s view, the answer is “Yes and No”, 
depending on what kind of “legally” dangerous cargo is in question.  
 
In The Giannis NK,21 Longmore J held as a matter of impression that the words “goods 
of a dangerous nature” in Art IV r6 mean “goods that are physically dangerous”. 
However, in House of Lords, by Lord Lloyd and Lord Steyn,22 dangerous cargo “must 
be given a broad meaning” to the extent that such cargo is liable to lead to “physical 
damage” to the ship or other cargo. As the author understands, Art IV r6 includes 
“physically dangerous” cargo and “legally dangerous” cargo which lead to personal 
injury or physical damage. However, goods that merely cause delay to the carrier are 
probably not to be regarded as ‘dangerous’ within the Hague Rules, which is confirmed 
in a recent case Bunge SA v ADM do Brasil Ltda (The Darya Radhe).23 It was held that 
the shippers of cargoes of Brazilian soya bean meal pellets were not liable for 
expenditure and delay incurred in dealing with live rats which were discovered in the 
cargo loading, because a cargo loaded with a live rat was not a dangerous cargo under 
the Hague Rules. It was found that the cargo of pellets did not pose a physical danger to 
another maize cargo on board. It plainly posed no threat of damage to the ship itself. In 
fact the cargo was not rejected by the Iranian receivers after fumigating the cargo. 
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 [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 171, at 180; where Longmore J. said: “more over the normal meaning of the word 
‘dangerous’ in relation to goods does seem to me to imply that the goods are such as to be liable to cause physical 
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 [1998] 1 Loyd’s Rep. 337, at 341, 346 
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 [2009] EWHC 854 (Comm); [2010] 1 All E.R. (Comm) 784; [2009] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 175; [2009] 1 C.L.C. 608 
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Accordingly, it is most unlikely that the word of “dangerous” under Hague Rules has a 
meaning beyond physical danger.   
 
As we can see, only part of “legally” dangerous cargo is left outside of the scope of Art 
IV r6: such cargo not liable to give rise to any physical damage, but only to 
consequences such as forfeiture and detention (by the operation of a local regulation 
relating to the characteristics of the cargo). Obviously, the HR/HVR provisions will not 
apply to it. However such “legally’ dangerous cargo is still covered by the common law 
and the shipper has a strict liability.24 Surely, the common law indemnity is different 
from that provided under Art IV r6 in so far as the “legally” dangerous cargo is 
concerned. 
 
Finally, at common law the shipper implied undertakes not to ship dangerous cargo 
without first notifying the carrier of their particular characteristics. This approach places 
an onerous responsibility for such cargoes squarely on the shoulder of the shipper.25 It 
was argued by Mustill, J. in The Athanasia Comninos.26 If the shift in emphasis from 
“dangerous” to “injurious” were to take hold, then there might also be some justification 
for cutting down the scope of absolute liability, 27  since the range of dangerous 
substances could be constantly expanded. 
4.2.1.2 Shipper’s Liability under the Hague, 
Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules  
Both the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules28 make express contractual provision for the 
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557. See also, Gay, R. Dangerous cargo and legally dangerous cargo, in Thomas D.R. (editor) The evolving law and 
practice voyage charterparties (2009) Informa, p. 107 and p. 120; see also Rose, F. D., Cargo Risks: Dangerous 
Goods, (1996) 55 C.L.J. 601; 
25
 Ibid., p502. 
26
 [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. p277 
27
 Girvin, Stephen D., Shipper’s liability for the carriage of dangerous cargo by sea, [1996] L.M.C.L.Q 496 
28
 Up to 22 November 2006, there are 89 states adopted Hague Rules 1924, 24 states adopted Hague-Visby Rules 
1968 and 19 states adopted 1979 protocol; 32 states adopted the Hamburg Rules. The Hague-Visby Rules were given 
the force of law in the UK by the Carriage of Goods by Sea 1971 (the COGSA 1971), but the US is still clinging on 
longer to the Hague Rules 1924 and it was given the force by US Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936 (the COGSA 
1936). 
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carriage of dangerous goods, in exactly similar terms, under Article IV rule 6. By their 
terms, the Rules apply by force of law, however the effect is very much the same as a 
contractual provision. The rules apply between parties to a contract of carriage and they 
are often incorporated in a B/L or a charterparty, where their effect must be contractual. 
 
The Hamburg Rules specify requirements for the shipment of dangerous goods under 
Art. 13. The Hamburg Rules 29  go slightly further than the Hague-Visby Rules, 
supposedly because the number of dangerous goods has increased dramatically since 
1924.30 They specify that the shipper must mark and label the goods in such a way as to 
indicate that they are dangerous.31 Where the shipper hands over dangerous goods to 
the carrier or an actual carrier, as the case may be, the shipper must inform him of the 
dangerous character of the goods and, if necessary, of the precautions to be taken.32 The 
bill of lading must include an express statement, if applicable, as to the dangerous 
character of the goods, as furnished by the shipper.33 The provisions may not be 
invoked by the carrier if he has taken the goods in his charge “with knowledge of their 
dangerous character”.34 
 
There is no express definition of “dangerous” in either the Hague-Visby or Hamburg 
Rules, but both link special rules to the category. No doubt any substance listed in the 
IMDG Code will qualify but courts have tended to apply the rules to dangerous 
situations as well as to dangerous goods.35 
 
Although the Hamburg Rules have made more specific provisions, compared with HR 
and HVR, they haven’t fundamentally changed the known scheme of liability for 
                                                       
29
 The United Nations Convention on the Carriage of Goods by Sea (Hamburg Rules) entered into force on 1 
November 1992 when the pre-requisite number of countries acceded to the Convention. However, none of the world's 
major trading nations have acceded to the Hamburg Rules, nor have its provisions been widely incorporated in 
national legislation, reflecting a general view that the Hamburg Rules have over-compensated in their effort to redress 
a perceived imbalance in the Hague Rules in favour of shipowners. The Hamburg Rules probably cover less than 5 
per cent of world maritime trade. Up to November 2007, there are 32 countries adopted it. 
30
 UNCTAD Report: The economic and commercial implications of the entry into force of the Hamburg Rules and 
the Multimodal Convention (UNCTAD 1991), p.123. 
31
 Hamburg Rules, Article 13 (1). 
32
 Hamburg Rules, art.13 (2). 
33
 Hamburg Rules, art.15 (1) (a). 
34
 Article 13 (3). 
35
 See Jackson, Dangerous cargo: a legal overview, op. cit. at A5 
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dangerous cargoes.36 They all have very similar provisions for dealing with dangerous 
goods, which largely supersede the common law rules related to shipper’s obligation to 
give notice. Since the vast majority of maritime jurisdictions have adopted and abide by 
one or other version of the HVR, this section will focus on shipper’s liability under this 
regime. 
 
Art, IV rule 6 of the HVR is as follow:37 
“goods of an inflammable, explosive or dangerous nature to the shipment whereof the carrier, 
master or agent of the carrier, has not consented, with knowledge of their nature, may at any 
time before discharge be landed at any place or destroyed or rendered innocuous by the carrier 
without compensation, and the shipper of such goods shall be liable for all damages and 
expenses directly or indirectly arising out or resulting from such shipment. 
 
If any such goods shipped with such knowledge and consent shall become a danger to the ship 
or cargo, they may in like manner be landed at any place or destroyed or rendered innocuous by 
the carrier without liability on the part of the carrier except to the general average if any” 
 
There are two important functions of Article IV (6). Where dangerous goods are shipped, 
on the one hand, this provision renders the carrier immune from certain legal liabilities 
and/or compensates the carrier for certain losses suffered;38 on the other hand, it creates 
a liability for the shipper. This section will only focus on shipper’s liability. 
 
This provision distinguishes between two situations: 
- First: the carrier’s consent to the shipment of the cargo has been obtained in ignorance of the 
dangerous nature of the goods. In such an event the carrier is not only entitled to land, 
destroy or render the dangerous goods without paying compensation, but he is also able to 
hold the shipper liable for all the damages and expenses directly or indirectly arising from 
                                                       
36
 Girvin, Shipper’s liability for the carriage of dangerous cargo by sea, [1996] L.M.C.L.Q. 502 
37
 The provision is identical in Art IV rule 6 of the Hague Rules. 
38
 Where a carrier does not know about the dangerous nature and character of goods before shipment, he has the right 
to land, destroy or render those goods harmless after shipment without liability to pay compensation. A carrier’s 
immunity from liability will protect him against claims by any party to a bill of lading, or by any bailor (i.e. the 
owner of goods that are in the possession of the carrier for their safe carriage) on the terms of a bill of lading. Where 
a cargo owner who is not a party to a bill of lading brings a claim against a carrier, the carrier may be able to raise the 
common law defence of inherent vice to any such claim. 
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such shipment. 
- Secondly: when a cargo is initially shipped with the knowledge of its dangerous character 
and consent of the carrier, if the goods become subsequently a danger to the ship, the carrier 
is entitled to take similar action to avoid the danger to ship or cargo, without liability to 
shipper except as to general average. In this situation, the shipper will not be liable to the 
carrier unless general average is an issue. The carrier must bear his own costs since he has 
sufficient knowledge of the risk or danger, by agreeing to carry the goods, accepted that risk 
as well.39 
 
In the first situation, a carrier has the right to recover from a shipper regarding “all 
damages and expenses directly or indirectly arising out of or resulting from such 
shipment”. So far as the wording “directly or indirectly” is concerned, in order for a 
carrier to make a recovery from a shipper, it seems that he does not have to prove that 
the dangerous nature of goods was the “proximate” (i.e. the nearest in time or physical 
location) or the “dominant” cause of the loss. All that the carrier has to prove is that the 
dangerous nature of the goods was “a cause” of the loss in order to succeed his claim 
against the shipper under Article IV r.6.  
 
In The Fiona,40 in the Court of Appeal Hoffmann L.J. and Hirst L.J. considered that the 
wording “directly or indirectly” related primarily to “causation”. Hoffmann L.J. stated 
that it might make the shipper liable, not only in cases where the shipment of dangerous 
cargo “caused” the damage, but also “in cases in which one would ordinarily say that 
the shipment had merely provided an occasion for something else to cause the damage, 
e.g. if the gas had been deliberately ignited by an arsonist or the explosion caused by 
some highly abnormal accident”.41 However, it also held in the Court of Appeal that the 
wording “directly or indirectly” did not exclude the normal rule that a person (e.g. a 
carrier) cannot, in the absence of clear provisions to the contrary, enforce an indemnity 
against a person (e.g. a shipper) where one of the effective causes of his loss was his 
                                                       
39
 There is an exception, if the shipper is in breach of a term of the contract (charterparty prohibits the shipment of 
any dangerous cargo) not to ship dangerous goods, he will be liable; see Chandris v Isbrandtsen-Moller [1951] 1 KB 
240. See also Wilson, (2008) Carriage of Goods by Sea, 6th ed. p35 
40
 The Fiona [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 506. The facts of The Fiona have been summarised in section 4.2.1.5 below. 
41
 [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 506, at 522 
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own negligence or wrongful act. This will be discussed in detail in section 4.2.1.5. 
 
It has been suggested that the words “directly or indirectly” extend the rules of 
causation and hence by implication those of remoteness of damage,42 but no case has 
applied such an interpretation, for which it is difficult to see justification. 
 
This section of the thesis only deals with the first situation where dangerous goods 
shipped without notice and a carrier has a cause of action against a shipper. If there is a 
proper notice such as in the second situation, there can be no question of recovery from 
the shipper. 
4.2.1.3 Notice of the Shipment of Dangerous Cargo 
A carrier may lose his right to sue for damages arising from the shipment of dangerous 
cargo if, having been informed of its dangerous nature, he nevertheless carries it. In 
essence, the object of the obligation imposed on the shipper to give notice is to provide 
the carrier with the opportunity either to refuse to carry the goods or to take necessary 
precautions to protect his vessel and any other cargo on board the ship.43  
 
Once specific notice has been given by the shipper e.g. full disclosure of the nature of 
the goods, and the warnings and information are adequate for a normal carrier to 
understand and to guard against44 then, at common law, the shipper’s obligation has 
been discharged. If the carrier subsequently consents to carry the cargo, with full 
knowledge of the risks,45 the shipper will not be liable for any resulting damages,46 
because the carrier is the author of his own misfortune (see International Mercantile 
Marine Co. v. Fels,47 discussed below). 
 
Nevertheless, it is possible that a carrier may not have been informed of the dangerous 
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 Ibid. at 522 per Hoffmann L.J. See also Judge Diamond Q.C. in The Fiona at first instance [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 
pp. 286-287 
43
 Girvin, Shipper’s liability for the carriage of dangerous cargoes by sea, [1996] L.M.C.L.Q. 491 
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 Cooke, Kimball & Young, Voyage Charters, (1993) LLP, at 111. 
45
 Rose, Cargo risks: “dangerous” goods, (1996) C.L.J. 606 
46
 Wilson, op. cit. p36 
47
 International Merchantile Marine Co. v. Fels, 164 F. 337, (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff’d, 17 F. 275 (2dCir. 1990) 
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nature of a cargo, or has been deliberately misled. In such cases, it is clear that the 
shipper is in breach of his obligation to provide notice to the carrier of the cargo’s 
dangerous characteristics. However, in other cases a carrier may be given certain 
accurate information regarding the nature and character of the goods, but the question is 
whether or not the information and notice was accurate or sufficient. 
 
In The Athanasia Comninos,48 where the contract was for the carriage of “coal”, and 
the carrier argued that the coal shipped was particularly hazardous in that it had a 
propensity to emit unusually large quantities of methane gas. Accordingly, a special 
warning of its dangerous characteristics was required. Mustill J. held that although the 
incidence of risk with the cargo of coal concerned in this case was higher than with 
ordinary coal, the difference in degree was not so great as to amount to a difference in 
kind. He found that the damage was actually caused by the carrier’s failure to comply 
with safety standards of the kind which should have been adopted in the carriage of any 
cargo of coal. Therefore the carrier’ claim regarding an indemnity on damage from the 
charterer failed.  
 
From this case we can see that if the danger posed by a cargo only different from 
ordinary cargo in degree, the shipper’s obligation to notify the carrier does not extend to 
an obligation of a special warning regarding that danger. However, if the increased 
degree of risks involved in its carriage has changed into a new kind of risk, a special 
notice of the dangerous characteristics of the cargo should be given to the carrier. It 
seems that whether it is a different “kind” of danger is relating to whether it is necessary 
to have a different way of handling the goods, or different precautions to be taken. In 
The Fiona,49 the cargo of fuel oil was unusually volatile due to the presence in it of 
methane bubbles. The cargo was described as “fuel oil” but this was held inadequate on 
the grounds that, at the time of carriage (1988), the risks attendant on carriage of certain 
types of fuel oil were not generally known, so a special notice should have been given.  
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 [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 277, 283 
49
 [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 506, affirming [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 257. The owner’s claim failed on other grounds. See 
detailed discussions below in section 4.2.1.5. See also Cooke, (2007) Voyage Charters, 3rd edition Informa, London, p. 
162; Baughen, Obligations of the shipper to the carrier, (2008)14 JIML, p. 557 
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Generally, the notice50  must be presented in a manner that carrier with normal 
experience and skill would be able to appreciate the nature of the risks involved and to 
take the necessary precautions.51 Such information, if effective, must be communicated 
in an intelligible way to the right people (e.g. the shipper’s master), at the right time 
(before shipment). Otherwise, the cargo can be dangerous without such special 
information such as in Micada v. Texim.52 
 
Surely, if an experienced carrier is unable to locate information about the dangerous 
cargo after exhausting all other means, the shipper or charterer must disclose this special 
information. Put another way, the obligation to give notice applies only to information 
that would not be available to a reasonable experienced carrier.53  
 
On the other hand, if the characteristics of a cargo are well known, and do not involve 
any unusual or peculiar hazards for goods of that type, there is generally no obligation 
on the shipper to provide the carrier with any information beyond that contained in the 
shipping documents. In International Mercantile Marine Co. v. Fels,54 a vessel was 
damaged when naphtha vapour, which had exuded from a shipment of “Fels-Naphtha” 
soap, exploded in Liverpool harbour following a voyage from Philadelphia. The court 
held that the use of the word “naphtha” in the description of the goods was sufficient 
notice to the carrier of the dangerous nature of the goods.55  
 
Normally, provided the cargo is adequately labelled and described in the shipping 
documents, a carrier should be able to consult IMO publications, such as the IMDG 
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 In practice, a shipper will often provide a carrier with (1) comprehensive shipping documents/ instructions 
covering the carriage of the cargo; and/or (2) a Material Safety Data Sheet (“MSDS”), which includes details of the 
hazards associated with a chemical and provides information on its safe use. 
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 Cooke, Voyage Charters, (1993), 2nd ed., at 111. 
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 Ibid., at 347; see also Martines v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 529 F.2d 457, 462-63 (5th Cir. 1976) and held the 
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Code and the BC Code56 and cargo handling manuals such as Thomas’ Stowage. Put 
another way, unless the shipowner knows or ought to know the dangerous character of 
the goods, there will be an implied warranty by the shipper that the goods are fit for 
carriage in the ordinary way and are not dangerous.57 
4.2.1.4 Shipper’s Strict Liability 
Considering the nature of shipper’s liability relating to dangerous cargo, the House of 
Lords in The Giannis NK58 confirmed that the shipper’s duty is absolute both at 
common law and under the HVR.  
 
In The Giannis NK, shippers shipped ground-nut extractions from Senegal to the 
Dominican Republic which, unknown to anyone, were beetle-infested. There was no 
danger to the other cargo, but the infestation made the vessel unwelcome at its 
destination. The carrier had no practical alternative but to dump the whole cargo at sea. 
After which the vessel put into San Juan, Puerto Rico, it had to be fumigated and was 
eventually cleared to load her next cargo 2½ months later. The shipowner’s claim to 
recover damages for delay and other costs, together with an indemnity to cover any 
claims by the owners of cargo of wheat was successful.59  
 
The most important and interesting question, which has been addressed by both the 
Court of Appeal and the House of Lords in The Giannis NK,60 is whether the shipper’s 
liability under Art IV, r.6 was qualified by the principle embodied in Art IV, r.3,61 i.e. 
whether the negligent conduct at least was required. Hirst LJ rejected the argument put 
forward by the shipper, pointing out that the clear wording of Art IV. r.6 indicated the 
strict nature of the undertaking. Even if the undertaking was qualified by Art IV r.3 and 
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 The Code of Safe Practice for Solid Bulk Cargoes (BC Code) which is a guide on the standards to be applied in the 
safe stowage and shipment of solid bulk cargoes (excluding grain). 
57
 Scrutton on Charterparties and Bills of Lading, 20th ed. Sweet & Maxwell, 1996, p105. 
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the “act, fault or neglect” on the part of the shipper or his people was required, the act of 
shipment was sufficient for the purposes of the provision. 
 
The House of Lords concluded that, for a variety of reasons, the obligation in Art IV r.6 
of the HVR remained strict despite Art IV r.3. The majority considered the provision 
with regard to dangerous goods to be “free-standing”,62 whereas Lord Cooke referred 
the view that Art IV r.6, as a matter of construction of the Rules as a whole, takes 
priority over Art IV r. 3.63 In any case the English law position made it absolutely clear 
that the shipper’s liability is not fault-based and is not dependent on his knowledge or 
the means of knowledge of the dangerous nature, both at common law and under HVR. 
 
A question arises here: whether a shipper could exclude his strict liability under Art IV 
r.6 by means of an appropriately worded exception in the bill of lading? As the author 
understands, in England, except for “fraud”, all other types of liabilities can be excluded. 
Moreover, HR/HVR Art III r8 does not prevent shipper from doing so. Thus the answer 
to the above question is “yes”. 
 
Presumably, both Art III r8 and Art IV r3 are intended to regulate freedom of contract, 
as two parts of the same regime (i.e. HR/HVR).64 Art III r8 prohibits any contractual 
provision reducing the carrier’s liabilities below those stated in the Rules;65 Art IV r3 
does not allow the imposition on the shipper of obligations which depend on the 
shipper’s “act, fault or neglect”. Indeed, they are treated as regulating the express terms 
of a contract of carriage to control on certain topics the freedom of contract which the 
shipper and carrier would otherwise have. Accordingly, Art III r8 only prohibits the 
carrier from reducing his liability, not the shipper. Therefore it is possible for the shipper 
to exclude his liability, even if it is strict.   
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 Article IV rule 3 provides a shipper will not be liable for damage caused by his cargo, unless he is negligent and it 
is a general provision about shipper’s liability based on fault.  Article IV rule 6 is a specific provision dealing with 
dangerous goods which should be seen as exception to the provision in Article IV rule 3. 
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 [1998] 2 W.L.R. 206, at 224; Nicholas Gaskell, Bill of Lading: Law and Contracts. LLP, 2000, at p. 475 
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 Robert Gay, Chapter 6 Dangerous cargo and “legally dangerous” cargo, in D. Rhidian Thomas (editor), The 
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 Unlike English law, there is no equivalent provision of the Maritime Code to Art III r8 of the HR/HVR. The author 
suggests that it should be stipulated during the revision of Chinese maritime code. See discussion in section 4.3.2.3 
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Nonetheless, the whole issue of dangerous cargo continues to attract the attention of 
national legislatures, the courts and international conventions.66 This reflects the need 
to keep abreast of a constantly expanding range of dangerous cargoes which are being 
transported by sea, particularly considering the definition of dangerous cargo has a 
much broader interpretation both under HR/ HVR and common law.  
 
This approach undoubtedly places an onerous responsibility for such cargoes on the 
shipper’s shoulders, hence there might be some justification for cutting down the scope 
of absolute liability. Otherwise it will produce an imbalance between the rights and 
duties of the shipper and carrier. Under English case law, it is not easy to see any scope 
for cutting down the scope of absolute liability.67 As a result, the shipper and his 
insurers68 are put into a very difficult situation to bear the costs caused by undisclosed 
dangerous cargo. 
4.2.1.5 Whether Joint Causation between Carrier’s 
Liability and Shipper’s Liability Bars the 
Carrier’s Claim?—HVR and 1945 Act  
In this section, the author will discuss the above question mainly under HR/HVR. A 
brief discussion on the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 will be seen.69 
 
Art III of HR/HVR70 is mainly concerned with cargo claims against the carrier. 
However, it may also be pleaded as a bar to a carrier’s claim in the situation where the 
shipment of dangerous goods results in a damage or loss, but breach of the carrier’s duty 
is identified as a contributory factor. A straightforward English illustration is 
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Mediterranean Freight Services Ltd v. B.P. Oil International Ltd (The Fiona).71  
 
In The Fiona, a vessel was preparing to discharge a consignment of fuel oil. During 
sounding operations a serious explosion took place that resulted in the loss of life and 
damage. The explosion took place predominantly because the fuel oil had become 
contaminated with previous cargo residues (thus putting the carrier in breach of Art III, 
r.1), but also because it had a tendency (which the shipper had wrongly failed to reveal) 
to produce explosive vapours. The central issue was which obligation prevailed. The 
Court of Appeal held that Art III rule 1 was an overriding article and that the carrier’s 
breach of his obligation under that article prevented him from claiming an indemnity 
under Art IV r6. It should be noted that the unseaworthiness of the vessel in The Fiona 
was the major cause for the loss.72 However, if it is not the dominant cause, we can see 
a different result in The Kapitan Sakharov73. 
 
Generally, the breach of carrier’s obligation cannot be pleaded to Art IV r6, if 
non-causative. That is to say, if the breach of the seaworthiness obligation is not related 
to the loss caused by the dangerous cargo, the carrier would still be able to invoke the 
indemnity under Art IV, r.6 of the HVR. Indeed, the view that the question of causality 
is of crucial relevance has been confirmed in Northern Shipping Co. v. Deutsche 
Seerederei G. m.b.H. and others (The Kapitan Sakharov).74 In this case, a shipper 
misdescribed a container of dangerous cargo that was loaded on deck. At the same time, 
the carrier wrongly stowed containers holding a highly volatile chemical under deck in a 
poorly ventilated compartment. The container of dangerous cargo on deck, which had 
been misdescribed by the shipper, exploded and caused damage to the surrounding 
containers. This led to the ignition of the containers containing the highly volatile 
chemical under deck, which in turn led to the sinking of the vessel. The Court of 
Appeal75 held that the carrier was in breach of Art III r1 of the HR in failing to exercise 
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due diligence to make the ship seaworthy regarding the stowage of the containers under 
deck, but not for the dangerous cargo stowed on deck as he was not aware of its 
hazardous nature. Consequently the carrier was not entitled to claim an indemnity from 
the shipper for his liability for the loss of the vessel and under-deck containers, however, 
he was entitled to claim an indemnity for the on-deck containers. It should be noted here 
the carrier’s breach of seaworthiness was merely an effective cause, and not the 
dominant cause of the loss. 
 
Following The Fiona and The Kapitan Sakharov, the law can be summarised as follows: 
where both a breach of the carrier’s seaworthiness obligation and a breach of the 
shipper’s obligation relating the shipment of dangerous goods contribute to a loss, the 
shipowner will only be entitled to rely on the indemnity provided in Article IV r.6 to the 
extent that damage is clearly attributable to the dangerous nature of the goods. Where 
the unseaworthiness was at least a necessary contribution factor to the loss, the carrier 
will have to bear the whole responsibility in the absence of evidence identifying 
dangerous goods as the sole cause for (part of ) the loss.76 
 
Regarding the burden of proof in relation to the cause of loss in the above cases, it rests 
with the carrier (as plaintiff).77 Under the HR/HVR, where a carrier who has sustained 
loss in connection with the carriage of dangerous cargo brings a claim against cargo 
interests under Art IV r 6, the burden of proof was on the carrier to establish that the 
whole or a specific part of the damage or loss was caused by dangerous cargo.78 That is 
to say the carrier can only claim the indemnity (under Art. IV r6) for any part of the loss 
that can be shown to be due exclusively to the shipment of undeclared dangerous cargo 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Appeal emphasized that the essential question was whether the shipowners’ lack of due diligence in the stowage of 
the isopetane causing unseaworthiness of the vessel was an effective cause of the fire in the hold and the loss of the 
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such as in The Kapitan Sakharov. In the absence of evidence on the relevant proportion 
of loss due to dangerous cargo and unseaworthiness, the carrier cannot claim the 
indemnity and will be held liable for the whole loss such as in The Fiona. 
 
The above cases raise a very interesting question: should the defence of contributory 
negligence under the Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act 1945 be utilised and 
so allow apportionment between the carrier’s breach of his due diligence obligation 
under Art. III, r.1 and the shipper’s breach of his obligation not to ship dangerous goods 
under Art. IV, r.6? 
 
Section 1 of the 1945 Act79 permits damages to be reduced “where any person suffers 
damages as the result partly of his own fault and partly of the fault of any other person 
or persons...” Considering the carriage of dangerous cargo, if the carrier’s breach of his 
obligation can be qualified as “fault” (e.g. lack of due diligence), it does not follow that 
the shipper’s liability can be so described. As discussed in The Giannis NK,80 the 
shipper’s liability is absolute and not necessarily based upon negligence or principles of 
“fault”. Where a claim is based on the breach of an absolute duty, without negligence, 
the Act does not apply.81 The machinery of the Act can be utilised but only in the 
shipment of dangerous cargo where the shipper is at “fault” and he is in some way 
negligent or lacking proper care, skill or prudence,82 such as “inherent vice” or 
“insufficient packing” etc. In short, with regards to contractual liability (not tort),83 
contributory negligence does not apply to strict liability. 
 
Unlike the overriding obligation under Art. III r1,84 the carrier’s obligation under 
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 It should be noted that the words in S.1(1) of 1945 were repeated in the Civil Liability (contribution) Act 1978, 
ss.1(1) and 2(1). See also Spike Charlwood, Contribution and professionals: an overview of the 1978 Act, 
alternatives to it, and its relationship with contributory negligence, [2007] Professional Negligence, p. 83. 
80
 [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 337. 
81
 The 1945 Act does not apply to strict (as against negligence-based) contractual duties: see Forsikrings Vesta v 
Butcher [1988] 2 All E.R. 43 and Raflatac v Eade [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 506. See also Tennant Radiant Heat v. 
Warrington Development Corporation [1998] 1 E.G.L.R.41. It is submitted that the nature of the breach rather than 
the nature of the duty should be the guiding principle. 
82
 Cooke, Voyage Charters, op. cit, p 795. 
83
 As to contributory negligence in tort, see details in section 3.1.6.1 
84
 The overriding obligation under Article III r.1 in relation to Article IV r6, The Fiona [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 257, 
discussed above. In addition, where loss or damage results from the unseaworthiness of a vessel before or at the 
beginning of the voyage due to failure to exercise due diligence, the carrier is not entitled to rely upon the exceptions 
in Art IV r2 of the Hague Rules, Maine Footwear Co. v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine [1959] A.C. 589 
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Art. III r2 is expressly stated to be “subject to the exceptions in Art IV”.85 Accordingly, 
the carrier may avoid liability by proving that the loss or damage was in fact caused by 
one of the exceptions of Art. IV, r.2 (a) to (q). If the damage resulted from two causes 
(e.g. lack of care for cargo under Article III r2 and an exculpatory exception under 
Article IV r. 2), the carrier is responsible unless he can separate the loss resulting from 
each cause.86 If the carrier can separate the losses, then he is responsible only for the 
loss caused by his improper care.87 
 
Considering the carriage of dangerous cargo, if the carrier fails to comply with Art III r2 
(but not exempted from liability under Art IV r2), there might be a joint causation 
between shipper’s liability (Art IV r6) and carrier’s liability (Art III r2). However, there 
seems to be no direct English authority on the use of Art. III r2 as a defence. In the 
author’s opinion it should be discussed in two situations: (1) The only reason why a 
carrier failed to properly and carefully look after the goods was due to the shipper’s 
failure to provide proper information; (2) A carrier’s failure is not caused by any such 
lack of information. Obviously, in the first situation, there wouldn’t be a breach of Art 
III r. 2 by the carrier and the shipper will be held liable in full.  
 
In the second situation, if the goods had been shipped with the consent and knowledge 
of a carrier and if the carrier’s own failure on care of cargo caused the damage, then the 
carrier is liable and he does not have the right to claim an indemnity from the shipper, 
since his own wrongful act or negligence was the cause of the loss. In the Atlantic 
Duchess,88 the carrier failed to convince the Court that the cargo there involved greater 
risks than those which could be expected from the description in the contract of 
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 Article IV provides various defences for a carrier where loss or damage results from certain events (whether the 
cargo shipped is dangerous or not). Care of cargo under Article III (2) is a stringent obligation, there is nothing in the 
Hague or Hague-Visby Rules referring to due diligence to care for the cargo. Nevertheless, courts, particularly in the 
United States, continue to refer to due diligence to care for cargo. The reference to due diligence in caring for cargo 
has resulted in further errors. Some courts have stated that the carrier need prove only due diligence to care for cargo 
in order to exculpate itself. This is incorrect. See Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, 3rd ed., 1988, chapter 26, p551. 
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 Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, 3rd ed., p.557. This was clearly stated by the U.S. Supreme Court in The Vallescura 
(Schnell & Co. v. S.S. Vallescura, 293 U.S. 296 AT P. 306, 1934 amc 1573 at p. 1578 (1934)): “where it appears that 
the injury to cargo is due to either to sea peril or negligent stowage, or both, and the carrier fails to show what 
damage is attributable to sea peril, he must bear the entire loss”. 
87
 Detailed discussion about exceptions (Art IV r2) can be seen in section 4.3.1.5 
88
 [1957] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 55, at pp. 95-96. 
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carriage.89 Thus his claim failed. 
 
On the other hand, if the precautions would have been appropriate for the goods as 
described in the contract, but were insufficient for the particular goods shipped, the 
shipper would be held liable, because the carrier could not have been expected to be 
aware of the particularly dangerous characteristics of the cargo.90 This belongs to the 
first situation described above; the reason why the carrier failed to take sufficient 
precautions was his failure to receive proper information from the shipper. 
 
The real problem is where the damage was caused partly due to the carrier’s breach of 
his obligation under Article III r.2 and partly due to the shipper’s failure to informing of 
the dangerous cargo (it being assumed that the carrier’s negligence is not related to the 
lack of information about the dangerous cargo). If the carrier can separate the losses, 
then he is only responsible for the loss caused by his improper care for cargo and he is 
still entitled to claim indemnity against a shipper under Art IV r.6. Meanwhile, the 
shipper should not be entitled to recover significant damages materially caused by 
dangerous goods unless he can prove how much of the damage was caused by reasons 
other than his own breach of contract. For example, the reason for the damage is the 
carrier’s negligence on looking after goods and the shipment of dangerous goods was in 
no way related to the loss, such as in The Athanasia Comninos.91  
 
In certain circumstances, the damage cannot be separated due to two concurrent causes, 
e.g. carrier’s negligence under Art III r2 and shipper’s failure to notice under Art IV r6, 
it seems that the question is largely one of causation92—a causation analysis of 
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 Ibid., pp120-121. Pearson J. held that any extra risks attached to the carriage of butanised crude oil were not 
different in kind from those attached to the carriage of ordinary crude oil, and thus warranted no special warning. 
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 Micada Company Naviera S.A. v. Texim [1968] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 57. In this case, the cargo loaded was iron ore 
concentrate, the moisture content of which was such that it required the fitting of shifting boards. The master was 
given inaccurate information about the moisture content, and no shifting boards were fitted. Holding the charterers 
were liable for the consequent shifting of the cargo on the voyage. 
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 The Athanasia Comninos, [1990] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 277, pp.293-294. A claim by the shipowner based on the 
shipment of dangerous cargo failed because he could not prove the coal had special properties making it unusually 
hazardous in comparison with other coal. The shipper had no liability to pay any indemnity for the damage because, 
on the evidence, the explosion on that vessel had occurred when the gas and air mixture was ignited by a crew 
member striking a match to light a cigarette in the forecastle. 
92
 Durr, Dangerous Cargoes, presented at “Understanding and Manage Cargo Claims”, Lloyd’s List Events, 18th 
January 2006. 
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pinpointing which of the two competing breaches was the proximate or dominant cause 
of the loss.93 If the damage from two causes cannot be separated, and there is no way to 
decide which of the two competing breaches was the proximate cause of the loss, in the 
author’s opinion, the carrier and shipper should be jointly liable for the whole loss.  
 
It is also applicable to a slight different situation. For example, in the case of 
charterparty bills of lading,94 if the shipper95 is in breach of its indemnity but the 
concurrent fault is that of stevedores engaged by the charterer96 to load the vessel, and 
both charterparty and B/L have FIOST terms.97 With FIOST terms, the fault is in no 
way the shipowner’s (carrier),98 who would not be responsible for defects in loading. 
So he should be able to recover under the shipper’s indemnity from either the shipper or 
the charterer. Suppose the shipper has to pay the shipowner in full, what happens to the 
charterer? The author thinks: because there is concurrent fault of the stevedore (engaged 
by the charterer), the charterer should share the responsibility based on the proportion of 
damage caused by the stevedore’s fault. If there is no contract between the charterer and 
the shipper, the shipper’s recourse against the charterer would have to be in tort. If it is 
impossible to decide the proportion and no way to find out which cause is proximate (or 
dominant), the shipper and charterer should be jointly liable for the vessel’s damage.  
 
In a more interesting situation is where the shipper is in breach of its indemnity and the 
concurrent fault is that of the stevedores engaged by the carrier. If there is no charter, 
just a B/L on FIOST terms, it is not clear, despite The Jordan II,99 whether the Fiost 
terms would work or whether it would still infringe Art III r8. This point was 
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 The situation is different from two concurrent causes (bases on Article III r 2 & Article IV r6) which can be 
separated (see discussion in previous paragraph). It is also different from two concurrent causes in The Kapitan 
Sakharove (based on Article III r. 1 and Article IV r6) can be separated and damages caused by separated actions of 
different people (see discussion of this case in section 6.1.3.1).  
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 A “charterparty bill of lading” means if linking these contracts is through express words in the bill of lading 
incorporated the terms and conditions of the voyage charter. See also Simon Baughen, Chapter 11 Charterparty bills 
of lading – cargo interests’ liabilities to the shipowner, in D. R. Thomas (editor) The Evolving law and practice of 
voyage charterparties, (2009) Informa, London, pp. 217-250. 
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 Shipper’s liability is subject to the shipowner’s bill of lading, and most commonly the indemnity in respect of 
dangerous cargo (Art IV r6) will be implied into the bill of lading as well as the charterparty. 
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 Charterer’s liability is subject to the charterparty. 
97
 “Free in and Out Stowed and Trimmed”, a shipping term where cargo is loaded, discharged stowed and trimmed 
free of expense to the shipowner. That means the shipper takes the responsibility to load and the consignee to 
discharge.  
98
 See The Jordan II [2004] UKHL 49, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 1363 that FIOST clauses are effective despite HVR Art III r8. 
For details about FIOST clause see section 4.3.2.3 
99
 Ibid.  
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particularly left open by Bingham J in The Saudi Prince (No 2),100 where FIOST clause 
would only be effective to the extent that they reflected the facts and the contractual 
reality of the bargain between the carrier and the cargo owner.101 Although the B/L 
(clause 5 and clause 24) appeared to shift responsibility for loading and discharge onto 
the cargo owner, it was held the shipowner was responsible for loading, stowing and 
discharging, given the matter of facts was the shipowner paid for and arranged for the 
stevedoring.  
 
Suppose, the FIOST clause is not effective, that means the carrier’s loss is due partly to 
his own fault (breach of his duty under Art III r.2) and partly due to the shipper’s breach 
of his duty under Art IV r6. The answer will be same as what has been discussed in 
respect of the relationship between Art III r2 and Art IV r6. Furthermore, if the FIOST 
clause is not effective and the shipowner’s contractors (stevedores) have been negligent, 
an interesting question arises here: can the shipowner sue the shipper on the indemnity 
of Art IV r6, while he or his contractor has contributory negligence? One thing for sure 
is the 1945 Act is out of account here since it does not apply to strict contractual duties. 
So prima facie the shipowner recovers, but if he or his contractor (stevedore) has been 
very foolish, it may be an extreme case to argue lack of causation.102 We can see, 
generally the shipowner will be indemnified by the shipper under Art IV r6, then the 
shipper may have a recourse action against the negligent stevedores in tort.103 
 
In some circumstances, the carrier may lose his indemnity from the shipper. Suppose, a 
shipper did not notify the carrier about the dangerous cargo, but the carrier’s action was 
reckless. For example, his crew noticed fumes from a container soon after loading the 
cargo on board. After realising it was dangerous cargo, the carrier kept silent and 
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 The Saudi Prince (No 2) [1986] 1 Lloyd's Rep. (QB) 347, 352; [1988] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 1 (CA).  
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 In this case, the bill of lading (clause 5 & clause 24) appeared to shift responsibility for loading and discharge 
onto the cargo owner. On the facts, “unloading was carried out under the control and supervision of the master by the 
owner’s own stevedoring enterprise, with whose appointment the receivers had nothing to do whatever”. Also the 
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accepted responsibility for loading, stowing and discharging, even if this was done in the name of the receivers. 
Therefore, the shipowner would continue to be liable for the acts and omissions of the stevedores in loading, stowing 
and discharging. 
102
 See Beoco Ltd v Alfa Laval Co Ltd, [1994] 4 All E.R. 464, [1995] Q.B. 137 
103
 For detailed discussion on Recourse see section 4.7 
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continued sailing with his crew on board and did not discharge the cargo at a port where 
the ship had stopped, nor informed other parties. Finally the ship sank. In the author’s 
view, the shipper should not be responsible for the loss since it was the carrier’s fault. In 
this case, the carrier’s fault broke the chain of causation between shipper’s undisclosed 
cargo and the loss. Therefore the carrier should be responsible for the whole loss. 
Furthermore, under Art IV r.5(e) the carrier may lose his limitation104 because he was 
acting recklessly which resulted in his damage. 
 
The question of whether the unseaworthiness caused by carrier’s lack of due diligence 
as a novus actus interveniens,105 had broke the chain of causation between shipper’s 
undisclosed cargo and a loss of a ship was raised in The Kapitan Sakharov,106 where 
undisclosed dangerous goods were shipped in a container and ignited during the voyage. 
The resultant fire spread to inflammable cargo that had been wrongfully stowed under 
deck, in a breach of Article III rule 1. The shipper argued that the carrier’s wrongful act 
in stowing the cargo under deck was a novus actus, and such an intervening act should 
release the shipper’s liability for the damage of the vessel. It was held by Auld L.J. the 
shipper was liable for the part of the damage caused solely by the initial fire caused by 
undisclosed dangerous cargo but not for the consequent damage that resulted once the 
fire spread to the inflammable cargo stowed below deck. In addition, Auld L. J. cited the 
decision in The Sivand107 that “whether an intervening act is truly the sole effective or 
independent cause is a question of fact to be resolved on a common-sense basis to 
which issues of foreseeability and fault may be but are not necessarily relevant.” 
Accordingly, the carrier’s claim against the shipper relating to undisclosed dangerous 
cargo would not have failed by reason of a break in the chain of causation.  
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 The standards for the shipowner (carrier) to qualify the limitation of liability are pretty same under CLC, 
HR/HVR and HNS etc. For example, Article IV r5 (e) of HVR provides: “Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be 
entitled to the benefit of the limitation of liability provided for in this paragraph if it is proved that the damage 
resulted from an act or omission of the carrier done with intent to cause damage, or recklessly and with knowledge 
that damage would probably result”. 
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 In Oxford Dictionary of Law, “novus actus interveniens” is defined as “A new intervening act or cause. An act or 
event that breaks the casual connection between a wrong or crime committed by the defendant and subsequent act or 
event that breaks the casual connection between a wrong or crime committed by the defendant and subsequent 
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 [2000] C.L.C. 933, at 952 
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 Humber Oil Terminal Trustee Ltd v Owners of the ship ‘Sivand’, [1998] CLC 751, per Evan L.J. pp. 759-761. 
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4.2.2 Chinese Law 
Chinese maritime law is derived primarily from international maritime conventions, 
international shipping practices and maritime regulatory documents in different forms 
and of different effect, legislated by the competent authorities of the People’s Republic 
of China. It appears largely, though not exclusively, in the form of the Maritime Code of 
the P.R.C.,108 in force as of July 1, 1993.109 It is also worth noting that China does not 
apply, at least in pure form, any of the HR, HVR or the Hamburg Rules. Instead it 
adopts a slightly “pick-and-mix” attitude between them. The Maritime Code of the 
People’s Republic of China 1992 (hereafter Maritime Code) essentially embodies the 
Hague-Visby Rules, but these are coupled with certain provisions under the Hamburg 
Rules, and there are also new provisions, notably on liability for economic loss resulting 
from delay in delivery of the goods (Art 57).110  
 
For example, major elements drawn from the Hague-Visby Rules include seaworthiness, 
care of cargo, deviation, carrier’s exceptions from liability, limitation on carrier’s 
liability. Major elements drawn from the Hamburg Rules include the definition of 
carrier/ actual carrier, the period of carrier’s responsibility, live animals and deck cargo, 
liability for delay, notification of loss and damage of cargo, shipper’s liability, i.e. re 
bills of lading under Arts.72 to 74 of Maritime Code, which essentially ratified Arts.14 
and 15 of the Hamburg Rules with slight modifications.  
 
A good example for seeing China’s legislative “pick and mix” policy is through Article 
46 regarding the period of the carrier’s responsibility. Article 46 of the maritime Code 
distinguishes container shipping from bulk carriage. In the case of container shipping, 
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 Adopted at the 28th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People's Congress on November 
7, 1992, promulgated by Order No. 64 of the President of the People's Republic of China on November 7, 1992, and 
effective as of July 1, 1993. See the Maritime Code (in English) at http://www.colaw.cn/findlaw/marine/maritime.htm 
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 There is also the Chinese General Law of Contract. But the failure to segregate the various provisions dealing 
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following section. 
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the Maritime Code of P.R.C., (in Chinese), People’s Communication Press, (1993) pp36-79. See also Li, The 
Maritime Code of the People’s Republic of China, [1993] LMCLQ 204, at 209. 
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the carrier is liable for the safety of the containers from the time they have been 
delivered to the carrier to the time they are delivered to the consignee at the port of 
discharge (port to port for containerized goods).111 This essentially modifies Article 4 
of the Hamburg Rules, where the period of responsibility is from port to port for all 
types of goods. Since most containers with dangerous cargo inside are packed and 
sealed by the shipper (or his sub-contractor packer), the carrier is liable only for 
ensuring that the seal and container are intact. The shipper must be responsible for the 
authenticity of the dangerous cargo packed in an undamaged and sealed container. 
 
In the case of bulk carriage under Article 46, the carrier is responsible for the safety of 
cargo from the time that the cargo is loaded on board to the time the cargo is unloaded 
from the ship (rail to rail for non-containerized goods), which is very similar to Article 1 
(e) of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules,112 given HR/ HVR take the position that the 
carrier is liable for cargo from the time when cargo has passed the ship’s rail in loading 
to the time the cargo has passed the ship’s rail in unloading (rail to rail rule). The effect 
of Article 46 is the period of carrier’s liability for bulk carriage is shorter than that for 
container shipping. It should be noted that regarding bulk carriage, Article 46, paragraph 
2 does not prohibit the contracting parties from extending the period of carrier’s liability 
by agreement. For example, carrier may agree to extend his responsibility for bulk 
goods so long as under the port to port rule. However, Article 46 does not appear to 
allow the parties by agreement to reduce the period of carrier’s responsibility in respect 
of container shipping.  
 
We can see the defect of this “pick and mix” policy is, effectively, the carrier may bear 
longer period of liability for the safety of containerized cargo than that for 
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 Article 46 of Maritime Code provides: The responsibilities of the carrier with regard to the goods carried in 
containers covers the entire period during which the carrier is in charge of the goods, starting from the time the carrier 
has taken over the goods at the port of loading, until the goods have been delivered at the port of discharge. The 
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charge of the goods, starting from the time of loading of the goods onto the ship until the time the goods are 
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     The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the carrier from entering into any agreement 
concerning carrier's responsibilities with regard to non-containerized goods prior to loading onto and after 
discharging from the ship 
112
 Article 1 (e) of the HR/ HVR states that “carriage of goods” covers the period from the time when the goods are 
loaded on to the time they are discharged from the ship. 
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non-containerized cargo under Maritime Code. Obviously, it is different from the 
situation in the UK where Hague-Visby rules are implemented and two types of cargoes 
are treated equally in respect of the period of carrier’s responsibility. Here a question 
arises: will this distinction between containerized cargo and non-containerized cargo 
have any effect to the shipper’s liability for undisclosed dangerous cargo in China? As 
the author understands the effect will be the shipper should give notice to the carrier 
slightly earlier for containerized cargo than for non-containerized cargo under Article 
68113 and Article 46 of the Maritime Code. For example, the shipper should notify the 
carrier the dangerous nature of the containerized cargo in good time i.e. before the 
carrier taking over the cargo at the port of loading. To non-containerized cargo, notice 
should be given before loading on board.  
 
Finally, in respect of the relationship between Maritime Code and relevant international 
Conventions, as one of the main drafters of the Maritime Code, the adviser of the 
Standing Committee of the People’s Congress, Guo Riqi, pointed out: “The Maritime 
Code has been drafted strictly according to international standards, either from a general 
point of view or from specific point of view.”114 For example, in Chapter 2 of the 
Maritime Code, concerning maritime mortgages and liens, it adopts the provisions of 
the 1967 Convention on Maritime Liens and Mortgages. Considering the contracts of 
carriage of goods by sea in Chapter 4,115 although based on the substantial provisions 
of the Hague-Visby Rules, it incorporates many articles of the Hamburg Rules. 
Concerning contracts of carriage of passengers by sea in Chapter 5, it adopts substantial 
provisions of the 1974 Athens Convention. In Chapter 8, concerning collisions at sea, it 
adopts substantial provisions of the 1910 Collision Convention.116  In Chapter 9, 
concerning salvage, it adopts substantial provisions of 1989 International Convention on 
Salvage. In Chapter 10, concerning limitation of liability for maritime claims, it adopts 
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 See detailed discussion about Article 68 in section 4.2.2.2 
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 Guo Riqi, “An introduction to the legislation of the Maritime Code”, in the Ministry of Communications (ed.). 
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substantial provisions of the 1976 Convention on Limitation of liability.117  
4.2.2.1 General Laws of Contract 
Quite apart from the Maritime Code, however, there is the Chinese general law of 
contract. China’s General Principles of Civil Law118 became effective on January 1, 
1987. Prior to the adoption of the Civil Law, no statute existed that regulated the 
contractual relations between individuals. The Civil Law does not contain a separate 
chapter that deals with contract law. Rather, contract law principles are generally 
interspersed throughout it. The one exception is Section 2 of Chapter VI dealing with 
civil liability for breach of contract. The failure to segregate the various provisions 
dealing with contract law, combined with the absence of an index, makes the Civil Law 
difficult to use.119 Moreover, the Civil Law is not integrated with the other laws, 
statutes, and regulations dealing with contract law. The need to coordinate among the 
various laws affecting contract is especially noteworthy. 
 
On March 15, 1999, the National People's Congress of China took a bold step towards 
modernising the country's legal system and its fledgling market economy by enacting 
the Unified Contract Law (UCL).120 The UCL, which took effect on October 1, 1999, is 
extensive and sophisticated. Structurally, the Unified Contract Law is divided into three 
parts - General Provisions, Specific Provisions and Supplementary Provisions - with 23 
Chapters featuring 428 Articles.121 The UCL does not replace the contract provisions of 
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the Civil Law 1987, but it is a more specific legislation on contract law and is often 
used as reference in trials.122  
 
When drafting the Unified Contract Law (UCL), the Chinese legislators123 referred 
extensively to the UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts,124 in 
particular those provisions in the chapter on General Provisions.125 However, it is 
insufficient to have only general provisions without specific rules to deal with concrete 
cases. This is why specific provisions were included to regulate different kinds of 
contract under the second part of this legislation, e.g. Chapter 17 entitled: “Transport 
Contract”, including four sections, with a total of thirty four Articles.126 Most are 
general provisions covering transport by sea, air, rail and road. Since these provisions 
are broadly worded (not as specific as the Maritime Code), in practice they are rarely 
used in Maritime disputes.  
4.2.2.2 Shipper’s Liability under Chinese Maritime 
Code127 
Chapter 4 of the Maritime Code covers “Contract of Carriage of Goods by Sea”. It runs 
to eight parts, embodying Articles 41-106.128 The shipper’s liability in respect of 
carriage of dangerous cargo appears under Article 68, and is effectively Article 13 of 
Hamburg Rules in another guise: 
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 See Zhang Yuqing & Huan Danhan, The New Contract Law in the People's Republic of China and the UNIDROIT 
Principles of International Commercial Contracts : A Brief Comparison. See details 
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passengers; section 3: Contract of carriage of goods and section 4: Multi-model transport contract (Articles 288-321). 
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 See the Maritime Code in details at footnote 108 
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 Chapter 4 of the Maritime Code: Section 1 Basic Principles; Section 2 Carrier’s responsibilities; section 3 
Shipper’s responsibilities; section 4 Transport documents; section 5 Delivery of goods; section 6 Cancellation of 
contract; section 7 Special provisions regarding voyage charter party; section 8 Special provisions regarding 
multi-model transport contract. 
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“At the time of shipment of dangerous goods, the shipper shall, in compliance with the 
regulations governing the carriage of such goods, ensure they are properly packed, distinctly 
marked and labelled and notify the carrier in writing of their proper description, nature and the 
precautions to be taken. Where the shipper fails to notify the carrier or notifies him inaccurately, 
the carrier may have such goods landed, destroyed or rendered innocuous when and where 
circumstances so require, without compensation. The shipper shall be liable to the carrier for 
any loss, damage or expense resulting from such shipment. 
Notwithstanding the carrier’s knowledge of the nature of the dangerous goods and his consent 
to their carriage, he may still have such goods landed, destroyed or rendered innocuous, without 
compensation, when they become an actual danger to the ship, the crew and other persons on 
board or other goods. However, the provisions of this paragraph shall not prejudice the 
contribution in general average, if any.” 
 
As far as the shipper’s liability is concerned, Article 68 has the following meaning: First 
the shipper is obliged to follow the required standards for carrying dangerous goods i.e. 
the packaging and labelling dangerous goods. The shipper must inform the carrier in 
writing of the name and dangerous nature of the goods and provide sufficient 
instructions for carrying them. If the shipper breaches this obligation, the carrier is 
entitled to discharge, destroy or take any measures deemed to be necessary by him or 
her after discovering the dangerous nature of the goods carried.  
 
Article 68 has specified that shipper has the responsibility to pack, mark and label the 
goods in a suitable manner as dangerous. For example, in China Foreign Trade 
Transportation Corporation v. China International Petroleum and Chemicals (Qinu) 
Company and Petroleum and Chemicals Import and Export Company of Shanghai,129 
the defendants failed to pack the cargo of dangerous chemicals adequately and the 
plaintiff carrier had to sail from Singapore back to Qingdao Port, the original port of 
departure, to deal with a dangerous gas leaking from the cargo. The Maritime Court in 
Qingdao in 1991 held that the packaging of the chemicals did not meet the standards set 
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 The Institution for Practice Legal Research of the National Supreme Court, ed., Selected Cases of the People’s 
Court (in Chinese), (1992) Vol. 1, Publishing House of the People’s Court, Beijing, pp 147-154. 
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out in the relevant international convention (IMDG Code) and supported the plaintiff’s 
argument that the cost to clear up the gas from the holds carrying the chemicals in 
Amsterdam would be too great to justify the continuation of the planned journey after 
the leakage was discovered in Singapore. The defendant was liable for damages and 
costs caused by the dangerous gas leaking from the cargo. 
 
In certain circumstances, if the hazardous substance is not listed in the IMDG Code, the 
shipper will be held liable for inadequate notice or insufficient packing under Maritime 
Code 1992. In Orient Overseas Container Line Inc v. Sinochem Shandong Yantai Import 
& Export Co Ltd (Sinochem), and Yantai Native Products and Animal By-Products 
Import & Export Group Co Ltd (NPAB), (The Steady Crocodile),130 the plaintiff (carrier) 
accepted a booking by NPAB on 15 August 1997 and issued an original shipped bill of 
lading (B/L). The B/L indicated that the cargo was thiocarbomide dioxide, the carrying 
ship was The Steady Crocodile, the port of discharge was Los Angeles, and the shipper 
was NPAB. On the night of 19 August 1997, when The Steady Crocodile was berthed at 
Shanghai, the second hold began to fume. According to the investigation of the 
Shanghai Pudong New Zone Environment Monitoring Centre, the fumes were 
attributable to the spontaneous combustion of thiocarbamide dioxide loaded in container 
number OOLU3360121. The ship left this container at the terminal and arrived at Kobe 
on 23 August. After arrival, the plaintiff appointed Seagull Marine (Yokohama) Co Ltd 
to inspect the contamination of the vessel and the conclusion was that the second hold, 
which held number OOLU3360121 container, and the surfaces of 25 other containers 
were contaminated. In August 1997 and August 1998, the plaintiff appointed Shanghai 
Zhong Heng Consulting Co Ltd Edmondson (a Hong Kong expert) and Mullen (a 
Singaporean expert) to examine the polluted container, and their conclusions were that 
the spontaneous combustion was attributable to improper stowage since there was no 
proper segregation or fixation between the cargo and container. Turbulence caused by 
rough seas led to several broken packages and the moisture came into contact with the 
dangerous cargoes. According to the investigation, Sinochem and NPAB concluded a 
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http://www.ccmt.org.cn/hs/news/show.php?cId=5693 
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contract individually and NPAB was not liable for any disputes caused. 
 
It was held,131 according to the PRC Maritime Code 1992 Article 66,132 that NPAB 
(shipper) had the obligation of proper packaging and encasing, so he was liable for the 
resulting damage. Sinochem was only the cargo owner without any contractual 
relationship with the plaintiff carrier. The export agency contract between NPAB and 
Sinochem could not antagonise the carrier. From this decision, we can see, although the 
thiocarbomide dioxide was not listed in the IMDG Code133 when the contamination 
happened,134 it did not exclude the obligation of packaging and encasing imposed on 
the shipper by Article 68 of Maritime Code 1992. It should be noted that the 
thiocarbomide dioxide was stowed under deck by the carrier and in this case it was not 
negligent stowage at that time since there was no specific requirement for it under the 
old IMDG Code. However, according to the new IMDG Code,135 the thiocarbomide 
dioxide has to be stowed on deck.  
 
If this case happened after the cargo was listed in the IMDG Code, in the author’s 
opinion, the spontaneous combustion would be attributable to insufficient packaging by 
the shipper and improper stowed by the carrier. Since Chinese law allows the reduction 
of contractual liability for contributory negligence under Article 113 of the Civil Law,136 
the shipper’s liability should be deducted by certain amount subject to the carrier’s 
negligent stowage. That is to say Chinese law allows loss caused by the contributing 
fault of both the shipper and the carrier to be apportioned between these parties. This is 
very different from the existing English law137 where the carrier would (under the 
HVR), clearly be held liable for the entire loss unless it could show that a quantifiable 
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 The first instance was before Shanghai Maritime Court [1998] No. 419. The decision was given by Yongkang 
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 Article 66: the shipper shall have the goods properly packed and shall guarantee the accuracy of the description, 
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liability”. See the discussion of “The Jin Han” on application of the contributory negligence in contract under Article 
113 in section 4.3.2.1 
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 For a summary of the legal position of English law, see The Kapitan Sakharov [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 255, see 
particularly the statement by Auld LJ at 267-270. See also the Court of Appeal decision in The Fiona [1994] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep. 506, particularly the speeches of Hirst LJ at p 519 and Hoffmann LJ at p 521. See also section 4.2.1.5 
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part of loss was not at all due to its negligence. 
 
In the second situation described in paragraph two of Article 68, if the shipper has 
complied with the obligation to pack and label the dangerous goods and has provided 
sufficient information for transportation, and the carrier has given consent to carry the 
cargo, the carrier is entitled to dispose of the goods for the safety of the ship or other 
cargoes on board when necessary and without compensation for the loss of dangerous 
cargo to the shipper. However, the carrier must bear his own costs and fees on dealing 
with dangerous cargo. In this situation, the carrier and shipper are not liable to each 
other unless general average is an issue. On the other hand, if the carrier fails to follow 
the instructions for carrying the dangerous goods correctly and has caused loss or 
damage to the dangerous goods or other goods on board, the carrier will be liable to 
compensate such loss or damage. 
 
If the carrier has proper notice from shipper and consents to carry the dangerous cargo, 
the shipper will be still liable for damages if the packing was inadequate and would 
have to pay the expenses incurred by the carrier. In Ocean Shipping Co of Shanghai v. 
Haerbing Chemical Products Import and Export (Dalian) Co,138 the defendant shipper, 
contracted the plaintiff carrier to ship 29 containers of acetic acid from the Port of 
Dalian to Japan in August 1991. The cargo was carried with the knowledge of the 
carrier., but many barrels containing the chemical were defective and the inadequate 
packing was not detectable by the carrier. Several containers housing the defective 
barrels showed serious leakage of acetic acid when the vessel arrived at the Port of 
Kobe. The local stevedore refused to unload the leaking containers. The carrier 
informed the shipper of the incident and the shipper instructed the carrier to bring the 
containers back to the Port of Dalian. The vessel visited the Port of Nagoya to discharge 
other cargoes on board. However the Japanese Maritime Safety Bureau discovered the 
leakage and banned the vessel from stopping at any Japanese port. The vessel sailed 
back to the Port of Dalian with the 29 containers containing the chemical and the other 
95 containers that should have been unloaded at the Port of Yokohama. The vessel had 
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 Select Cases of the People’s Court, op. cit., vol. 10, 1994, pp152-160. 
  148
to cancel its plan to bring 71 containers from Japan to China because of its inability to 
discharge containers in Japan.  
 
In March 1992, it was held by the Maritime Court of Dalian that the shipper had the 
obligation to properly pack the dangerous chemical, so he was liable for the resulting 
damage. The carrier was allowed to claim the losses arising from the return carriage of 
29 containers, the loss of freight arising from the next scheduled voyage of carrying the 
71 containers to China, the costs for inspecting and repairing the containers and the 
vessel, the cost for inspecting the containers in Japan and the cost for storing the 
containers in the Dalian Port. Interest on the losses and costs claimed were also granted. 
The Court of the Appeal disallowed the claim for the loss of the next scheduled voyage 
because the carrier had arranged another vessel to carry the containers concerned. The 
Court of Appeal also reduced the costs for inspection in China, for repairing the 
containers and vessel and for storage of the containers because the carrier was held to be 
partially liable for the costs incurred. 
 
This case involved the occurrence of indirect loss to the shipment of dangerous cargo. If 
the carrier didn’t arrange another vessel to bring the 71 containers to China but he 
carried it back in his own ship, in the author’s opinion the carrier’s loss of freight should 
have been compensated by the shipper since the leaking containers with the acetic acid 
inside was the main reason of this loss.  
4.2.2.3 Further Discussion and Recommendation 
As we know, the acetic acid in the above case was carried with the knowledge of the 
carrier, but the packing was defective, if this case was determined under the HR/ HVR, 
the carrier may perhaps rely on Art IV r3 to allege that the loss concerned was caused 
by the fault or negligence of the shipper. It relates to the shipper’s obligations to give 
notice to the carrier and properly pack and label his cargo. With regard to the shipper’s 
liability to give notice, after The Giannis NK,139 the position of English law is made 
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absolutely clear that the liability is strict,140 both at common law and under the HVR. 
 
With respect to the shipper’s liability to the carrier, the relevant provisions under 
Maritime Code are largely Hamburg-based which have made more specific provisions, 
but haven’t fundamentally changed the scheme of liability for dangerous cargoes under 
HR/ HVR. No doubt, the liability of the shipper to give notice, under Article 68, is 
strict.  
 
It is not clear whether the shipper’s liability for incorrect labelling and insufficient 
packing under Article 68, it is strict or based on fault. In fact, the shipper’s liability for 
labelling and packing has already been specifically stipulated by Articles 66141 and 
70.142 Therefore, the author suggests that there is no need to repeat the same issue in 
Article 68 without further clarification or specification. According to Articles 66 and 70, 
the shipper’s liability of incorrect labelling and insufficient packing is based on fault. 
 
Another issue the author would like to point out is the definition of “actual carrier” 
under Maritime Code,143 which is largely Hamburg based, has resulted in confusions 
relating to the shipper’s notice to the carrier under Article 68. 
 
Under Article 68, it is only referring to the shipper’s liability to notify the carrier of 
cargo’s proper description. It is not clear whether the shipper’s notice to the “carrier” 
also includes the actual carrier. The author presumes the answer is “yes” given the 
meaning of Article 61: “The provisions with respect to the responsibility of the carrier 
contained in this Chapter shall be applicable to the actual carrier”. The author suggests 
the wording of “actual carrier” should be added to Article 68.  
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Also in practice, the shipper’s agent or carrier’s agent often act for their principal while 
dealing with the transportation of dangerous cargo. These persons are usually involved 
in the day-to-day business near the harbour. Unfortunately, in the Maritime Code, there 
is a lack of clarification of the status of agent’s right and liability relating to the carriage 
of dangerous cargo. In my view, Article 68 needs to be clarified such that it applies to 
the shipper’s and carrier’s agents. 
 
Whether or not the “actual carrier” knows of dangerous cargos has meaning of 
importance in relation to the safety of transportation. No doubt, the scope of “carrier” 
should include the actual carrier or the person that has the authority to act as a carrier, 
such as ship master. In practice, the master is the person in charge of the ship and 
cargo.144 It is the most straight and effective way to notice him about the dangerous 
nature of cargoes and make sure proper precaution has been done on board. 
Unfortunately the provision of Article 68 does not clarify the meaning of carrier at all.  
 
In comparison, in England the shipper’s liability to notify the carrier is under Article IV 
r6 of HR/HVR, which is specified to apply to “the carrier, master or agent of the 
carrier”, and this provision is very clearly promulgated regarding to the meaning of 
carrier. 
 
As the author understands, there is a lack of coherence among different chapters of 
Maritime Code. This is due to the fact that the Chinese legislative authority tried to 
“pick and mix” all the good aspects of the HR/HVR and Hamburg Rules. A negative 
impact of this attitude is real. The author suggests during the revision of Maritime Code, 
different chapters need further coordination and it would be better to have the revised 
Code based on one of the above international conventions or the new Rotterdam 
Rules.145 
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4.3 The Liability of the Carrier to the Shipper 
4.3.1 English Law 
It has been confirmed that a shipper’s liability to notify carrier the dangerous nature of 
cargo is strict both under common law and HR/HVR.146 However the risks of carriage 
of dangerous cargo by sea should be shared by carrier and shipper. Here a question 
arises: will the shipper be able to sue the carrier for damaging the dangerous cargo in 
any event? This question leads us to the real issue of causation: how far does wrongful 
shipment of dangerous cargo by the shipper affect the carrier’s liability to him? 
 
There are two situations. One is where the carrier has full knowledge of the dangerous 
cargo and consents to carry it. Accordingly, he is assumed to have taken the risk of any 
accidents which may ensue due to the dangerous character of the cargo. Under Article 
III of HR/HVR, the carrier has a stringent obligation to provide a seaworthy ship and 
properly carry, keep and care for the cargo. If the carrier fails to use ordinary skill and 
care, and to provide the special facilities required for dangerous cargoes, he will be 
liable for the resulting damage. The courts, therefore in the final analysis must decide 
whether the cargo loss or damage results from: (a) a lack of due diligence to make the 
vessel seaworthy; (b) improper care of the cargo or (c) one of the exculpatory 
exceptions protecting the carrier under Art. IV r2. 
 
The other situation relates to unlawfully shipped dangerous cargo. First, presumably 
loss due to the dangerous nature (something the carrier is not liable for), such as, 
damage arising from inherent defect of the cargo (Art. IV 2 (m)); or inadequate packing 
and marking (Art. IV 2(n) & (o)); or misrepresentation of the nature or value of the 
cargo (Art. IV 5 (h)). Even if carrier was potentially liable to shipper, the carrier could 
immediately recover that sum from shipper as an indemnity. Secondly, presumably, loss 
not due to the dangerous nature of the cargo, even if the cargo is shipped unlawfully. 
For example, cargo of explosives shipped on board with insufficient packing, (Art IV 
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(m)), the carrier through unseaworthiness causes the cargo to become wetted by sea 
water. The carrier should be liable for the loss due to the unseaworthiness. Some 
relevant cases will be discussed (e.g. The Fiona147). 
4.3.1.1 Dangerous Cargo Shipped with Notice and 
Consent 
If dangerous goods have been shipped with the carrier’s consent, he is assumed to have 
taken the risk of any accidents which may ensue to his own vessel (not necessarily to 
the cargo). Whether or not the carrier is liable for any damages will depend on the 
reasons that caused the realisation of any potential dangers.  
 
In practice, if the damage occurs during the course of transit because the shipped 
potentially dangerous cargoes become actually dangerous, the cargo claimants must 
attempt to prove that it was the carrier’s lack of due diligence to make the ship 
seaworthy (Art III r1), or there was a lack of care for cargo (Art III r2). Generally, once 
a carrier receives special instructions from the shipper, he must follow those instructions, 
or negotiate new terms and conditions, or refuse the goods. Otherwise, he will be 
responsible for the consequences.148  
 
In response to the cargo interests, the carrier must prove his due diligence to make the 
ship seaworthy before and after the voyage with respect to the loss. In addition, he must 
prove either the cause of the loss was due to the dangerous character of the cargo or one 
of the exculpatory exceptions under Art. IV 2, e.g. loss due to inherent defect, quality or 
vice of the cargo (Art IV r2 (m)). If the only reason for the casualties was the breach of 
carrier’s obligation under Article III r.1, the carrier would be held liable for the whole 
loss. 
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4.3.1.2 Liability with respect to Unlawfully Shipped 
Dangerous Cargo 
If a loss is due to the dangerous nature of a cargo and the carrier does not have complete 
knowledge about the cargo which he is expected to have,149 the carrier is not liable for 
the loss, e.g. damage arising from inherent defect of the cargo (Art. IV 2 (m)),150 or 
undisclosed dangerous cargo (Art. IV r6).151 Even if the carrier was potentially liable to 
shipper, e.g. lack of due diligence to care for cargo (Art. III r.2), the carrier could 
immediately recover that sum from shipper as an indemnity. 
 
The carrier’s obligations imposed by Art. III r.2 are not absolute but subject to Art. IV. 
The carrier may avoid liability by proving that the loss or damage was in fact caused by 
one of the exceptions of Article IV r.2 (a) to (q).152 Comparatively, the obligation of 
seaworthiness under Art. III r.1 is an overriding one: if carrier doesn’t fulfil it, he cannot 
be protected by the defences under Art. IV r. 2.  
 
The excepted perils under Art. IV r.2 are as follows: (a) negligence of the carrier in the 
navigation or management of the ship, (b) fire, (c) & (d) overwhelming natural forces: 
perils of the sea153 and acts of God, (e) to (k) overwhelming human forces: act of war, 
act of public enemies, restraint of princes, quarantine, strikes, riots and civil 
commotions, (l) certain deviation for saving for attempting to save life or property at sea, 
(i) (m) (n) (o) (p) faults of the shipper, inherent vice, insufficient of packing and latent 
defects and (q) catch-all exception.  
 
In this chapter, we will not discuss all of them, but will focus on the rules particularly 
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relating to dangerous cargo liability. First of all, we will discuss the carrier’s obligation 
as regards seaworthiness. 
4.3.1.3 Seaworthiness 
Under Art III r.1, a carrier is bound before and at the beginning of the voyage to 
exercise due diligence154 to make the ship seaworthy. Seaworthiness is a wide concept: 
a ship can be unseaworthy not only if physically decrepit but also if unfit for the 
particular voyage anticipated through being improperly crewed, equipped and supplied, 
or if uncargoworthy,155 such as unfit for the particular cargo to be carried.156 
 
When damages are caused by not only unseaworthiness but also a cause for which the 
carrier can exculpate himself, e.g. shipper’s misrepresentation of the nature of cargo, the 
carrier could still be held liable. This is because seaworthiness is a preliminary 
obligation to any exculpatory exception. That is to say, if the carrier doesn’t fulfil the 
obligation of seaworthiness, he cannot be protected by the defences under Art IV r2. As 
far as dangerous cargo is concerned, the duty to provide a seaworthy ship is to show and 
provide a seaworthy ship as regards the cargo which has been notified to the carrier. 
4.3.1.3.1 Seaworthiness and Competent Crew 
A vessel is judged to be unseaworthy if due diligence has not been exercised and that 
the owner failed to ensure that the crew were adequately experienced and trained in the 
operation of the ship.157 For example, a crew member is incompetent and commits a 
negligent act such as the master navigating erroneously158 or a second engineer opening 
the wrong valve and flooding cargo instead of a ballast tank.159  
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With regards to dangerous goods, the carrier160 should ensure that the officers and crew 
are at all times informed of such goods carried on board, and that their properties are 
known and what to do in case of an emergency (for example, how to use protective 
clothing and breathing apparatus).161 By the lack of knowledge of the peculiar hazards 
of the cargo, the incompetence of crew can amount to unseaworthiness. For example, in 
The Eurasian Dream,162 a fire started on deck 4 of the pure car carrier Eurasian Dream 
while in port at Sharjah. The fire, which was not contained or extinguished by the 
master and crew, eventually destroyed the vessel’s cargo of new and second-hand 
vehicles and rendered the vessel itself a constructive total loss. 
 
It was held by Cresswell, J. 163  that the loss and damage was caused by the 
unseaworthiness of Eurasian Dream; the fire would not have broken out if the master 
and crew had been properly instructed and trained; the master and crew were ignorant to 
the peculiar hazards of the car carriage, and the car carriers; the Univan manuals failed 
to give guidance for the supervision of stevedores; and the vessel should have been 
supplied with specific documentation dealing with the danger of fire on car carriers and 
the precautions to be taken to avoid such fires, including supervision of stevedores and 
the prohibition of hazardous activities by stevedores. 
 
Carriers should ensure that the crews are properly trained,164 and should be familiar 
with handling hazardous goods and to enable employees to recognise and identify 
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the ship. This meant that well in excess of 50m of propane was released onto the sea round Akatun before the valve 
could be closed. With a boiling point of -43°C, the cold liquid propane flash vaporised when it hit the sea and the gas 
could began to drift. A small work boat entered the cloud, carrying with it a source of ignition, and the inevitable 
happened. The ensuing fire was quite exciting, being concentrated round Akatun. Fortunately the crew were well 
prepared, did a quick start, and the master put the vessel into full astern, ripping it off the berth. He then did a 
three-point turn and sailed out of the fire. The crew’s quick actions had saved a much more serious incident.  
Compared the facts of The Akatun, where the crew are inexperienced in the operation of the ship and the owner fails 
to instruct them properly in the incident (owner’s due diligence has not been exercised). No doubt the vessel will be 
regarded as unseaworthy. 
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hazardous materials.165 There might be some duty of the carrier to train the crew even 
in respect of what to do about unlawfully-shipped cargo, so as to render the vessel 
unseaworthy if this was not done. Generally, the training for the safely handling 
dangerous cargo includes the relevant IMO Codes.166 For example, IMDG Code, 
Emergency Procedures for Ships Carrying Dangerous goods (EmS),167 The Medical 
First Aid Guide for Use in Accidents Involving Dangerous Goods (MFAG),168 The 
IMO/ILO Guidelines for Packing Cargo in Freight Containers or Vehicles (Packing 
Cargo Transport Units),169 and Regulations and resolutions referred to in the IMDG 
Code and supplement.170 
4.3.1.3.2 Cargoworthiness in Relation to Damage to 
Dangerous Cargo 
Although many instances of unseaworthiness relate to defects in the ship or its 
machinery which may affect all cargo, e.g. engine defects or defective navigational 
equipment, the definition in Art III 1(c) clearly covers “uncargoworthiness”, e.g. where 
the ship is safe as a navigation entity, but unfit for the particular cargo to be carried.171 
Under Art III r. 1(c), the carrier should exercise due diligence to make the holds, 
refrigerating and cooling chambers and all other parts of the ship in which goods are 
carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation.  
 
A classic example is “insect infestation” where holds are not fit for cargoes of foodstuffs 
(e.g. groundnuts), and the infested cargo may result in the vessel involving in a 
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 Peermohamed & Emery, op. cit., p.19. 
166
 Shipping companies are required to assist seafarers in coping with these differences by establishing procedures to 
ensure that new personnel, as well as personnel transferred to new assignments, are given proper training for their 
new duties, see ISM Code 6(3) & 6(5). The revised STCW Convention also provides that seafarers should be given 
the opportunity for training in safety and survival; shipowners have many new training responsibilities under the 
STCW 1995 amendments. See Li, K.X. & Ng, Jim Mi, International Maritime Conventions: Seafarers’ Safety and 
Human Rights, 33 J. Mar. L. & Com. 381, July 2002, p. 392. 
167
 This is one of the recommendations issued by IMO in Volume V of IMDG Code to provide extra guidance in safe 
carriage of dangerous goods. Its 1994 edition with sales No. English edition IMO-260E. 
168
 Volume V of IMDG Code is a Supplement to the Code, including The IMO/WHO/ILO Medical First Aid Guide 
for Use in Accidents Involving Dangerous Goods (MFAG), see details at www.imo.org 
169
 These guidelines are included in Volume V of IMDG Code. Where there is reason to suspect that a cargo transport 
unit in which dangerous goods are packed is not in compliance with the provisions of the IMDG Code, or where a 
container packing certificate/ vehicle packing declaration is not available, the unit should not be accepted for 
shipment. 
170
 Such as other IMO instruments including BC Code, IBC Code, IGC Code, Dangerous Goods Declaration and 
Form for Cargo Information (issued under MSC/Circ 663) and so on. 
171
 Gaskell, Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts, (2000) LLP, at 275. 
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dangerous situation. However, contamination claims raise difficult questions of proof 
and the degree of care expected of the carrier.172 The obligation of seaworthiness could 
presumably extend to the information given by the master to the shipper, e.g. as to 
previous cargoes which had been shipped. Here the legal question will often be whether 
the carrier had exercised proper care once the cargo on board.173  
 
It would also be relevant to establish whether the insects presented in defective cargo 
have been notified to the carrier on shipment.174 In The Giannis NK,175 for the decision 
on the source of an infestation of khapra beetles in a cargo of groundnuts, the evidence 
pointed to cargo (rather than ship) infestation, despite a cargo fumigation certificate at 
the port of loading. So it is the shipper’s liability for the shipment of infested cargo. In 
this case, the carrier did not know about the infestation of beetles, so he was not liable 
for uncargoworthiness to the cargo owner of wheat (dumped into the sea). Suppose, if 
the carrier had noticed the beetles at the beginning of the voyage, but kept silence to the 
owner of wheat, he would be liable for unseaworthiness, where carrier’s liability may 
supplement that of the shipper of groundnuts. 
4.3.1.3.3 Stowage and Seaworthiness 
Improper stowage can be a cause of unseaworthiness in two ways: (1) it may cause 
instability or danger of the ship, e.g. stowing inflammable cargoes near sources of heat 
and (2) it may cause damage to the cargo so stowed or to other cargo.176 If the cargo is 
loaded in such a way as to endanger the stability of the ship, the latter will be 
unseaworthy.177 By contrast, if the ship’s holds are perfectly sound, but the cargo is 
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 The Athenian Harmony [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 410. Also see The Fiona [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 506 (C.A.) 
173
 The Iron Gippsland [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 335. 
174
 This issue would raise questions of apparent conditions on shipment such as bills of lading containing a 
pre-printed statement on the face that the goods have been received or shipped in “apparent good order and 
condition”, as required by Art. III r.3 of the Hague and Hague-Visby Rules and Article 15(1)(b) of the Hamburg Rules 
1978. Also there are possible liabilities of the shipper to give proper and sufficient information in order to carry the 
dangerous cargo safely. 
175
 [1992] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 171. 
176
 Poor stowage of cargo which results in direct damage to that cargo or other adjacent cargo is lack of due diligence 
to make the vessel seaworthy because the ship’s holds, etc. are not fit and safe to receive the cargo. Direct damage to 
cargo by improper stowage is nevertheless better considered under Article III r. 2 where the carrier, because of his 
obligation to ‘stow, carry, keep, care for’, etc., is responsible for direct damage to all cargo when damaged by bad 
stowage, whether it was the cargo itself which was stowed badly, or other cargo loaded at the same, or later or earlier 
port. Tetley, M.C.C. 3rd ed., 1988, p387.  
177
 See Kopitoff v. Wilson and Others (1876) 1 Q.B.D. 377, where poorly stowed amour plate broke through the side 
of the ship and sank it, and Ingram & Royle Ltd v. Services Maritimes du Treport [1913] 1 K.B. 538, where 
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stowed negligently next to another cargo which damages or contaminates it, the courts 
may hold that there was no breach of the obligation of proper stowage under Art. III r.1, 
but a possible breach of the obligation of proper stowage under Art. III r.2.178 
 
This is particularly relevant to dangerous cargo case: the same stowage may be safe for 
some types of cargo but not for others. In Ingram & Royle Ltd v. Service Maritimes du 
Treport,179 where a dangerous sodium cargo180 negligently secured on deck by the 
shipowner (it was insufficiently packed and stowed with insufficient care). The vessel 
started in rough weather; the cases of sodium broke loose, and coming into contact with 
water caused a series of explosions and fire on board, as the result the ship went down 
and the plaintiffs' cargo of mineral waters were lost.181 It was held by Scrutton J. that 
the ship was not seaworthy at the commencement of the voyage owing to bad stowage 
endangering her safety.182 The cause of the sinking of the ship with its other cargo was 
either fire or peril of the sea, but none of them could exempt the carrier from liability for 
unseaworthiness. Consequently, the defendants were liable for the loss of the plaintiffs' 
goods. 
 
Nowadays, various publications give guidance to masters on stowage requirements,183 
e.g. Thomas, Stowage (2002),184 but specific requirements may well be included in a 
charterparty and then incorporated into the bill.185 
 
The IMO, as might be expected, issues recommendations for the stowage of dangerous 
goods. For example, heat-sensitive commodities stowed below deck must not be stowed 
next to a fuel tank. Again, for some cargoes stowage below deck is considered the safest, 
but other cargoes may be stowed on deck according to their properties.186 The stowage 
                                                                                                                                                                  
inflammable sodium was inadequately stowed on deck. 
178
 CF. Elder Dempster & Co. Ltd v. Paterson Zochonis & Co. Ltd [1924] A.C. 522; Scrutton, p. 98. 
179
 [1913] 1 K.B. 538. 
180
 More precisely, metallic sodium saturated with petrol. 
181
 The plaintiffs claimed damages for the loss of certain cases of mineral waters shipped on the defendants' 
steamship, the Hardy, for carriage from Le Tréport to London. 
182
 See also Kopitoff v. Wilson (1876) 1 Q. B. D. 377 
183
 Gaskell, Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts, (2000) LLP, p.276. 
184
 Thomas Robert Ellis, Thomas’s Stowage: the properties and stowage of cargoes, (2002) 4th ed., Glasgow: Brown, 
Son & Ferguson 
185
 Gaskell, op. cit., p.276 and section 21B Incorporation charterparty terms into the bill, p 692. 
186
 All three forms of calcium hypochlorite are now required by the IMDG Code to be carried on deck and to be 
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plans of dangerous cargo187 should ensure that only valid positions are utilised for 
dangerous goods when planning the loading.188 Likewise the dangerous goods plan on 
board must be duly filled in with information pertaining to the dangerous goods on 
board. This allows a quick and easy location of the dangerous goods.189  Regulations 
pertaining to stowage and segregation of dangerous goods are stipulated in the IMDG 
Code190 and must be followed.191 
4.3.1.3.4 The I.S.M. Code and Seaworthiness 
The International Management Code for the Safe Operation of Ships and Pollution 
Prevention (the “I.S.M. Code”)192 is now in force in most countries193 and it creates a 
new and higher standard of seaworthiness, which can be expected to affect the 
interpretation of due diligence in Art. III r1 of HR/ HVR and “measures (relating to 
seaworthiness) that could be reasonably required” in Art. 5(1) of the Hamburg Rules194 
in the future.195 For example, the failure of the shipowner to have a Safety Management 
System (SMS) complying the Code or to ensure that a valid Safety Certificate (SMC) is 
carried aboard the vessel, could constitute a lack of due diligence rendering the ship 
unfit to carry cargo and therefore unseaworthy. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
shaded from direct sunlight. A deck stow avoids the risk of high ambient hold temperatures due to restricted 
ventilation and external heating by heated bunker tanks and steam pipes. 
187
 The Maritime Safety Committee adopted in 1991 amendments to regulation VII/5 of SOLAS which include the 
provision of container packing certificates/ vehicle packing declaration and dangerous goods special lists, manifests 
or stowage plans. 
188
 The class introductions (total 9 classes) in IMDG Code also give information concerning procedures which 
should be followed during loading and unloading. 
189
 Peermohamed & Emery, Dangerous Cargo, (2002), 16(7), P & I International p. 19. 
190
 Each class of dangerous goods in IMDG Code is preceded by an introduction which describes the properties, 
characteristics and definition of the goods and gives detailed advice on handling and transport, e.g. stowage and 
segregation, including separation from special spaces or areas in a ship. See details in Focus on IMO: IMO and 
dangerous goods at sea, May 1996, at www.imo.org 
191
 From 1 January 2004, the IMDG Code becomes mandatory (with some provisions remain recommendatory), 
where the flag State regulations require strict compliance with the IMDG Code, means that the stowage of cargo must 
follow the IMDG Code 
192
 See relevant discussion on I.S.M. Code in Appendix II  
193
 I.S.M. Code adopted by IMO on November 4, 1993 as the Annex to Resolution A.741(18), was subsequently 
adopted as Chapter IX of the SOLAS Convention on May 24 , 1994. It therefore now applies as mandatory law, 
rather than merely as a recommendation of the IMO, in 158 States SOLAS states (representing 98.8% of world 
merchant shipping fleet; both China and UK have ratified it.). I.S.M. Code came into force for most categories of 
cargo vessels engaging in international voyages, as of July 1, 1998 and became applicable to all cargo ships, as well 
as offshore drilling platforms, as of July 1, 2002. On 24th March 2006, EC Regulation 336/2006 on the 
implementation of the ISM Code within the EU entered into force and repealed EC Regulation 3015/95.  
194
 Article 5 (1) of Hamburg Rules makes the carrier liable for loss or damage to the goods, as well as for delay in 
their delivery, unless the carrier proves that all measures that could reasonably be required to prevent the occurrence 
and its consequences were taken by it, as well as by its servants and agents. The burden of proof therefore continues 
to fall upon the carrier, but the due diligence obligation of Hamburg would seem to apply, not subject before and at 
the commencement of the voyage, but all times and stages of the journey. See Tetley, Marine Cargo Claims, 3rd ed., 
1998, p396.  
195
 Tetley, International Maritime and Admiralty Law, 2002, p84. 
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The ISM Code covers all tankers, chemical tankers, gas carriers, bulk carriers, and 
certain other cargo vessels.196 The ISM Code sets International Standards for the Safe 
Management and Operation of ships. Shipowners are required to adopt and implement a 
SMS for their vessel and to designate a person with direct access to the highest level of 
management within the shipping company, to ensure that defects in the vessel are 
detected, reported and corrected quickly.197 
 
The Code requires carrier to document and implement clear procedures for safety 
management both ashore and afloat. Risk management (risk assessment) is commonly 
found to be part of the procedures within a company’s or vessel’s SMS.198 As we can 
see, in order to manage the risk inherent with carrying dangerous cargoes, the carrier 
needs to ensure that his team is advised of the risks involved in advance and the team 
should follow the carrier’s written procedures. A carrier may require his team to adhere 
to the procedures to carry the dangerous cargo safely. 
 
Naturally, some cargoes that must be carried are dangerous. However, by assessing the 
risk of carrying such a cargo one can minimise the risk by being aware of the 
procedures and standards required to carry such a cargo safely. For example, there are a 
number of requirements or risks to be assessed in the standard procedure of loading a 
noxious substance or marine pollutant. An ISM approved vessel might have to complete 
several checklists before a cargo can be accepted for shipment. Once the vessel is ready 
to receive the cargo, further checklists are often prepared before operations commerce. 
A responsible person on the ship should assess the risk to the vessel when carrying such 
a cargo, for example, the availability of breathing apparatus, special fire-fighting 
equipment etc.199 Such a system can be said be effective at managing the risk because 
while assessing the risk all dangers are highlighted. 
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 For example, passenger ship of Class I, II and IIa and cargo high-speed crafts of 500 tons or more, which are 
engaged in international voyages, and the cargo ships and mobile offshore units of 500 tons or more which are also 
engaged in international voyages, must be fully compliant by 1 July 2002. 
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 The I.S.M. Code’s verification, reporting and auditing requirements also ensure that a “paper trail” is created 
relating to such defects, which will provide documentary evidence of the diligence or lack thereof on the part of 
shipowners and ship operators in complying with the requirements of SMS. See also Tetley, op. cit., p. 290. 
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 Peermohamed & Emery, Dangerous Cargo, P & I International, 2002, 16(7), p. 19. 
199
 Ibid. 
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In addition, if a ship is not compliance with the ISM Code (unseaworthiness), the 
shipowner may loss his defences contained in Art IV r2 headings a-c of HR/HVR (e.g. 
navigating error, fire, perils of the sea). In the author’s view, ISM Code is relevant to 
fault-based liability, e.g. shiopwner’s responsibility to cargo and ship. If the shipowner 
does not exercise due diligence to comply with the Code or it is below the standards of 
Code, he has fault and should be responsible for the resulting damages.  
 
Surely, a seaworthy ship must have the degree of fitness with regards to certain 
circumstances,200 e.g. perils of the sea. If it is the unseaworthiness caused the damage, 
he can not rely on the exceptions under Art IV r.2. Moreover, non-compliance with the 
Code may lead to liability on the part of ship managers who undertake ISM 
compliance—relevant systems and general ability to manage ships will be tested. 
Presumably, the shipowner will not be allowed to deny liability for cargo loss resulting 
from navigating errors, if the negligent management of the ship related to lack of 
ISM-related documents and instructions. Finally, the shipowner may loss his limitation 
under Art IV r5 (e) of HVR,201 because of his fault on non-compliance with the ISM 
Code (e.g. it is regarded as a reckless action).  
4.3.1.4 The Duty Properly to Load, Handle, and Care for 
Cargo 
Under the contract of affreightment, the carrier’s duty of care202 for the cargo is 
non-delegable,203 and the carrier is accordingly responsible for the acts of the master, 
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 Panayiotis Neocleous & Costas Stamatiou, Legal aspects of the ISM Code, (2006) International Company and 
Commercial Law Review, p. 218. A vessel must have the degree of fitness that an ordinarily careful and prudent 
shipowner would require his vessel to have at the commencement of a voyage having regard to all possible 
circumstances. See McFadden v Blue Star Line [1905] 1 K.B. 697.  
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 Art. IV r5 (e) Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be entitled to the benefit of the limitation of liability provided 
for in this paragraph if it is proved that the damage resulted from an act or omission of the carrier done with intent to 
cause damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that damage would probably result.  
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 The primary liability for loading, stowing and trimming the cargo maybe shifted from the owners to charterers by 
a clause paramount, e.g. Line 78 of NYPE 1993. 
203
 The duty of seaworthiness is non-delegable as well. With respect to the other obligations which the carrier must 
discharge under art.3(2), however, notably loading, stowage and discharge, the United Kingdom takes the position 
that the parties to the contract of carriage are free to agree to transfer some or all of those duties to the shipper, 
consignee or charterer (e.g. by inserting “FIO” clauses in the bill of lading). These terms, which really derive from 
chartering, but are sometimes included in bills of lading, transfer to the shipper or consignee the carrier’s ordinary 
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the crew, the stevedore and his other agents; but not, very significantly, other cargo 
owners. This matters a lot in the case of dangerous cargo: it insulates the carrier from 
liability where a cargo owner fails to take proper precautions re dangerous cargo.  
 
Unlike the duty of seaworthiness, which operates only before and at the beginning of 
the voyage, the duty of care for the cargo204 operates during the voyage as well, so that 
the carrier is responsible for the acts of the master and crew while the vessel is 
underway.205 Care for the cargo is a stringent obligation, because Art. III r.2 states that 
the carrier shall “properly and carefully” care for the goods. 
 
There has been comparatively little discussion on Art. III r.2, probably because it is 
expressly made subject to the list of exceptions in Art. IV r.2 and most discussions have 
focused on whether the carrier falls within these exceptions. However, there are 
problems caused by Art. IV r.2(a), which exempts the carrier from “act, neglect, or 
default… in the management of the ship”, since almost every failure to care for cargo 
under Art. III r.2 could fall within these words, unless they are given the narrow 
meaning by the courts. Most importantly, it has to be distinguished between 
management of the cargo alone (a matter within Art. III r.2) and management of the ship 
as a navigable entity (a matter within Art. IV r.2(a)).206 The distinction is nearly always 
a difficulty, and somewhat artificial one. 
 
For example, in The Iron Gippsland,207 a tanker loaded a mixed cargo of oil products, 
but inert gas was supplied for the whole ship under a common system. Automotive 
diesel oil in tank 3 was contaminated by the gas and it was shown that the carrier ought 
to have known that this cargo should have been isolated and was liable for failure to 
have a sound system under Art. III r.2. The carrier sought to rely on Art. IV r.2(a) on the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
responsibility for paying for and controlling either loading and discharging (“free in and out”), loading only (“free in 
liner out”), loading, stowage and discharge (“free in and out, stowed”) or loading, stowage, trimming and discharge 
(“free in and out stowed and trimmed”). Accordingly, the carrier is required to load, stow and discharge carefully and 
properly, but only to the extent that it has undertaken contractually to perform those specific functions. See Pyrene Co. 
Ltd. v. Scindia Navigation Co. Ltd. [1954] 2 Q.B. 402 at pp.417-418, [1954] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 321 at pp.328-329. 
204
 The obligation to properly and carefully care for the cargo means the carrier needs to use special skill and provide 
special facilities to the carriage and also the knowledge of the carrier relating to dangerous cargo. 
205
 Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law, 3rd ed. (2001), p.605. 
206
 For example, in Gosse Millerd v. Canadian Government Merchant Marine [1929] A.C. 726. 
207
 [1994] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 335 (Supp. Ct. N.S.W.) 
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basis that the inert gas system was a safety measure for the protection of the vessel. It 
was held that, despite this, the purpose of the system was primarily to manage the cargo, 
not only for the protection of the cargo but also for the ultimate protection of the vessel 
from adverse consequences associated with that cargo, and so there was no fault or 
neglect in the management of the ship within the exception. 
 
In a recent case of The Aconcagua,208 where a shipper did not give proper notice to a 
charterer in respect of the dangerous nature209 of chemical calcium hypochlorite. The 
charterer had admittedly been negligently stored a container of this chemical next to a 
fuel tank which was heated during the voyage. It was held by Christopher Clark J. that 
heating the fuel tank when a container of calcium hypochlorite was stowed next to it 
was a failure properly to care for the cargo but it was an act, negligent or default in the 
management of the vessel which was an excepted peril under Art IV 2(a). Accordingly, 
even if the heating had been causative,210 the charterer would still be entitled to an 
indemnity under Art IV r6.  
 
A similar decision was given in Compania Sud American Vapores v MS ER Hamburg 
Schiffahrtsgesellschaft Mbh & Co KG,211 where a container of calcium hypochlorite 
exploded because it was stowed next to bunker tanker which was heated during the 
voyage. The shipowner brought a claim against the charterer for loss of fire and loss and 
damage. The interesting issue was whether the act [the heating of the bunker tanks] was 
done as part of the care of the cargo or as part of the running of the ship, not specifically 
related to the cargo. It was found that the heating of the bunker tank was to facilitate the 
transfer of oil from it to the engine. It was a single act which did not relate in any way to 
the care of the cargo.212 It was held213 that the shipowner had defence to claim by 
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 Compania Sud Americana de Vapores SA v Sinochem Tianjin Import & Export (The Aconcagua), [2009] EWHC 
1880 (Comm); [2010] 1 Lloyds’ Rep. 1 
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 The abnormal characteristics of the chemical: it ignited at a much lower temperature than could be expected by 
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 The likelihood was that the heating of the tank was not a cause of the explosion. The sole cause of the explosion 
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1880 (Comm), para. 339 
211
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 Albeit it may have indirectly adversely affected the cargo [2006] EWHC 483, para. 60. 
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 [2006] 1 C.L.C. 683, at 712; [2006] EWHC 483, para. 60. 
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reason of Art IV r.2(a) of the HVR—the heating of the bunker oil was an act, neglect or 
default in the management of the ship.  
 
In virtually all cases involving an allegation of breach of the duty of care for cargo, the 
carrier will try to satisfy the proof of an excepted cause under Art. IV r. 2214 such as 
inherent vice, insufficient packing and other matters. When the loss is due to both lack 
of care for cargo under Art. III r2 and an exculpatory exception under Art. IV r. 2, the 
carrier is responsible unless he can separate the loss resulting from each cause.215 If the 
carrier can separate the losses, then he is responsible only for the loss caused by his 
improper care.  
4.3.1.4.1 Duty to Care for Cargo: Obligations When 
Receiving Cargo 
Considering the special feature of the dangerous cargo and risks involved in the voyage, 
the obligation to properly and carefully care for the cargo seems to imply this. First of 
all, the carrier must study the cargo carefully before loading, in order to be able to care 
for it (assuming the shipper has disclosed all relevant facts). On the other hand, the 
shipper has the reciprocal obligation to give special instruments for special cargoes. 
 
While the carrier agreed to carry the goods with knowledge of its dangerous character, 
and the shipper supplied special instructions for the cargo, the carrier must follow those 
instructions, or negotiate new terms and conditions. Otherwise, he will be liable for the 
consequences.216 For example, in the American case of Waterman Steamship Corp. v. 
Virginia Chemicals, Inc.,217 where the plaintiff carrier accepted a hazardous cargo of 
sodium hydrosulfite knowing that it is a chemical which catches fire when it comes in 
contact with water. It was held that the carrier having done so, "it then accepted the 
obligation to carry [the cargo] safely." 218  The carrier’s negligence in improperly 
handling and improper stowage of the hazardous cargo proximately caused the fire and 
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 651 F. Supp. 452 at p. 456, 1988 AMC 2681 at pp.2688-2689 (S D. Ala. 1987)  
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 See also Verbeeck v. Black Diamond Steamship Corp. 269 F. 2d 68 at 70, 1960 AMC 163 (2 Cir. 1959) 
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rendered the vessel unseaworthy.219 Therefore the carrier was guilty of fault and was 
precluded from recovering on its claim. Furthermore, the carrier should be liable for the 
loss of the hazardous cargo. 
 
If the carrier cannot supply the type of stowage or ventilation required, for the safety of 
the vessel and other cargoes on board, the accepted practice is for the carrier to refuse 
the goods. But when the carrier has contracted to carry the goods with knowledge, then 
refuses to carry the cargo, it is the author’s opinion that in this case the carrier will be in 
breach of the contract and he should be responsible for damages and losses caused. 
Where the carrier has had the same opportunity as the shipper to inspect the condition of 
the goods before agreeing to carry them, it has been held that the shipper or charterer is 
not liable if the goods become dangerous as a result of their unsound condition on 
loading. Special shipping instructions are not necessary if the care required by certain 
commodities is well known in the trade.220 
(i) Obligation to familiarise oneself with the cargo 
Prior to loading the carrier must study the cargo carefully and fill out the stowage plan 
of the dangerous goods with the appropriate information obtained from the dangerous 
cargo manifest. The master must ensure that only such dangerous goods included in the 
dangerous cargo manifest are loaded. The carrier, in studying cargo, must learn from the 
past and must employ modern methods and up-to-date practices,221 and he must follow 
existing regulations, as in the American case of Waterman Steamship Corp. v. Virginia 
Chemicals, Inc.222 
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The carrier has an obligation to familiarise himself with the cargo, but the shipper has a 
reciprocal obligation to give handling instruments where necessary. Prior to the arrival 
of the vessel, most commonly, a shipper needs to prepare (1) a full and complete set of 
dangerous cargo manifests for dangerous goods to be loaded with the shipper’s 
declaration and container packing certificate (multimodal dangerous goods form) 
attached, and/or (2) provide a Material Safety Data Sheet (MSDS)223 which includes 
details of the hazards associated with a chemical carried on board and provides 
information on its safe use. The above documents must be handed to the master upon 
arrival. When the manifests have been received on board, they must be carefully 
checked by comparing the information submitted with the IMO Code224 and the 
vessel’s dangerous cargo checklist.  
(ii)Right to refuse cargo 
A carrier is not generally obliged to accept hazardous cargo if he cannot give it proper 
stowage and care during the voyage. The purpose of the notification of the dangerous 
cargo is to enable the carrier to take the necessary precautions to ensure safe carriage, or 
to reject it—if he is not contractually obliged to carry it. Depending on the specific 
situation of each case, the carrier can choose to refuse the cargo or notify the shipper of 
its inability and obtain the consent of the shipper to carry the goods under special terms 
and conditions.225 Presumably once the carrier has knowingly accepted the cargo he is 
bound to take all reasonable steps as regards that cargo. 
 
Where the charterparty contains an express prohibition of dangerous goods,226 the 
carrier will clearly be justified in refusing. In the absence of express prohibition, the 
issue would depend on how the cargo is described in the charterparty. If it is described 
only in general terms, the carrier is entitled to refuse if the extra precautions required to 
                                                                                                                                                                  
the ship, rending the vessel unseaworthy. 
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ensure safe carriage will cause unreasonable delay or expense.227 Where the cargo has 
been described specifically in the charterparty, but presents unusual risks which are 
different from those usually associated with a cargo of the charterparty description, it is 
unclear whether the carrier is entitled to refuse the goods on the ground that they fall 
outside the charterparty description (this view was taken by Evans J. in The Amphion228); 
or whether, having received the appropriate notice, he is obliged to carry them (this 
view seems more in accord with The Atlantic Duchess229 and The Fiona,230 although it 
should be subject to the qualification that if it is impossible to carry the goods safely, the 
carrier is justified in refusing them).  
 
In addition, it is also the view taken in Scrutton,231 subject to the qualification that if it 
is impossible to carry the goods safely, the carrier is justified in refusing them. Also the 
carrier’s obligation to study the cargo and his right if necessary to refuse it was 
confirmed by the US Supreme Court in The Ensley City.232 
4.3.1.4.2 Proper and Careful Loading and Stowage 
The duty of a carrier at loading is extremely broad. It seems that the carrier must ensure 
the cargo is loaded safely including the cargo is loaded without delay and stowed in 
such a manner that it can be found for quick and safe discharge.233 When loading 
dangerous cargo, a number of dangerous chemicals are often stowed together in the 
same hold, particularly in the case of containerised cargoes. There is a potential risk of 
interaction between these chemicals. Thus a carrier should have a proper dangerous 
cargo stowage plan. 
 
A shipper should give the carrier instructions for cargo requiring special care. Otherwise, 
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the carrier is expected to be an expert in respect to ordinary cargo and should stow it 
properly without having to receive special instructions.234  Stowage of cargo into 
containers when done by carriers must be done properly and carefully, with proper 
bracing, blocking and dunnage inside. The stowage in such circumstances is part of the 
loading of the ship.235  The contents must be firmly stowed and secured against 
movement and chafing. Particular care must be taken to ensure that the contents will not 
fall outwards when the doors are opened. Dangerous cargo forming only part of the load 
must be stowed in the door area of the container for ease of access and inspection unless 
specifically agreed otherwise by the operator.236 These precautions are of paramount 
importance as the effects of damage arising from the poor stowage of hazardous cargo 
could be widespread. If the improper stowage of cargo in containers is done by the 
shipper, and he stuffs and seals the containers, he will be responsible for the 
consequences.  
 
The carrier’s obligation of stowage under Art. III r.2 must be exercised throughout the 
whole voyage. The carrier must fulfil his obligations “properly and carefully”, and for 
the safe carriage of chemicals, he should provide specialist knowledge, skill and 
equipment. For instance, through the stowage and segregation procedures the carrier 
should be able to (1) keep dangerous goods under constant surveillance in order that 
leaks (if any) are detected at an early stage; and (2) have adequate means of putting out 
a fire before it breaks out on board.237  
4.3.1.5 Whether a Carrier is Exempt from Liability? 
The basic problem with the liability scheme under HR/HVR is that it gives rise to 
uncertainty. It gives the cargo owner two causes of action, based on Art. III rr.1 and 2, 
which effectively involve the taking of care, yet in Art. IV r.2 it lists a whole catalogue 
of exceptions where the carrier is not liable, and the relationship between the two 
                                                       
234
 Tetley, op. cit., p. 546. 
235
 Ibid. 
236
 Luddeke, Marine Claims—a guide for the handling and prevention of marine claims, (1996) 2nd ed., LLP, at 45 
237
 Peermohamed & Emery, Dangerous Cargo, P & I International, 2002, 16(7) p. 19. 
  169
Articles is unclear.238 This is particularly so where the cause of loss could be regarded 
as concurrent,239 e.g. where goods are badly stowed (a failure to comply with Art. III 
r.2), but damaged during a storm240 (under Art. IV r. 2(c), exception of peril of the sea).  
It seems based on an analysis of causation and which of the two competing elements 
was the decisive or dominant cause of the loss.  
 
In Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v. Gamlen Chemical Co. (A/Asia) Pty Ltd,241 
where drums of chemicals broke adrift in a storm and the carrier claimed to rely on the 
peril of the sea exception. It was held that, as the loss could have been avoided by the 
exercise of reasonable care by the carrier in stowing the cargo, there was no peril of the 
sea, given the fact that the bad weather, though severe, was not unforeseeable. Stephen J 
rested his judgment on the fact that the two possible causes were not of equal 
effectiveness and that the inadequate stowage was the decisive or dominant cause.242 
 
Another group of defences absolve the carrier from liability for damage that is beyond 
his ken in terms of the knowledge.243 I will not discuss all of them, but only focus on 
those particularly relating to dangerous cargo liability. For example, under Art IV r 2: 
neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible for loss or damage arising or 
resulting from 
(I) Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods; 
(m) Wastage in bulk or weight or any other loss or damage arising from inherent 
defect, quality, or vice of the goods; 
(n) Insufficiency of packing; 
 
All of these causes of loss for which the carrier is not liable potentially clash with the 
duty of the carrier to properly care for cargo; they are thus narrowly construed.244 
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Accordingly, shipper’s negligence or improper acts may result in the carrier being 
exempted from liability on care for cargo under Article III r.2. 
4.3.1.5.1 Acts or fault of the Shipper 
The defence of act or omission of the shipper (Article IV r. 2(i)) is holding that because 
the way the shipper either knew or specified the goods should be carried, the damage 
resulted despite a proper care taken by the carrier. For example, where the shipper 
risked sending perishable cabbages without refrigeration at lower cost, the carrier will 
not be liable.245 It should be noted that this defence, like most of the other defences 
under Art. IV r.2, presumably only applies to claims by the corresponding shipper (A), 
given the damage caused by his act or omission; it will not help the carrier where the 
claimant is another shipper (B). Because B’s contract with carrier is a separate one from 
A’s contract and the carrier cannot be exempt from liability regarding his failure of 
looking after B’s cargo (under Art III r2). Furthermore, when the carrier is sued by a 
third party bill of lading holder (C), Art IV r2(i) is not a defence since C is a third party 
and the carrier cannot benefit the defence which is only to a contracting party, i.e. “the 
shipper”. 
 
By the broad exception under Art IV r2(i), the carrier is not responsible for damage to 
cargo arising from the acts of the shipper, his agents and representatives and owner of 
the goods. In addition, the carrier can be absolved his liability only if he could prove the 
shipper knew or be presumed to know of the risks involved and he had exercised proper 
care. If there is carrier’s negligence, that is a question of concurrent causes. The carrier 
will be responsible for the whole loss,246 unless he can separate the loss resulting from 
each cause. 
 
In Ismail v Polish Ocean Lines,247 where a charterer had authorised his brother to give 
instruction as to the stowage of potatoes on board and his brother as his agent had given 
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express instructions as to its stowage. When the ship arrived in England a large number 
of bagged potatoes were found to be rotten due to bad stowage. It was held that the 
charterer had assumed responsibility for the stowage of the cargo and the master was 
relieved of his responsibility for stowage and dunnaging under the charterparty (clause 
49). Since the damage resulted from the act or omission of the charterer’s agent or 
representative, the shipowners could rely on Art IV r. 2(i) of the Hague Rules. 
Accordingly, the shipowners were not liable for the damage of cargo due to improper 
stowage. 
4.3.1.5.2 Insufficiency of Packing 
The defence of “insufficiency of packing” under Article IV r.2 (n) is closely related to 
act or omission of shipper. It should be noted here shipper’s liability of insufficient 
packing is based on fault. The determination of exception of carrier’s liability is based 
on whether (1) the shipper knew the goods were at risk and could have specified a 
different method of packing and (2) the carrier exercised reasonable care in stowage.248 
In the case of dangerous cargo, the shipper’ liability of insufficiency of packing should 
be based on fault as well. By contrast, under Article IV r.6, shipper’s liability of 
disclosure of dangerous cargo is strict and the carrier is not responsible for damage to 
cargo even if the shipper has no knowledge of the dangerous nature of the cargo. 
 
In the author’s opinion, the packaging exception should be given a wider meaning in 
relation to dangerous cargo. It deals with goods not only adequately protected from 
damage to themselves; but also requires the goods to be packed to avoid damage to 
other goods. Also safety labelling should be part of packaging. Of course, such packing 
should prevent all but the most minor damage under normal conditions of care and 
carriage.249 This is true although some objects are packed very lightly; for example, 
steel rods are normally tied in bundles without other packing, while some objects have 
to be packed strictly according to the instruction, such as dangerous cargo of Potassium 
                                                       
248
 Schoenbaum, , Admiralty and Maritime Law, 3rd ed., 2001, p.620. 
249
 Proper packaging according to the conditions or the trade will generally be sufficient The Southern Cross, 1940 
AMC 59 (S.D.N.Y.1939). 
  172
Monopersulfate250 in The MOL Renaissance.251 
 
There is an obvious connection between packing and dangerous goods. Some cargoes 
cannot simply be classified as “dangerous” or “not dangerous”. Certain types of cargo 
are capable of causing damage only in certain factual contexts. For example, goods 
which, although harmless if packed in a proper and recognised manner, become 
potentially deleterious if not so packed.252 Or if they are allowed to escape from the 
vessel or from the container in which they are packed, e.g. crude oil, they will 
contaminate the environment. The insufficiency of packing can be the blasting fuse for 
potential dangerous cargo translated into an actual danger. 
 
Obviously, packing capable of preventing even the most minor damage is not practical 
or expected for most commodities, just as the degree of care that would have to be 
exercised by carrier in order to avoid all minor damage is not always practical or 
expected. There must be some middle ground or rule of reason between the degree of 
packing required, the care to be taken and the minor damage expected.253 This was put 
clearly by Learned Hand Ct. J., in The Silversandal.254 
 
In the case of dangerous cargo, a duty is clearly imposed on shippers to correctly label 
and package hazardous cargoes and to assist masters by properly apprising them of the 
properties of the cargoes. With the best will in the word, however, mistakes occur and 
cargoes are often incorrectly labelled, packaged or stowed.255 Most commonly, an 
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IMDG Code Listing will be the first indication of the general nature of dangerous 
substances being carried on vessel. With the cargo’s UN number, full details of its 
hazards can be obtained by seeking advice from experts or by reference to databases and 
technical literature. Of course, the method and standard of packing can be found in the 
IMDG Code and the IMO/ILO Guidelines for Packing Cargo in Freight Containers or 
Vehicles. Where the flag State regulations require strict compliance with the IMDG 
Code and other IMO recommendations, that means both shipper and carrier must follow 
these rules strictly, for example shipper needs to provide a MSDS256 or a dangerous 
cargo manifest with container packing certificate257, and the carrier needs to provide a 
proper dangerous cargo stowage plan.  
 
Where there is insufficient packing and any other cause of loss, the burden is, of course, 
on the carrier to show what percentage was due to the insufficient packing and what was 
due to the other cause.258 The carrier will be responsible for the whole loss if he is 
unable to separate the damage arising from the two causes. Suppose, insufficiency of 
packing of chemicals (with a broken water-resistant liner) was deemed to have caused 
part of the loss, but there was evidence showing that carrier negligently stowed  the 
container of chemical together with a container of wet cargoes (it damped the nearby 
container of chemicals).  If the carrier cannot separate which damage caused by the 
insufficiency of packing, he will be held liable for the whole loss. 
4.3.1.5.3 Inherent Vice 
The defence of “inherent vice” (Article IV r. 2(m)) covers loss or deterioration of cargo 
because of some internal characteristic, defect or inherent quality of the goods. This can 
be a natural characteristic of the goods, such as the tendency of fishmeal to generate 
heat,259 or of a chemical to discolour.260 The theory and policy of the exemption is that 
the shipper rather than the carrier should show the inherent characteristics of the goods 
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shipped and should have the responsibility of guarding against it.261  
 
In practice where any undisclosed dangerous cargo is damaged or deteriorates owing to 
its dangerous characteristics, the carrier, if sued, will always argue this exception. There 
are three different situations. If the danger is unknown to the carrier the exception in 
IV2m will apply. If the danger is known to the carrier then if the carrier fails to take 
proper care to deal with the dangerous feature he will be at fault, and fault negatives the 
excepted perils. If the carrier does not know but ought to, and for that reason fails to 
take proper precautions for the cargo, in the author’s opinion, it is the carrier’s 
negligence on care for the cargo, so the exception is not applicable to him. 
 
In addition, there must a middle ground between the care of cargo required of the carrier 
under Article III r. 2 and the right of the carrier to rely on an exception such as inherent 
vice under Article IV r. 2(m). The degree of care also depends on the explicit special 
conditions of care in the bill of lading contract or the implicit conditions of care arising 
from the well-known nature of the cargo and the practices and customs of the past.262 
For example, where refrigeration of a cargo is neither requested by the shipper nor 
provided by the carrier, the carrier need not refrigerate the cargo unless that is a custom 
and practice between shipper and carrier implied in the contract. 
 
There may be an overlap between goods that are “dangerous” and goods that suffer 
from “inherent defect, quality or vice”, inter alia because goods that suffer from 
inherent vice might become dangerous during a voyage. However, the distinction 
between them is not always easy to draw, but it is very important because whilst 
inherent vice constitutes a defence to a claim for damages arising out of loss or 
deterioration during a voyage, it does not of itself involve any breach of duty by the 
shipper, or confer any right of recourse on the carrier.263 Considering a shipper’s 
responsibility for disclosure the nature of dangerous cargo, the obligation to give notice 
to a carrier is absolute. The shipper is strictly liable if notice of the cargo’s actual 
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condition is not given, unless the actual condition is apparent to the carrier.264  
 
Then can we find any criteria to decide a particular cargo which is dangerous or 
inherent vice? It is submitted that in principle where the condition of the goods on 
shipment is such that they are liable to cause injury to persons or damage to the ship or 
other goods, or even serious delay to the voyage,265 they fall in the category of 
dangerous goods. However, how to draw the line is not always easy in practice. In The 
Athanasia Comninos,266 Mustill J. explained the decision on the grounds that it had not 
been proved that the cargo of coal had dangerous characteristics different in degree from 
those notoriously associated with goods of that type. He found that the damage was 
actually caused by the carrier’s failure to comply with safety standards of the kind 
which should have been adopted in the carriage of any cargo of coal. Therefore the 
carrier’ claim failed. In Greenshields, Cowie v. Stephens,267 where coal heated and 
ignited on the voyage, but since the carrier made no attempt to prove that it had been in 
a dangerous condition on shipment the case was treated as merely one of inherent vice. 
In Transoceanica v. Shipton,268 where the presence of stones in a cargo of barley 
prevented the cargo from being discharged by spout and delayed the vessel for a day 
and a half, it was suggested that the case was not one of dangerous goods, but merely of 
inherent vice.  
 
Considering the carriage of cargo which either inherent vice or dangerous, both the 
carrier and the shipper must ask themselves whether the nature of the cargo implicitly, 
or explicitly by the wording of the contract of carriage itself, requires special care of the 
cargo, e.g. refrigeration, or a certain height of stow, or a minimum ventilation or not 
more than a certain length of voyage, etc.  
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In General Feeds Inc v Burnham Shipping Corp (The Amphion),269 anti-oxidant-treated 
bagged fishmeal 270  was carried under a Gencon voyage charterparty. After the 
“fishmeal” had been loaded in Peru, a fire occurred within the cargo during outturn in 
China, and the shipowners incurred considerable expense in countering the fire, 
discharging the cargo, and rendering the hold fit for reuse. Expert witnesses found the 
cargo had been correctly loaded, stowed and cared for during the voyage and concluded 
that the fire was a consequence of a few bags of fishmeal within the consignment not 
having been adequately treated with the antioxidant chemical. That means the cargo did 
not comply with the description in the charterparty. It was held that owners were only 
under an obligation to ensure that the fishmeal presented for shipment complied with 
the IMDG Code, and the certificate issued by the Peruvian authorities established this to 
have been the case. Whereas owners may have accepted the residual risk of potential 
overheating occurring, even in an antioxidant treated-cargo properly handled, owners 
could not accept the risk from improperly treated fishmeal. The charterers were held 
liable, having shipped cargo other than specified in the contract.271  
4.3.1.5.4 Misrepresentation of Nature or Value 
Misrepresentation of the nature or value of the goods by the shipper results in a very 
heavy sanction—the carrier is not responsible for any loss or damage. That is to say, the 
carrier is entirely exempt from liability for loss or damage in connection with the goods 
according to Article 4(5)(h) of the HVR if either their nature or value knowingly been 
misstated by the shipper.  
Article 4(5) (h) of the HVR provides “Neither the carrier nor the ship shall be responsible in any 
event for loss or damage to, or in connection with, goods if the nature or value thereof has been 
knowingly misstated by the shipper in the bill of lading” 
 
This kind of misstatement usually arises where the shipper described the goods as some 
similar merchandise in order to obtain a lower freight rate, or to avoid customs duties, 
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or strategic goods embargoes.272 The warranty is not absolute but relates only to a 
misstatement of which the shipper was aware.273  Accordingly, the carrier is not 
responsible to either shipper or consignee for any damage to the goods. This is different 
from Article III r5, where a misstatement as to marks, numbers, quantity or weight in 
the bill of lading cannot be relied upon by the carrier against an innocent third party 
consignee. In The Aegean Sea274 Thomas J stated that the obligations in Article III r.3 
and r.5 of the Hague-Visby Rules was restricted to the shipper and did not extend to any 
third party holder of a bill of lading. 
 
Compared with Article IV r.6 of HR/ HVR, the shipper’s liability to disclose the 
dangerous characteristics of the cargo and give proper notice to the carrier is strict. The 
shipper shall be responsible for all damages and expenses directly or indirectly arising 
out of or resulting from such shipment. The shipper’s liability of misstatement of the 
nature is based on fault but the sanction is very onerous since there is a complete 
fundamental breach. The carrier is not responsible for the goods under the contract and 
the law, even if there is no causal connection between the shipper’s misstatement and 
the loss or damage.275 The difference between “misstated” and “not properly disclosed” 
is not easy to explain. Whether the shipper’s liability is strict depending on whether the 
cargo is dangerous. Generally, if the goods are liable to cause injury to persons or 
damage to the ship or other goods, or even serious delay to the voyage, they are 
dangerous.  
 
Article IV r.5(h) is very meaningful and important for the carriage of chemicals and 
other hazardous materials, particularly if they are not listed in the IMDG Code at the 
time of shipment. What should the shipper tell the carrier as to the particular dangers of 
the cargo? In The Asian Gem,276 the vessel contracted to carry some low-grade powered 
zinc dross277 from Long Beach to Japan where, at that time, they were less fussy about 
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 This is a case (U.S. 1981) involving United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936, § 1304, equivalent of 
Article IV r 5 para. 4 of the HR and Article IV r5 (h) of the HVR. This case was referred in Watt, “Know your cargo”, 
P&I International, May 1999, p. 102. 
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 While at that time zinc dross or zinc ashes was not specially named in the IMDG Code, it was effectively present 
as a class 4.3 “water reactive substance NOS” or “not otherwise specified” materials. 
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pollution when smelting low-grade zinc ores. The ship asked whether the material was 
dangerous and was told by the shipper: “it is not listed in the IMDG Code” despite the 
shipper’s knowledge that the material produced hydrogen. This was a bulk cargo and 
was transported to the ship in trucks and loaded. The ship was told to keep the material 
dry, despite it having been stored outside for up to two years, and despite the trucks 
having been sprayed with water to reduce dusting problems. As the ship sailed, the 
diligent crew began to apply Ram-nek bitumen tape to the hatch covers to keep water 
out, but it was cold so the seaman doing work used a paraffin blow lamp to heat the tape 
and metal to get good adhesion. The inevitable happened, there was an explosion and 
the hatch covers were blown up. Then the American Coast Guard and American fire 
experts got involved in the continuing fire fighting.  
 
In this case the shipper did not give proper notice278 to the carrier about the dangerous 
characteristics of the cargo and he was liable for all damages and expenses caused. 
Following the incident, zinc ashes was specifically incorporated into the Code and 
entered in the IMO bulk cargo code, as a hazardous material generating flammable gas 
when wet.279 
4.3.2 Chinese Law 
Articles 47280 and 48281 of the Maritime Code regulate the carrier’s liability. Most of 
the duties are related to the seaworthiness of the vessel. They also require the carrier to 
take reasonable care and due diligence to carry cargo during the voyage. These duties 
are identical to Article III of the HR/ HVR. In fact, the Chinese texts of Articles 47 and 
48 appear to be based on a translation of Article III, hence this section is very brief. 
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 The shipper should note there are often NOS catch-all categories in the IMDG Code and should notice the carrier 
that potential danger of zinc dross and it produces hydrogen. 
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 See Watt & Burgoyne, Know your cargo, (1999) P&I International, 13(5) p.103. 
280
 Article 47: The carrier shall, before and at the beginning of the voyage, exercise due diligence to make the ship 
seaworthy, properly man, equip and supply the ship and to make the holds, refrigerating and cool chambers and all 
other parts of the ship in which goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, carriage and preservation. 
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 Article 48: The carrier shall properly and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for and discharge the 
goods carried. 
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4.3.2.1 Seaworthiness 
Seaworthiness of the vessel is the most important obligation of the carrier. The scope of 
the duty of due diligence must be ascertained in the particular context. The nature of the 
goods to be carried may vary, as do the weather conditions that may be encountered. 
The carrier must provide a vessel suitable to carry the cargo concerned in a particular 
route of voyage. Otherwise, the vessel will be uncargoworthy. 
 
If the carrier is told about the dangerous nature of the cargo, he must provide a ship that 
is fit to provide that cargo. If the cargo holds are not suitable for stowing the cargo in an 
acceptable way, the vessel is uncargoworthy. In The People’s Insurance Company, 
Guangxi Nan’ning Branch v. Tianjin Navigation Co. Ltd (The Jin Han),282 by a 
charterparty dated 3 July 1995, the defendant shipowners agreed to charter the “Jin 
Han” to charterers carrying 6,000 tonnes of zinc concentrate from China to Korea. 
During the course of loading,283 intermittent rain was encountered and without cover, 
this cargo became wet on the quay.284 
 
The shipper did not produce a certificate of moisture content of 12.41285 to the ship’s 
agent nor to the carrier, and instead presented a shipping order to the ship’s agent 
showing the moisture content of 8.9 percent. Soon after departing from the load port, 
the sodden cargo shifted286 during heavy weather and the vessel sank with all cargo lost. 
There are two issues need to be concerned, (1) was the shipper287 liable for the 
consequences of the misstatement of the moisture content? (2) Was the ship seaworthy, 
and if not, was the defendant shipowner liable for the loss? 
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 The Jin Han, first instance before Guangzhou Maritime Court on 4 November 1996, (1996) 
Guangzhou-maritime-No.80; on appeal before Guangdong People’s High Court, 31 December 1997. 
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 During the course of loading, China Commercial Inspection Bureau (CCIB) issued a Certificate in respect of the 
export of zinc concentrates confirming the moisture content of 12.41 percent. 
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 The plaintiff underwriters had issued an insurance policy in respect of cargo carried on board the “Jin Han”. After 
the loss, the shipper received a full indemnity from their cargo underwriters (People’s Insurance Company), and the 
plaintiff underwriters became subrogated to the shipper’s rights, under the PRC law, entitled to sue in their own 
name. 
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The dangerous cargo of zinc concentrate is a mineral which will produce a free surface 
effect when the moisture content is more than 8 percent and this can seriously affect the 
stability of the vessel and the carrier would be entitled to refuse to load or carry the 
cargo according to a relevant Regulation in China.288 Therefore, this case concerns 
unlawfully shipped dangerous cargo. 
 
It was held in Guangdong People’s High Court that the defendant shipowner did not 
ensure that the vessel complied with safety requirement for the shipment of zinc 
concentrates prior to loading, since the cargo holds were not suitable for stowage of the 
cargo (with moisture content more than 8%) in a seaworthy status prior to voyage. Also 
the master and the chief officer failed to refuse to load the cargo on the basis that the 
moisture content was above 8 percent. The crew were incompetent and they failed to 
study cargo by testing the sample before loading. According to Article 47 of Maritime 
Code,289 the vessel was unseaworthy and the defendant shipowner was liable for 70% 
of the loss and damage concerned. Under Article 113 of the General Principles of Civil 
Law290 and Articles 66,291 68292 of the Maritime Code, the plaintiff shipper was held 
responsible for 30% of the loss and damage to the cargo subject to their contributory 
negligence on misstatement and loading a cargo with more than 8% moisture content.293 
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 [88] MC No. 275, Article 9. The PRC Ministry of Communications (MC) had promulgated regulations on 22 
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 Article 47 of Maritime Code provides: “The carrier shall, before and at the beginning of the voyage, exercise due 
diligence to make the ship seaworthy, properly man, equip and supply the ship and to make the holds, refrigerating 
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with the regulations governing the carriage of such goods, have them properly packed, distinctly marked and labelled 
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innocuous when and where circumstances so require, without compensation. The shipper shall be liable to the carrier 
for any loss, damage or expense resulting from such shipment”. 
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 The Court of Appeal also found on a subsidiary point, on the measure of damages for loss of the cargo, that in 
accordance with Article 55 of the PRC Maritime Code, damages for loss of the cargo should be calculated on the 
basis of CIF value of the cargo. The earlier court judgment at first instance, which held that the amount of the 
insurance payment by the plaintiff underwriters is the measure of loss, was overturned. 
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4.3.2.2 Properly Load, Handle and Care for Cargo and 
Exceptions for a Carrier’s Liability 
Under Art. 48 of the Maritime Code, the responsibility to look after and carry the cargo 
properly during the voyage is a broad one, including seven specific roles: load, handle, 
stow, carry, keep, care for and discharge the goods carried. Furthermore, it requires the 
carrier to “properly and carefully” handle, preserve and carry the goods during the 
whole process of voyage.  
 
We can see Art. 48 is a direct incorporation of Art III r2 of the HR/HVR,294 but omits 
the introductory words of Art III r2 “subject to the provision of Article IV” (exceptions 
for the carrier’s liability). This omission does not, however, make the carrier’s 
obligation under Art. 48 absolute in China or more stringent than the UK where the 
HVR apply. Indeed, no problem in practice: Art. 48 of Maritime Code must be read 
together with Art. 51 which sets out exceptions for the carrier’s liability. Art. 51 largely 
adopts the same approach as the HR/HVR, and specifies 12 exceptions which are a 
simplified version of the 17 exemptions listed under Art IV of the HR/HVR.295 If the 
carrier cannot prove the existence of one of these exceptions, he must be held liable for 
the damages caused during the voyage. 
 
More specifically, where damage is entirely due to the carrier’s failure to load, stow or 
care for the cargo, the carrier bears any loss. Thus where a shipper shipped flammable 
thiourea dioxide but gave impeccable notice of its danger to the carrier, he was not 
liable when the chemical started a fire because the carrier has stowed it too close to a 
source of heat such as in China National Chemical Construction Corp. Shenzhen 
Branch (CNCCC) v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., Ltd.296  
 
                                                       
294
 Article III r.2 of HR/HVR: Subject to the provisions of Article IV, the carrier shall properly and carefully load, 
handle, stow, carry, keep, care for, and discharge the goods carried. 
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 Article 51 leaves a number of exemptions, such as the act of public enemies, the arrest or restraint of princes, 
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insufficiency of package and insufficiency of marking. 
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 Guangzhou Maritime Court, (2003)-Maritime-No. 307 & No. 343. 
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In this case, the claimant shipper (CNCCC) contracted the defendant carrier to ship 720 
casks of thiourea dioxide297 from Shenzhen to Rotterdam on the MOL Promise. The 
carrier was given proper notice298 and the chemical was properly packed and labelled 
with a certificate of Inspection of Packing for Dangerous Export Goods. On 12 June 
2002, the master of MOL Promise found some fuming containers that quickly led to a 
big fire and resulted in the total loss of claimant’s cargo. According to the investigation 
of Sarda Ispezioni in Cagliari, the fumes were attributable to the spontaneous 
combustion of thiourea dioxide. After examining the damaged containers and other 
polluted containers nearby, it was found that 8 freezers stowed together and generated 
excessive heat around the thiourea dioxide.299 It was assumed the heat from the freezers 
caused spontaneous combustion.  
 
It was held,300 according to Art. 68, that there is no liability of the shipper since he had 
given the carrier proper notice and also properly packed and labelled the dangerous 
cargo. According to Article 48 of the Maritime Code,301 the carrier negligently stowed 
dangerous cargo very near the freezers, therefore he was liable for the total loss of the 
claimant’s cargo. In addition, the court denied the defendant’s motion to exempt from 
liability based on the damage caused by fire on the vessel302 since it was obvious that 
the fumes from dangerous cargo led to a fire and the fire was caused by the negligence 
of the carrier. 
 
There is a more complicated situation where the loss or damage occurs from two 
concurrent causes and there is no decisive or dominant cause (both contribute to the 
loss). For example, one cause, for which the carrier is liable e.g. failure to care for 
goods (under Art. 48) combines with an excepted peril such as inherent vice or 
navigational fault (under Art. 51). There is no relevant provision of the Maritime Code 
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 Thiourea dioxide is listed in category 4.2 of IMDG Code, UN number 3341. 
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 The carrier received the notice about the dangerous nature before shipment and consented to carry them in two 
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 Article 48 The carrier shall properly and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for and discharge the goods 
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 Under Article 51, “fire” is one of the exceptions for the carrier, unless the fire was caused by the negligence of the 
carrier and his or her employees or agents. 
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covering this issue. In the author’s view, the carrier should be responsible only to the 
extent of the losses and damages caused by his failure to care for cargo (first cause). 
Meanwhile, the carrier should bear the burden of proof with respect to the losses and 
damages resulting from the second cause which absolves him from liability. 303 
Accordingly, if the carrier can not satisfy the proof of the excepted cause, he should be 
responsible for all damages and losses. More specifically, there are two different 
situations depending on the type of damage. 
 
One is, the faults of the shipper and the carrier cause different damages, for example if 
the fire starts on deck (A) because of the shipper’s fault (e.g. insufficient packing), but 
then spreads to another part of ship (B) because of the carrier’s fault (e.g. improper 
stowage of cargo under deck). Clearly here the shipper is responsible for A but the 
carrier for B. 
 
The other one is: a single item of damage (e.g. a single explosion) is caused by the 
faults of both shipper and carrier. This is more difficult. If the shipper sues the carrier or 
vice versa, this can be regarded as a matter of “comparative negligence”304 under 
Chinese law. Apparently, no relevant provision of Maritime Code covering this issue, 
but in practice it is likely for the claimant’s damage to be reduced, if it is partly due to 
his own fault.305 If a third party (e.g. another cargo owner) sues the carrier (or the 
shipper), in the author’ view, the shipper and carrier should be jointly liable for the 
whole loss, given it is difficult to decide the proportion of liability for a single item of 
damage.306 But this does not affect the recourse between them later on.  
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 Article 54 of the Chinese Maritime Code: “Where loss or damage or delay in delivery has occurred from causes 
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defendant.   
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4.3.2.3 Further Discussion on FIOST Terms in 
China—Compared with England 
In China, the carrier’s duty of care for the cargo under Article 48 is non-delegable. 
Accordingly, the carrier is responsible for the acts of the master, the crew, the stevedore 
and his other agents. For example, the carrier is responsible to ensure the master and 
seafarers keep the holds free of water and the temperature of the chambers for the 
carriage of dangerous cargo are adequately cooled. Also in practice, it is common for 
the carrier to subcontract some work (e.g. stowage) to an independent company (e.g. 
stevedore’s company). If the stevedores failed to perform their jobs properly, the carrier 
would be responsible for any losses and damages caused. However, if these stevedores 
were hired by the shipper, would the carrier’s obligation be transferred to the shipper 
and hence the carrier be relieved from liability for improper stowage? Again, if there is 
a FIOST clause307 in the bill of lading, can the carrier’s responsibility for loading, 
stowing or discharging, be transferred to the shipper or consignee in China?  
 
Some Chinese scholars308 believe the carrier’s duty of care for cargo under Art. 48 is a 
stringent obligation and cannot be excluded by contract, such as by inserting FIOST 
clause in a bill of lading (although possible in charterparty).309 They think because no 
relevant provisions in the Maritime Code that entitle the carrier to exclude his 
obligations relating to loading, stowing and discharging of the goods, the carrier should 
be responsible for any losses or damages caused by the stevedores, even if they were 
hired by the shipper.  
 
Obviously, the above result is not ideal, thus the author is not agree with their opinion. It 
would be unfair for the carrier to be liable for any delays, losses or damages caused by 
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chapter. I will discuss it later. 
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shippers, consignees or their agents, who have agreed to be responsible for the loading, 
handling, stowing or unloading of the goods in the contract of carriage. The author 
suggests that the Chinese legislators should stipulate the FIOS terms under the Maritime 
Code. The carrier’s obligation should be limited to the proper assistance and supervision 
of the stevedores to stow goods on board. The shipper (or consignee) should be liable 
for any damages or losses caused by improper stowage if the stevedores were hired by 
him.  
 
In comparison, the issue has been satisfactorily interpreted in English law: but for 
Article III r8 of HR/HVR, there would be no problem with FIOST clauses.310 The 
question is simply whether those clauses fall within the prohibition in that Article III 
r8.311 If not, the parties to the contract of carriage are free to agree to transfer some or 
all of the carrier’s duties to the shipper or consignee (e.g. by inserting “FIO” clauses in 
the bill of lading). 312  These terms, which really derive from chartering, but are 
sometimes included in bills of lading, transfer to the shipper or consignee the carrier’s 
ordinary responsibility for paying and controlling either loading and discharging (FIO 
“free in and out”), loading only (“free in liner out”), loading, stowage and discharge 
(FIOS “free in and out, stowed”) or loading, stowage, trimming and discharge (FIOST 
“free in and out stowed and trimmed”).  
 
In English Law, the carrier is required to load, stow and discharge carefully and properly, 
but only to the extent that it has undertaken contractually to perform those specific 
functions. For example, if the shipper was liable under its indemnity under English law, 
but the concurrent fault was that the stevedores who damaged the vessel while loading 
dangerous cargo on board, the bill of lading on FIOST term, what would happen? Surely, 
with the insertion of FIOST term, the shipper would be responsible for loading 
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 The Jordan II [2004] UKHL 49, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 1363, FIOS(T) clauses are effective despite HVR Art III r 8. But 
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pp.328-329. 
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(stevedores employed by him). Meanwhile he had strict liability for non-disclosure of 
dangerous cargo under Art. IV r6 of HVR. Therefore, the shipper should indemnify the 
carrier in full.  
 
In China, unlike English law, there is no equivalent provision in the Maritime Code to 
Art III r8 of the HR/HVR. The issue of “transfer carrier’s responsibility to the shipper or 
consignee” under FIO clause (inserted in the B/L) is not covered by the Code either. The 
current law lacks sufficient clarification and does not specifically provide the carrier 
with relief from liability where work is undertaken by a shipper or consignee based on 
the agreement (e.g. FIO clause). Actually, this lack of clarification with FIOST terms 
exists in all previous cargo conventions, such as HR/ HVR and Hamburg Rules, but it 
has been clarified in the recent Rotterdam Rules. 
 
In the author’s view, the way of English case law interpretation of the carrier’s 
obligations under the FIOST clause is much more sensible and clear. In China if FIOST 
terms were to be incorporated into a bill of lading, parties would be free to transfer 
some of the carrier’s duties to the shipper as well. This “freedom” should be recognised 
and clarified during the revision of Maritime Code. Furthermore, an equivalent 
provision to Art III r8 of HR/HVR should be stipulated. At present, there is a potential 
danger that a carrier might insert a very wide exceptions clause in a bill of lading that 
gave him a better deal than under the exceptions listed in Article 51 of the Maritime 
Code,313 given Article 78 of the Maritime Code which provides that: “The relationship 
between the carrier and the holder of the bill of lading with respect to their rights and 
obligations shall be defined by the clauses of the bill of lading”. In most cases, the 
Chinese courts will have no choice but give effect to this express term in the B/L 
regarding carrier’s exception of liability. As a result, the listed exemption of liability 
will be in favour of the carrier; and the B/L holder will be left in a disadvantageous 
position. But, occasionally the carrier may fail to benefit from the exception if somehow 
he is challenged by the court on assessment of the available evidence and the carrier is 
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 Article 51 of the Maritime Code largely adopts the same approach as the HR/ HVR with a specific list of 
exception of liability. See the full text in Appendix II.  
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not able to prove the existence of exception concerned. Under Article 51 (last 
paragraph), the carrier is required to bear the burden of proof.    
 
Finally, the author thinks the new UNCITRAL Convention on the international carriage 
of goods wholly or partly by sea, Article 13.2314 and Article 17.3(i)315 are very 
successful and appear satisfactory. These provisions overcome the problems with FIOS 
terms under previous cargo Conventions. So they could be used as a reference for 
Chinese legislators. 
4.3.2.4 Concluding Remarks 
Briefly, the liability of the carrier to the shipper under Maritime Code is HVR-based, 
which is the same as in England. However, considering the liability of the shipper to the 
carrier, the relevant provisions under Maritime Code are largely Hamburg-based which 
have made more specific provisions, but haven’t fundamentally changed the scheme of 
liability for dangerous cargoes under HR/ HVR. They all have very similar provisions 
dealing with dangerous goods, which largely supersede the common law rules related to 
shipper’s obligation to give notice. 
 
Nonetheless there is still difference between two countries. For example, unlike English 
law, there is not any equivalent provision of the Maritime Code to Article III r8 of the 
HR/HVR (prohibiting the carrier from reducing certain liabilities). Also whether the 
carrier is relived of liability based on the FIOST clause inserted in B/L has been 
interpreted in different way. In England, it is clearly interpreted in case law that the 
parties to the contract of carriage are free to agree to transfer some or all of the carrier’s 
duties to the shipper or consignee. But this issue has not been stipulated or clarified by 
Chinese Maritime Code, which need draw attention to Chinese legislators. 
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 Under Article 13 para2, “Notwithstanding paragraph 1 of this article, and without prejudice to the other 
provisions in chapter 4 and to chapter 5 to 7, the carrier and the shipper may agree that the loading, handling, stowing 
or unloading of the goods is to be performed by the shipper, the documentary shipper or the consignee. Such an 
agreement shall be referred to in the contract particulars”. 
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 Under Article 17, para3 (i), “Loading, handling, stowing, or unloading of the goods performed pursuant to an 
agreement in accordance with article 13 paragraph 2, unless the carrier or a performing party performs such activity 
on behalf of the shipper, the documentary shipper or the consignee”. 
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4.4 Will Transferee be Liable for Dangerous Cargo in 
England and China? 
Having analysis the allocation of risks between the original contracting parties, we need 
next to address the question of whether this liability may extend to third parties. This 
leads on to the most pressing issue in this area of law—should third parties ever be 
contractually liable in respect of the shipment of dangerous cargo?  
 
Generally, the approach is different in England and China: and that England will be 
dealt with first, based on a few important decisions relating to carriage of dangerous 
cargo. This issue is not particularly stipulated by Chinese legislation. In China, it is 
simply left to the freedom of contract. The right and liability of transferee is normally 
defined by specific clauses of B/L. For example, Article 78 of Chinese Maritime Code 
provides: “(1) The relationship between the carrier and the holder of the bill of lading 
with respect to their rights and obligations shall be defined by the clauses of the bill of 
lading. (2)Neither the consignee nor the holder of the bill of lading shall be liable for the 
demurrage, dead freight and all other expenses in respect of loading occurred at the 
loading port unless the bill of lading clearly states that the aforesaid demurrage, dead 
freight and all other expenses shall be borne by the consignee and the holder of the bill 
of lading”. Nonetheless, the author would like to do some exploration and briefly 
discuss this topic based on her understanding of Chinese law.  
4.4.1 English Law 
4.4.1.1 Transfer of Bill of Lading 
As far as contractual liability is concerned, the HR/HVR (and also the Hamburg Rules) 
provide it is the shipper who is liable under its indemnity for damages caused by his 
undisclosed dangerous cargo.316 Whether this can be transferred to a third party holder 
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 Gaskell, op. cit., p. 476. The Hague/ Hague-Visby Rules and also Hamburg rules are related to the legal issues of 
the carriage contract between shipper and carrier, not referring to the third party such as a transferee of bill of lading. 
Considering the shipper’s liability, it can be divided into three categories: the obligation to provide accurate 
information on the goods to the carrier; to give appropriate warning and instructions to the carrier for the carriage of 
dangerous cargo; and to be responsible for the carrier’s loss or damage which is caused by the act, fault or negligence 
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of a bill of lading317 is not entirely clear. Considering transfer of bill of lading during 
the voyage of dangerous cargo, there are three questions need to be discussed: first, does 
the third party (transferee of B/L) become liable with regard to the shipment of 
dangerous cargo? Secondly, if he does, does the shipper cease to be liable or the 
transferee’s liability is only in addition to the shipper’s rather than substitution? Finally, 
if the transferee is liable, does he cease to be liable when he passes the document of title 
on to a sub-buyer? 
4.4.1.2 Whether Transferees become Liable 
Based on a strict interpretation of the privity rule,318 the only way a third party can be 
liable on a contract is by specific legislative enactment. The relevant legislation is 
section 3 (1) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992. Under s. 3(1), the lawful holder 
of a bill of lading (or a sea waybill) who takes or demands delivery or claims under the 
contract of carriage becomes subject to the same liabilities under the contract as if he 
had been a party to it.319  
 
Baughen and Campbell have argued that “this wording would suggest that the third 
party simply assumes all the liabilities to which the original party to the contract was 
subject. However, this is not the only way in which the provision can be construed. ‘The 
same’ need not entail that every obligation of the shipper must be imposed on the third 
party as well”.320 Instead, what it should entail is a comparison of the third party’s 
position with the position which would be occupied by an original shipper. In the 
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situation that a third party had nothing to do with the cargo prior to loading, indeed he 
will have even less opportunity of ascertaining the true nature of the cargo than the 
carrier.  
 
Nonetheless, the indemnity in Art IV r.6 does not contain an express statement to 
prohibit the transfer of a shipper’s liability to other persons.  
 
The question then arises whether the lawful holder of bill of lading or other document of 
title becomes liable to indemnify the carrier in respect of dangerous goods. The authors 
of Scrutton321 suggest that the answer is in the negative. The note in Scrutton on Article 
III, rule 5 reads as follows: 
“Under Section 3 (1) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992, a person to whom rights of suit 
are transferred under the Act… becomes subject to “the same liabilities under that contract as if 
he had been a party to that contract”. If the guarantee referred to in this Rule is within the 
meaning of section 3 (1) of the Act, then the person on whom liabilities are imposed by the 
section would, like the shipper, be deemed to have guaranteed the marks etc… and would also 
be liable for any loss consequent upon the guarantee. The Rule itself, however, seems to show 
an intention that the shipper only and not the consignee or indorsee should be liable under this 
guarantee and the courts will probably give effect to this intention by holding that the person on 
whom liabilities are imposed by section 3(1), although deemed to be a party to the contract of 
carriage, is not the Shipper within the Rule. If this be so, the carrier, sued in the English Court 
under Article III Rule 4 by a transferee who has acted in good faith could bring in the shipper as 
third party.” 
 
In an obiter dictum in The Aegean Sea,322 Thomas J expressly indorsed the same view 
given by the authors of Scrutton that “shipper” in Article IV rule 6 cannot be read as 
including a lawful holder of the bill of lading to whom rights and liabilities are 
transferred under COGSA 1992, and that therefore such a holder is not subject to the 
shipper’s Hague Rule liabilities in respect of dangerous cargo.323 In addition, there is 
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some judicial support to impose the duty in Article IV r6 solely on the initial “shipper”. 
It is has indeed been interpreted in this fashion even in the case where the term 
“shipper” appears elsewhere in the HR/HVR such as in The Filikos,324 where the Court 
of Appeal considering the term in Art IV r2(i). Nonetheless, there is no reported case in 
which it has been held that the shipper’s contractual obligation can be transferred to a 
third party, given that the liability imposed on the shipper is strict. 
4.4.1.3 Whether Transferees’ Liability is in Addition to 
the Shipper’s or in Substitution for it? 
On the assumption that the dicta in The Aegean Sea are wrong, then the argument is that 
the dangerous cargo liability can be transferred to the holder of B/L. Subsequently, a 
question arises: will the transferee’s liability is in addition to the shipper’s or in 
substitution for it? 
 
In The Giannis NK,325 the shipper had endorsed the bill of lading to their immediate 
purchasers and so the property in the cargo of ground-nuts had passed to those 
purchasers under s. 1 of the Bills of Lading Act 1855.326 Were the shippers divested of 
their liability for the carriage of dangerous goods by virtue of the endorsement to the 
purchaser of the ground-nuts? In the first instance, Longmore, J. expressed his opinion 
in a negative way327 and he relied expressly on the obiter statement of Mustill, J. in The 
Athanasia Comninos:328 
It may well be that in the main a transfer of the document, satisfying the requirement of the 
1855 Act, operates to transfer away many of the shipper’s contractual obligations, but the Act 
cannot in my judgement have been intended to divest the shipper of responsibility for the 
consequences of loss, arising from the act of shipment itself. 
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In the appeal in The Giannis NK, Hirst L.J. noted that at common law the shipper would 
have remained liable, notwithstanding endorsement of the bill of lading. He also 
emphasised that the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992, s.3 (3)329 had made this point 
explicit:330 
In my judgement it would require very clear words indeed to divest the owner of his rights 
against the shipper (with whom he is in contractual relationship) and leave him with his sole 
remedy against a complete stranger who happens to be the consignee of the goods, or an 
endorsee of the bill of lading, of whose whereabouts and financial stability he knows nothing, 
and who may be a man (or enterprise) of straw…. I am satisfied that the shippers were not 
divested of liability by virtue of s.1 of the 1855 Act. 
 
In the House of Lords, both Lord Lloyd of Berwick and Lord Steyn assumed that 
although all the shipper’s original liabilities were transferred under the Bills of Lading 
Act 1855,331 such transfer was by way of addition to the liability of the original shipper, 
rather than by way of substitution.332 Therefore, the shippers were not divested their 
obligations under Article IV rule 6 by virtue of indorsement of the bill.333 Obviously, 
the answer to the question above is the shipper doesn’t cease to be liable, even if the 
transferee might be liable in addition to the shipper himself. 
 
What has been discussed above approved the approach in the expression of Article IV 
rule 6 of Hague Rules which provide a liability of the shipper shall not be transferred to 
or otherwise prejudiced the position of a transferee of a bill of lading. In addition, 
shipper’s liability under Article IV rule 6 shall be treated with similar intention to his 
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liability under Article III rule 5. Art III r.5 relates to shippers’ liabilities of the marks, 
quantity and weight of goods334 do not appear appropriately transferred to the receivers 
of goods, because the “shipper” rather than the transferee has the opportunity to invest 
the goods, thus there is no possibility of transfer of shipper’s liability to third parties in 
both Articles.335 
 
However, it seems that the stated intention of the Law Commissions about the COGSA 
1992 is different from the above approach. The Law Commission envisaged the 
possibility of statutory transfer of a shipper’s liability for dangerous goods to a bill of 
lading holder. The Law Commission specifically rejected any provision preventing the 
transmissibility of this liability to third party. It was at 3.22 of Law Com No. 196 (1991) 
“Rights of suits in respect of carriage of goods by sea” stated:336 
“We do not think that liability in respect dangerous goods is necessarily more unfair than 
liability in respect of a range of other matters over which the holder of the bill of lading has no 
control and for which he is not responsible, as for instance liability for loadport demurrage and 
dead freight. Also, it may be have been the prime mover behind the shipment. Furthermore, it is 
unfair that the carrier should be denied redress against the indorsee of the bill of lading who 
seeks to take the benefit of the contract of carriage without the corresponding burdens? 
 
The Law Commission achieved their apparent objective and the section 3 of COGSA 
1992 does, in the cases to which it applies, subject a bill of lading transferee to the 
shipper’s Hague Rule liability for the shipment of dangerous cargo. However there is 
still some confusions. With respect to the example of loadport demurrage or dead freight 
in above paragraphs, at least the indorsee can be alerted to its potential liability by 
scrutinising the terms of the bills of lading which is different from the position of 
dangerous cargo. In the latter situation, although the indorsee may have instigated their 
shipment in their actual condition with the undisclosed defect that rendered then 
dangerous. Therefore, it is both open to the courts to confine the obligation imposed 
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under Article IV rule 6 to the original shipper and desirable that they do so, in which 
case significant expression and answer will be given to the question whether third party 
should ever be liable in respect to the shipment of dangerous cargo?   
4.4.1.4 Whether Transferees Cease to be Liable When 
Document of Title Passed on to a Sub-buyer? 
If the intention of the Law Commission is eventually confirmed, and thus The Aegean 
Sea approach held to be wrong, and the shipper’s undertaking in respect of dangerous 
cargo is transferable to third parties under section 3(1) of COGSA 1992, a further 
questions arises—can such third parties (intermediate buyers) subsequently divest 
themselves of liability by transferring the bill of lading to another party, i.e. a 
sub-buyer? 
 
This issue came before the House of Lords in The Berge Sisar.337 The case involved the 
liability of an intermediate party who had called for samples from the cargo prior to 
delivery and on the basis of their analysis had decided not to take delivery but to resell 
the cargo. In due course they obtained the bill of lading which they then passed on to 
their sub-buyer. This temporary possession of the bill gave the intermediate buyer rights 
of suit under section 2(1) of COGSA 1992, of which they were divested under section 
2(5) when they passed on the bill to their sub-buyer. The question arose as to whether, at 
the time they had acquired rights of suit they also acquired liabilities under the bill by 
virtue of section 3(1) (c). If so, had they been divested of those liabilities when they in 
turn transferred the bill of lading? 
 
The first question depended on whether the intermediate buyers had made a “demand 
for delivery” when they requested samples of the cargo from the shipowners. The House 
of Lords held that at the time the intermediate buyer made the request they were not in a 
position to make a “demand” for delivery as they lacked the bill of lading and so lacked 
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the authority to make such a demand. It would be preferable to have been that a request 
for samples prior to delivery could not amount to a “demand for delivery”.338 
 
As to the second question, the House of Lords expressed their view that, even if liability 
had attached to the intermediate buyers, they would have been divested of it when they 
lost rights of suit under section 2(5) for the following reasons. First, the House observed 
that ss. 2(1) and 3(1) COGSA 1992 specifically adopted the crucial wording of the Bills 
of Lading Act 1855, which formed the basis of Smurthwaite v. Wilkins,339 that the 
holder of a bill of lading is liable under that bill unless and until he endorsees the bill to 
someone who also fulfils the conditions of liability. Second, the underlying principle of 
COGSA 1992 was that of mutuality, tying statutory burdens to statutory benefits.340 
One consequence of this wider analysis is that, contrary to the position in Smurthwaite v. 
Wilkins, divestment of liability would not be dependent upon the subsequent acquisition 
of liability by the third party to whom the bill of lading to be transferred. Thus, if that 
party decided not to take delivery, neither it nor the intermediate party would be 
liable.341 The decision given by the House of Lords in The Berge Sisar is clear that 
neither the intermediate bill of lading holder nor their sub buyer would undertake the 
liability transferred from the original shipper. 
4.4.1.5 Concluding remarks 
From what has been discussed above, we can see the shipper’s liability under Article IV 
rule 6 does not transfer to a third party under COGSA 1992, although the Law 
Commission thought it did. I am disagree with the Law commission’s opinion, given 
that the liability imposed on the shipper is strict, and compared with the carrier, the third 
party has even less opportunity of ascertaining the true nature of the cargo. Furthermore 
the third party is in no position to give the appropriate notice to the carrier to enable it 
carry cargo safely. 
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If the liability does pass, the shipper does not cease to be liable and the transferee can 
only be liable in addition to the shipper himself. If liability does pass, the transferee 
loses liability as soon as he loses his rights when B/L is passed to his sub-buyer. 
4.4.2 Chinese Law 
Unlike England, China has no specific legislation dealing with the transfer of rights and 
duties arising under a bill of lading. The matter has therefore to be dealt with as one of 
general principle. Moreover, the author will explore the third party’s bill of lading 
holder’s liability in China and most discussions will only represent the author’s personal 
opinions in relation to dangerous cargo liability. 
4.4.2.1 General Principles on “Transfer of Rights and 
Liabilities” 
As a developing country, China only began setting up her detailed commercial law in 
the 1980s. Chinese legislators never tried to regulate the very complicated issues under 
the Maritime Code such as rights of the controlling party and the transfer of rights. 
Particularly, these topics have not been addressed in any cargo Conventions including 
Hague/ Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules;342 Nor has China any equivalent to English 
legislation, such as the Bills of Lading Act 1855 and the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
1992. 
 
In addition this section will focus on the “transfer of rights and liabilities” under 
negotiable transport documents (i.e. Order B/L343 and Bearer B/L344). The author has no 
intention to deal with “straight” bill of lading or seaway bill, 345  since the 
non-negotiable B/L is very rarely to be used during the carriage of dangerous cargo in 
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China.346 
 
Under the Maritime Code, there is as stated above no particular provision in dealing 
with the “transfer of rights and liabilities” to a bill of lading holder, who is not an 
original party to the contract of carriage. The starting point is simply freedom of 
contract: as the Maritime Code, Art.78 r.1, says: “The relationship between the carrier 
and the holder of the bill of lading with respect to their rights and obligations shall be 
defined by the clauses of the bill of lading”. Here the B/L holder includes transferees, 
and Art. 78 r.2347 refers to certain responsibilities (i.e. demurrage, dead freight and 
other expenses) might be transferred from the shipper under specific clause of B/L. But, 
the provision does not help us to understand, with regard to the shipment of dangerous 
cargo, whether the shipper’s liability can be transferred to a third party (e.g. consignee). 
Nonetheless, some general legislation might help, such as the General Principles of 
Civil Law and the Contract Law 1999.348 
 
Under Contract Law 1999, Article 88 “Upon consent by the other party, one party may 
concurrently transfers his/her rights and obligations under a contract to a third person”. 
This means the burden of a contract can be transferred under Chinese law, but there are 
strict conditions to do it.  
 
Firstly, there must be an agreement from the transferee. Some Chinese scholars349 think 
it is necessary to have a contract between the third party and the original contracting 
party with an express agreement by the third party to take the burden of contract. 
Although there is a lack of Chinese legislation on this issue, surely this must be 
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necessary as a matter of logic. Secondly, according to Article 84 of Contract Law,350 it 
is subject to the carrier’s consent that the shipper’s obligation can be transferred to a 
B/L holder. Thirdly, according to Article 86,351 if the obligation is exclusively personal 
to the original shipper, it cannot be transferred to a B/L holder. Fourthly, according to 
Articles 79 and 89,352 in light of the nature of the contract, some rights and obligations 
cannot be transferred.  
 
In the light of what I have said above, none of the conditions can be satisfied in the case 
of dangerous cargo. For instance, it is very unlikely to see the B/L holder would agree 
on taking all shipper’s obligations on dangerous cargo, before knowing the exactly 
amount of damages could occur. Moreover, it is impossible to get the consent from the 
carrier in advance as to which transferee will take the responsibility (instead of the 
shipper) since the B/L can be transferred many times while the cargo on board during 
the voyage. Furthermore, considering the nature of the carriage contract, it is not 
realistic for the transferee to get hold of all information about the dangerous nature of 
cargo before cargo’s delivery. Accordingly, the obligation to notify the carrier, as 
discussed in English law section, can be regarded as an exclusively personal duty of the 
original shipper and a third party cannot substitute for the shipper.  
4.4.2.2 Further Discussion and Recommendation 
Generally, the shipper’s duty of notice cannot be transferred and the transferees will not 
become liable with regard to the shipment of dangerous cargo in China,353 same as that 
in England. However, the above general rules in the Contract Law and the Civil law are 
not specifically designed for applying to maritime cases, and cannot be construed as 
“transfer the shipper’s contractual rights and liabilities to a B/L holder” particularly in 
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the case of dangerous cargo. As stated above, the Chinese legislators have not touched 
the topic on transfer of rights and liabilities under the Maritime Code. This issue should 
be clarified during the revision of the Code, but how to stipulate it? 
 
The author suggests to add a condition to “transfer of liability” such as “under fair and 
reasonable rule”. Based on this general rule, it would be obviously unfair and 
unreasonable for a third party bill of lading holder to be liable for the notice of 
dangerous cargo and to indemnify the carrier in the situation where he has nothing to do 
with the cargo prior to loading, and thus has less opportunity to check the cargo than the 
carrier. Therefore the shipper’s liability relating to the dangerous cargo must not cease 
after the bill of lading has been transferred to a third party. Furthermore, in the author’s 
view, the advantage of the “fair and reasonable rule” would leave space and flexibility 
for Chinese judges to interpret relevant provisions relating to the “transfer of rights” in 
dangerous cargo cases, given that China is not a “case law country” and so there is no 
possibility for a judge to “make” law. 
 
Although the above general rule can be used as guidance, it would be necessary to 
clarify specific issues by Chinese legislation. Firstly, at what stage would the B/L holder 
become subject to the liabilities under the contract? Article 133 of Contract Law354 only 
deals with the “transfer of ownership” upon “delivery”. There is a big gap between 
“obtaining ownership” and “subject to liability”. The whole process of delivery is 
almost always a time consuming process. When and how the consignee assumes 
liability is a very difficult question, and was not answered satisfactorily either in the UK 
Bill of Lading Act 1855 or in the UK Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992.355  
 
Secondly, the “ownership” of the cargo is transferred from shipper to consignee does 
not automatically result in the shipper losing his rights such as the “right of control” of 
cargo, the “right to delivery” of cargo, and the “right of recourse” against the carrier etc. 
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Thus, the shipper’s obligation for damages caused by dangerous cargoes in the author’s 
view, should not automatically transfer to the consignee along with the “transfer of 
ownership”. All these issues need to be stipulated if the topic of “transfer of rights and 
obligations” is added to the Maritime Code.  
 
Thirdly, to what extent should the liabilities of the B/L holder be subject to? The author 
believes the extent should at least be narrowed down to “such liabilities have to be 
incorporated in or ascertainable from the B/L”. The relevant issue is regulated under 
Article 58, r.2356 of the new UNCITRAL Convention,357 and it can be used as a 
reference for Chinese legislators during the revision of Maritime Code. 
 
Indeed, the author thinks the new Convention has provided a much better solution as to 
“transfer of liabilities” in relation to dangerous cargo. Under Article 58, r.2, the B/L 
holder assumes the liabilities if it “exercise any right under the contract of carriage”. 
But it does not then assume the same liabilities as if it had been the original party (i.e. 
shipper) to the contract. It only assumes any liabilities “imposed on it under the contract 
of carriage” and then only “to the extent that such liabilities are incorporated in or 
ascertainable from” the bill of lading. Accordingly, the B/L holder would not be liable to 
the carrier for damages for shipping a dangerous cargo. 
4.5 Liability under Charterparty Forms 
It is not very common to find dangerous cargo clauses in the standard voyage 
charterparty forms, such as Gencon,358 possibly because it is in the nature of this 
charterparty that the cargo for shipment on the voyage will be expressly agreed between 
the contracting parties. This may be contrasted with most time charterparty forms, such 
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as NYPE 1993359 and Baltime form360, where the charterer has a greater discretion as to 
the cargo to be shipped and where it is more usual to find a clause expressly prohibiting 
the shipment of certain goods.  
 
Where the charter contains a clause paramount, such as clause 24 of the NYPE form 
incorporates the Unites States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1936 which following the 
Hague Rules, the common law obligation of the charterer to give notice of shipment of 
dangerous cargo is probably superseded by the rights expressly conferred on the carrier 
by Article IV r. 6 of the HR/ HVR.361 Since Article IV r. 6 and some relevant provisions 
have been discussed in details, this section will focus on some particular charterparty 
clauses relating to charterer and shipowner’s liabilities regards to dangerous cargo.  
 
There is no separate section on charterparty in Chinese law. In China, most maritime 
laws/rules concern bill of lading not charterparties. Like most countries, China leaves 
relevant issues of charterparties to the uniform rules, such as Baltime form, NYPE 1993 
and Gencon, in order to be consistent with international formula.362 Article 127 of the 
Maritime Code 1992 states: “The provisions concerning the rights and obligations of the 
shipowner and the charterer in this Chapter363 shall apply only when there are no 
stipulations or no different stipulations in this regard in the charter party”. Accordingly, 
charterer’s liability in respect of dangerous cargo will depend on the specific terms of 
the particular charterparty and nothing particularly different from that in England. One 
exception is the common law indemnity may be implied into chapterparties in England, 
but not in China. I will discuss it in the last section. 
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4.5.1 Rights of the Owners When Cargo Loaded in 
Breach of the Charterparty Terms 
Where the dangerous cargo loaded does not comply with the terms of the charterparty, 
e.g. Clause 4(a) of NYPE 1993364 or Lines 32 to 36 of Baltime form,365 the charterers 
are in breach of the contract and the owners are entitled to recover damages for the loss 
caused by the breach. For example, in The Maaslot,366 the owner’s claims were 
awarded for demurrage and related damages arising from the charterer’s loading of 
condensate that did not conform to the charterparty specification (“undarker 2.5 NPA”).   
 
Where the breach consists in loading dangerous cargo, the carrier may also rescind the 
contract on the grounds that the charterers are in breach of a fundamental term. For 
example, in The Merhanik Yuryev,367 held the owner was justified in refusing to load 
Iraqi gas oil misrepresented by the charterer to be Iranian gas oil, in contravention of 
U.N. sanctions and Norwegian law.  
 
If the carriers do rescind, they are entitled to freight on the basis of quantum meruit for 
the carriage actually performed, as well as to damages for any further loss which they 
suffer.368 If they elect to affirm the contract, they are entitled to damages for any loss 
resulting from the shipment of dangerous cargo, but the provisions of the contract will 
continue to apply, including any provisions which limit or exclude damages.369  
 
In Chandis v. Isbrandtsen-Moller,370 the Evgenia Chandris was chartered for a voyage, 
the charter providing: “Cargo to consist of lawful general merchandise, excluding acids, 
explosives, arms, ammunition or other dangerous cargo.” The charterers shipped 
turpentine, which was a dangerous cargo, and the discharge was delayed as a result. It 
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was held that this cargo was excluded under the above clause and that the charterers 
were accordingly in breach of a “fundamental terms”. Although the master had 
consented to the shipment of turpentine, it did not waive the rights of the owners in 
respect thereof.371 
 
If the charterers order the master to load excluded cargo and the owners either are 
unaware of this or instruct the master to accept it under protest, the owners may be 
entitled to additional remuneration based on the current market rate for carriage of the 
excluded cargo, either as damages or under an implied promise by the charterers.372 In 
Steven v. Bromley,373 Atkin L.J. discussed the possibility, on which he reserved his 
opinion, of the shipowner who charters his ship for non-dangerous work and finds it 
used instead for dangerous work claiming as part of his damages for breach of contract 
reasonable extra remuneration for the dangerous work.  
4.5.2 Indemnity under Employment Clauses in Time 
Charterparties 
Most time charters374 provide that the master shall be under the orders and directions of 
charterers as regards employment of the vessel, agency and other arrangements, and that 
the charterers shall indemnity the owners against any consequences or liabilities that 
might arise from complying with such orders and directions.375  Even where the 
indemnity obligation is not express, it will frequently be implied as a concomitant of the 
owner’s obligation to comply with the charterer’s orders.376 Unlike the standard form of 
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indemnity given by a bareboat charterer, which covers all losses arising out of his 
operation of the vessel, a time-charterer’s indemnity applies only to losses which are 
caused by his orders; he is not liable for all losses or misfortunes suffered by the owners 
on the mere ground that they arose while his orders were being carried out.377  
 
In certain circumstance, a cargo is properly declared and carried, but nevertheless there 
is an accident and the ship is damaged. No doubt, under Article IV r. 6 of the HR and 
HVR, the shipper is not liable; but under the NYPE and similar charters the charterer is. 
Nonetheless, the indemnity provisions do apply to dangerous cargoes where damage is 
caused by the nature of the cargo without any breach on the charterer. 
 
For instance, the bulk carriers Athanasia Comninos and Georges Christos Lemos were 
chartered to carry coal from Canada to the UK.378 Each ship was damaged on the 
voyage by an explosion of air and methane gas which had accumulated in the holds 
after loading. In the Athanasia Comninos, a claim by the shipowners based on shipper’s 
indemnity as regards undisclosed dangerous cargo failed because they could not prove 
at the trial that the coal had special properties making it unusual hazardous in 
comparison with other coal cargoes.379 In the Georges Christos Lemos, an alternative 
claim for charterer’s indemnity as regards employment of the vessel, which depended 
on the issue of whether, on the facts, the damages had been caused by the charterers’ 
orders to load the coal, succeeded.380 Mustill J. concluded: 
(1) There was no liability to pay indemnity for the damage to the Athanasia Comninos 
because, on the evidence, the explosion on that vessel had occurred when the gas and air 
mixture was ignited by a crew member striking a match to light a cigarette in the forecastle381; 
(2) By contrast, in relation to the Georges Chr. Lemos there was no such intervening cause, 
and the charterers were liable to indemnify the owners for the damage caused by the 
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accumulation of gas emitted by the cargo; for this purpose it was unnecessary to show that the 
coal was in any way unusual.382 
 
It should be noted for the owners to succeed under the indemnity, they must prove an 
unbroken chain of causation between the instructions of the charterers and the loss 
suffered.383 Donaldson, J., said in The White Rose:384 “A loss may well arise in the 
course of compliance with the time charterers’ orders, but this fact does not, without 
more, establish that it was caused by and is in law a consequence of such compliance 
and, in the absence of proof of such causation, there is no right to indemnity.” Another 
relevant case is Portsmouth Steamship Co. Ltd v. Liverpool & Glasgow Salvage 
Association.385 
 
Where it is possible to segregate the damage caused by the charterer’s order from 
damage resulting from other causes, the owner may be indemnified in respect of the 
former. In Deutsche Ost-Africa-Linie v. Legent Maritime (The Marie H),386 The Marie 
H was fixed on the NYPE form for trip to East Africa. An additional clause allowed 
explosives to be shipped subject to certain conditions.387 General cargo was loaded, 
including seven containers and a crate of explosives. The ship then encountered a 
violent storm and had to put to Lisbon where she was repaired and her cargo was 
repacked. Precautions made necessary by the presence of explosives among the cargo 
prolonged the time taken by this work and also increased its cost. 
 
The sole arbitrator, relying on Clause 8 and the additional explosive cargo clause, held 
that the owners were entitled to an implied indemnity arising from their obedience to 
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the charterer’s orders to load the explosives, covering a refund of deducted 
off-hire/damages for delay and expenses at Lisbon but only to the extent that the delay 
and expense had been exacerbated by the presence of the explosives. His approach was 
approved by the Commercial Court. 
4.5.3 The Responsibility of Cargo Handling 
Who will be responsible for handling cargo is a very important issue in the case of 
dangerous cargo. Without proper and careful handling, some potentially dangerous 
cargoes may become real danger. In the absence of express provision, the obligation to 
load, stow, trim and discharge the dangerous cargo is at common law on the owners.388  
However under specific clauses, both NYPE 1993389 and Baltime390 put the primary 
responsibility for loading on the charterer. It is submitted that these express clauses are 
sufficient to transfer to the charterers the responsibility for these operations, whether the 
Hague Rules are incorporated into the charter or not.391  
 
For example, during the course of loading, by incident, a careless stevedore started a 
fire in the hold of the vessel and a cargo of ferro silicon became dangerous and caused 
losses. Under ordinary NYPE, the charterer is responsible for loading and he pays for it. 
But NYPE may be altered so as to prevent charterers having to pay, see The Clipper Sao 
Luis.392 
 
In Macieo Shipping v. Clipper Shipping Lines Ltd (The Clipper Sao Luis),393 the issue 
arose, but in a slightly unexpected way. It was not so much the cargo that was dangerous, 
but the loading of it. The only relevance to dangerous cargo is the obvious one: even if 
the charterer is in breach, the owner must show the breach caused his loss. What 
happened was that, while loading in Rio de Janeiro, a careless stevedore somehow 
started a fire in the hold of the Clipper Sao Luis. The fire took hold in baled cotton 
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which was already stowed and took time to control and put out. The re-entry of the 
vessel into service was delayed until necessary reports and certificates had been 
produced. The owners sued the charterers for the costs of delays attributable to 
extinguishing the fire and getting the vessel back into service and disputed the 
charterer’s contention that the ship was off-hire under the charterparty for that period. 
The charterers counterclaimed 50% of the hire which they had agreed to pay pending 
the action and for survey fees and other expenses incurred as a result of the fire. 
 
The charterparty, in NYPE form, and its clause 8 imposed the usual obligation on the 
charterers to “load stow and trim” and “the Captain … shall be under the orders and 
direction of the charterers as regards employment and agency; and the charterers are to 
load, stow and discharge the cargo at their expense under the supervision and 
responsibility of the Captain”. It should note where it is intended by the parties that 
responsibility for the operation set out in Line 78 shall be upon the owners, the words 
“and responsibility” should be inserted after “supervision”. The addition of these words 
has been held to effect a prima facie transfer from the charterers back to the owners of 
liability for the entire operation of loading, stowing, trimming and discharging the cargo, 
unless it can be shown that the charterers have intervened and in so doing have caused 
the relevant loss or damage.394 But liability may revert to the charterers, despite the 
amendment of Clause 8 to include the words “and responsibility” before “of the 
Captain”, if the loss or damage results from the appointment by the charterer of 
stevedore who are not reasonably competent.395 
 
The judge concluded that an owner who did nothing about a fire would be better off 
than if he put it out and suffered delays.396 The interpretation is, surely, inevitable.397 
Then, is there an implied obligation that the charterer must appoint non-negligent 
stevedores? David Steel J thought not, but did hold that there was a rather lower 
obligation to appoint competent stevedores. In the instant case, however, although a 
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warranty of competence existed, the owners had not established that the fire was caused 
by the incompetent stevedores.398 
 
Finally, it drove the case finally back to dangerous cargoes. The question was whether 
the vessel was off-hire under the terms of the charterparty, clause 15 of which 
specifically mentions fire.399 The shipowners argued that the delays were attributable to 
the charterer’s failure to obtain necessary dangerous cargo certification. What was 
loaded in Rio was a cargo of ferro silicon, which it was conceded was a dangerous cargo 
under the charterparty. It also required a certification, under SOLAS, relevant to the 
charterer’s obligation with regard to dangerous cargo, and how far? David Steel J. did 
not need to get too deeply involved in that. He found, quite simply, there to be no 
evidence that the certification had delayed the ship: the fire delayed the ship. It was 
properly off-hire.400Accordingly, the owners’ claim was dismissed and the charterers’ 
counterclaim allowed in respect of the hire.401 
4.5.4 Whether the common law indemnity is implied 
into charterparties? 
In respect of the shippers’ strict liability for undisclosed dangerous cargo, most old 
common law authorities are concerned with the bill of ladings,402 not chartreparties. 
Will the charterer come under the common law obligations that apply to a shipper? This 
is a very interesting academic question, although not a problem in practice. In practice, 
most commonly modern charters will contain clauses expressly prohibiting the 
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shipment of certain goods (i.e. dangerous cargo). Accordingly, charterer’s responsibility 
in respect of dangerous cargo will be clarified by specific terms of charters (e.g. with a 
paramount clause incorporating HR/HVR). It will be unlikely for the shipowner 
(unaware of the potential danger to his vessel) to have a charter in the absence of 
specific terms to deal with dangerous cargo. 
 
In the author’s view, generally there is no good reason at common law to differentiate 
between chaterparties and the bill of ladings with regards to the duties of the shipper,403 
particularly so far as voyage charterparties are concerned. Therefore the answer to 
above question is “yes”, but there are certain situations where a charterer cannot be 
deemed as a shipper. Accordingly, whether the common law strict liability can be 
extended to the charterer will depend on the specific terms of the particular 
charterparty.404 Three situations will be discussed here.  
 
First, at common law the strict liability obligation is originally bound only the person 
who presents the goods to be loaded. Suppose for example in 19th century, a 
charterparty did not contain any words which would deem the charterer to be the 
shipper (Hague Rules or HVR did not exist). If the charterer had not shipped dangerous 
cargos, and had not agreed to be named as a shipper in a mate’s receipt or a bill of 
lading, but he had simply made a separate contract under which the goods were carried, 
accordingly there would be no reason for him to be liable under the common law.405 
Instead, the shipper should be responsible for it. 
 
Secondly, most modern charters will incorporate the Hague Rules (in one or another 
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version) and it will put the charterer under obligation in respect of dangerous cargo, but 
the charterer’s obligations will not be more than that is set out in the Rules. i.e. it is 
limited to “physically” dangerous cargo. Accordingly, the incorporation of the HR/ 
HVR will not place a charterer under any obligation with regard to “legally” dangerous 
cargo which is not such as give rise to physical damage. However, if the specific terms 
of charterparties clearly exclude “legally” dangerous cargo and the charterer is deemed 
to be the shipper, then the incorporation of the Rules would have the effect that the 
charterer comes under the common law obligations that apply to the shipper,406 
including “legally” dangerous cargoes.407 
 
Finally, a voyage charter may contain words which would have the effect of deeming 
the charterer to be the shipper.408 If the charterer himself is also the shipper, surely the 
charterer will be strictly liable for dangerous cargo409 and so the charterer comes under 
the common law obligations that apply to the shipper. 
 
In summary, regarding the duties of the shipper to dangerous cargo, originally the 
common law indemnity concerned the B/L, not the Charterparty. However, with specific 
terms of the particular charterparty, such as by the way of provisions in the charterparty 
which has the effect of deeming the charter to be the shipper, the common law 
obligations may apply to charterer. With the incorporation of HR/HVR, the charterers 
may undertake the obligations implied at common law which apply to the shipper, but 
only to the extent which set out in the Rules. 
 
In the situation where a shipper’s indemnity as regards undisclosed dangerous cargo is 
implied into charterparties, a question arises: is there any difference between an 
indemnity and a contractual obligation in respect of shipper’s (or charterer’s) liability 
for damages caused by dangerous cargo? In the author’s view, there is a difference 
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between them since not all indemnities are relating to breach of contract. Indeed, some 
are, some not, depending on the particular provisions of a specific charterparty.  For 
instance, in a case where a charterer is deemed as a shipper, without breach of a 
charterparty (contract law), it is possible for the charterer to be held liable under 
indemnity as regards undisclosed dangerous cargo, particularly in respect of legally 
dangerous cargo at common law. Accordingly, a charterer can be held liable under its 
common law indemnity as regards undisclosed dangerous cargo, even if he does not 
breach his contractual obligation under a charterparty.  
 
In addition, considering the charterer’s indemnity under employment clauses in time 
charterparties, a charterer’s indemnity applies to losses caused by his order or direction, 
even if the indemnity obligation is not express in the charter, such as in NYPE 1993.410 
For example, if a dangerous cargo is properly declared and carried, but nevertheless an 
accident occurs and the ship is damaged. No doubt, under Article IV r. 6 of the HR and 
HVR, the shipper’s liability is discharged because he has give proper notice to the 
carrier (i.e. proper and sufficient disclosure of dangerous nature of the cargo). But, 
under a charter in NYPE (or similar charters) a charterer will be held liable for damages 
caused by the dangerous cargo due to implied indemnity obligation against any 
consequences or liabilities that might arise from complying with his order.411 Therefore, 
the indemnity provisions do apply to dangerous cargo cases where damage is caused by 
the nature of the cargo without any breach of a contractual obligation on the charterer. 
 
In contrast, regarding China, as a codified law country, obviously the common law 
indemnity has no influence on China. Accordingly, neither shippers nor charterers will 
be held liable for “legally” dangerous cargo under Chinese law. 
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4.6 Third Party Reliance on Contract of Carriage Terms 
Under English law, there is longstanding criticism of the privity rule,412 and what we 
concerned is the problem for third parties who are not agents or servants to limit their 
liability in casualties involving dangerous cargo.413 Can we find a way to allow third 
parties414 to benefit from the contract of carriage? A more interesting question is this 
the shipper breaks his contract with the carrier by loading dangerous cargo and a third 
party (other cargo owner) suffers loss, can the third party claim against the shipper as a 
third party beneficiary of the contract? 
4.6.1 Problems of Third Party Relying on Contract 
On a strict interpretation of the privity rule,415 exclusion clauses could not be relied 
upon by third parties, such as the carrier in the case of a bill of lading issued by the 
charterer to a shipper, or stevedores. In the past, the courts have found ways to 
circumvent the doctrine in the carriage context, inter alia by reliance on principles of 
the law of agency416 or bailment417, but particularly by giving precedence to a policy of 
respecting the commercial intentions of the contracting parties.418  
 
While the House of Lords strictly applied the privity rule in Scruttons v. Midland 
Silicones419 in refusing to allow stevedores, engaged as independent contractors, to 
invoke to protection of a limitation clause in the contract of carriage.420 Lord Reid 
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 There is no separate section dealing with it in Chinese law, since there is no privity rule of contract in civil law 
and no relevant problems on third party beneficiary in China. 
414
 For example, stevedores and terminal operators, whom the carrier declares are not his agents or servants, but 
independent contractors. 
415
 It is well-known that there are two distinctive features of English contract law that are not found (in the same term) 
in civil law jurisdictions such as China, France, Germany or Scotland, namely consideration and privity. It is also 
well-known that, at least, privity has been subject to attacks from judges, legislators and academics for much of the 
20th century. 
416
 See Scruttons v. Midland Silicones, [1961] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 365, at 374, Lord Reid set out four conditions must be 
fulfilled to create an agency relationship. See foot note 420. 
417
 The Pioneer Container [1994] 2 AC 324. There was no privity of contract between the original bailor and the 
sub-bailee (bailment on terms). See also the words of Lord Denning MR in Morris v. C.W.Martin [1966] 1 Q.B. 716, 
at 729. This case did not concern a contract of carriage of goods by sea. 
418
 Girvin, The Law Commission’s Draft Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Bill and the carriage of goods by sea, 
[1997] L.M.C.L.Q. 541, at 542. 
419
 [1961] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 365, at 374 
420
 In this case, a drum of chemicals was shipped under a bill of lading which contained a paramount clause limiting 
the carrier’s liability to USD 500 for any package by reference to the United States Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
1936. The drum was damaged by the negligence of stevedores employed by the carrier and damage exceeding USD 
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concluded that,421 on the facts, the word “carrier” in the bill of lading could not include 
a stevedore, an independent contractor, and so this argument had to fail.422 
 
It is standard practice for charterparty forms and bills of lading to include clauses which 
exempt the carrier from liability,423 either explicitly or by incorporating the terms of the 
HR/HVR in a clause paramount.424 If the voyage is covered by HR/HVR, the catalogue 
of exceptions enumerated in Art. IV, r.2 will be mandatorily applicable to the 
contract.425 The HVR,426 Art. IVbis, rr. 1 and 2 now provides that a servant or agent of 
the carrier may rely on the defences and limits of liability which may be invoked under 
the Rules in an action in tort or contract against him. But Art. IVbis, r. 2 specifically 
excludes independent contractors.427 To be properly effective, this provision needs to be 
revised so that it covers any third party that performs services for which the carrier is 
responsible under the HVR. This encouraged the drafting of Himalaya clauses.428  
 
Nonetheless, the Himalaya clause was examined in a recent case Whitesea Shipping & 
Trading Corp v EI Paso Rio Clara Ltda and others (The Marielle Bolten),429 where a 
disputation involved some third parties and they are the carrier’s servants, agents or 
sub-contractors within the Himalaya clause. But in fact these third parties did not 
undertake the sea carriage; and the actual carriage was undertaken by the carrier alone. 
It was held by Flaux J. that the enforcement of a covenant (contained in a Himalaya 
clause in the bills of lading) not to sue against the third parties was not contrary to Art. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
500 resulted to the chemicals. The consignee sued the stevedores. Held, (Lord Denning dissenting) that damages were 
not limited to USD 500 as the parties to the contract of carriage were not acting as agents for the stevedores, who 
were not “carriers” within the meaning of the bill of lading or the USA Act 1936, and were not themselves parties to 
the contract of carriage, and there was no other, implied contract with them. 
421
 [1962] A.C. 446. Lord Reid set out four conditions must be fulfilled to create an agency relationship: first, the bill 
of lading makes it clear that the stevedore is intended to be protected by the provisions in it which limit liability; 
secondly, the bill of lading makes it clear that the carrier in addition to contracting for these provisions on his own 
behalf, is also contracting as agent for the stevedore that these provisions should apply to the stevedore; thirdly, the 
carrier has authority from the stevedore to do that, or perhaps later ratification by the stevedore would suffice; 
fourthly, that any difficulties about consideration moving from the stevedore were overcome 
422
 Ibid., p. 447. 
423
 E.g. Gencon 1994 cl.16 and 17 (strikes and wars); NYPE 1993 cl. 32 (war). Such clauses will also be 
supplemented by exceptions implied by the common law. See Scrutton, para.105. 
424
 See Congenbill 1994, cl. 2; NYPE 93, CL.31(a). 
425
 By virtue of the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1971, s. 1(2).  
426
 But not the Hague Rules. 
427
 It states “such servant or agent not being an independent contractor”—who are in most cases stevedores. See 
Gronfors, Why not Independent Contractors? [1964] J.B.L. 25. 
428
 The Himalaya clause sought to extend the defences of the carrier to servants, agents and independent contractors 
engaged in loading and unloading the cargo. See also Collinebill 1994, cl.18; Combiconbill, cl. 16. 
429
 [2009] EWHC 2552 (Comm); [2009] 2 C.L.C. 596 
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III r8 of the Hague Rules. Accordingly, the carrier could show a sufficient interest in 
enforcing the covenant to entitle them to an anti-suit injunction. 
 
However, the use of Himalaya clause has its limitation,430 as was exemplified in The 
Starsin.431 The majority of the Court of Appeal held that, in so far as the clause sought 
to extend to the independent contractor a wider exemption than that available to the 
contractual carrier under the HR, it was rendered void by Art. III r.8.432 
 
In a case where an incident involving carriage of dangerous cargo, how can a way be 
found to permit third parties who are independent contractors, such as stevedores or 
terminal operators to limit their liability and benefit from the contract of carriage? One 
possible solution is to amend the privity rule by a new statute such as the Contracts 
(Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 and by reliance on it a third party may “in his own 
right” enforce a term of a contract where the contract expressly provides that he may do 
so (section 1(1)(a)). 
4.6.2 The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 
The U.K. Parliament passed the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999433 after a 
report by the Law Commission in 1996.434 This Act reforms the law of privity of 
contract435 to give third parties a right,436 in circumstances set out in s.1, to enforce 
terms of contracts. In essence, if a contract between a promisor (e.g. holder of a bill of 
                                                       
430
 According to William Tetley, “the Himalaya clause is an ingenious, short-term solution to a difficult problem, but 
is a solution which raises infinitely more problems than it solves.” See Tetley, The Himalaya clause—revisited (2003) 
J.I.M.L. vol.9 (1), pp40-64, at 42. 
431
 [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 571. Charterers’ bills had been issued which include a Himalaya clause purporting to 
exclude the independent contractor from any liability to the shipper resulting from, inter alia, negligent damage to the 
goods. 
432
 Rule 8 provides that “any clause, covenant or agreement in a contract of carriage relieving the carrier or the ship 
from liability for loss or damage to, or in connection with, goods arising from negligence, fault or failure in the duties 
and obligations provided in this Article or lessening such liability otherwise a provided in this Convention shall be 
null and void and of no effect…”. 
433
 The Act does not apply to contracts made before 11 May 2000. 
434
 Report on Privity of Contract: Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties, Law Com. No. 242 (1996) ; see also 
Burrows, “Reforming Privity of Contract: Law Commission Report 242” [1996] L.M.C.L.Q. 467. 
435
 The Act amends but does not abolish the common law doctrine of privity of contract. In the words of the Law 
Commission’s Report on which the Act is based, the effect of the Act will be to create “a general and wide-ranging 
exception to the third party rule it [will leave] that rule intact for cases not covered by the statute”. See Privity of 
Contract for the Benefit of Third Parties: Law Com. No. 242 (1996) §5.16. 
436
 The common law doctrine of privity is generally thought to have two limbs or branches: that (C) the third party 
cannot take the benefit of a term of a contract between (A) the promisor and (B) the promisee; and that C cannot be 
bound by a term in such a contract. The exception created by the Act will be to the first branch of the doctrine; it will 
not directly affected the second branch. 
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lading) and promisee (e.g. carrier) provides expressly that a third party (e.g. stevedore) 
can enforce those terms in its own right, it will be a question of construction of the 
contract whether benefit was intended.437  
 
So far as contracts for the carriage of goods by sea are concerned, the right of a third 
party under s.1 must be read with s.6, which sets out exceptions. In particular s.6(5)(a), 
a third party has no right to enforce such a term for his benefit, in the case of a contract 
for the carriage of goods by sea, which is governed by the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 
1992. So bill of lading contracts or their equivalent are excluded but not 
charterparties.438  
 
There is, however, one major exception to this exception, permitting the third party 
beneficiary, in reliance on s.1, to “avail himself of an exclusion or limitation of liability 
in such a contract” (section 6(5)(a)). This proviso is expressly designed to preserve (and 
enhance) the operation of Himalaya clause.439 As the Explanatory Note to section 6(5) 
states: 
Subsection (5), which excludes certain contracts relating to the carriage of goods, nevertheless 
does not prevent a third party from taking advantage of a term excluding or limiting liability. In 
particular, this enables clauses which seek to extend an exclusion or limitation of liability of a 
carrier of goods by sea to servants, or agents and independent contractors engaged in the 
loading and unloading process to be enforced by those servants, agents or independent 
contractors (so called “Himalaya” clause). 
 
It follows that stevedores and others may now rely on s.1 of the 1999 Act in order to 
                                                       
437
 Gaskell, Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts, LLP, 2000, p. 380. 
438
 Charterparty forms, such as clause 15 of GENCON and preamble J of ASBATANKVOY, both concern the right 
of third party brokers to earn commission, the new Act would give a direct right of action to a broker to enforce a 
right to commission, even if specifically unnamed. Standard clauses 29 and 36 of the NYPE Form charter party may 
also potentially give rise to an action on the basis of the Act. Clause 29 of the NYPE provides that charterers will pay 
for crew overtime in relation to work ordered by charterers. Applying section 1 of the Act, clause 29 can be seen as an 
express benefit to a third-party crew member. If such a crew member was then not paid by his owner-employer it is 
possible that the crew member could utilise the new Act to mount a direct claim against a charterer. Clause 36 of the 
NYPE form provides a similar regime for compensation where a charterer is obliged to provide and pay for sweeping, 
washing and/or cleaning of holds between voyages and such work is undertaken by the crew. See Vlasto & Clark, The 
effect of the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 on voyage and time charter parties, 25 Tul. Mar. L.J. 519, at 
534.  
439
 Tetley, The Himalaya clause—revisited. (2003) Vol.9 (1), J.I.M.L. 40, at 49. 
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enforce Himalaya clauses and that the restriction imposed by the doctrine of privity (e.g. 
relating to agency) may now not apply.440 If third parties such as stevedores do wish to 
rely on Himalaya clauses by virtue of the Act they will have to show either an express 
term to that effect in the contract (section 1(1)(a)) or the contract “purports to confer a 
benefit” on them (section 1(1)(b)). Section 1(3) provides that the third party need not be 
identified by name, nor need they be in existence at the time the contract is made. It will 
be enough that they are a member of a class or answer to a particular description.  
 
This applies to stevedores and independent contractors involved in transportation of 
dangerous cargo. Stevedores and other sub-contractors can now be protected by much 
simpler wording by virtue of s.1. It could also provide similar protection for an actual 
carrier where performance of the carriage itself had been delegated to a 
sub-contractor 441  or where it formed part of a combined transport operation. 442 
Although the third party’s security is potentially threatened by the provisions on 
variation and cancellation contained in section 2, this is unlikely to be a problem in 
practice.443 
 
However, if the shipper breaks his contract with the carrier by loading dangerous cargo 
and a third party (other cargo owner) suffers loss, in the author’s opinion, the third party 
cannot claim that loss from the shipper as a third party beneficiary of the contract. There 
are three reasons. Firstly, the contract does not expressly provide that another cargo 
owner may claim that loss, nor does the term of the contract purport to confer a benefit 
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 Gaskell, Bills of Lading: Law and Contracts, op. cit., p. 381. 
441
 See The Starsin [2003] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 571. Where the House of Lords held that the actual carrier (shipowner) fell 
within the definition of an “independent contractor” for the purpose of the clause. 
442
 Even though the liability may arise out of land, not sea carriage, it seems that the exclusion in s.6(5)(a) relates to 
the nature of the contract, rather than the place of any damage. Provided that the relevant term appears in a contract 
which is also evidenced by a bill of lading, then s.6(5)(a) will apply. The road or rail carrier would have to rely on the 
proviso to s.6(5), whereas if there were an independent contract of road or rail transport the wider protection of s.1 
would apply. Such an independent transport contract between the cargo owner and the road or rail carrier might arise 
through the agency of the sea carrier; but it would be necessary to clarify whether the sea carrier was really acting as 
an agent, or was merely using the road or rail carriers as sub-contractors to fulfil its own combined transport 
obligation. See Gaskell, op. cit., p. 383. 
443
 One possible defect of the new legislation is the retention of the right of the original parties to vary or rescind the 
contract without the consent of the third party beneficiary (s.2(1)). This exercise of such a right of revision, which 
could effectively remove the protection otherwise afforded to the third party, is however, subject to certain 
qualifications. The parties to the contract can not vary or rescind the contract without the third party’ consent once the 
third party has communicated to the promisor his assent to the provisions in the contract to his benefit (s.2(1)(a)), or 
where he has relied on such provisions and the promisor is either aware of such reliance (s.2(1)(b)) or could 
reasonably be expected to have foreseen it (s.2(1)(c)). See Wilson, Carriage of Goods by Sea, 5th ed. 2004, p. 115;  
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on the third party, accordingly the third party cannot reply on section 1(1)(b). Secondly, 
the other cargo owner is not “expressly identified in the contract by name or as a 
member of a class or as answering a particular description”, thus not qualified as a third 
party beneficiary under Section 1(3). Thirdly, the other cargo owner seeks to enforce a 
right against the shipper is not a deviate right (a right under the contract between 
shipper and carrier), that is against section 3(2). Therefore, other cargo owners cannot 
claim their loss from the shipper of undeclared dangerous cargo as third party 
beneficiaries under the 1999 Act. 
4.6.3 Concluding Remarks 
The 1999 Act amends but does not abolish the common law doctrine of privity of 
contract. The explicit recognition given to Himalaya clause is a very important 
development. 444  Provided that the Himalaya clause is accurately drafted, an 
independent contractor can rest assured on his statutory entitlement to reliance on the 
terms of the clause.  
 
If the Act applies to the contract involving dangerous cargo, the stevedore and 
independent contractor will be protected by exclusion or limitation of liability in a 
contract of carriage.445 However, a third party (other cargo owner) cannot rely on the 
Act to claim his loss against a shipper of dangerous cargo.446 There is no doubt the Act 
will be widely welcomed for the statutory certainty which will give to the vast majority 
of Himalaya clauses, without necessary of having to argue by analogy with the 
established authorities.447 
                                                       
444
 Although the Himalaya clauses have been accorded judicial recognition throughout the Commonwealth for 
several decades now, there has always been some insecurity as to the contractual basis under which such clauses may 
be relied upon. 
445
 The direct relief provided by the new statutory remedy might be expected in time to supplant the more 
cumbersome agency device in the Himalaya clause. The new Act effectively dispenses with all but one of the four 
conditions that were set out in Scruttons v. Midland Silicones [1961] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 365, at 374. The condition that 
remains is the two-fold test in section 1(1) of the Act. For this reason, while the new Act greatly alleviates the 
previous problem and largely replaces the need for Himalaya clause, it does not automatically follow that Himalaya 
provisions are completely obsolete or no longer necessary. 
446
 Another cargo owner can not be regarded as a third party beneficiary of the contract of carriage (between the 
shipper of dangerous cargo and the carrier). 
447
 Although such authorities are not binding on the courts in England, it is unlikely that a serious case could ever be 
made out for not following them. See Baughen, Shipping Law, 2nd ed., p. 53. 
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4.7 Complex Liabilities and Rights of Recourse 
The HNS Convention makes the carrier liable to third parties, but there are ways of 
passing the loss on to the person who ought to pay. Under the HNS Convention, Article 
7(6) “Nothing in this Convention shall prejudice any existing right of recourse of the 
owner against any third party, including, but not limited to, the shipper or the receiver of 
the substance causing the damage, or the persons indicated in paragraph 5.”448 As we 
can see a shipowner has the right of recourse under the Convention. Although the 
Convention is not in force yet, the shipowner still has the right of recourse under 
general principles of municipal law. 
 
If the carrier is liable to a third party,449 but considers either that he was not himself at 
fault, or that he was not the only person at fault, he may wish to look to someone else 
for reimbursement of what he has had to pay the claimant.450 By way of recourse, a 
charterer or cargo owner may be held liable to the shipowner under a charterparty or 
similar contracts, e.g. shipowner’s recourse action against demise or bareboat charterers 
based on the indemnity which is given by a bareboat charterer and normally covers all 
losses arising out of his operation of the vessel.  
 
Again there may be recourse against time or voyage charterers based on their breach of 
the safe port warranty, typically following grounding incidents at or near ports; or 
shipment of dangerous cargo, particularly in relation to the loading, stowage and 
carriage of various hazardous or noxious substances.  
 
Furthermore, many time charters provide that the master shall be under the orders and 
directions of charterers as regards employment of the vessel, agency and other 
                                                       
448
 Article 7(5) Subject to paragraph 6, no claim for compensation for damage under this Convention or otherwise 
may be made against: (a) the servants or agents of the owner or the members of the crew; (b) the pilot or any other 
person who, without being a member of the crew, performs services for the ship; (c) any charterer (howsoever 
described, including a bareboat charterer), manager or operator of the ship; (d) any person performing salvage 
operations with the consent of the owner or on the instructions of a competent public authority; (e) any person taking 
preventing measures; and (f) the servants or agents of persons mentioned in (c), (d) and (e); unless the damage 
resulted from their personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with 
knowledge that such damage would probably result. 
449
 Whether a stranger to the adventure or the owner of other goods on board his vessel 
450
 See, Mustill, Carrier’s Liabilities and Insurance, in Gronfors, Kurt (ed.), Damage from Goods (1978), op. cit, p. 
84. 
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arrangements, and that the charterers shall indemnify the owners against any 
consequences or liabilities arising from complying with such orders and directions.451  
 
The rights of recourses considered in this chapter are based on contractual liability and 
they mainly subject to HNS and other conventions. But, in respect of the possibility of a 
contribution action in tort,452 the carrier or shipowner has also a recourse action against 
other persons. For example, (1) against the manufacturer of the ship or subcontractors if 
the way the ship was built aggravated the consequence of the fault of the dangerous 
cargo owner. It is an application of the concept of product liability, and it is based on 
strict liability in tort.453 (2)Against members of the ship’s crew, the captain for instance, 
if the shipowner or carrier can prove the fault (gross negligence) of that person (e.g. 
captain), against him the recourse action is brought. (3)Against the stevedore, if the 
accident took place during the embarkation or during the discharge of the dangerous 
cargo and if the fault of the stevedore aggravated the fault of the goods owner or was 
one of the causes of the damage. (4)It is quite the same against the packer of the 
containers if the way of packing, the negligence in packing aggravated the fault of the 
goods owner.454  
 
In addition, in a case where the dangerous cargo damages involving third parties’ fault, 
the shippers (or charterers, receivers) may have recourse actions in tort against these 
third parties such as longshoremen, warehousemen and stevedores etc. 
 
Nonetheless, in practice, it should be avoided to use recourse actions as a means of 
channelling responsibility back to one finally responsible person, since the variety of 
liability rules under general law relate to dangerous cargo already create big difficulties, 
and any attempt to single out one person in a chain by moving the loss from the one 
after the other, is bound to create all sorts of trouble.455 Flexibility of solution is needed, 
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 See generally Wilford, et al., Time Charters, 4th ed., 1995, at 291. 
452
 See relevant discussions in sections 3.1.6.1; 3.1.6.3 
453
 See details in Chapter 3, e.g. section 3.1.4 Product Liability. 
454
 See Pontavice, Emmanuel du,The Victims of Damage Caused by the Ship’s Cargo, in Gronfors, Kurt (ed.), 
Damage from Goods, (1978) op. cit., p.54.  
455
 As the author understands, the trouble is relating to the existing, sometimes far-reaching divergences between 
different national legal regimes with regard to the laws in relation to civil liability and compensation. It is suggested 
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because situations differ considerably as to the multi-dimensional problems involved in 
the carriage of dangerous cargo. Different types of cases call for different solutions. 
Therefore the freedom of contract seems to be meaningful and it may offer one method 
of keeping a reasonable degree of flexibility.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
to apply the general rules of torts and of law of contract under the national law. For example whether the damages 
caused by dangerous cargoes are recoverable, there are different rules, e.g. causation and remoteness in common law 
countries, but these rules do not exist in civil law countries. In addition, there can be so many persons involved and it 
is extremely difficult to single out one responsible person. Finally, it will be not easy to reach agreement on an 
international level regarding whether and to what extent there should be made exceptions from the principle of 
channelling in terms of rules on recourse actions.  
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Chapter 5 The International Framework for 
Marine Pollution Control 
 
Pollution is one of the most important areas1  for dangerous cargo liability. The 
following two chapters will therefore cover the topic in depth. Chapter 2 deals with 
international anti-pollution regimes (other than intra-EU) as they apply to dangerous 
cargoes; Chapter 3 deals with the corresponding EU anti-pollution regimes. 
5.1 Introduction 
First, we discuss and analyse the international framework for marine pollution control, 
particularly with a focus on the liability system.  
 
As we know, the concern over the carriage of hazardous substances is shown by the 
growing number of international conventions relevant to it. They deal with all three 
main areas—regulating safety, carriage and third party liability. Some are focused on 
particular substances where the catastrophic nature of potential harm (e.g. nuclear 
materials) or the sheer amount carried (e.g. oil) or both have given rise to a need for 
special international controls.2  
 
International conventions with respect to pollution effectively divide into two types: 
measures aimed at prevention ex ante and those directed to compensation ex post. The 
most important conventions of the former sort are SOLAS and MARPOL;3 of the latter, 
the regimes built up by the CLC and Fund Conventions, Bunker Convention 2001 and 
HNS Convention 1996. Prevention measures mainly focus on the technical 
requirements such as ship structure standards and safety standards, which should be 
enforced by the contracting states. The liability system on the other hand is not only 
meant to compensate the victims, but can also be designed to such a way that it will 
                                                       
1
 Dangerous cargoes raise two serious legal issues: pollution and other kinds of loss. 
2
 Jackson D.C., Dangerous cargo: a legal overview in “Maritime Movement of Dangerous Cargoes—Public 
Regulation and Private Liability”, Papers of a one day seminar, Southampton University 11th September 1981. 
3
 See Appendix II. 
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give incentives to the actors to take preventive measures to avoid pollution. This chapter 
will examine and assess the international liability conventions in details. For prevention 
measure, such as MARPOL 1973/78,4 I.S.M. Code5 and Dumping Convention,6 see 
Appendix II. 
 
With regard to other international conventions covered by this thesis, (1) the safety 
convention, e.g. SOLAS and IMDG Code have been discussed in Chapter 1; (2) the 
carriage conventions, e.g. the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules relating to 
carriage contracts governed by these rules which will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
 
So far the only area of pollution where the acceptance of an international regime is 
widespread is oil, although marine pollution caused by hazardous and noxious 
substances may come into consideration. Since the existing system regarding pollution 
resulting from the carriage of oil is now well-established as a legal model for other 
marine pollution legislations,7 it is very important to discuss the CLC 1969 / 1992 
Protocol8 and Fund Convention1971/ 1992 Protocol.9 From the development of the oil 
pollution legislation, we can see how effective the international legislation has been in 
reducing marine pollution.  
 
Furthermore, the HNS Convention is modelled on the very successful and widely 
accepted oil pollution conventions. However by August 2009, only 14 countries have 
ratified it, comprised 13.61% of merchant tonnage.10 In section 5.2.2.5, we will discuss 
                                                       
4
 The 1973 MARPOL Convention includes regulations aimed at preventing and minimizing pollution from 
ships—both accidental pollution and that from routine operations, see “International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships, 1973, as modified by the Protocol of 1978 relating thereto (MARPOL 
73/78)”, at http://www.imo.org/home.asp 
5
 The I.S.M. Code was first enacted as an Annex to IMO Resolution A.741, adopted November 4, 1993. IMO 
adopted the ISM Code as Chapter IX of SOLAS on May 24, 1994. Up to 31 March, 2007, SOLAS 1974 has been 
ratified by 158 States, representing 98.8% of world merchant shipping. Both China and UK have ratified it. ISM 
Code became applicable to all categories of cargo ships, as well as to offshore drilling platforms, as of July 1, 2002. 
6
 International Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, adopted 
in quadruplicate at London, Mexico City, Moscow, and Washington, December 29 1972 and in force August 30, 1975, 
as subsequently amended. It has been ratified by 84 States, representing 67.71% of world merchant shipping (by 31 
March 2008). It became operational in China on 15 December 1985. 
7
 For example, the Bunker Convention 2001, NHS Convention 1996, etc. 
8
 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC), 1969; The Protocol of 1992. See 
details at http://www.imo.org/home.asp 
9
 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage (FUND), 1971; The Protocol of 1992. See details at http://www.imo.org/home.asp  
10
 For detail see http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D26103/status-x.xls  and 
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the reasons that have delayed or hindered the ratification of the HNS Convention. 
5.2 Liability Conventions 
An international liability and compensation scheme has long been seen as necessary 
particularly when concerned with liability to third parties, which is not covered by the 
regime of carriage conventions;11 and where relevant domestic laws vary and may not 
be effective. This conclusion has been more easily accepted with respect to the carriage 
of oil than with the transportation of other hazardous and noxious substances (hereafter 
HNS) such as chemicals.12  The IMO has strived for twenty years to produce a 
Convention designed to do for the victims of chemical related incidents, what the 
International Convention on Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC)13  and the 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage (Fund)14  Conventions have done for oil 
pollution victims. 
 
Public attention to oil pollution was first raised on an international scale after the Torrey 
Canyon incident in 1967. Action was then taken by several governments within the 
framework of the IMO which resulted in the adoption of CLC 1969,15 followed in 1971 
by the adoption of Fund Convention.16 Since then, CLC/Fund conventions have been 
regarded as a well-established legal model for other marine pollution legislations. 
 
Governments participating in the 1969 International Conference on Marine Damage 
have of course been aware of the fact that pollution may also be caused by agents other 
than oil. They decided, however, to tackle the problem of oil pollution as a first 
                                                                                                                                                                  
http://www.imo.org/ 
11
 Notwithstanding improved safety standards for the design, construction and equipment of ships carrying HNS, it is 
inevitable that accidents of a catastrophic nature cannot be totally prevented 
12
 Cleton, Robert, Liability and Compensation for Maritime Carriage of Hazardous and Noxious Substances (HNS), 
De la Rue Colin (editor), “Liability for Damage to the Marine Environment” chapter 15, Lloyd’s of London Press Ltd, 
1993. at 173 
13
 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (CLC), 1969; The Protocol of 1992. See 
details at http://www.imo.org/home.asp 
14
 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution 
Damage (FUND), 1971; The Protocol of 1992. See details at http://www.imo.org/home.asp 
15
 The International Convention on Liability for Oil Pollution Damage in 1969 
16
 The International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for the Compensation for Oil 
Pollution Damage; followed by the International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage, 
2001 (The Bunker Convention) which is very similar to CLC/ Fund.  
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priority.17 Nevertheless, other forms of pollution came to be regarded as a serious 
priority later on, and the result in 1996 was the International Convention on Liability 
and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous and 
Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS).18 It is clear that by the time of its adoption, the 
elaboration of the HNS Convention had become a very complex and often cumbersome 
operation.19 There is no doubt that it represents an important step forward; however, it 
also has a number of potentially significant defects which should be challenged. 
 
In this section, appropriate, comparative references will be made to other international 
legal instructions, such as the 1976 International Convention on Limitation of Liability 
for Maritime Claims (1976 LLMC), and the “nuclear” conventions. Besides, another 
convention which has had some influence on the elaboration of the HNS Convention is 
CRTD Convention in the field of inland transport.20 I will refer to these conventions in 
so far as their provisions are relevant to the various items discussed. 
5.2.1 The Torrey Canyon and Oil Pollution Conventions 
The pollution of the seas and coastal waters by oil escaping from sea carriers or even the 
threat of it has become a serious problem in the middle of 20th century. However, prior 
to the historic disaster of the Torrey Canyon incident in 1967, there was no international 
legal regime to protect those who suffered damage as a result of it.21 Where an incident 
occurred outside a state’s jurisdiction, international law was powerless to address the 
questions of liability and compensation.22 At that time, compensation was governed by 
the various general rules of tort law in each state. 
                                                       
17
 LEG VII/11, paras. 8-10. Furthermore, there was general consensus within the legal committee that as regards 
issues of liability and compensation in particular, if the required “technical” information did not become available in 
relation to possible types of pollutants other than oil and their polluting potentialities, any further work could not be 
usefully undertaken. 
18
 See details at http://www.imo.org/home.asp 
19
 Little, Gavin, The Hazardous and Noxious Substances Convention: a new horizon in the regulation of marine 
pollution, [1998] L.M.C.L.Q. 554. 
20
 Convention on civil liability for damage caused during carriage of dangerous goods by road, rail and inland 
navigation vessels (CRTD), elaborated in 1989 under the auspices of the Economic Commission for Europe of the 
United Nations in Geneva. 
21
 Although individual states might have laws i.e. Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Southport Corpn. [1956] A.C. 218. 
22
 See also Wu Chao, Pollution form the Carriage of Oil by Sea: Liability and Compensation, KLUWER LAW, 
International London- The Hague-Boston, 1996, p.2. 
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5.2.1.1 Torrey Canyon 
In March 1967 the tanker Torrey Canyon grounded off Lands End. She was carrying 
107,000 tons of crude oil and despite the efforts of professional salvors she could not be 
refloated. Despite the UK government’s ordering the bombing of the cargo to burn it off 
to prevent pollution, the consequence was severe pollution to the UK and French coasts. 
 
The victims that suffered from the spill were in an unfortunate position. The law in 
relation to liability and compensation for oil pollution was not favourable to claimants. 
The principal claimants were the central government and local authorities who had 
incurred expenditure for cleaning up the oil spill and those who had suffered other 
financial losses. 
 
In presenting their claims, however, they were faced with numerous legal and practical 
problems. At the time of the Torrey Canyon incident, there was no rule of international 
law specifying an applicable law so it was therefore necessary to turn to the national 
legal system for pollution. The incident has to constitute a tort in English law.23 
However, there was also no legislation relating to liability for oil pollution in England, 
hence the principles of common law were applied.24 Common law provides three main 
causes of action which form the basis of tortious or quasi-tortious liability: trespass,25 
nuisance26 and negligence.27 But the principles of trespass and nuisance are unlikely to 
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 Morris, The Conflict of Laws, Sweet & Maxwell Ltd, 6th ed., 2005, p75, p367. In reality, if a tort is committed in 
England, it is natural that English law should apply. If the tort is committed on board a vessel on the high seas, the 
court applies the law of the vessel’s flag state; if the tort takes place in the territorial waters of another country, the 
law of that country applies. In all these cases, the incident has to constitute a tort in English law. In other words, the 
defendant may also take advantage of the law of the place where tort was committed. It should be noted that the 
difficulties encountered in determining the governing law only relate to the basis of liability. 
24
 Before the Torrey Canyon incident, there was a very important case—the Southport Corporation Case—the first 
case in the United Kingdom to be concerned with oil pollution damage. On that account alone it constitute a most 
important authority; in addition it provided an opportunity for the discussion of most of the major issues of common 
law liability in such cases. Particularly the principles of tort law discussed in that case were very useful in the analysis 
of the Torrey Canyon in the following paragraphs. See Esso Petroleum Co. Ltd. v. Southport Corpn. [1956] A.C. 218; 
also Abecassis and Jarashow, Oil Pollution from Ships, op. cit., p.357. 
25
 In order to bring an action in trespass, there must be unjustifiable and intentional interference with the plaintiff’s 
property. This interference must be direct; if it is consequential damage, it is then considered to be a nuisance. It can 
be concluded that trespass will not normally lie in oil pollution cases, either because the injury suffered will be held 
to be consequential, not direct, or because, in cases where the discharge was unintentional, the court is not likely to 
allow any other action than one in negligence. See Rogers, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, 12th ed, 1984, p.360. See 
also Abecassis and Jarashow, Oil Pollution from Ships, 2nd ed. (1985), Stevens & Sons, at p.358 
26
 Rogers, Winfield and Jolowicz on Tort, 12th ed, 1984, p.380. Public nuisance is primarily a part of the criminal law. 
However, it is established law that an individual who suffers special damage as a result of a public nuisance may 
maintain civil proceedings for damage. In the case that the foreshore is polluted, it will constitute a public nuisance 
  226
be effective in oil pollution claims.  
 
In order to found an action in negligence,28 four requirements must be satisfied: (1) 
duty of care;29 (2) breach of duty by the defendant; (3) a causal connection between the 
defendant’s careless conduct and the damage; (4) foreseeability of the damage.30 In the 
Torrey Canyon, it is possible that the first two elements were in place but not the last 
two.31 Unfortunately a claim raised in negligence was likely to fail. The damage must 
be the foreseeable consequence of the negligent act and the burden of proof falls on the 
plaintiff.32 Private claimants might also have difficulty because of the peculiarities of 
pollution cases in which it is the environment, not their property, which is injured.33 
Under English law no duty of care is owed to those who are exposed to pure economic 
loss (as distinct from consequential economic loss resulting from property damage or 
personal injury).34 
 
In the wake of the Torrey Canyon disaster, the Brussels Conference of November 1969 
adopted the 1969 CLC (“Civil Liability Convention”) and the International Convention 
                                                                                                                                                                  
only if a sufficiently large class of Her Majesty’s subjects have been affected. If even quite a large stretch of coastline 
(say two or three miles) owned by one person, and not habitually used for recreation by more than a few members of 
the public, were to be polluted, it is not certain that there could be a public nuisance. But where such a stretch is so 
used, for instance, harbours, public beaches and marinas, there probably will be a public nuisance. In such cases, the 
question of whether or not a plaintiff can recover damages will rest on whether he can show “special damage”. See 
also Abecassis and Jarashow, Oil Pollution from Ships, 2nd ed., (1985) Stevens & Sons, p.370. Private nuisance has 
been described as the unlawful interference with a person’s use or enjoyment of land, or some right over or in 
connection with it. Proof of the nuisance shifts the burden of proof that the interference is justifiable (i.e. reasonable) 
on to the defendant. Prove your nuisance, and liability is established unless the defendant can exculpate himself. No 
defendant will be able to show that oil pollution is reasonable—it is simply not that kind of interference.  
27
 A case framed in nuisance or trespass could be supported only if the Government was able to show that the Crown 
was seeking compensation in respect of damage suffered by or expenses incurred in relation to property in its 
ownership or occupation. But the Crown did not own much of the foreshore involved in the accident and this made it 
difficult to frame a claim in nuisance or trespass. See Griggs, Patrick, Extending the frontiers or liability—the 
proposed Hazardous Noxious Substances Convention and its effect on ship, cargo and insurance interests, [1996] 
L.M.C.L.Q 146 
28
 Clerk & Lindsell on Torts, 18th ed. (2000) London, Sweet & Maxwell, p.274 
29
 Duty of care: the existence in law of a duty of care situation to avoid injury 
30
 That means that the particular kind of damage to the particular claimant is not so unforeseeable to be too remote. 
31
 Griggs, Patrick, “Extending the frontiers or liability—the proposed Hazardous Noxious Substances Convention 
and its effect on ship, cargo and insurance interests”, [1996] L.M.C.L.Q. 146. It should be considered that 
shipowners have a duty not to carry out any action which they might reasonably consider may pollute the coastline, 
as with any duty not to interfere with the rights of others. Breach of that duty, commonly found in the actions of the 
master, or even those of the shipowner, is carrying out an action which a reasonable man would not carry out. There 
was no doubt that the crew of the Torrrey Canyon had been negligent and that the owners were vicariously 
responsible for the acts of their servants. See also Wu Chao, op. cit. p.16. 
32
 There is an essential requirement of negligence is the “foreseeability of the damage”. This requires the existence of 
a link of causation between the breach of duty and the damage. 
33
 Wu chao, op, cit, p16 
34
 Griggs, Liability for hazardous and noxious cargoes: the HNS Convention, International Business Lawyer, 
September 1996. pp 350-351. 
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Relating to the Intervention on the High Seas in Cases of Oil Pollution Casualties  
(“Public Law Convention”). The former is a very important convention in the field of 
civil liability for pollution damage and I will give a special attention to it and its 
replacement, the 1992 CLC in my thesis. The latter is less important since its effect is 
merely to confirm the previously uncertain right of a State to intervene on the high seas 
when faced with pollution, or the threat of pollution from a foreign-flagged vessel. 
 
The practical importance of the CLC, by contrast, can be seen in connection with the 
Braer and Sea Empress casualties. The Braer brought devastation to the Shetland 
fishing industry in 1993 and in 1996 the Sea Empress did much the same for the fishing 
industry around Milford Haven. Although none of those whose livelihoods have been 
affected by these two incidents can be happy with the compensation which they have 
received, at the end of the day, most are likely to have done better than the Torrey 
Canyon victims.35  
 
On the other hand, it has to be recognised that there must be a limit to any increase in 
liability. Profit and risk must be balanced: if the risk is greater than the profit, it would 
not be surprising to see traditional industries abandoning the activity generating the risk. 
As for oil pollution, if the burden imposed by the law is too great, it is conceivable 
(though one suspects unlikely) that industry will stop transporting oil because it is no 
longer commercially viable to do so.36 In the United States, the very strict law on 
pollution is significant, so much so, that some major oil companies today have opted not 
to be owners or bareboat-charterters of oil tankers going to the United States. This has 
lead to the creation of more and more single-ship companies which are content to trade 
with the United States on the basis that they have very limited financial capability and 
therefore very limited risks.37  
 
The 1969 Convention, which achieved international effect in 1975, by which year the 
                                                       
35
 Griggs, Patrick, Liability for hazardous and noxious cargoes: the HNS Convention, (1996) International Business 
Lawyer, 24-8, pp 350-351 
36
 Wu chao, op, cit, p5 
37
 Wu Chao, op. cit, p5, see also Susan Hodges and Christopher Hill, Principles of Maritime Law, London: LLP, 
2001, p138 
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minimum number of states as required by the Convention itself had signified adoption, 
has itself been replaced by what was initially known as the 1984 Protocol but which has 
now become the 1992 Convention.38 Currently, both China39 and United Kingdom are 
parties to 1992 CLC. I will firstly give a description of the 1969 Convention and then 
discuss the important differences of the 1992 Convention from 1969 Convention. 
5.2.1.2 The Original 1969 Convention — Significant 
Provisions 
The International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage (1969 
CLC),40 provides that the shipowner has strict liability41 (i.e. he is liable also in the 
absence of fault) for pollution damage caused by oil spilled from his ships carrying oil 
in bulk as cargo (i.e. laden tankers), 42  subject to a few exemptions. 43  Another 
significant provision is the channelling of liability that only the shipowner and no one 
else is exposed to liability.44 That means claims for pollution damage under 1969 CLC 
can be made only against the registered shipowner concerned.45 The Convention 
prohibits claims against the servants or agents of the owner.46 But the owner is entitled 
to take recourse action against third parties in accordance with national law.47  
 
In addition, the shipowner is normally entitled to limit his liability under the 1969 
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 See Hodges, Susan and Hill, Christopher op. cit, p140. 
39
 China adopted 1992 CLC on 5th January 1999 and it came into force in China on 5th January 2000. P.R.C does not 
adopt 1971 Fund (1984/1992 Protocols) but both Hong Kong and Macau are parties to 1992 CLC and 1992 Fund. It 
should be noted, in mainland China, 1992 CLC are only applicable in the litigation concerning foreign affaires. 
Chinese ships with total weight over 300 tonnes carrying oil in bulk as cargo and transporting oil internationally, if 
the litigation without involving foreign elements, Chinese Maritime Code (Chapter 11) applies. Chinese ships with 
total weight under 300 tonnes transporting oil within Chinese waters and the litigation without involving foreign 
affaires, the 1994 compensation limitation regulation promulgated by the Ministry of Communications applies. 
40
 International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, 1969 (The CLC), Brussels, November 1969; 
Cmnd. 6183. The 1969 CLC applied to China on 29th April 1980 and applied to U.K. on 19th June 1975. 
41
 Article III(1) of 1969 CLC. 
42
 Article I (1). Very significantly, spills of bunkers from tankers are excluded from CLC 1969 because they are not 
carried as cargo. Now, they are covered by the Bunker Convention 2001. 
43
 Article III(2): No liability for pollution damage shall attach to the owner if he proves that the damage: (a) resulted 
from an act of war, hostilities, civil war, insurrection or a natural phenomenon of an exceptional, inevitable and 
irresistible character, or (b) was wholly caused by an act or omission done with intent to cause damage by a third 
party; or (c) was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful act of any Government or other authority 
responsible for the maintenance of lights or other navigational aids in the exercise of that function. 
44
 Article III (1), Article I (3); see details at Susan Hodges and Christopher Hill, op. cit, p140. 
45
 This does not preclude victims from claiming compensation outside this Convention from persons other than the 
shipowner. 
46
 See the second part of Article III(4). 
47
 Article III rule 5. See also the right of subrogation in Article V (5) of CLC. The receivers of oil will pay through 
the Fund. 
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CLC.48 We can see this provision provides the corresponding balance to temper the 
harness of strict liability.49 To those in the shipping industry, it is probably easy to 
accept that the limitation of liability is as natural as the fact of liability. The theory is 
that without limitation industry would not carry out hazardous activities which are 
nonetheless essential to society. The more “strict” the liability, the more necessary it is 
on this argument to limit this liability.50 The 1969 Convention was no exception: its 
limitation provisions, referred to below, were very much dictated by the heavy burden 
of liability. 
 
Under the original provisions, the owner is entitled to limit his liability and the limits51 
were much higher than those of the 1957 Limitation Convention.52 As with say 
collision liability, the right to limit was lost if the accident resulted from the shipowner’s 
actual fault or privity.53 In order to benefit from the limitation, the shipowner or his 
insurer had, according to Article V (3), to set up a limitation fund through a court in a 
Contracting State, 54  which court was solely competent to determine all matters 
regarding apportionment and distribution of the fund.55 
 
With strict liability under the CLC 1969, another important feature of CLC is its system 
of compulsory insurance under article VII,56 which protects claimants in the event that 
the registered owner is unable to meet his liabilities under the Convention. Under the 
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 Article V(1) 
49
 Susan Hodges and Christopher Hill, op. cit, p142; see also Z. Oya Ozcayir, (1998) Liability for Oil Pollution and 
Collisions, LLP, p. 217 
50
 Wu Chao, op. cit, p62. 
51
 Tanker owners were permitted to limit their liability to 2,000 gold francs per ton of the ship’s tonnage, with a 
maximum of 210 million francs under Article V (1). 
52
 The 1957 Convention offered 1,000 francs for damage to property and 2,100 francs for personal injury, since 
pollution damage generally consists of damage to property. 
53
 Article V (2). The condition of limitation is the same as that for 1957 Convention. 
54
 If several courts in the Contracting States are involved, the owner or his insurer only has to set up one fund 
through one of the courts. 
55
 Article IX (3). 
56
 Article VII: “The owner of a ship registered in a Contracting State and carrying more than 2000 tonnes of oil in 
bulk as cargo, shall be required to maintain insurance or other financial security such as the guarantee of a bank or a 
certificate delivered by an international compensation fund in the sums fixed by applying the limits of liability 
prescribed in article V paragraph 1 to cover his liability for pollution damage under this Convention”. Compulsory 
insurance is not unknown in international law, but this was the first time for it to be stipulated in international 
shipping law (i.e. 1969 CLC). More than half century ago, the Compulsory Insurance was stipulated under The 
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to Damages Caused by Aircraft to Third Parties 
on the Surface 1933 (the Rome Convention). Moreover, compulsory insurance has become a feature of recent liability 
conventions, notably CLC 1992 (Article VII), Bunker Convention 2001 (Article 7); HNS Convention 1996 (Article 
12) and Nairobi International Convention on the Removal of Wrecks, 2007 (Article 12). 
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CLC 1969 the owner of a tanker carrying more than 2,000 tonnes of persistent oil as 
cargo is obliged to maintain insurance to cover his liability.57 Tankers must carry a 
certificate on board attesting the insurance cover. In practice, the insurance certificate is 
issued by the tanker’s P&I Club. This was universally considered adequate security. 
 
In addition, claims for pollution damage under the CLC 1969 may be brought directly 
against the insurer or other person providing financial security for the shipowner’s 
liability,58 as they placed themselves in the position of guarantors. That is to say, a 
claimant may sue the insurer directly, without need to sue the ship or its owner. As a 
quid pro quo for the direct action against the insurer, he got two important rights. Firstly, 
he was endowed with a right to limit his liability, independently upon whether the 
insured tanker was permitted to limit.59 That is to say, even in the case of fault or 
privity on the part of the shipowner, the insurer could take advantage of the limits of 
liability. Secondly, in addition to the shipowner’s defence,60 the insurer had another 
defence in the shape of intentional fault on the part of the shipowner, in which case the 
insurer will be relieved from his liability to make payment, with the assured bearing the 
entire burden.61 
 
No doubt, the concept of compulsory insurance is just as important as strict liability and 
limitation of liability. The reason is that these insurance guarantees are available only if 
they are subject to clear limits. Consequently, the right of the shipowner and his insurer 
to limit liability goes hand in hand with the imposition of strict liability and the 
compulsory insurance provisions. Furthermore, with the provisions of compulsory 
insurance in place, in practice it is most likely all claimants would seek to recover 
damages from the registered owner or directly from his insurer in accordance with 
Article VII and to ignore other potential defendants except in extreme cases. 
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 Article V 
58
 Article VII (8) 
59
 Article VII (8) gives the insurer the right to limit his liability to the Article V(1) amount, and this right is 
absolute—it applies even in the case of the actual fault or privity of the assured owner. Article V (11) provides the 
insurer with the right to constitute a limitation fund in any event. Article V (5) also grants of subrogation to the 
insurer in the event that it pays compensation for pollution damage before distribution of the fund. 
60
 Article VII (8) affords the insurer all the defences which the owner could have invoked under Article III (2) and 
(3), except the bankruptcy or winding-up of the owner. 
61
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5.2.1.3 The Civil Liability Convention as Revised62 
The CLC was revised by the 1992 Protocols and took the basic provisions of the 1984 
Protocols.63 It came into force on 30 May 199664 and was enacted into English law by 
ss 152-170 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995.65 China ratified the 1992 Protocol on 
5th Jan. 1999 and became applicable to both China and Hong Kong on 5th Jan. 2000.66  
 
The broad aim and indeed effect of the 1992 CLC is to additionally embrace those areas 
of compensation which were traditionally provided by the ship and which were covered 
by TOVALOP,67 but were not covered by CLC 1969.68 The international regimes 
established by the two Conventions and the voluntary agreements respectively, although 
innovative and beneficial at the time, quickly became deficient. The main reason is that 
the risk of pollution increased at a rate to which existing laws could not adapt. In 
particular, the Amoco Cadiz and Tanio incidents revealed not only the insufficient 
compensation limits but also the obstacles to their application.69 
 
The idea of raising the compensation limits was at the heart of the initiative to revise the 
1969 CLC and 1971 Fund.70 As we know, the two conventions formed a whole and the 
resulting regime was founded on an apportionment of the financial burden between the 
shipowners and the cargo interests. When seeking to raise the ceiling of liability and 
compensation, it is essential to keep this interaction in mind. Should the CLC limits be 
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 Up to 31 December 2007, 1992 CLC has 120 Contracting States, 1992 Fund has 102 Contracting States, see 
general information at IMO website http://www.imo.org/home.asp 
63
 The attempts at revision began in 1979 and the work itself was completed in 1984 when two protocols were signed 
in order to revise the 1969 and 1971 Conventions. These 1984 protocols were replaced by two new protocols in 1992, 
with amendments intended to facilitate their entry into force. 
64
 The UK has introduced the 1992 Convention into its own law by sections 152-171 of the Merchant Shipping Act 
1995. Thereby the Merchant Shipping (Oil Pollution) Act 1971, which contained the 1969 CLC, was repealed. 
65
 The provisions of the convention with modification are to be found in Part VI Chapter III of the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1995, ss. 152-170. Section 171 contains traditional provisions dealing with the transition from the 1969 
CLC to the 1992 Protocols. 
66
 China declared that the Protocol will be applicable to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region at the same 
time. In mainland China, it is only applicable to cases involved foreign elements. See Si, Maritime Law, 2003, p. 323. 
67
 TOVALOP stood for a shipping industry agreement entitled “Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement concerning 
Liability for Oil Pollution”. The final demise of this industries’ voluntary agreement was on 20 February 1997. 
68
 This was believed to be essential if “life after TOVALOP” (RIP 20 February 1997) was, from a victim’s point of 
view, to be as fully functional as it was when TOVALOP was alive and well. Hill, Maritime Law, 6th Edition, LLP, 
2003, p 433. 
69
 Wu Chao, op. cit. p129. 
70
 The International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for Compensation 1971 (Fund 
Convention 1971). See section 5.2.1.4 
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raised excessively, the shipowners would shoulder the bulk of the financial burden. 
Conversely, if the CLC limits were not adequately increased, the cargo owners, that is, 
the oil industry, would have to fund the bulk of compensation for pollution damage. 
 
Except for the inadequate limits of liability and compensation, there are some other 
weak points of the original Conventions. The definitions of “ship” and “incident” need 
to be expanded, the definition of “pollution damage” should be clarified, and also it is 
necessary to re-discuss the “Geographical Scope” and make the “channelling of 
liability” more sufficient. Therefore, there was an urgent requirement to revise the legal 
regime. 
  
The 1992 CLC builds on the structure of the 1969 CLC but contains the following 
important differences. I will particularly discuss the provisions which have been 
specifically updated or clarified with comparisons to the equivalent provisions in its 
predecessor. 
 
• Article I, rule 1—“Ship” 
The definition of ship under 1992 CLC is more specific than that in 1969 CLC. The 
1969 definition was brief and restricted to “any sea going vessel and any seaborne craft 
of any type whatsoever actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo”. The 1992 definition71 
requires the ship to be constructed or adapted to carry oil, i.e. capable of carrying oil in 
bulk.72 This new provision makes the convention apply to unladen tankers (tankers in 
ballast) and to oil pollution from bunkers in such vessels.73 In short, the first part of the 
new definition refers to tankers and any ships adapted to carry oil in bulk as cargo and 
that pollution damage caused by such ships, either laden or unladen is recoverable under 
                                                       
71
 Under Article II, rule 1 of 1992 Protocol, “ship” means “any sea-going vessel and seaborne craft of any type 
whatsoever constructed or adapted for the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo, provided that a ship capable of carrying oil 
and other cargoes shall be regarded as a ship only when it is actually carrying oil in bulk as cargo and during any 
voyage following such carriage unless it is proved that it has no residues of such carriage of oil in bulk aboard.” 
72
 If it is capable of carrying other cargoes, i.e. a ship which is not characteristically a tanker in the traditional sense, 
but provided it is actually carrying oil in bulk at the time of the spill, the provisions of the convention will apply to 
that incident. 
73
 During the draft of 1984 Protocol, there were doubts about the way in which the inclusion could be effective, 
because no definition of unladen tankers was given for the purpose of this extension. But these doubts were not 
considered to be serious enough to be addressed. It seems no big problem in practice so far. See 
http://www.coastalwiki.org/coastalwiki/North_Sea_pollution_from_shipping:_legal_framework (accessed on 
07/07/2010). See also Marsden on Collisions, 13th ed., 2003, p.423 
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the terms of 1992 CLC.  
 
There is a question arises here: whether offshore craft, namely floating storage units 
(FSUs) and floating production, storage and offloading units (FPSOs) should be 
regarded as being covered by the definition of “ship” under the 1992 Conventions? In 
October 1999, the 1992 Fund Assembly had endorsed the conclusions that an offshore 
craft should be regarded as a ship under the 1992 Conventions only when it carries oil 
as cargo on a voyage to or from a port or terminal outside the oil field in which it 
normally operates, although in any event the decision would be taken in light of the 
particular circumstances of the case.74 However, some member states have applied a 
different interpretation of the definition of ship75 from the IOPC Fund’s interpretation. 
 
At present member states still have different views in respect of the definition of ship. 
Some are in favour of a wider definition of ship than the one applied at present by the 
Funds, while others are against by arguing that the present wording of definitions 
simply cannot be interpreted to cover FSUs and FPSOs. Regarding the broader 
definition, the risk is that the Funds could be liable to pay for an FSU incident, but the 
Funds would not have received contributions covering the operations of the FSU 
because contributions are determined by contributing oil, which at present does not 
include Ship To Ship (STS) operations. In addition, if the IOPC Funds decide to amend 
the present interpretation in order to cover FSUs and FPSOs, that means shipowners and 
insurers would subject to strict liability and in many cases compulsory insurance under 
the 1992 Conventions. Accordingly, regarding either upholding or amending the present 
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 See details at 
https://www.bimco.org/Members/News/General_News/2009/10/16_IOPC_Funds_will_reconsider_definition_of_ship
.aspx (accessed 06/07/2010). See also Willem Oosterveen, Some recent developments regarding liability for damage 
resulting from oil pollution- from the perspective of an EU Member State, Environmental Law Review, 2004, 6(4) pp 
223-239, at 235. 
75
 For example, in 2006 the Greek Supreme Court made a decision differing from the above interpretation given by 
IOPC Funds. This case was involving the Slops incident occurred in Greece in 2000. The Slops was originally 
designed and constructed for the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo, but in 1995 underwent a major conversion in the 
course of which its propeller was removed and its engine was deactivated and officially sealed with a view to 
converting the status of the craft from a ship to a floating oily waste receiving and processing facility. According to 
the IOPC Funds’ interpretation, the Slops should not be regarded as a ship under 1992 Conventions. But the Greek 
Supreme Court decided that at the time of the incident the Slops should be regarded as a ship as defined in the 1992 
Conventions because it had the character of a seaborne craft which, following its modification into an FSU, stored oil 
products in bulk and, further it had the ability to move by being stowed with a consequent pollution risk without it 
being necessary for an incident to take place during the carriage of the oil in bulk. As a result, the 1992 Fund in July 
2008 paid 4 million Euros to the claimants as principal, legal interests and costs in accordance with the judgement by 
the Greek courts. 
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IOPC Funds’ interpretation, there are a large majority of Member States at a meeting in 
October 2009, in support of having a study carried out by external consultant, which 
could then be presented at the next session of IOPC Funds.76  
 
The author is in favour of a wider definition of ship to cover FSUs and FPSOs. To 
amend the present IOPC Funds interpretation is desirable because these units do pose a 
significant risk of oil pollution incidents, while they operate at sea and usually contain 
large quantities of oil.  
 
The second part of the definition (conditional clause) concerns combination carriers in 
the situation where ships sometimes trade with oil in bulk as cargo and sometimes with 
other cargoes (e.g. minerals in bulk).77 It should be noted that the literal meaning in the 
1969 CLC included combination carriers, provided that they were carrying oil in bulk as 
cargo at the time of the incident. The new definition in 1992 CLC extends the coverage 
of combination carriers to any subsequent voyage, with the term of “any voyage” being 
defined as the whole return voyage. This means the liability of combination carriers 
under the 1992 CLC is extended to include the whole voyage following the carriage of 
oil in bulk as cargo unless it is proved that there are no oil residues remaining on board 
from such carriage of bulk oil.  
 
• Article I, rule 5—“Oil” 
In Article I, rule 5, oil is widely defined and significantly includes bunker oil.78 CLC 
1969 did not include bunkers, but TOVALOP did if they came from a tanker, and the 
1992 CLC follows TOVALOP. It must be noted that spills of bunkers, if they are to be 
covered by the convention, must be from vessels capable of actually carrying oil as 
                                                       
76
 Dates for this meeting will be informed when available. See also 
https://www.bimco.org/Members/News/General_News/2009/10/16_IOPC_Funds_will_reconsider_definition_of_ship
.aspx (accessed 02/07/2010) 
77
 These ships must have an insurance certificate (P&I) when they are operating as tankers, but not when operate as 
bulk carriers. The P& I Clubs need to know at what point a ship requires a certificate. Therefore they proposed the 
1984 Protocol should apply during the carriage of oil and should cease to apply at the end of the voyage following the 
carriage of such oil. It was agreed that the end of the voyage subsequent to the carriage of oil in bulk as cargo would 
be the determining point. For details see O.R.1984, Vol. 2, LEG/CONF. 6/ 47, 2/4/84, p. 52. See also the discussion 
about the combination carriers in respect of the definition of “ships” in the 1969 CLC and the 1984 Protocol in Wu 
Chao, op. cit, p. 142. 
78
 Article I rule 5, “oil” means “any persistent hydrocarbon mineral oil such as crude oil…” See also Hodges, Susan, 
Principles of Maritime Law, op. cit. p147. 
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cargo.79 The convention does not apply to bunker spills from any merchant ship. 
 
• Article I rule 6&7—“Pollution damages” and “Preventive measure” 
The 1992 CLC clarifies how pollution damage may be recovered following an oil spill. 
The concept of “pollution damage”80 was based on 1969 CLC,81 but the meaning is 
narrower than that attributed to it in the 1969 CLC.82 The Protocol covers pollution 
damage as before but environmental damage compensation is limited to costs incurred 
for reasonable measures to reinstate the contaminated environment. But the 1992 CLC 
definition of “pollution damage” is far from ideal. Particularly it is vague and unclear 
regarding the criteria for compensation for reinstatement of the environment.83 It does 
not state explicitly what kinds of reinstatement measures would be eligible for 
compensation.  
 
As a system of economic compensation for oil spill damage, claims relating to the 
impairment of the environment would be accepted by IOPC Fund only if the claimant 
had suffered a quantifiable economic loss, measurable in monetary terms, according to 
the declaration in Resolution No 3 of the IOPC Fund Assembly.84 The Fund will pay 
for clean-up costs, environmental restoration costs, including measures taken at an 
alternative site, plus the cost of assessing environmental damage, provided that the 
restoration and assessment fulfil the criteria established in the 2002 Claims Manual on 
Environmental Damage by IOPC Fund.85 The Fund will not pay for compensation of 
                                                       
79
 Ibid. p148. 
80
 Article II, rule 3 of 1992 CLC. 
81
 Under Article I (6) of 1969 CLC, “pollution damage” is defined as “loss or damage caused outside the ship 
carrying oil by contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such escape or 
discharge may occur (1992 CLC added more about environment here), and includes the costs of preventive measures 
and further loss or damage caused by preventive measures.  
82
 Article II, rule 3 of 1992 CLC. Pollution damage means “(a) loss or damage caused outside the ship by 
contamination resulting from the escape or discharge of oil from the ship, wherever such escape or discharge may 
occur, provided that compensation for impairment of the environment other than loss of profit shall be limited to 
costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement actually undertaken or to be undertaken”; (b) “the cost of preventive 
measures and further loss or damage caused by preventive measures”. 
83
 De La Fayette, New approaches for addressing damage to the marine environment, The International Journal of 
Marine and Coastal Law, Vol 20, No 1 (2005), pp. 167-224, at 180 
84
 Michael Mason, Civil liability for oil pollution damage: examining the evolving scope for environmental 
compensation in the international regime, Marine Policy 27 (2003) 1-12, at 3. See also De La Fayette, op. cit., pp. 
180-182. 
85
 The aim of any reasonable measures of reinstatement should be to bring the damage site back to the same 
ecological state that would have existed had the oil spill not occurred, or at least as close to it as possible (that is, to 
re-establish a biological community in which the organisms characteristic of that community at the time of the 
incident are present and are functioning normally). Reinstatement measures taken at some distance from, but still 
within the general vicinity of, the damaged area may be acceptable, so long as it can be demonstrated that they would 
  236
environmental damage beyond economic loss. Strictly speaking, the definition of 
“pollution damage” under the 1992 CLC is undeveloped and it does not include “pure” 
environmental damage such as ecological damage. Unlike the EU Environmental 
Liability Directive 2004/35, biodiversity damage (e.g. damage to species and habitats)86 
is not covered by the 1992 CLC/Fund conventions. 
 
The 1992 CLC also allows expenses incurred for preventive measures87 to be recovered 
even when no spills of oil occurred, provided there was grave and imminent threat of 
pollution damage.88 In contrast, the 1969 CLC would neither reimburse such costs nor 
allow them to rank against a limitation fund set up because a spill subsequently took 
place. However TOVALOP did and the 1992 CLC caught up with this development.89 
 
• Article II—Geographical scope 
The 1969 CLC only covered damage on shore or in the territorial waters.90 According 
to Article II (a) (2) of the 1992 Protocol,91 the territory extends to “the exclusive 
economic zone” (EEZ) and it follows that shipowners can now be made liable in respect 
to oil spills much further out on the high seas than before under the 1969 CLC. The 
words of Article II of 1992 Protocol originally came from Article 3 of the 1984 
Protocol,92 which was different from 1969 CLC.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
actually enhance the recovery of the damaged components of the environment. This link between the measures and 
the damaged component is essential for consistency with the definition of pollution damage in the 1992 CLC and 
Fund Conventions. See De La Fayette, op. cit., p. 210 and p. 218 
86
 For detail see discussion in sections 5.3 and 5.3.2 
87
 Article I, rule 7 of 1969 CLC, Preventive measures means any reasonable measures taken by any person after an 
incident has occurred to prevent or minimize pollution damage. There is no definition of preventive measures in 1992 
CLC. 
88
 Merchant Shipping Act 1995, Section 153(2). See Baughen, Shipping Law, 2nd ed. Cavendish Publishing Limited, 
2001, p334. 
89
 It should be noted here, that as with the CLC 1969 definition, the new definition still does not deal with the 
question of causation and is left to be decided according to provisions contained within national regimes. See 
discussion in 6.1. See also Marsden on Collisions, 13th ed., 2003, p.425. 
90
 Article II of the 1969 Convention states: “This Convention shall apply exclusively to pollution damage caused on 
the territory including the territorial sea of a Contracting State and to preventive measures taken to prevent or 
minimise such damage.” We can see the 1969 CLC was exclusively territorial in application. That means what 
mattered and what had to be determined for that Convention to apply was the damage caused by the escape of oil 
within the territorial limits of a Contracting State. 
91
 Under Article II, The convention shall apply exclusively: (a) to pollution damage caused: (1) in the territory, 
including the territorial sea, of a Contracting State, and (2) in the exclusive economic zone of a Contracting State, 
established in accordance with international law, or, if a Contracting State has not established such a zone, in an area 
beyond and adjacent to the territorial sea of that State determined by that State in accordance with international law 
and extending not more than 200 nautical miles from the base lines from which the threat of its territorial sea is 
measured; (b)to preventive measures, wherever taken, to prevent or minimise such damage 
92
 This provision was one of the most contentious at the 1984 Conference. See Abecassis, D.W. & Jarashow, R.L., 
Oil Pollution from Ships—International, United Kingdom and United States Law and Practice, London: Stevens & 
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It should be noted that the definition of EEZ is a major innovation of the 1982 LOS 
Convention,93 which extends to 200 Nautical Miles from the territorial sea baseline.94 
According to Article 56 of LOS, EEZ confers on coastal states, jurisdiction for the 
prevention of the marine environment.95 At the 1984 IMO conference, developing 
countries successfully pushed EEZ into the amendment to CLC/Fund Conventions.96 
Eventually, EEZ is incorporated into CLC/Fund 1992.97 Obviously, the extension of the 
geographical coverage will help to enhance the rights of victims by admitting extra 
territorial claims in EEZ.  
 
A question arises: how about oil pollution occurred outside of EEZ? According to the 
IOPC Fund 1992 Claims Manual,98 responses on the high seas to an oil spill would in 
principle qualify for compensation only if they succeed in preventing or reducing 
pollution damage within the territorial sea or EEZ of a contracting state. According to 
IOPC Fund, given world shipping lanes, oil spills on the high seas are rare.99 Moreover, 
we cannot ignore the difficulty of mounting a practical response to an oil discharge on 
the high seas. That is to say, it is rare to have responses on the high seas. If there is, the 
above criteria must be satisfied. Generally, the geographic scope of CLC/Fund will not 
be extended to the high seas. 
 
However, it should be noted in theory that Article 221 (1) of the LOS Convention 
affords states the right of intervention on the high seas in respect of maritime casualties 
threatening harmful pollution in spite of the practical rationale for restricting liability for 
high seas oil pollution damage to its impact on national interests.100 More radically, 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Sons, 2nd ed., 1985, p234. 
93
 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOS) 1982, see full text at 
http://www.globelaw.com/LawSea/lsconts.htm; both UK and PRC have ratified the Convention.  
94
 Article 57 of the LOS 1982 
95
 Specifically, Article 56(1)(b)(iii) of the LOS Convention recognized for the first time coastal state jurisdiction in 
the EEZ over protection and preservation of the marine environment.  
96
 Michael Mason, Civil liability for oil pollution damage: examining the evolving scope for environmental 
compensation in the international regime, Marine Policy 27 (2003) 1-12, at 6. 
97
 EEZ is incorporated into CLC 1992 as Article II and the Fund 1992 as Article 3 
98
 International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund 1992. Claims Manual. London: IOPC Fund 1992, 2000, p.7. 
99
 Michael Mason, op. cit. p. 6. 
100
 As a general rule that only the flag state may exercise jurisdiction over a ship on the high seas (Article 91 of the 
LOS). But there are certain exceptions to the exclusive of flag state jurisdiction. See Z. Oya Ozcayir (editor), (1998) 
Liability for Oil Pollution and Collision LLP, London and Hong Kong, p. 405. See also Michael Mason, op. cit, 7. 
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Article 218 (1) provides that a port state may also take legal proceedings against a 
vessel in one of its ports that is alleged to have illegal discharged oil outside that state’s 
territorial sea or EEZ, including high seas. Where the port state ascertained that a vessel 
in one of its ports is in violation of applicable international rules and standards, and 
thereby threatens damage to the marine environment, it shall take administrative 
measures to detain prevent the vessel until the cause of the violation have been removed, 
or the vessel goes to the nearest repair yard (Article 219). Accordingly, the discharges 
are no longer regarded as freedom of the seas. Proper control of all sources of pollution, 
including oil pollution is now a matter of legal obligation. This obligation covers not 
only “States and their maritime jurisdiction, but also the marine environment as a whole, 
including high seas (Article 194). We can see it is possibility for a coastal state to 
intervene the oil pollution occurred on high seas under LOS. 
 
• Article III rule 4 — Channelling provisions 
The CLC aims to channel liability through the carrier; thus it bars claims against a 
number of others involved. The 1992 text excludes claims (whether under the 
Conventions or otherwise101) not only against the servants or agents of the owner (who 
were protected under the 1969 provisions)102 but also against various other parties.103 
The full list is given in rule 2 of Article IV of CLC 1992: 
(a) The servants or agents of the owner or a member of a crew; 
(b) The pilot or any other person who, without being a member of the crew, performs services for 
the ship; 
(c) Any charterer (howsoever described, including a bare boat charterer), manager or operator of the 
ship; 
(d) Any person performing salvage operations with the consent of the owner or on the instructions 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Farkhanda Zia-Mansoor, International Regime and the EU Developments for Preventing and Controlling 
Vessel-source Oil Pollution, (2005) European Environmental Law Review, p.166.  
101
 Article III (4) of 1969 CLC was limited under the convention. 
102
 Article III (4) of 1969 CLC provided that: “No claims for compensation for pollution damage shall be made 
against the owner otherwise than in accordance with this Convention. No claim for pollution damage under this 
Convention or otherwise may be made against the servants or agents of the owner”. The scope of Article III (4) of 
1969 CLC was very limited and did not offer any protection to salvors, charterers and others. Where such a person 
was responsible for the spill, claimants would have claims against both the owner, under this convention, and such 
other person, under general principles of municipal law. See Abecassis and Jarashow, Oil Pollution from Ships, 
Stevens & Sons, 2nd ed. 1985, p.255 
103
 Anderson, Charles B. & De la Rue, Colin, Charter party symposium—part II: liability of charterers and cargo 
owners for pollution from ships, (2001) 26 Tul. Mar. L.J.1, at 7. 
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of a competent public authority; 
(e) Any person taking preventive measures; 
(f) All servants or agents of persons mentioned in subparagraphs (c) (d) & (e). 
 
• Article V—Limitation of liability 
Where the limitation of liability is concerned, generally, oil pollution claims have 
always been treated separately from maritime claims.104 The revised limits105 under 
1992 CLC are as follows: 
(1) There is a flat rate of 3 million SDRs for vessels whose gross tonnage does not exceed 
5,000 tons.  
(2) For vessels whose gross tonnage exceeds 5,000 tons but does not exceed 140,000 tons, 
the figure is 3 million SDRs plus 420 SDRs for each additional ton over 5,000 tons.  
(3) For vessels whose tonnage exceeds 140,000 tons, the figure is a flat rate of 59.7 million 
SDRs.  
 
Limitation of in respect of CLC claims, which are excluded from the 1976 Limitation 
Convention, will now (since 1992 Protocol) be lost in the same way. The type of 
conduct which would break limitation is covered by 1992 Protocol, Art. 6.2.106 The old 
“fault or privity” test (Art. V of 1969 CLC) has been replaced with a test by which “it is 
proved that the pollution damage resulted from owner’s personal act or omission, 
committed with the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that 
such damage would probably result”.107 The new wording is adopted from the 1976 
Convention. 
                                                       
104
 Where the polluting vessel is also responsible for other loss or damage (e.g. loss of life, personal injuries, 
property damage or cargo claims), the owner must seek limitation under global limitation provisions, e.g. LLMC 
1976 or 1996 Protocol. 
105
 A simplified procedure has been adopted for increasing these figures. Under Article 6.3 of the 1992 Protocol, the 
limitation fund can be established before any action under the convention is brought. 
106
 Article V.2 of CLC 1969 is replaced by Art. 6.2 of the 1992 protocol which provides as follows: “The owner shall 
not be entitled to limit his liability under this Convention if it is proved that the pollution damage resulted from his 
personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such damage, or recklessly and with knowledge that 
such damage would probably result”. 
107
 The wording of the 1992 Protocols refers to the “personal” acts or omissions of the shipowner. This word is 
omitted from the Merchant Shipping Act 1995, which adds “any” to the words “such damage” which appear in the 
Protocols. It is probable that these two linguistic differences between the Act and the protocols will not prove 
significant. Under MSA 1995, s. 157 (3), the claimant needs to prove that the damage or cost “resulted from anything 
done or omitted to be done by [such person] either with intent to cause any such damage or cost or reckless and in the 
knowledge that any such damage or cost would probably result”. 
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5.2.1.4 The 1971 “Fund” Convention 
The International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation 1971 (“Fund Convention”) was a natural progression from the CLC 1969. 
UK is a party to the Fund Convention,108 but China is neither a party to 1971 Fund nor 
1992 Protocol up to August 2009. There are a few reasons for China not ratifying the 
Fund Convention/ Protocols which will be discussed later.109 
 
The starting point is the level of compensation provided under the CLC was not high 
enough. It was recognised at the time that the 1969 CLC was merely an interim 
compromise. A compromise solution had to be found in order to bring the 1969 
Conference to a conclusion.110  
 
This compromise was achieved by the adoption of two texts: the 1969 Convention and a 
Resolution111 on the Establishment of an International Compensation Fund for Oil 
Pollution Damage.112 Without the promise of a fund, the 1969 Conference would very 
probably have failed to adopt an instrument at all.113 We can imagine that if the CLC 
had been the only Convention spawned by the 1969 Brussels Conference, there would 
have been great disappointment amongst coastal States, potential victims of oil pollution 
and shipowners liable for the damage.114 
 
Since the CLC had chosen the shipowner as the liable party on the basis of strict liability, 
it was considered that the oil industry should share some of the burden of compensation, 
                                                       
108
 From 16 May 1998, Parties to the 1992 Protocol ceased to be Parties to the 1971 Fund Convention due to a 
mechanism for compulsory denunciation of the "old" regime established in the 1992 Protocol. See “Fund 1971” at 
http://www.imo.org/home.asp. U.K. is party to 1992 Protocol, therefore ceased to be party to the 1971 Fund. 
109
 See section 5.2.1.7 
110
 See discussion in section 5.2.1.2. 
111
 O.R. 1969, LEG/CONF/C.2/WP.44, WP.45, pp. 603-609. This resolution was adopted by 33 votes to 6 with 6 
abstentions. 
112
 At the Conference 1969, in order to facilitate the compromise formula, a Working Group was set up to examine 
the question of liability based on an international fund. It was apparent by the time the group produced its report that 
there was no hope of formulating an instrument to set up such a fund, and so the Conference adopted a Resolution 
that IMO put the matter in hand immediately, and call a Diplomatic Conference not later than 1971 to consider and 
adopt a suitable Convention. 
113
 Abecassis and Jarashow, Oil Pollution from Ships, , 2nd ed. 1985, Stevens & Sons, p.253 
114
 The motivating force behind the setting up of this convention was a clear recognition by the oil industry, the main 
beneficiary of the carriage of oil by sea, that the shipping industry should not be obliged to shoulder the full burden of 
responsibility for the consequences of oil pollution damage from an escape or spill from a ship at sea. Hodges, 
Principles of Maritime Law, op. cit., p145. See also Wu Chao, op. cit, p76 
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which led to the idea of a second convention establishing a Fund to which the industry 
would contribute. Broadly speaking, the IOPC Fund is financed by contributions which, 
by Article 10, must be paid by those persons who have received crude oil or fuel oil in 
the territory of contracting States, namely, the importers of oil. Compared with the CLC 
which only concerned the owners of oil cargoes indirectly, the Fund Convention 
concerned them directly, by making them contribute to the Fund.115 
 
The provisions of the Fund Convention are directly tailored to supplement those of the 
1969 Liability Convention, so that in most cases the same definitions are adopted. The 
basic principle is that, where liability under the Liability Convention ends, the IOPC 
Fund’s liability begins.116  
 
Under the terms of Article 4 (1), the Fund shall pay compensation to any person 
suffering pollution damage in the following situations: 
●Where the shipowner and his insurer are unable to fulfil their financial obligations 
(IOPC Fund as substitute or supplement).117 
●Where the value of the damage caused by the escape of oil exceeds the offending 
shipowner’s CLC liability limits (IOPC Fund as supplement).118 
 
The most important of the above reasons is that contained in sub-paragraph (c) of 
Article 4 (1), and to date it is under this heading that all Article 4 claims against the 
IOPC Fund have arisen. It means that usually the IOPC Fund comes in at the point 
where the damage exceeds the Liability Convention limit of 2,000 gold francs (about 
133 SDRs) per limitation ton. But where the owner is not entitled to limit his liability, 
due to his actual fault or privity, of course in that case the IOPC Fund is unlikely to have 
to pay anything because the claimant should have received full and adequate 
compensation for their pollution damage from the shipowner. If the owner is incapable 
of paying claims in full and his insurance fails, Article 4 (1) (b) would apply. 
                                                       
115
 The IOPC Fund is governed by an Assembly of all contracting States to the Fund Convention. Hence, while it is 
States who govern the IOPC Fund, it is largely oil companies who contribute to it. Only states party to the 1969 
Liability Convention may become party to the 1971 Fund Convention. 
116
 Abecassis and Jarashow, Oil Pollution from Ships, (1985, 2nd ed.) Stevens & Sons, p.255. 
117
 Article 4 (1) (b) 
118
 Article 4 (1) (c) 
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On the non-applicability side,119 the Fund incurs no obligation in situations: 
(1) where pollution damage results from an act of war, hostilities, civil war or 
insurrections;120 or 
(2) from oil spilled from a warship or a ship under government ownership engaged 
in non-commercial operations;121 or 
(3) the damage was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful act of any 
Government or other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other 
navigational aids in the exercise of that function;122 or  
(4) the claimant victim was unable to show conclusively that the damage was 
directly consequent upon an incident in which one or more vessels were 
involved.123 
 
The text of the 1971 Convention provided for a maximum sum of 450 million gold 
francs (30 million SDRs124) although the Convention had the capability built into it of 
having this figure stepped up to 900 million francs (60 million SDRs 125 ) if 
circumstances in the future justified such a doubling.126 The 1971 Convention came 
into force in October 1978 and has proved to be a success. The IOPC Fund has been 
presented with claims from 57 incidents from its creation in October 1978 until June 
1991.127 It has made payments of compensation and indemnification amounting to 
some $70 million.128 
 
                                                       
119
 See Article 4 (2) 
120
 Article 4(2) (a) 
121
 Article 4(2) (a) 
122
 Article 4(3): “… The Fund shall in any event be exonerated to the extent that the shipowner may have been 
exonerated under Article III, paragraph 3, of the Liability Convention.” Article III paragraph 3: “… The owner will 
escape liability if he proves that the damage was wholly caused by the negligence or other wrongful act of any 
Government or other authority responsible for the maintenance of lights or other navigational aids in the exercise of 
that function”. 
123
 Article 4(2)(b) 
124
 In 1976 a Protocol to the Convention had been adopted which changed the expression of the various amounts 
from gold francs to SDRs, as defined by the International Monetary Fund. The 1976 Protocol follows the 1976 
Protocol to the Liability Convention, in expressing the gold franc amounts in Articles 4 and 5 of the Convention in 
SDRs on the basis of 15 gold francs equals 1 SDR. Hence, for instance, 450 and 900 millions francs become 
respectively 30 and 60 million SDRs.   
125
 Ibid. 
126
 Hodges, Principles of Maritime Law, op. cit. p145 
127
 Wu Chao, op. cit, p101. 
128
 Ibid. 
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From what has been discussed above, we can see the twin pillars of the liability and 
compensation regime have been a resounding success. They are truly revolutionary 
instruments of international law. They create a regime of strict liability with very few 
exceptions. Considering implementation of liability, it is concomitant with principles in 
the compulsory insurance and direct action against the insurer. As a result, they make 
provisions for governments and citizens alike to have relatively quick and assured 
compensation for their oil pollution losses.129 
 
The texts of the Conventions themselves are not free from ambiguities, such as the 
definition of “pollution damage” should be clarified, and also it is necessary to 
re-discuss the “Geographical Scope” and make the “channelling of liability” more 
sufficient (most of them are cleared up or revised by the1992 protocols, see 5.2.1.3). It 
means that particular care must be taken in ratifying legislation.130 Further, states 
should consider the extent to which they wish to make provision in their national 
legislation for the special regulation of the problem of oil pollution from ships and 
installations not covered by the instruments discussed in these two conventions.131  
5.2.1.5 The 1992 Fund Convention132 and the 2003 
Protocol133 
In the same way that CLC 1992 is a revision and economic update of CLC 1969, so 
Fund 1992134 is the same in relation to Fund 1971. The 1992 Protocols have made the 
following alterations in the operation of the fund: 
(a) The overall fund limit has been increased to 135 million SDRs, with a simplified 
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 Abecassis and Jarashow, Oil Pollution from Ships, op. cit., p.301. 
130
 At the time of the 1969 Liability Convention and 1971 Fund Convention, not so many criticisms could be made 
of these instrument, but after several decades, because gaps or vagueness in the liability convention and fund 
convention, which has eventually caused continual and needless problems of interpretation. The Oil Conventions, like 
all the other international conventions, from time to time need updating. 
131
 Ibid. 
132
 Up to August 2009, records show that 121 States had accepted the 1992 Protocol to CLC and 104 States had 
accepted the 1992 Protocol to the International Fund Convention. These acceptances include nearly all of the 
significant maritime States, (e.g. U.K.), but not including P.R.C. (China declared that the 1992 Protocol will be 
applicable to the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region only from January 5, 2000). Another notable exception is 
the US. 
133
 The 2003 Protocol establishing an International Oil Pollution Compensation Supplementary Fund was adopted on 
16 May 2003 and came into force on 3 March 2005. U.K. is party to the 2003 Protocol but China is not. 
134
 The provisions of the Fund Convention have been given UK endorsement by sections 172-81 in the main body of 
the Merchant Shipping Act 1995. By July 2010, China has not ratified the 1992 Fund. 
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procedure for increasing the limit. 
(b) The fund’s rights of subrogation can now come into existence before any judgment 
is given against the shipowner. 
(c) “roll-back” relief135 is abolished. 
 
Same as with the 1969 CLC, the 1992 CLC is based on the principle of the shipowner’s 
strict liability, creating a system of compulsory liability insurance. The IOPC Fund, 
which supplements the 1992 CLC, provides additional compensation to injured parties 
when the compensation under the CLC is inadequate. The new regime gives a broader 
meaning to “ship” “oil” and definition of recoverable “pollution damage” with wider 
“channelling” provisions which exclude claims against a broader range of parties 
(associated with the shipowner) for the types of damage which they cover. By becoming 
a member to the CLC, a state becomes eligible to share in the corresponding IOPC Fund. 
The overall fund limit has been increased to 135 million SDRs, with a simplified 
procedure for increasing the limit. 
 
In October 2000, the IMO adopted two resolutions increasing the limits contained in the 
1992 CLC and IOPC Fund by 50%.136 The amendments raise the maximum amount of 
compensation payable from the IOPC Fund for a single incident, including the limit 
established under the 2000 CLC amendments, to 203 million SDR.137 
 
In addition, recent experience in the maritime transport field has shown that 
environmental damage can be very high (the Erika138 and the Prestige139). Although it 
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 “roll-back relief”: this is colloquially known as the “fairy godmother” approach of the oil industry to the tanker 
industry. The 1971 Fund committed itself to reimbursing the offending tanker owner with amounts in excess of the 
equivalent of 15000 francs (i.e. 500 francs less than the ship limitation figure) per ton of the ship’s tonnage or a 
maximum of 125 million francs whichever is the less. This seemingly generous obligation need not, however be paid 
where the damage has been occasioned or at least contributed to by the willful misconduct of the tanker owner. 
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 The amendments entered into force on November 1, 2003 (under tacit acceptance). See 
http://www.imo.org/home.asp; see also “International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, The Prestige 
Incident—Spain, 13 November 2002 (hereafter IOPC Prestige Report), http://www.iopcfund.org/prestige  
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 The limits provided as follows: (a) For a ship not exceeding 5,000 gross tons liability will be limited to 4.51 
million SDRs. (b) For a ship between 5,000 and 140,000 gross tons liability will be limited to 4.51 million SDRs plus 
631 SDRs for each additional gross ton over 5,000. (c) For a ship over 140,000 gross tons liability will be limited to 
89.77 million SDRs. 
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 The Malta registered tanker ERIKA sank on Sunday, December 12 1999, in bad weather in the Atlantic Ocean, 80 
km west of the French coast of Brittany. The ship broke in two and sank with 20,000 tons of heavy crude oil. The 
ERIKA oil spill was the largest heavy crude oil spill in European waters since AMOCO CADIZ in 1978 spilled 
220,000 tons near the small French fishing village Portsall, also in Brittany. A 360 km long coast line was severely 
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was decided in October 2000 to raise the liability limits by more than 50% contained in 
1992 CLC/ FUND, 140  the European Commission considered this insufficient to 
guarantee an adequate protection for victims of major oil spills.141 The Commission has 
proposed increasing available funds by 50%, providing a total of SDR 300 million, and 
creating a third tier fund, the Compensation for Oil Pollution in European Waters Fund 
(hereafter “COPE”), with a EUR 1 billion ceiling.142 This would compensate for 
damage relating to oil spills that occur in European waters and for which the claims 
exceed the liability limits of the Fund Convention. COPE was proposed to be financed 
by European oil recipients.143 
 
When informed of this initiative at a Fund meeting, some non-EU states expressed 
concern about regional measures adversely affecting the international regime. In 
response, several members later proposed the elaboration of a Supplementary 
Protocol144 to the IOPC Fund that would serve the same purpose, but would be open to 
all members of the Fund. 145  Then European ministers decided that it would be 
preferable to proceed by improving the international regime, rather than by establishing 
a European Fund. The European Parliament agreed, but it proposed adding pollution 
damage by HNS and Bunker fuels to the draft COPE Fund and insisted upon a review 
of the international regime after three years to determine whether its operation was 
satisfactory. If it was not, a European alternative should be adopted.146 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
polluted. 
139
 On 19 November 2002 the Bahamas-flagged single-hull tanker Prestige sank off the Atlantic coast of Spain 
spilling a huge amount of one of the most polluting types of oil into the ocean and causing an ecological and 
economic catastrophe of unprecedented proportions. 
140
 Fund Protocol 2000 came into effect on 27 June 2001. http://www.itopf.com/compensation02.PDF 
141
 COM (2000) 802 final, 55. The commission refers to the type of the damage for which claims are made. No 
claims have yet been presented to the IOPC Fund for costs incurred in taking measures to restore affected habitats or 
other natural resources. The Commission correctly notes that if such measures are going to be taken more frequently, 
the total amount of compensation claimed will exceed liability limits more often. 
142
 See European Parliament Resolution on the ‘prestige’ Oil Disaster off the Coast of Galicia, 2004 O.J. (C 25 E) 
P415—COPE Resolution, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2004/ce025/ce02520040129en04150417.pdf 
143
 COPE has been blocked in the Council since June 2001. The Council has been waiting for the IMO to increase 
the overall compensation well above the maximum limit of 135 million SDRs under 1992 CLC and 1992 Fund 
Conventions. Since the Fund Protocol 2003 has increased the overall limit by more than 50%. So far COPE has not 
taken place. 
http://www.greens-efa.org/cms/default/dokbin/102/102989.our_key_proposals_for_maritime_safety_in@en.pdf 
144
 The 2003 Protocol. See details in the following paragraph.  
145
 Fund Doc. 92FUND/WGR.3/8/4, 1 June 2001. 
146
 De La Fayette, Louise Angelique, New Approaches for Addressing Damage to the Marine Environment, (2005) 
Vol. 20, number 2, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, pp167-224, at 207. 
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Finally, the agreement on a protocol establishing a third tier of compensation for oil 
spills had been reached in May 2003 at the IMO.147 The 2003 Protocol establishes a 
supplementary fund to provide compensation to victims in states parties only when the 
amount of compensation owing to the victims exceeds both the CLC limit and the funds 
available under 1992 IOPC Fund. The receivers of oil in states parties to the Protocol 
designated under the IOPC Fund would have to pay additional contributions to the 
supplementary fund when called upon to do so. Under this scheme, concerning the 
equitable burden sharing as between the shipowner and the cargo interests, shipowners 
would not have to pay any additional amounts.148 Under the agreement, the aggregate 
amount of compensation available to victims of oil spills will be SDR750m, close to 
one billion Euros, which is inclusive of compensation from the CLC and Fund 
Conventions as well as additional compensation from the International Oil Pollution 
Compensation Supplementary Fund.149 
 
According to Mans Jacobsson,150 with the establishment of the new fund, the IOPC 
fund would be able to pay 100% of claims secure in the knowledge that back up funding 
was available through the supplementary fund.151 A cap of 20% on annual contributions 
payable by a single contracting state was agreed which will be particularly pleasing to 
the countries such as Japan, a heavy oil importer. The new fund was to come into 
existence three months after at least eight states who have received a combined total of 
450m tons of oil had ratified the protocol. The Supplementary Protocol came into force 
on 3 March 2005.152 After its ratification, the future compensation level is more in line 
with the magnitude of oil spill damage. 
 
Last but not least, we need to double check whether the result of the designed regime is 
fair for both parties—the proportions of compensation paid by shipowners and receivers. 
                                                       
147
 Up to July 2010, there are27 Contracting States to the 2003 Protocol, http://www.imo.org/home.asp 
148
 Protocol of 2003 to the 1992 International Convention on the Establishment of an International Fund for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage, text in IMO Doc. LEG/CONF.14/20. 
149
 IOPC Fund Press Release of 16 May 2003, The International Community Adopts Protocol on the Establishment 
of a Supplementary Fund for Compensation for Oil Pollution, EU Institutions Press Release DN: IP/03/701, 
16/05/2003, “Maritime Safety: Loyola de Palacio Welcomes the Agreement for New Levels of Oil Pollution 
Compensation”. 
150
 The International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund director. 
151
 Lloyd’s List 19/5/03, page 1 
152
 Up to August 2009, Fund Protocol 2003 has 24 Contracting States. See details at http://www.imo.org/home.asp 
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For a ship of the size of the Erika the liability limit under CLC 1992 works out at 
around US$12 million.153 It has been suggested that this figure is too low and the 
owner’s proportion of the total compensation should be increased. Considering 
shipowner’s proportion of compensation, it is important to have the big picture in view, 
rather than just a single case. When the Fund Conventions are in force the shipowner’s 
limit is of little significance to claimants; it serves mainly to determine how the overall 
cost is apportioned between the shipping industry on the one hand and oil receivers on 
the other.  
 
When the two industries agreed to share this burden, they adopted the two-tier system 
described above. Naturally this means that in the case of a major spill the proportion 
contributed by oil receivers is considerably larger than the shipowner’s share, 
particularly if the ship is a small one with a relatively low limit. But these cases are in a 
small minority.154 The question whether the apportionment is well struck cannot be 
judged from a single case, but only by reviewing how the overall cost of oil pollution 
claims has been met over a period of time. A study of 360 tankers spills in the ten years 
(1990-1999) demonstrated that their overall cost would have been shared approximately 
equally between the two industries if the 1992 Conventions had applied in each case.155 
5.2.1.6 Two Voluntary Schemes—STOPIA 2006 and 
TOPIA 2006 
We notice that the increased compensation discussed above, e.g. the Supplementary 
Fund came into force in March 2005 and would be financed entirely by the oil industry. 
One question arises: will the overall cost be shared equally between the shipping and oil 
industries? 
                                                       
153
 See CLC 92, Article V. 
154
 On the other hand, somebody argued that “in most instances the money comes entirely from the shipowner and 
the oil industry contribute is nil”. See Anderson, Charles B. & De La Rue, Colin, op. cit., p. 55. 
155
 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council Communication on the Safety 
of the Seaborne Oil Trade [Erika I Package], COM(2000) 142 final, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy<uscore>transport/library/com142-en.pdf; Communication from the Commission to 
the European Page 69, Parliament and the Council on a Second Set of Community Measures on Maritime Safety 
Following the Sinking of the Oil Tanker Erika [Erika II Package], COM(2000) 802 final, available at 
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/124242.htm (summarizing). 
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The IOPC Fund Assembly met in October 2005 to consider whether or not to proceed 
with the revision of the 1992 CLC and Fund Conventions. Unsurprisingly, the decision 
was made to halt the revision.156 For many states, this decision was made in reliance on 
the offer made by the shipowners to share the overall cost of claims equally with the oil 
receivers. 
 
In order to address the imbalance, the International Group of P& I Clubs157 (supported 
by the shipping industry) introduced on a voluntary basis, a compensation package 
consisting of two agreements: the Small Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification 
Agreement (STOPIA) 2006158 and the Tanker Oil Pollution Indemnification Agreement 
(TOPIA) 2006.159 These contractually-binding agreements160 entered into force on 20 
February 2006. 
 
The International Group of P & I Clubs agreed to indemnify:161 (a) the 1992 Fund, for 
damages caused by small tankers 162  to the effect that the maximum amount of 
compensation payable by the owners of such ships would be 20 million SDRs (in 
accordance with STOPIA 2006);163 and (b) the 2003 Supplementary Fund, 50% of the 
                                                       
156
 It made the following decisions: (1) That there was insufficient support to continue the revision process which 
would be removed from the Assembly’s agenda. The Working Group set up to consider revision would be disbanded; 
(2) The proposal authorized by International Group Club Boards shortly before the meeting to put in place a binding 
contractual scheme in order to share the overall cost of claims 50/50 with oil receivers in the event that revision was 
abandoned was noted, and the Fund Director was instructed to collaborate with the International Group acting on 
behalf of shipowners and with OCIMF on behalf of oil receivers in order to put forward a package of voluntary 
agreements for consideration by the Assembly at its next meeting in February or March 2006. 
157
 A group of 13 mutual insurers that between them provide liability insurance for about 98% of the world’s tanker 
tonnage. 
158
 STOPIA 2006 largely mirrors the original STOPIA which has been in force since March 2005 and under which 
the owner of relevant tankers of 29,548 or less agree to indemnify the 1992 Fund for the difference between the 
vessel’s limit of liability under CLC 92 (SDR 4.5 million) and SDR 20 million. STOPIA 2006 differs from the 
original STOPIA is that it contains a review mechanism. In addition STOPIA 2006 applies to all states party to 1992 
Fund whereas the original STOPIA only applied to such states as were also party to the Supplementary Fund 2003. 
159
 International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds, STOPIA and TOPIA, Note by the Director, submitted to the 10th 
Extraordinary Session of the Assembly of the 1992 IOPC (92FUND/A./ES.2/7), 1 February 2006. Further 
information can be sought at the IOPC Fund’s website (www.iopcfunds.org), or ITOPF’s website (www.itopf.com). 
For recent information about the numbers of ships entered in STOPIA and TOPIA 2006, see 13th session of the 
Assembly of the 1992 IOPC (92FUND/A.13/23) on 2 October 2008. 
160
 This legally binding agreement is between shipowners and their P&I club. This means owners’ increased liability 
incurred under these voluntary agreements is covered by P&I. 
161
 The implementation of STOPIA 2006 and TOPIA will be reflected in changes to the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) which is currently in force between the IOPC Funds and the International Group in order to 
give effect to the Clubs’ undertakings to provide automatic entry in STOPIA 2006 and TOPIA and to provide cover 
for the liabilities arising thereunder. In addition the MOU gives the 1992 and Supplementary Funds the right of direct 
action against the Clubs in respect of those liabilities. 
162
 The relevant tankers of 29,458 GT or less. 
163
 At the IOPC Assembly meeting it was agreed that this offer should not extended to non-Fund states (which are 
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amounts paid in compensation by that Fund (under TOPIA 2006). It should be noted 
they operate by indemnifying the 1992 Fund/ Supplementary, rather than paying the 
claimant directly.164  Moreover, STOPIA 2006 and TOPIA 2006 are not contracts 
between the Funds and the shipowner, but unilateral offers by shipowners which confer 
enforceable rights on the Funds. Finally, both STOPIA and TOPIA 2006 will be 
reviewed in 2016 and at five-year intervals thereafter.165 
 
In practice, these voluntary schemes are established by a legally binding agreement 
between the owners of ships in the relevant category, which are insured against oil 
pollution risks by P&I Clubs in the International Group. In all but the rare cases, the 
relevant vessels will automatically be entered into the scheme as a condition of club 
cover.166 Shipowners’ increased liability incurred under these voluntary agreements is 
covered by P&I.  
 
Generally TOPIA 2006 is similar to STOPIA 2006, but two differences should be noted: 
(1) TOPIA applies to all relevant tankers regardless of size, whereas STOPIA only 
applies to small tankers; (2) under TOPIA 2006, indemnification is 50% of the amount 
of any claim falling on the Supplementary Fund, i.e. the amount payable under the 
Supplementary Fund is shared from the bottom up, as opposed to STOPIA, whereby the 
indemnification of Fund is for the difference between the vessel’s limit under CLC 92 
(i.e. SDR 4.5 million) and SDR 20 million. 
 
As we know, the reason to constitute these voluntary schemes is to deal with two 
problems connected with sharing the burden of compensation between the shipping and 
                                                                                                                                                                  
party to CLC 92 but not the Fund 92), given that it would act as a distinctive to them becoming signatories to the 
1992 Fund. See www.iopcfunds.org 
164
 This means the Fund/ supplementary would continue to be liable to compensate claimants in accordance with the 
1992 Fund Convention and the Supplementary Fund Protocol respectively. Then they would be indemnified by the 
shipowner in accordance with STOPIA 2006 and TOPIA 2006. 
165
 Both contain a review mechanism whereby the agreements may be adjusted to compensate prospectively if after 
the first ten years of its operation the proportion of claims paid by either shipowners or oil receivers under all three 
conventions (CLC 1992, Fund 1992 AND Supplementary Fund 2003) since 20th Feb. 2006 is greater than 55%. If that 
proportion is greater than 60%, the agreements must be adjusted. See also The International Regime for 
Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage—Explanatory note prepared by the Secretariat of the International Oil 
Pollution Compensation Funds, (June 2009) at http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/genE.pdf 
166
 Gard News 182, May/ July 2006, STOPIA and TOPIA 2006- What, why and when? at 
http://www.gard.no/gard/Publications/GardNews/RecentIssues/gn182/art_3.htm 
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oil industries. One problem is the limitation of liability enjoyed by small tankers under 
the 1992 CLC is out of proportion to the damage that they can cause. The other problem 
is the Supplementary Fund will be financed entirely by cargo interests. Before drawing 
any conclusions, it would be helpful to see some specific examples/figures illustrating 
the impact of these voluntary agreements. 
 
The IOPC Fund carried out a statistical review167 on the cost of pollution claims falling 
under the CLC and Fund Conventions between 1978 and 2003. The cost had been 
shared approximately equally between the shipping and oil industries during this 
period.168 If the claims figures for the same period were to be adjusted as if the STOPIA 
and TOPIA had been applied, the shipowners would have paid 51% and oil receivers 
49% at 2002 values. This split is reversed if the claims figures are inflated to the 
projected 2012 values.169 Although the equitable result for the past may not necessarily 
be repeated in the future, it does give us some confidence on the application of STOPIA 
2006 and TOPIA.  
 
In summary, the target of TOPIA and STOPIA 2006 is to ensure the total cost of 
pollution claims falling within CLC 92, Fund 92 and Supplementary Fund 2003 are 
shared equally between the shipping and oil industries. Although there may be large 
variations in the proportion of claims cost borne by the two industries from year to year, 
particularly if serious incidents do occur, the review mechanism of these new schemes 
will provide a means for correcting any significant imbalance. 
                                                       
167
 See further information at 
http://www.westpandi.com/WestPandI/NoticesToMembers/ArchiveContainer/2005-2006/2005-13.htm 
Or http://www.simsl.com/Circulars-London/L.51.pdf 
Or see www.iopcfunds.org 
168
 See details at http://www.simsl.com/Articles/STOPIA_TOPIA0406.asp (accessed on 18th June 2009) 
169
 For further information see www.iopcfunds.org See also “OCIMF 2006 Annual Report” at 
http://www.ocimf.com/view_document.cfm?id=777;  
See also http://www.skuld.com/templates/newspage.aspx?id=1106 (accessed on 24th June 2009) 
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5.2.1.7 Why has not China Ratified the Fund 
Convention/ Protocols?  
By August 2010, nearly all significant maritime States would have ratified the Fund 
Convention/ 1992 Protocol (including U.K.), but not including China.170 The author 
will analyse the main reasons for China not ratifying the Fund/Protocol and give some 
personal recommendations for the domestic legislation for compensation, e.g. a national 
Fund. 
 
China has ratified the CLC 1969/1992 Protocol, but not the Fund Convention 
1971/1992 protocol. The reason is financial: China has always regarded herself as a 
developing country, and taken the view that Chinese industries would be unfairly 
disadvantaged if it had to pay into the compensation fund under the same contribution 
rules as the developed countries. 
 
China has imported significant amounts of oil in last two decades; 158.3 million tonnes 
of oil in 2005 including 126.8 million tonnes of crude oil and 30.5 million tons of fuel 
oil. 171  Were China a contracting state to the 1992 Fund/ Supplementary, 172  its 
contribution would be over 10% in 2006, based on its status as the second heaviest oil 
importer (after Japan) among all members states.173  
                                                       
170
 By August 2010, 105 States had accepted the 1992 Protocol to the International Fund Convention. See details at 
http://www.imo.org/ China declared that the 1992 Protocol will be applicable to the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region only from 5th January, 2000, but not to mainland China. Another notable exception is the US. 
171
 Song Jiahui,(2006) Prevention of Pollution from Ships – Creating a system of Prevention, Reduction and 
Compensation (in Chinese), Dalian Maritime University Pressing, at p.13. See also 
http://www.lrn.cn/stratage/expertpoint/200606/t20060620_90885.htm (In Chinese, Access on 17 April 2009) 
172
 The basis for the levy of contributions to the Fund 1992 is: any person (in a member state) who receives more 
than 150 000 tonnes of crude oil or heavy fuel oil transported through sea in a calendar year has to pay. The levy of 
contributions is based on reports on oil receipts in respect of individual contributors (oil reports) which are submitted 
to the Fund Secretariat by the Governments of Member States. Contributions are paid by the individual contributors 
directly to the IOPC Funds. Governments are not responsible for these payments, unless they have voluntarily 
accepted such responsibility. As regards the Supplementary Fund, for the purpose of contributions at least 1 million 
tonnes of crude oil or heavy fuel oil will be received each calendar year in each Member State of that Fund. If the 
aggregate quantity of contributing oil received in a Member State is less than 1 million tones, that Member State will 
be liable to pay contributions for a quantity of contributing oil corresponding to the difference between 1 million 
tones and the aggregate quantity of actual contributing oil receipts in respect of that State. For details see “IOPC Fund 
Annual Report 2007” at http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/AR06_E.pdf p. 37 ; see also 
http://www.marinebuzz.com/2008/03/11/international-oil-pollution-compensation-funds-iopc-funds-an-overview/ 
173
 China is the third heaviest oil importer after US (not member of CLC/Fund) and Japan in the world. For details 
see Chenhui, Thousands of tonnes of oil spilled into Shenzhen sea water (in Chinese), Yang Cheng Evening news, 2nd 
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For example, in oil year 2005 (annual contribution year 2006), Levy per tonne: 
£0.0020156 to the 1992 Fund and £0.0020154 to the Supplementary Fund. Suppose 
China is a member state to the Fund 1992, she should contribute [157 million tons x 
£0.0020156= £316,449]. The Fund Assembly decided to levy 2006 contributions of £3 
million; contribution to the General Fund, if China is a member state, she should 
contribute over 10%. As to Supplementary Fund, China will pay [157 million tons x 
£0.0020154= £316,418]. The Supplementary Fund Assembly decided to levy 2006 
contributions of £1.4 million; contribution to the General Fund, if China is a member 
state, she has to contribute about 20% (a cap of 20% on annual contributions payable by 
a single contracting state to the Supplementary Protocol 2003). In this case, those oil 
companies in China who have imported crude oil and fuel oil must contribute to the 
1992 IOPC Fund174 and the Supplementary Fund based on oil received in the preceding 
year with regard to the general fund contribution.175 Obviously, this will put a big 
financial burden on Chinese oil industry. In comparison, the UK as the eighth heaviest 
oil importer among all member states, contributed just 5% to the 1992 Fund in 2006.176 
 
Moreover, there is no doubt that this figure (China’s contribution to Fund) would 
increase, since it is predicted that China will import up to 250 million tonnes of oil in 
2020.177  It is not clear whether China will have the same economic strength as 
developed countries such as Japan to contribute significant amounts of money to the 
Fund, particularly given in the event of another major incident such as the Prestige, 
member states would have to contribute to the major claims fund which will be much 
                                                                                                                                                                  
August 2002, A6.   
174
 For details see “IOPC Fund Annual Report 2007” at http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/AR06_E.pdf, p.40. 
175
 It was decided by the Fund Assembly that there should be no levy of 2006 and 2007 contributions to the Erika 
and Prestige major claims fund. If there is any major claim as The Erika and The Prestige, member states’ 
contributions to the IOPC Fund will be much more. As we know, levies for a major incident probably spread over 
several years. For details see http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/4%20The%20HNS%20Fund%20Mans%20Jacobsson.pdf  
and see also see “IOPC Fund Annual Report 2007” at http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/AR06_E.pdf p. 39 
176
 1992 Fund--General Fund Contributions by member states in 2006: Japan 18%, Italy 10%, Republic of Korea 8%, 
Netherlands 8%, France 7%, India 7%, Canada 6%, United Kingdom 5%, Singapore 5%, Spain 5%, and others 21%. 
Supplemental Fund—General Fund Contributions 2006: Japan 20%, Italy 19%, Netherlands 15%, France 15%, Spain 
9%, and others 22%. 
177
 Song Jiahui, op. cit. p. 136 
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more than the normal figure.178 Some Chinese scholars179 have argued that it is not fair 
for the Chinese industries which are still in the process of developing and growing, to 
bear this kind of burden.  
 
The author must admit that Chinese’s economic is fragile in certain aspects, particularly 
after the credit crunch of 2008-2009 where many industries are still struggling to 
survive. However there must be a time scale for Chinese legislators to decide the 
ratification of Fund Convention. Currently China is a member state to the 1992 CLC 
(but not to 1992 Fund), that means Chinese oil cargo interests have no economic 
responsibility to bear any contributions to the Fund Convention, and leave Chinese 
shipping industry to bear the total responsibility under CLC. This will result in an 
imbalance of responsibility in respect of sharing the risks of oil pollution between the 
shipping industry and the oil cargo interests in China. Furthermore, it will deviate from 
the original design of the regime of the CLC and Fund Conventions. At the time of the 
adoption of CLC, shipowners are chosen to bear the strict liability under CLC, and this 
is combined with liability for the oil cargo interest (receivers) to contribute to the 
supplementary compensation under Fund. The levy of contributions is based on how 
much they have received crude oil and heavy oil in one calendar year in a member state.  
 
Generally, the 1992 Fund will pay supplementary compensation to those suffering oil 
pollution damage in a member state, who do not obtain full compensation under the 
1992 CLC. It is not difficult to see the advantages for China to ratify Fund Convention 
in order to benefit the higher limit of compensation. For example if a pollution incident 
occurs involving a tanker and China is a party to the Fund, the supplementary 
compensation under the Fund is available to the Chinese governments or other 
authorities have incurred costs for clean-up operations or preventive measures. 
Compensation is also available to Chinese private bodies or individuals who have 
                                                       
178
 The payments made by the 1971 and 1992 Funds in respect of claims for compensation for oil pollution damage 
have varied considerably from year to year. As a result, the level of contributions to the Funds has fluctuated from 
one year to another. See “IOPC Fund Annual Report 2007” at http://www.iopcfund.org/npdf/AR06_E.pdf p. 41. 
179
 Ni Xuewei & Zai Wuyang, Research Study on the principles of legislation and compensation mechanism of the 
international Conventions relating to the civil liability for oil pollution (in Chinese), [2004] Maritime Law Review, 
Vol. 10 Issue1, 35, at 46, Law Press China.  
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suffered damage as a result of the pollution. More specifically, fishermen whose nets 
have become polluted are entitled to compensation, and compensation for loss of 
income is payable to fishermen and to hoteliers at seaside resorts. This compensation is 
independent of the flag of the tanker, the ownership of the oil or the place where the 
incident occurred, provided that the damage is suffered within a member state of the 
Fund. Therefore the ratification of Fund by China should be put on the agenda by 
Chinese legislators.  
 
The author believes it will be a necessary step for China to ratify the Fund 1992 in the 
future, since China will try to maintain economic growth and significant amounts of oil 
will be transported by sea. There always is a potential risk of oil pollution. Only after 
China becomes a member of the Fund Convention, we can say the risks of 
transportation of oil will be shared and digested by all member states. Accordingly, 
Chinese victims can benefit from a much more adequate compensation scheme designed 
by CLC/ Fund Conventions. After drawing this conclusion, we need make a further 
study to reveal the financial pros and cons for China to sign up the Fund.   
 
On the one hand, so far as the timescale of ratification of Fund is concerned, some 
issues worry Chinese legislators, such as the “uncertainty” of the total amount of claims 
arising from some serious oil pollution incidents. For example, in the case of the Erika, 
for quite a few years, the level of the 1992 Fund’s/ Supplementary Protocol’s payment is 
uncertain.180 Actually, regard to any serious incident, no doubt it will be an expensive 
bill for all member states.181 Therefore a realistic question for the Chinese oil industries 
is: if China ratifies the Fund Convention, could they survive if a number of serious oil 
pollution incidents occur somewhere in the world? Frankly, there is not any assured 
                                                       
180
 Such as the Erika incident, the Executive Committee decided in July 2000 that the payments by the 1992 Fund 
should be limited to 50% of the amount of the loss or damage actually suffered by the respective claimants, as 
assessed by the 1992 Fund’s experts. The Committee decided in January 2001 to increase the level of the 1992 Fund’s 
payments from 50% to 60% and in June 2001 to 80%. In February 2003 the Committee authorized the Director to 
increase the level of payments to 100% when he considered it safe to do so. In April 2003 the Director increased the 
level of payments to 100%. 
181
 For example, regards to the Erika, by 31 December 2007, 7130 claims for compensation had been submitted for a 
total of £155 million. Payment of compensation has been made in respect of 5926 claims for a total of £95.1 million, 
out of which the 1992 Fund had paid £85.7 million. In addition, for the French government’s claim for clean-up costs, 
the 1992 Fund paid the French state £10 million in 2005 and a further £6.7 million in 2006. 
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answer until China finally signs up the Fund and some casualties actually occur in the 
world. But we can go further and argue if Chinese industries had to pay into the 
compensation fund under the same contribution rules as the developed countries, would 
they be unfairly disadvantaged? In the author’s view, unfortunately they would be. But 
we have to accept the reality that it is very unlikely for the IMO to create any 
preferential policies for developing countries. Therefore, by ratifying the Fund 
Convention, Chinese cargo interests (oil receivers) must bear the costs and contribute to 
the Fund under the same rules. 
 
On the other hand, it is an urgent issue for China to ratify the Fund, especially 
considering the poor situation of oil pollution clean-up in China. The reality is without 
recovery compensation from the Fund, it will be very difficult to improve levels of 
efficiency and coordination regarding pollution clean-up in China, particularly 
considering clean up companies are unattached to the government. They would be 
reluctant to be involved in cleaning the pollution if there was no guarantee of 
compensation recovery from the Fund or from any other scheme. This problem can be 
seen from the following cases. 
 
On 1 May 1996, the Zhe-Pu-Yu-You No. 31182 collided with rocks and sunk. 476 tonnes 
of oil spilled into the Old Metal Mountain Water Channel causing major pollution to the 
surrounding area in Liaoning Province. The Liaoning Harbour Superintendence 
Administration was responsible for organising the pollution clean up. The Chinese 
Transport Department paid RMB2.6 million in advance to clean up the pollution which 
would be paid back later by the shipowner according to the polluter pays principle. 
However, the shipowner owned a single-ship company and announced bankruptcy 
immediately after this accident. At that time, insurance was not compulsory for a 
domestic transportation company under Chinese law,183 there would be no way for the 
government to get the tax payer’s money back.  
                                                       
182 This case was unreported. See relevant information at the website of Qing-Dao-Huan-Bao (in Chinese) at 
http://www.qepb.gov.cn/demo1/dictionarycontent.asp 
183
 The 1969 CLC applied to China on 29th April 1980. China ratified the 1992 CLC on 5th January 1999 and it 
  256
 
The above case illustrates the victims that suffered due to the spill, who were in an 
unfortunate position as the pollution clean-up fees could not be recovered from any 
clean-up funds. The solution to the problem is by China either ratifying the IOPC Fund 
or setting up a national Compensation Fund, accordingly the victims would have much 
better rights of recovery compensation. 
 
In recent years, many high-profile oil spills happened along Chinese coasts, the public’s 
attention to oil pollution was raised on a large scale. On 24th March 1999, the 
Min-Ran-Gong No.2184 had over 589.7 tonnes of oil spilled after its collision with the 
Dong-Hai No. 209, polluting Zhuhai Fishing Pond, Red Tree national park and 300 sq. 
km of sea near the port of Zhuhai. Immediately after the incident, the Zhuhai Harbour 
Superintendence Administration with the support of local Council started an oil-spill 
emergency and more than 2000 people were involved in the pollution clean-up.  
 
It was held by the Guangdong Maritime Court that under Art. 169 of the Maritime Code, 
the Min-Ran-Gong No.2 was at fault and shall be liable for damages caused by the 
collision and oil pollution clean-up costs, totalling RMB 9.7 million. However, the 
shipowner was entitled to limit his liability to 52, 934 SDR (RMB 0.6 million) under 
Articles 207 and 208 of the Maritime Code. Since the Min-Ran-Gong No.2 was 
performing domestic transportation, the shipowner was not subject to the CLC limits.185 
In addition, for any unsatisfied claims (e.g. costs of cleaning up and other damages), the 
claimants have no recourse to the Fund/Protocol, given that the Fund can only be 
invoked when the oil pollution occurs on the land or territorial seas of the “contracting” 
state. Unfortunately China will not ratify the Fund Convention in near future.186  
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The above cases provide examples of how the lack of further recourse to the 
FUND/protocol (or any other clean-up fund) can be a great disadvantage to Chinese 
claimants. In fact, there are serious problems on raising cleanup funds and using modern 
science and information technology to improve the marine environment in China. In 
practice, the equipment used in pollution clean-up is primitive. Except for Qingdao and 
Shenzhen Harbour Superintendence Administrations who have some underdeveloped 
machines, 187  all other harbours lack of proper equipment to deal with oil spill 
emergencies.188  
 
In the author’s opinion, if China does not ratify the Fund convention/Protocol, it would 
be necessary to set up a national Compensation Fund for oil pollution damage, such as 
the domestic legislation in US (i.e. OPA 1990) or Canada (i.e. SOPF).189 Following the 
international scheme, the national fund would be paid by those persons who received 
crude oil and fuel oil in China. Since China is a party to CLC 1992, but not to the 
FUND convention, the author suggests that the national fund cover damages that occur 
within Chinese territory but not limited to domestic or international transportation. It 
can be used to pay claims arising from spills of both persistent and non-persistent oil 
from all types of ship. This means any Chinese claimant would be entitled to recourse 
from the national fund, if the valid claims exceeded the 1992 CLC limit or the 
transportation does not involve foreign elements (not covered by CLC). 
 
With regard to the total amount of money that the national fund would levy 
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contributions on, in my view the following issues should be taken into account. In 2003, 
China had approximately 2500 tankers in total of which 2000 of them (80%) are under 
1000 tonnes.190 Among those 2000 tankers, only 51 bought insurance191 covering oil 
pollution damage.192  
 
From 1973 to 2003, Chinese registered ships have been involved in 30 serious oil 
pollution incidents and each of them had over 50 tonnes of oil spilled; 73% of the 
incidents were caused by small tankers (under 1000 tonnes).193 From 1991 to 2003, on 
average, each serious incident caused RMB 6.8 million of oil pollution damage, and 
there were two serious oil spills per year along the Chinese coast.194 It is predicted that 
the national fund must levy contributions of over RMB 40 million during a financial 
year. It would be a reasonable decision to make for all tankers over 500 tonnes. 
 
Another interesting question arises: should small tankers (less than 2000 tonnes) be 
regulated to have compulsory insurance of oil pollution damage under national 
legislation? Although China is a party to the CLC Convention, most of the tankers 
carried less than 2000 tonnes of oil, so there was no compulsory insurance requirement 
for them under the CLC.195 In China it is not difficult to promulgate the rule of 
compulsory insurance by the legislative authority, but in practice shipowners would face 
great difficulty in getting insurance if no insurance company would be willing to take up 
the risks to the scope that shipowners wish to be insured. Currently the majority of oil 
pollution insurance policies in the Chinese market are undertaken by either the China 
Shipowners Mutual Assurance Association or the People’s Insurance Company of China 
(PICC).196 The latter took up 80% of the Chinese market relating to oil pollution claims. 
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Its relevant clauses can be summarized as follows: 
 
Insurance Clause re: Oil Pollution claims for Small and Coastal Ships in China (PICC) 
Tankers (gross tonnes) Premium 
(RMB) 
Measurement of Indemnity 
(RMB) 
<200 10,000 1 million 
201-500 20,000 2 million 
501-1000 25,000 3 million 
1001-1600 30,000 5 million 
>1600 +20/tonnes 10 million 
 
We can see the premium is relatively/comparatively low, and the maximum 
measurement of indemnity is only RMB10 million. The PICC policy is particularly 
designed for the small tankers which could not afford the expensive premiums. The 
advantage is that it would not put a heavy burden on shipowner, even if compulsory 
insurance becomes applicable. On the other hand, there is negative impact to the 
claimants given that the insurance can not cover all the resulting damages, particularly 
in the case of serious oil pollution incidents.  
 
In my view, this is a positive step by insurance companies who are willing to insure 
small ships against oil pollution damages. It would make the regulation and 
enforcement of compulsory insurance much easier in China in the future. However the 
reality is the current Chinese shipping industry is still struggling to pay for the insurance 
of Principal Risks. This is especially true for tankers less than 500 gross tonnes because 
most of them are owned by one-ship companies and it is still too much for them to 
insure other additional risks such as oil pollution damages. However it is a necessary 
step for compulsory insurance to be applicable to Chinese domestic transportation when 
China’s economic strength is strong. 
 
In short, it is urgent for Chinese legislators to set up a national fund for compensating 
those affected by oil spills in China. The relevant domestic legislation in US and Canada 
can be used as a model. The author suggests the scope of this fund should cover claims 
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arising from spills of both persistent and non-persistent oil from all types of ships in 
China. Furthermore, compulsory insurance should be applicable to ships (doing 
domestic transportation197) over 500 tonnes.  
5.2.1.8 Concluding Remarks 
From what has been discussed so far, we can see the international civil liability regime 
for oil pollution damage is much more successful than other legal regime in this area. 
This is largely due to the fact that ocean-shipping is a well-developed trade built on a set 
of established customs and regulations. Additionally, the oil industry comprises a 
relatively uniform body of commercial interests identified with the single commodity of 
oil.198 However, persistent oil is not the only substance carried by sea which has a 
potential for doing damage to the environment or to individuals. Numerous chemicals of 
a hazardous nature are regularly transported by sea and there have been enough 
incidents in recent years to raise the spectre of a huge chemical related incident,199 in 
respect of which claimants would be faced with the same problems as were encountered 
following the loss of the Torrey Canyon. 
5.2.2 HNS Convention 1996 
We now pass from international conventions in force to those that are not. As noted 
above, oil is not the only dangerous pollutant and there are lots of problems raised by 
marine pollution by agents other than oil. For example, with a vessel transporting 
Hazardous and Noxious substances (hereafter HNS), there is the risk of damage 
occurring on a massive scale as a consequence of an accident. Notwithstanding 
improved safety standards for the design, construction and equipment of ships carrying 
HNS, sometimes in large quantities, accidents of a catastrophic nature cannot be totally 
prevented. Therefore, an international liability and compensation scheme is called for.200 
This conclusion has been more easily accepted in the past with respect to the carriage of 
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oil than with respect to the transport of other HNS, but international opinion is 
changing.  
 
Due to specialised trade practices in the HNS industry, and the complexity of the 
substances involved, there are greater difficulties in deciding on a proper channelling of 
liability for ocean-shipping of HNS, because it required an agreed policy as to which 
participants in the processing chain should share liability for damage.201 After an initial 
failure to agree on a draft at a diplomatic conference held in 1984,202 several years’ 
further consideration culminated in the adoption of the International Convention on 
Liability and Compensation for Damage in Connection with the Carriage of Hazardous 
and Noxious Substances by Sea (HNS Convention) on May 3, 1996.203 It is the 
production of 20 years’ work by the IMO, based upon the text of the 1984 revisions to 
the CLC and Fund Conventions.204 
5.2.2.1 International Law Background  
In order to realise the problems that have come up in connection with the elaboration of 
the HNS Convention, it is necessary to have a short look at those conventions which 
deal with the shipowner’s liability and the limitation of this liability. 
 
First, there is the 1957 Limitation Convention which entered into force in May 1968 and 
which, generally, limits the shipowner’s liability with respect to all personal and 
property claims including claims for oil pollution, nuclear damage and, of course, 
damage caused by noxious and hazardous substances. However, soon after the adoption 
of this Convention, shipowners and insurers were unwilling to risk the possible 
unlimited liability for maritime nuclear damage, commerce in some nuclear substances 
was being frustrated. This came about indirectly and in part as a result of the 
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predilection of courts in some States to “break” the 1957 limits in order to give plaintiffs 
higher amounts of compensation.205 A special regime of liability was needed for this 
special form of carriage.  
 
After the adoption of the Paris and Vienna Convention of 1960 and 1963 regarding 
liability for nuclear damage from land based sources, which channelled the liability to 
the operator of the nuclear installation, the 1971 Brussels Convention Relating to Civil 
Liability in the Field of Maritime Carriage of Nuclear Materials extend the liability to 
the transportation of nuclear substances by sea.206 This Convention provides that not 
the shipowner but only the operator, as defined in the convention is responsible for 
damage caused by a nuclear incident.207 It entered into force in 1975. 
 
Similarly it was recognised that the 1957 limits of liability were unsuitable for the 
damage caused by crude oil carried in tankers. Therefore, the 1969 CLC was adopted.208 
Like the 1971 Nuclear Convention, the 1969 CLC constituted in effect an exception to 
the 1957 Limitation Convention by new and more effective limitation systems and 
higher limits. We can see that between the 1969 CLC and the “nuclear” conventions 
there was a large gap, as hazardous and noxious substances are considered, which 
should be filled by a single comprehensive convention. 
 
During the preparatory work of the IMO legal committee on the draft HNS Convention, 
another limitation convention was particularly considered— The 1976 Convention on 
Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims (1976 LLMC),209 which was intended to 
replace the 1957 Convention and took account of the developments since 1957. 
Although the Convention generally covers all maritime claims, it excludes from its 
scope those claims for which there was in 1976 a special limitation regime, i.e. claims 
for pollution damage (whether or not actually covered by the 1969 CLC) and claims 
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subject to legislation governing liability for nuclear damage.210  
 
However, the 1976 LLMC had not made any exemptions for liability resulting from the 
carriage of HNS but had rather, on purpose, included claims caused by these substances 
in the global limitation provided for by this Convention. When attempting to draft a new 
convention regarding liability and compensation for HNS, the IMO Legal Committee 
was accordingly confronted with the task of fitting such a new convention into the 
system of the already existing maritime liability conventions. 
5.2.2.2 Development of the Draft HNS Convention 
As early as the Brussels Conference of November 1969, which in the wake of the Torrey 
Canyon disaster—adopted the 1969 CLC, governments represented at the conference 
urged that IMO (then IMCO) should identify its work on “all aspects of agents other 
than oil”.211 However, from a questionnaire sent out to the Member States of IMO, it 
was found that there was no sufficient expertise available on the extent of possible risks 
involved;212 and any further work could not be usefully undertaken until the required 
“technical” information became available in relation to possible types of pollutants 
other than oil, and their polluting potentialities.213 
 
Also many governments showed a lack of interest in the matter, mainly because they 
failed to see a special need for a new convention. Perhaps this was also due to the fact 
that there were no records of many serious HNS incidents.214 It was very different from 
the situation when 1969 CLC was elaborated.215 The industries involved (shipowners, 
chemical industry and insurers) were very much opposed to the idea of a new HNS 
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Convention.216 
  
At its 33rd session in September 1977, the IMO Legal Committee ascribed “highest 
priority to work on a new and comprehensive convention to provide a liability and 
compensation system for hazardous and noxious substances other than oil (referred to as 
the Draft HNS Convention).217 One of the most controversial issues has been the 
question of who should be liable to pay compensation under the new HNS Convention. 
It is not surprising that none of the industries218 involved in the transportation of HNS 
has been eager to accept new liabilities and the resulting financial burdens.  
 
Shipowners and P & I Clubs have argued that any special risks created by the transport 
of HNS are not caused by the movement of these substances but by their inherent 
dangerous qualities.219 According to these industries there is no reason to impose on a 
shipowner a liability which would go beyond his traditional liability for negligence. The 
chemical industry has pointed out that shipowners are well aware of the special risks 
involved with the transportation of HNS and that they should know which precautions 
must be taken to avoid HNS accidents and that, once the cargo has passed into the 
custody of the carrier, it is out of control of the shipper and other interested parties in 
the cargo.220 
 
However, from the point of view of the victims, it does not so much matter who will be 
liable to pay compensation, provided that a new liability and compensation scheme will 
guarantee efficient and adequate compensation. It should be noted that the person on 
whom the liability will be imposed must be easy to identify. In general the shipowner 
will fulfil such a condition since he can be traced by consultation of the ship’s register. 
Also the P & I Clubs would be in a better position to provide suitable insurance cover 
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than cargo insurers since environmental liability insurance does not exist at present for 
cargo owners.  
 
At the Legal Committee’s 36th session in June 1978, an “Informal Working Group” was 
set up and three alternative texts of draft articles for a new instrument were 
developed.221 In addition, consideration was given to another two alternative texts. 
They basically concerned different possible systems of party liability,222 including: 
(1) joint and several liability of the shipper and the shipowner (Alternative I);223 
(2) a two-tier system of liability providing for a primary liability of the shipowner and an 
excess (“residual”) liability of the shipper (Alternative II);224 
(3) exclusive liability of the shipper (Alternative III); 
(4) allocating liability to the shipowner alone (Alternative IV); 
(5) the liability should be borne exclusively by the cargo interests as product liability 
(Alternative V).225 
 
It was decided at the Committee’s 41st session in October 1979, to deal first with 
Alternative II226 and then proceed at a later stage to Alternative IV.227 The Legal 
Committee elaborated a draft Convention on the basis and submitted it to the 1984 IMO 
Conference.228 The 1991 Draft HNS Convention made the shipowner or operator 
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strictly liable for damage caused by dangerous goods at sea.229 Under the 1991 Draft, 
the shipowner was not liable for damage if the consignor failed to inform the shipowner 
that the consignment contained dangerous goods, and if the shipowner did not know nor 
could have known of the goods’ dangerous nature.230  
 
Nonetheless, there was a big divergence of views about a possible second tier of 
compensation. A number of delegations argued that a future HNS Convention should 
not go any further because any second tier for the compensation of HNS damage would 
create serious complications and could become a barrier to the establishment of a new 
international instrument. However, other delegations proposed a second tier in the form 
of an international compensation fund (the “Scheme”). They believed that the Scheme 
should make supplementary compensation available in case of major accidents,231 
taking into accounts (a) shipowner’s unwillingness to bear the full risk; (b) uncertainty 
over the capacity of the insurance market to absorb it;232 and (c) the lack of prior 
experience of major HNS cleanup costs. 
 
When discussing these issues, we should always be aware of one important fact: unlike 
the situation of the 1969 CLC was elaborated, there is, although several incidents233 
have occurred, no specific incident,234 which serves like the Torrey Canyon for the CLC, 
as a model for the risk to be dealt with in the HNS Convention. This has the 
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disadvantage of making it difficult if not impossible for all delegates to have the same 
idea of the situation to be covered by the Convention.235  
 
The difficulties the Legal Committee had to cope with when elaborating the new 
Convention were mainly in the following four basic areas:236 
(1) the scope of application (especially the noxious and hazardous cargoes to be covered, the 
mode of carriage on the ship and the nature of damage for which compensation should be 
provided in this Convention); 
(2) the nature and limitation of liability; 
(3) the definition of the person liable in addition to the shipowner, if any; 
(4) the establishment of compulsory insurance and its control, including the availability of third 
party insurance cover, in the P&I Clubs or in the open insurance market. 
5.2.2.3 Main Elements of The HNS Convention 1996 
In this section, I intend to discuss the main issues addressed by the HNS Convention. 
The HNS Convention as adopted on 3 May 1996, has its object: the establishment of a 
system for determining liability and providing compensation for damage arising out of 
the carriage of specified hazardous and noxious substances at sea.237 It is based on the 
two-tier system established under the CLC and Fund Conventions. However, it goes 
further in that it covers not only pollution damage but also the risks of fire and 
explosion, including loss of life or personal injury as well as loss of or damage to 
property. 
 
The HNS Convention will not come into force internationally until it has been ratified 
by at least 12 States of which at least four must each have a fleet totalling more than two 
million gross tons.238 In addition, the Secretary General of the fund must be satisfied 
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that potential fund contributors have received in the preceding year not less than 40 
million tons of contributing cargo.239 
 
●The structure of the Convention 
As noted above, the 1996 HNS Convention contains a two-tier system in one 
international instrument. The first tier, providing for a strict shipowner’s liability, is 
modelled on the CLC 1984. The second tier provides for an international compensation 
scheme, which will be financed by contributions by the receivers of such cargoes in 
contracting states. The first tier has the following characteristics:240 
(1) Strict liability placed upon the shipowner with a very limited range of defences.241 
(2) “Damage” includes loss of life and personal injuries as well as property damage.242 Claims 
for loss or damage by contamination of the environment will be paid243 “provided that 
compensation for impairment… other than loss of profit from such impairment shall be 
limited to costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement”. 
(3) The shipowner’s liability can arise from damage caused by a wide range of bulk and 
packaged substances carried as cargo; these are generally defined by reference to existing 
international Conventions and Codes.244 
(4) The shipowner will be required to maintain insurance or other financial security to cover his 
liability for damage.245 Any damage claims may be brought directly against the insurer of 
the ship or other person providing the financial security for the owner’s liability.246 
(5) Liability will be directed away from servants and agents and directed towards the registered 
owner.
247
 
(6) The owner’s right to limit liability will only be lost “if it is proved that the damage resulted 
from his personal act or omission, committed with the intent to cause such damage or 
recklessly and with knowledge that such damage would probably result”248 (The same test 
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as appears in the 1976 Limitation Convention). 
 
If two ships249 are involved in an incident and the HNS Convention applies, the vessel 
owners are held jointly and severally liable for all such damages which result from the 
release of the hazardous substance and the damages are not reasonably separable.250 
That means a cargo owner cannot be subject to first-party liability under the HNS 
Convention. So much is for the first shipowner tier.  
 
The second tier is meant to be the HNS equivalent of the 1971 Oil Pollution Fund. It has 
generally been agreed that shipowner liability alone would not provide sufficient cover 
for the damage in connection with the carriage of HNS cargo.251 The first tier is 
therefore supplemented by the second tier, the HNS Fund. The fund will become 
involved in the following situations (as in the CLC): 
(1) No liability for the damage arises for the shipowner. This could occur, for instance, if the 
shipowner was not informed that a shipment contained HNS or if the accident resulted from 
an act of war.252 
(2) The owner is financially incapable of meeting the obligations under this convention in full 
and any financial security that may be provided does not cover or is insufficient to satisfy 
the claims for compensation for damage. 
(3) The damage exceeds the owner’s liability limits established in the Convention. 
 
Contributions to the second tier will be levied on persons in the Contracting Parties who 
receive a certain minimum quantity of HNS cargo during a calendar year. This tier will 
consist of one general account and three separate accounts for oil, liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) and liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), for avoiding cross-subsidisation between 
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different HNS substances.253 The fund will be financed by the receivers of HNS cargo 
through a tax payable to the fund. When an incident occurs where compensation is 
payable under the HNS Convention, compensation would first be sought from the 
shipowner, up to the maximum limit of 100 million SDR.254 Once this limit is reached, 
compensation will be paid from the second tier, the HNS Fund, up to a maximum of 250 
million SDR (including the first tier). 
 
●Scope of application: Definition of HNS 
One of the main questions under discussion relates to the definition of hazardous and 
noxious substances. There seems to be an understanding within the Legal Committee 
that the new Convention should in principle be applicable to a relatively large range of 
HNS, including not only HNS carried by sea in bulk but also in package form.255 
However, this decision is no more than a starting point which has to be elaborated 
further. There are several questions to be answered:256 
(1) To what extent will the HNS Convention fill the gap left by CLC and FC, which do not cover 
for example pollution caused by bunker fuel oil carried by ships other than oil tankers and 
caused by oils other than those defined in CLC Art. I? 
(2) Should the HNS Convention cover HNS carried in bulk and in packaged form as well, and what 
will be the consequences of the inclusion of HNS in packaged form? 
(3) Should ships carrying only residues of HNS or oil be covered (the “empty tanker problem”)? 
(4) Should the compulsory insurance requirements be applied to all ships carrying HNS or should a 
threshold or minimum quantity be introduced? 
(5) Should there be a separate definition of “contributing cargo”? 
 
Finally, it has been decided that the definition will be by reference to existing lists of 
substances used in IMO instruments.257 That means instead of checking a cargo 
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manifest against a single checklist of substances, a shipowner will have to check in the 
appendices to seven separate international instruments258 in order to know whether 
there is HNS cargo on board.259 Also there is a catch-all provision under Art. 1(5)(b).260 
 
It is noteworthy that bunkers have escaped again from the HNS Convention because 
they are not carried as cargo. As we know, IMO has placed the subject of pollution from 
bunkers in its priority work programme after HNS Convention 1996. On 23 March 2001, 
the International Convention on Civil Liability for Bunker Oil Pollution Damage 
(“Bunker Convention”) was adopted. From the above discussion, we can see the 
definition of HNS is not a typical technical matter but it depends largely on decisions of 
a more political nature. 
 
●Damage covered by the Convention 
The Convention provides for compensation to be paid in respect of loss of life or 
personal injury or damage by contamination of the environment.261 The Convention 
covers damage created in the territory or territorial seas of a state which has adopted the 
Convention including its exclusive economic zone (EEZ).262 The compensable damage 
can be briefly summarised as follows:263 
(1) Claims for loss of life or personal injury on board or outside the ship carrying HNS; 
(2) Claims for the costs of preventative measures and clean-up operations; 
(3) Claims for replacement or repair costs for damaged property; 
(4) Claims for quantifiable economic losses (this seems to include, e.g. loss of income due to 
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restrictions on fishing, reduced custom for hoteliers etc.); 
(5) Claims for the costs of reasonable measures of reinstatement (e.g. removing and replacing 
contaminated shingle on a tourist beach). 
 
There is nothing particularly revolutionary about the damage covered by the HNS 
Convention and the wording is principally borrowed from the Convention on Civil 
Liability for the Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road, Rail and Inland Navigation 
Vessels (CRTD). It should be noted, under the HNS Convention, damage to own cargo 
is not covered. Damage to property outside the ship (including other ships and their 
cargoes) is covered.264  
 
Clearly, making provisions for claims for death, personal injury and damage to property 
is relatively straightforward and uncontroversial.265 The provision for loss or damage 
caused by impairment of the environment is, however, rather more open to criticism.266 
First, it must be appreciated that only a restricted range of claimants, such as fishermen 
or hoteliers who can establish a chain, will receive compensation for “loss of profits” as 
a result of impairment of the environment. Those suffering other forms of economic loss 
(e.g. employees of service industries) will not, on the basis of Fund Convention practice, 
be successful.267 Secondly, the provision made for environmental damage is only 
limited. The Convention will provide welcome funding for reasonable measures of 
reinstatement of the environment after impairment, and preventative measures. It may, 
however, be very much more difficult to identify, in practical terms, how the 
environment has been impaired by a spill of hazardous and noxious substances, and 
then how to go about reinstating it, than in the aftermath of an oil spill.268 
 
The HNS Convention does not apply to damage caused by oil or nuclear substances 
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which are governed by other conventions.269  Although this means that pollution 
damage caused by persistent oil is not covered, the HNS Convention does extend to 
non-pollution damage270 caused by persistent oil such as damage caused by a fire or an 
explosion.271 As such it goes further than the CLC and Fund Conventions. 
 
●Limitation of Liability 
Here, in Art. 9, we come to the heart of the Convention. The system of limitation takes a 
familiar form. A shipowner will be entitled to limit his liability by applying a specified 
number of SDR to the tonnage of his vessel.272 For vessels up to 2,000 tonnes the 
maximum liability of the shipowner will be 10 million SDR. Above the minimum 
tonnage, the liability of the owner will increase by reference to the tonnage of the vessel 
up to the maximum liability of 100 million SDR for a vessel of 100,000 tons. By way of 
illustration and comparison, a vessel of 30,000 gross tons would have an LLMC 1976 
property damage limitation fund 5 million SDR, a CLC (with 1992 Protocol) limit of 14 
million SDR and a HNS limitation fund 45 million (for ships between 2,001 and 50,000 
grt, limitation is 1,500 SDRs per ton). We can see the size of the extra burden which 
will be placed on shipowners and insurers if this convention comes into force. 
 
It should be noted that following a most heated debate at the Diplomatic Conference, it 
was decided that the shipowner would be required to provide a separate limitation fund 
to cover HNS claims alone. Where an incident involves both HNS damage and other 
non-HNS related damage the HNS fund will be exclusively available to cover HNS 
claims and the shipowner’s normal limitation fund for maritime claims will cover 
non-HNS claims. 
 
The limitation fund of HNS can be established by provision of a bank guarantee in the 
courts of any States Parties under which the action is brought, or could be brought under 
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Art 38.273 The fund can be established by the liability insurer on behalf of the 
shipowner.274 Once a fund is established, the courts of the State where it is established 
shall obtain exclusive jurisdiction to determine all matters relating to its apportionment 
and distribution.275 
 
At first, shipowners and their liability insurers were strongly opposed276 to the creation 
of two separate self-standing funds but at the end of the day it proved impossible to 
devise a system which has allowed the shipowner’s liability under the HNS Convention 
to be treated simply as a supplement to the existing limitation fund.277 If every nation in 
the world operated an exactly similar limitation regime (e.g. the 1976 LLMC)278 there 
would be no difficulty. In those circumstances the HNS Convention could simply 
provide that a Contracting State could declare that the shipowner’s underlying right to 
limit in respect of any incident would be the LLMC 1976 and that in an HNS incident, 
if the LLMC 76 fund was not sufficient to meet all claims, the shipowner would provide 
a special HNS supplementary fund to meet the shortfall.279  
 
However, it is difficult to make this work if there is no international uniformity in 
relation to the underlying right to limit. Ratifying an international Convention brings 
with it certain reciprocal treaty obligations.280 Suppose, a HNS incident occurs in 
country A, which has moved on from the 1957 Convention (without denouncing it) and 
now applies the LLMC 1976 and also the HNS Convention. Let us further assume that 
the ship involved flies the flag of country B, which applies the 1957 Convention and 
does not apply the HNS Convention. In those circumstances the courts of country A 
would, it is said, be bound to permit the shipowner to limit according to the 1957 
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Limitation Convention. Claimants in country A would then find their claims falling into 
the gap which occurs between the upper limit of the 1957 Convention and the point at 
which the HNS scheme kicks in. 
 
It should be noted that on 13 May 2004, the 1996 Protocol to amend the Convention on 
Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 1976 (LLMC1976), entered into force.281 
The big difference between the LLMC 1976 limit and the HNS is narrow. 
 
Nonetheless, the amount of compensation to be made available for claimants under the 
HNS Convention is still open to criticism. There is wide acceptance of the fact that a 
catastrophic spill of hazardous and noxious substances could give rise to a very much 
higher level of damage than a large scale oil spill. Even small spills of some substances 
could have extremely serious consequences for public health, property, and the coastal 
and maritime environment.282 
 
●Compulsory insurance & direct recourse 
Those familiar with CLC 1969 will not be surprised to find that owners will be required 
to maintain insurance against liabilities arising under the HNS Convention and the ship 
will be required to carry on board at all times a certificate proving that she is properly 
insured.283 That is to say, the owners of ships registered in countries which have 
adopted the HNS Convention will be required to maintain insurance or other financial 
security up to the limits specified in the convention. Any damage claims may be brought 
directly against the insurer of the ship or other person providing the financial security 
for the owner’s liability.284 In the event of an incident, once a shipowner establishes its 
limitation fund, no further claims may be brought against the shipowner285 or the 
vessel. 286  Therefore, any property arrested as security, must be released. The 
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requirements under the Convention for compulsory insurance and the creation of a fund 
for compensation should be recognised as positive developments. 
5.2.2.4 Who is Liable to Whom? 
Claims for compensation for damage must generally be made against the shipowner,287 
and him alone288 unless it can be shown that the damage resulted from the act or 
omission of another person, “committed with the intent to cause such damage, or 
recklessly and with the knowledge that such damage would probably result.”289 In 
accordance with the aim of facilitating adequate, prompt and effective compensation, 
claims may be brought directly against the insurer or person providing financial 
security. 
 
(1) Recover from Shipowner 
If charterers and cargo owners have paid pollution claims or incurred the cost of 
preventive measures, they can take a recourse action against shipowners.290 Sometimes 
this has occurred under the present regime when the charterer or cargo owner is a major 
oil company which intervenes or participates in the response to an incident either 
because it is in the best position to provide promptly the necessary resources (e.g., spill 
response equipment in the case of an incident at or near to one of its terminals), or 
because it decides that it should intervene in the interests of public relations.291 
 
Where a charterer or cargo owner incurs the cost of preventive measures and the HNS 
Convention applies, he will enjoy the same right as any other person to recover the costs 
incurred.292  However, these rights are subject to certain constraints. The onus is on the 
party taking the measures to demonstrate that they are reasonable, and this may be 
questioned if there are any concerns that the nature or scale of the measures was guided 
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by considerations of publicity rather than by a technical appraisal of the appropriate 
steps.293 A claim to recover such expenses would also be subject to the owner’s right to 
limit liability. Even if this does not ultimately prevent the character or cargo owner from 
making a full recovery (e.g. because supplemental compensation is available from HNS 
Fund), full payment may be delayed if the incident gives rise to multiple claims and it is 
not initially clear whether the total of established claims will fall within the 
compensation limits.294  For reasons such as these, charterparties have sometimes 
contained clauses designed to improve the charterer’s right of receiving prompt 
reimbursement in such a case. 
 
Where claims for pollution damage are paid in the first instance by a charterer or cargo 
owner (or indeed by any other party), the question may arise whether the paying party 
can take over the rights which the person compensated would have had against the 
owner of the ship under the applicable compensation regime. If such rights are founded 
on strict liability they may in some cases provide a better remedy than a claim for 
damages under a contract between the charterer or cargo owner and the shipowner.  
 
It is very doubtful to what extent rights of recovery under the international 
compensation regime would be automatically transferred to the paying party by 
operation of law. The HNS Convention allows for the possibility that a person paying 
compensation may exercise rights of subrogation against the owner of the ship, but this 
is “only to the extent that such subrogation is permitted under the applicable national 
law”. 295  The law of at least some countries would not recognise any right of 
subrogation in the absence of a pre-existing obligation to pay the compensation.296 
Accordingly, a party paying compensation in such a case may have better rights of 
recovery if he obtains an assignment of the payee’s rights.297 
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(2) Recovery from HNS Fund 
The shipowner and his P&I Club are not the only parties from whom charterers or cargo 
owners may be entitled to recover compensation in respect of the cost of their response 
to an incident. In the case where the HNS Convention applies, they will enjoy the same 
rights as any other party to claim compensation (or supplemental compensation) from 
the second tier fund involved, i.e., the relevant HNS Fund.298  
 
In general, the criteria governing such claims are the same as those relating to claims 
against the shipowner.299 Also where the shipowner or the liability insurer pays a 
claimant prior to the distribution of the fund, they will be subrogated to the claimant’s 
rights against the fund.300 The right to limit will be lost in the same way as under the 
1976 Limitation Convention.301 
 
In order to encourage the owner to take adequate precautions to prevent damage, 
expenses reasonably and voluntarily incurred by the owner to prevent or minimise 
damage shall rank equally with other claims against the fund constituted by the 
shipowner pursuant to Article 9,302 and shall also be treated as damage for the purpose 
of payment of compensation from the HNS Fund.303 
5.2.2.5 The difficulty of ratifying the Convention and a 
Draft Protocol to the HNS Convention 
Neither the P.R.C. nor the UK304 has yet ratified the HNS Convention. There has 
admittedly been pressure from the European Council for ratification by the major 
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European States.305 By August 2009, however, only 14 countries had ratified the 
convention, comprising 13.61% of world tonnage.306 Although certain other states have 
expressed an intention to ratify the convention,307 uncertainty remains as to whether 
enough countries will ratify it so that it will enter into force.308 In a further effort to 
encourage adoption, the IOPC Funds agreed on a draft new protocol for the HNS 
Convention309 in June 2008. It is expected that a Diplomatic Conference will be held 
during 2010 with a view for final adoption. The proposed Protocol is referred to in more 
detail below. 
 
All this raises the question of why the HNS convention, which is modelled on the very 
successful and widely accepted oil pollution conventions—the CLC and Fund 
Conventions—should struggle to gain international acceptance. Some reasons discussed 
in the following paragraphs probably give some clues. 
 
Firstly, the fact that there has not been a serious HNS incident310 may well have 
induced a somewhat false sense of security, especially in the light of certain high-profile 
oil spills311 that have happened in the last few years.  
 
Secondly, without incidents creating lasting public outrage, other political and practical 
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3.6 at http://www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/archive/2005/pchns/ion3outcomeoftheinitialc1813.pdf 
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 See “The HNS Convention – Early ratification is vital”, Gard News, 175 November 2004/January 2005, p11 
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 See the draft protocol in the annex to document LEG 95/3, at 
http://folk.uio.no/erikro/WWW/HNS/LEG%2095-3.pdf The intention was to ensure that both instruments 
(Convention and Protocol) be read together and in this way to provide a workable solution to the problems of 
implementation that had so far prevented many states from becoming party. 
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 See footnote 234. See also the Appendix. 
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 The Prestige in December 2002, the Erika in December 1999. 
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considerations have delayed accession to the HNS Convention.312 Countries that import 
significant amounts of HNS cargo fear their industries will have to pay a 
disproportionate amount into the compensation fund for incidents elsewhere which 
would put them at a disadvantage as against their competitors.313 The UK is one of 
these countries, but is “keeping the issue under constant review”.314 China has the same 
problem: ratifying the HNS convention would put Chinese importers and industry at a 
cost disadvantage.  
 
Thirdly, another important issue is the complexity of the HNS Convention because it 
covers a large number of substances and wider range of risks, compensation to be paid 
in respect of loss of life or personal injury, pollution damage or damage caused by fire 
and explosion. Comparatively, CLC/ Fund Conventions only cover pollution damage. 
To see the difference, one example is whereas everyone can recognise an oil cargo when 
they see it, the same isn’t true of an HNS cargo. All this makes the ratification of HNS 
Convention far more difficult than the Oil conventions. 
 
Considering the above problems of obtaining signatories, at the 1992 Fund Assembly’s 
October 2007 session, it was decided to create a HNS Focus Group with the objective of 
developing a draft Protocol to the 1996 HNS Convention to offer solutions to remove 
the obstacles.315 The IMO duly approved a draft Protocol at its 95th session in early 
2009.316  The Group has worked within three areas317 which have been regarded as 
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 See “Environment—Growing momentum for HNS clamp”, Lloyd’s list, January 16, 2003. p5 
313
 For details see “Consultation on UK Implementation and Ratification of the Hazardous and Noxious Substances 
(HNS) Convention” (Final stage) April 2005, at http://www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/archive/2005/pchns/ (accessed 
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foreseeable future with direct impact on industry’s competitiveness. It was argued that any increase in import prices 
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 However, recent work within the IMO correspondence group to identify likely levels of contributing cargoes 
suggests that this is not as great a risk as feared. In addition, in the author’s view, UK ratification of the Convention/ 
Protocol may not put UK industries at a competitive disadvantage, given its industries survived at present are 
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of the Convention, in terms of contributing to the HNS Fund, will only enter into force in the UK when the 
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 For details see IMO Document 92FUND/WGR.5/11, see the text of the Protocol at 
http://folk.uio.no/erikro/WWW/HNS/LEG%2095-3.pdf 
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 See IMO document LEG 95/3/1 or http://folk.uio.no/erikro/WWW/HNS/LEG%2095-10.pdf 
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 For details see IMO document LEG 94/12, at pp. 12-14. See also http://www.mb.com.ph/node/199646 (accessed 
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particularly problematic and the Protocol has addressed each of them. 
 
Firstly, the difficulty in collecting data and reporting on packaged HNS has been 
identified as a serious obstacle. The solution in the Protocol is that packaged HNS 
should not be regarded as a type of cargo carrying liability to contribute, and 
accordingly that receivers of such goods should not be liable for contributions to the 
HNS Fund.318 However, it would still be possible to receive compensation from the 
HNS Fund in incidents involving packaged HNS,319  and indeed the shipowner’s 
liability limit for incidents involving packaged HNS will be increased. The specific 
level of increase will be set at the Diplomatic Conference. 
 
The second problem relates to contributions to the LNG (i.e. liquefied natural gas) 
Account.320 Under the 1996 HNS Convention, the person liable for LNG contributions 
is a titleholder321 to an LNG cargo. In other cases of HNS cargoes, the person liable is 
the receiver. While the receiver must be subject to the jurisdiction of a State Party, the 
titleholder need not be. It would, therefore, have been impossible to enforce payment of 
contributions to the LNG account by titleholders in non-member states. A solution in the 
draft Protocol is to remove the anomaly: the receiver, as defined in Article 1.4 of the 
Convention, would be liable for contribution, except for limited situations.322 
 
Finally, there is the issue of how to ensure submission of contributing cargo reports by 
States. Despite an obligation to do so, very few States, when ratifying the HNS 
Convention, have submitted reports on contributing cargo.323 The draft Protocol deals 
                                                                                                                                                                  
on 3rd June 2009); http://www.dma.dk/sw23105.asp (accessed 6th March 2009) 
318
 For details see IMO document LEG 94/12, pp. 6-7 
319
 Because incidents involving packaged goods will remain eligible for compensation 
320
 For discussions on Contribution to the LNG Account, see IMO document 92FUND/WGR.5/11, see also IMO 
document LEG 94/12, pp 8-10 
321
 More precisely, the person who held title immediately prior to the LNG cargo’s discharge. See Article 19.1(b) of 
the HNS Convention. For details see also IMO Document 92FUND/WGR.5/11 or 
http://seafarerblog.com/2009/04/11/imo-approves-draft-hns-protocol-aimed-at-bringing-1996-hns-convention-into-eff
ect.html (accessed on 01 June 2009) 
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 For example, in the situation where the titleholder pays them, following an agreement to this effect with the 
receiver and the receiver has informed the State Party that such an agreement exists. 
323
 This omission has been a contributing factor to the Convention not entering into force. In addition, there has been 
a growing awareness of the desirability of preventing the invidious situation which has occurred in the IOPC Funds, 
where non-submission of reports results in non-payment of contributions but not in withholding of compensation. See 
IMO document LEG 94/12, pp 10-12. 
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with this by imposing sanctions for non-reporting.324 
 
The IMO legal committee has now requested the IMO Council, which meets in June 
2009, to approve the holding of a diplomatic conference as early as possible during 
2010 to consider the draft Protocol, with a view to formally adopting it. 
 
In addition, in recognition of the complexities of HNS substances,325an electronic 
system326 has been developed to provide an optional reporting system for use by 
industry, States and the HNS Fund Secretariat. The electronic system also contains a 
database of all chemicals covered by the Convention.327 Surely all this will encourage 
countries to ratify the HNS Convention/ Protocol. 
5.2.2.6 Further Discussion and Recommendation: UK 
and PRC 
With regard to the ratification of HNS Convention/ Protocol, the UK is likely to ratify 
on principle as soon as the matters in the Protocol are sorted out. The following issues 
are worthy to be discussed.  
 
Firstly, due to major HNS incidents occurred along UK coast,328 it has increased the 
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 For example, (a) In order to ratify the draft Protocol, States will be required to submit reports on contributing 
cargo - IMO, as Depositary, will not accept any ratifications which are not accompanied by such reports. States will 
also be obliged to continue to submit reports annually thereafter until the Protocol enters into force. (b) Should a State 
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 Not least 6000 substances would fall within the scope of the Convention. See, p. 56, at 
http://www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/archive/2005/pchns/ 
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 IMO suggested to develop a software programme which would identify all substances covered by the HNS 
Convention 
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 The system known as the HNS Cargo Contribution Calculator (HNS CCC) is currently available on CD ROM, 
users will need to download the software but once this has been done system can be accessed quickly and provides 
secure data storage.  
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 For example, when the Ever Decent collided with a cruise ship (the Norwegian Dream) in 1999 off the east coast 
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Decent whose cargo included a number of HNS substances in containers. While the incident did not result in fatalities, 
or serious injuries, it did highlight the potential for a serious incident to occur. Another example, the Levoli Sun 
incident off the Channel Islands in 2000 was also a major HNS incident, for which claims for compensation would 
have been governed by the Convention, if in force. The Cargo presented a pollution threat and was carcinogenic. The 
Levoli Sun sunk and the cargo and bunker fuel on board had to be removed. This led to a long and costly savage 
operation. The government’s claim for response costs arising from the incident have still not been settled. See 
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urgency for the ratification of the convention. In addition, some preparation has been 
already undertaken by Parliament to allow UK to implement the convention. 329 
Moreover, in December 2003 and April 2005, the Department of Transport published 
two consultation papers both entitled “Consultation on UK implementation and 
ratification of the HNS Convention”.330 From the Government’s Response,331 we can 
see there were strong intentions to ratify the Convention.332 However, due to UK’s 
worries over certain aspects of the compensation scheme, and the process of waiting for 
the Protocol to address those concerns, it hasn’t ratified the Convention.  
 
In comparison, China has so far not had much interest in the HNS Convention, but this 
may change. With the development of Chinese industries, the amounts of HNS imported 
into China are increasing dramatically through marine transportation.333 Chinese coasts 
have been seriously affected by HNS incidents.334 However the difficulty hindering the 
ratification of HNS Convention is that there has been insufficient research undertaken 
on how much damage remains uncompensated at present, which would be compensated 
were China to ratify the HNS Convention.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
“Consultation on UK Implementation and Ratification of the Hazardous and Noxious Substances (HNS) Convention” 
(Final stage) April 2005, Annex VIII, page 128, at http://www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/archive/2005/pchns/ 
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 The enabling legislation which allows UK to implement the HNS Convention is contained in Section 14 and 
Schedules 3 of the Merchant Shipping (Maritime and Security) Act 1997. The need for the UK to become a party to 
the HNS Convention has, therefore, already been accepted by Parliament. All that remains is for Parliament and the 
Secretary of State to determine when and how. 
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 For details see “Consultation on UK Implementation and Ratification of the Hazardous and Noxious Substances 
(HNS) Convention” (Final stage) April 2005, at http://www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/archive/2005/pchns/ (accessed 
on 4th June 2009). 
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 Ibid., in the second consultant paper, Section 3 of the Consultant paper, p. 16 
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 There were strong intentions to ratify the Convention by June 2006, to ensure the UK would be compliant with 
the European Council’s Decision. European Council Decision (2002/971/EC) was adopted on 18 November 2002 
authorizing EU Member Sates to ratify the HNS Convention, and if possible by June 2006. (It should be clarified that 
this decision does not require the UK to ratify. It merely permits it to do so). In addition, there was a sign of political 
intent to proceed towards ratifying the Convention from a very early stage. The UK signed the HNS Convention 
within 12 months the Convention was open for signature as a sign of political intent to proceed towards ratifying the 
Convention. See “Consultation on UK Implementation and Ratification of the Hazardous and Noxious Substances 
(HNS) Convention” (Final stage) April 2005, Annex VIII, p. 125 at 
http://www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/archive/2005/pchns/ 
333
 From 1989 to 2004, the total volume of HNS carried in China increased by 30 times and their types increased by 
3 times. In 2004, the total national transport volume was about 147 million tons, among which 37 million tons were 
inbound cargoes. The main cargoes were vegetable oils, ethylene glycol, methyl alcohol, stryrene, sulphuric acid, 
xylene, toluene and its mixture, sodium hydroxide etc. In 2006, China has 27 bulk chemical carriers engaged in 
international trade, with average gross tonnage of 3,846 tons; 62 chemical carriers operating along Chinese coast, 
with average gross tonnage of 729 tons. See Xu Cuiming, China’s Strategy and Resources for emergency response to 
HNS Accidents, at http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/shisaku/bousai/em_hns/ch1.pdf 
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 For the HNS incidents along Chinese coasts including the GG Chemist in 2005, the Accord in 2002, and the 
Chung Mu No. 1 in 1995, see Appendix I. Moreover, there were 52 serious accidents caused by ships carrying HNS 
from 1991 to 2004. Among them, 14 accidents caused more than 100 tons of spillage. See Xu Cuiming, op. cit. p2  
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Before an integrated legal scheme is set up to deal with the problem relating to the 
liability and compensation from HNS incidents, the author suggests China should spend 
time and effort on research and making improvements on the following issues. 
 
The first step would be the collection of data from an HNS cargo risk assessment, more 
specifically, the number of vessels carrying HNS in Chinese waters and the number of 
incidents that have occurred. From this, the Harbour Superintendence Administration 
can predict the likelihood of an incident occurring in Chinese waters. A good example is 
the Chemical Risk Assessment commissioned by the UK Coastguard Agency in 2000.335  
 
Secondly, presumably those injured by HNS pollution received from a possible HNS 
Fund will be much more than their direct recovery from those responsible (where that 
liability can be enforced) under China’s existing legislation.336 It is important to know 
the recoverable damages in HNS cases, particularly calculating the difference between 
national scheme and the HNS Convention/Protocol.337  If China ratifies the HNS 
Convention/Protocol, presumably for damages not covered by current national law, 
there would be the possibility for the claimants to obtain recourse from the HNS Fund. 
 
Thirdly, to analyse current problems relating to the carrier’s compulsory insurance. For 
example whether ships registered in China can afford compulsory insurance required by 
the HNS Convention? 
 
Fourthly, double check whether the contributions from HNS receivers will cause 
competitive disadvantages to Chinese industry. Based on the collection of data, if China 
ratifies the HNS Convention/protocol, it is not difficult to calculate a rough figure as to 
how much the HNS receivers in China should contribute to the first payment and the 
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 The assessment considered data available for the years 1989-1998. During this period a total of 220 casualties 
involving chemical tankers occurred worldwide, of these, 38 occurred in UK waters. For the same period, there were 
a total of 105 casualties involving gas carriers with 13 of these occurring in UK waters. For details see “Consultation 
on UK Implementation and Ratification of the Hazardous and Noxious Substances (HNS) Convention” (Final stage) 
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 With the support from the Maritime Courts and the High Courts, it is possible to see how many incidents occurred 
in Chinese waters and to calculate the amount of compensation awarded to the relevant claimants from the data 
regarding recoverable damage from HNS incidents under current Chinese law. The competent authority could then 
calculate the total amount of unrecoverable damages relating to dangerous cargoes each year. 
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annual payment to the HNS Fund.338 The author suggests there should be a cap of 20% 
(or less) on the annual contributions payable by a single contracting state to the HNS 
Funds,339 since China probably will become one of the heaviest HNS importers in the 
world.  
 
Last but not least, there needs to be proper training for the relevant staff and guidelines 
for industry, particularly considering that the knowledge relating to dangerous cargo 
transportation is quite poor among Chinese manufacturers, shippers, and export 
agencies. The author admits that in many aspects they are less than professional and 
need more training.340 
 
In summary, China still needs to see whether ratification of the Convention/ Protocol 
would cause undue costs or competitive disadvantages. If it would then the Convention 
won’t be adopted: if not, then it might.341 And in any case China, like the UK, will do 
nothing until the Protocol is finalised.  
 
From what has been discussed, the HNS Convention can be summarised as: there are 
many positive features of the HNS Convention should be acknowledged. Although it 
might never enter into force, the key aspects of the convention are already open to 
criticism. The Convention should therefore be viewed as a welcome, but temporary, 
stage in an on-going process of improvement and reform, and not the end.  
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 It is necessary to predict the amounts of HNS imported into China and how much the receivers must contribute to 
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details see Wang Ruijun and Chen Deli, Study on Establishing the Liability System in China as to the HNS Pollution 
by Ship (in Chinese), World Shipping, Vol. 26, No. 1, Feb. 2003, p. 18. 
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The draft Protocol was in fact a free-standing treaty which was intended to complement 
the HNS Convention. These two instruments are supposed to be read together in a way 
to provide a workable solution to the problem of implementation of the Convention. The 
author thinks the draft protocol should be adopted as soon as possible since there are so 
many good points in it. The most notable ones are: the Protocol simplifies the HNS 
Convention and it becomes easier to identify contributors to the HNS Fund. Moreover, 
remedies are supplied in the Protocol to ensure Member States to submit information to 
the HNS Fund on contracting cargo. Accordingly, the possibility for the HNS Fund to 
collect the necessary contributions in case of incidents and to pay damages is enhanced. 
5.2.3 Limitation of Liability 
Where a shipowner incurs a liability by reason of negligent navigation or management 
of his ship, he may, nevertheless, not be required to pay the full amount because he is 
entitled to limit his liability according to relevant legislations. 342  Practically, the 
limitation of liability is not only benefiting the shipowner, his insurer but also the 
claimants.343 
 
As we have mentioned above,344 the shipowner is entitled to limit liability in respect of 
any incident up to an aggregate amount calculated under the terms of the HNS 
Convention.345  However, in order to benefit from this limitation of liability, the 
shipowner must constitute a fund, an international fund which is established by the 
Convention. 
  
Unlike CLC claims, HNS claims are not excluded from the 1976 Limitation 
Convention.346 HNS claims, therefore, will involve two parallel limitation regimes. 
However, the 1996 Protocols347 to the 1976 Convention will give a State Party the 
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 Marsden on Collisions at Sea, 13th ed., op. cit., p. 591. 
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 The claimants can be more confident that the shipowner will have been able to obtain insurance cover in respect 
of liabilities incurred and that there will be insurance funds available to satisfy their claims, in part of not in full. 
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 See section 5.2.2.3 
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 Article 9(1) of the HNS Convention 
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 Article 3(b) of the 1976 Limitation Convention provides that the Convention shall not apply to the following: (b) 
claims for oil pollution damage within the meaning of the CLC 1969 or any amendment or Protocol thereto, which is 
in force. 
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 On 13 May 2004 the 1996 Protocol to amend the Convention on Limitation of Liability for Maritime Claims 1976 
entered into force. It has been ratified by 34 States, representing 35.48% of world merchant shipping (by June 2009). 
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option to exclude HNS claims from the ambit of the 1996 Protocols.348 For a State does 
not adopt 1996 Protocols or the damage is outside of the scope of HNS Convention, a 
shipowner would have the facility of limiting liability in the ordinary way under the 
1976 Convention rather than under the specialised limitation regimes under the HNS 
Convention. Of course, the limit of the former is much lower than that of the latter. 
5.2.3.1 Convention on Limitation of Liability for 
Maritime Claims 1976349 
The Convention on Limitation and Liability for Maritime Claims 1976 (LLMC) in 
certain respects serves a similar function to other regimes pertaining to the carriage of 
goods by sea, such as Hague Hague-Visby Rules, Hamburg Rules and the Rotterdam 
Rules. The differences between them are LLMC does not deal with establishing liability 
which is a separate matter stipulated by other regimes. In addition, LLMC applies by 
force of international law and not by virtue of contractual arrangements, which the other 
regimes do.  
 
No doubt that the 1976 Convention has sought to achieve further international 
acceptance.350 When LLMC 1976 was drawn up, it was clearly necessary to avoid 
overlap with the CLC 1969. Indeed, oil pollution liabilities were excluded from 
limitation under Article 3 (b) of the LLMC.351 This means oil pollution was to remain 
                                                                                                                                                                  
On 13 May 2004, it became applicable in United Kingdom, but China has not ratified it by June 2009. 
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 It is likely that any State adopting the HNS Convention will also adopt the 1996 Protocols to the 1976 Limitation 
Convention so as to take advantage of this option. It will need to do so if it is to avoid the conflict in treaty 
obligations that would otherwise occur where it sought to impose the higher HNS limits against vessels flying the 
flag of a State which adheres to the 1976 Limitation Convention but which does not apply the 1996 HNS Convention. 
See Griggs, P, Extending the frontiers of liability – the proposed Hazardous Noxious Substances Convention and its 
effect on ship, cargo and insurance interests [1996] LMCLQ 145 
349
 The LLMC 1976 came into force on 1 December, 1986, at the same time it became operational in U.K. and U.K. 
declared its ratification to be effective also in respect of Hong Kong, but ceased to apply to Hong Kong with effective 
from 1 July 1997. It does not apply to mainland China and applies only to the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region. By notification dated 5 June 1997 from the People’s Republic of China with respect to the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region, it reserves the right in accordance with Article 18 (1) to exclude the application of 
Article 2(1)(d). 
350
 It has been ratified by 52 States, representing 49.94% of world merchant shipping (by July 2010). 
http://www.imo.org/home.asp 
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 Article 3 (b) of the LLMC excludes from limitation under this Convention: “Claims for oil pollution damage 
within the meaning of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage dated November 29th 
1969 or of any amendment or Protocol thereto which is in force”. We can see this wording was apposite to cover not 
only CLC 1969 but also the Protocols thereto, including the 1992 Protocol which gave rise to the CLC 1992. Liability 
for oil pollution under CLC 1992 is therefore likewise excluded from the ambit of LLMC 1976. 
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to limitation in accordance with CLC itself. It should be noted that only the shipowner 
can incur liability under the channelling provisions of CLC. Oil pollution claims against 
other parties (e.g. charterers) are excluded by CLC, so the victim must pursue on other 
legal basis. In a case that a charterer is held liable for oil pollution under his national 
liability laws and that country is a member state of LLMC, whether charterers can rely 
on the LLMC to limit their liability? It was not tested until The Aegean Sea352 in 1998. 
 
Before discussing the case, we need to clarify that the LLMC 1976 has a wider 
description of group of persons entitled to limit their liability, which is different from 
CLC. Article 1 (1) of the LLMC provides that: “shipowners and salvors” may limit their 
liability in accordance with the rules of the Convention for claims set out in Article 2. 
Under Article 1(2), the term “shipowner” is defined as “the owner, charterer, manager 
and operator of a seagoing ship”. In a recent case The MSC Napoli,353 it was held that a 
slot charterer was within the definition of shipowner in Article 1 of the 1976 
Convention and therefore entitled to limit its liability. 
 
We can see the arrangements under the two conventions are very different. For example, 
the LLMC 1976 provides for rights of limitation for charterers; but the CLC 1969 
provides for exclusion of liability of charterers. Bear in mind that the text of Article 3(b) 
of LLMC itself excludes not only liabilities incurred under CLC, but all claims for oil 
pollution damage within the meaning of CLC, even if liability arises for it outside the 
CLC regime, e.g. where the claim was brought against a party other than the shipowner. 
Here a potential danger exists where Article 3 (b) could produce the result of unlimited 
liability being incurred for pollution claims in non-CLC states, or even in CLC states 
when claims for oil pollution are brought against parties other than shipowner.354 In 
order to guard against this, some states (e.g. UK) try to enact supplemental legislation in 
their domestic laws to modify the effect of Article 3(b).  
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In the UK, Section 153 of the Merchant Shipping Act 1995 sets out the liability of the 
shipowner for claims governed by CLC. It follows that any liability for oil pollution 
which is not so incurred is likewise not excluded from the ambit of LLMC in English 
law.355 
 
In The Aegean Sea, the shipowners sought to recover from the charterers, amounts 
representing the value of claims made against them as well as the value of the vessel, its 
bunkers, and its freight. The owners claim that they were entitled to implied indemnity 
because the tanker had been sent to an unsafe port and the loss was sustained as a 
consequence of complying with the charterer's orders. The English High Court was 
asked whether charterers were entitled to limit their liability with respect to spill claims 
brought against them by the ship owners. The court held (by Thomas J.) that the LLMC 
1976 gave no right to the charterers to limit their liability in such unsafe port claims 
brought against them by the shipowners under the charterparty. This was because their 
acts or omissions in relation to the shipment of the cargo were acts or omissions done in 
their capacity as charterers not as (or qua) shipowners. The effect of this decision 
appears to be that if oil pollution claims had been brought directly against the charterer, 
then limitation would have been possible under the LLMC. However, if the claims are 
brought against the owner first and the owner seeks to recover from charterers by way 
of recourse, then limitation is not possible.356  
 
Following the decision of Thomas J in The Aegean Sea, in the case of The CMA 
Djakarta,357 David Steel J held that a charterer could only limit his liability to the 
extent that he was acting as (or ‘qua’) shipowner which he defined as undertaking an 
activity ‘usually associated with ownership’ and further defined as ‘to the extent that he 
operates or manages the vessel’. Accordingly, the charterers were not entitled to limit 
their liability as against owners in the circumstances of shipment of a dangerous cargo, 
which was an act done in their capacity as charterers. The charterers appealed.  
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The English Court of Appeal held358 that the judge had been wrong to approach the 
issue of limitation by considering whether the charterers acting as owners before they 
were entitled to limit. To say that a charterer had to be acting as owner was to impose a 
gloss on the wording of Article 1(2) of the LLMC 1976 and accord it a meaning other 
than its ordinary meaning. It was conceded that charterers had the same right as 
shipowners to limit as against cargo owners.359 The decision was that the charterers 
were entitled to limit their liability in respect of their liability to indemnify the 
shipowner in respect of cargo claims but not in respect of damage to the ship. From this 
decision we can draw a conclusion that a charterer’s ability to limit will depend on the 
type of claim that is brought against to him rather than the capacity in which he was 
acting when his liability was incurred.  
 
We can see from the implications of this decision that although it is possible for a wider 
circle of persons to limit their liability under Article 1 of LLMC, the nature of the 
claims has become more important than the persons against whom claims are made. It is 
therefore necessary to further study which types of claims will be subject to limitation 
under Article 2 of the 1976 Convention.  
 
The extent to which pollution liabilities are subject to limitation360 and the claims for 
which liability may be limited are listed in Article 2.1 of LLMC 1976 as follows: 
(a) Claims in respect of loss of life or personal injury or loss of or damage to property 
(including damage to harbour works, basins and waterways and aids to navigation), 
occurring on board or in direct connection with the operation of the ship or with salvage 
operations, and consequential loss resulting therefrom; 
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 The CMA Djakarta [2004] 1 C.L.C. 468; [1 Lloyd’s Rep. 460 
359
 [2004] 1 C.L.C. 468, at 469. It was conceded that a charterer could limit his liability when sued by a cargo-owner 
for loss of or damage to cargo and if the word ‘charterer’ was not to be construed as meaning qua shipowner in an 
action brought by a cargo-owner, it could not be so construed merely because the claimant was not the cargo-owner 
but the shipowner. But the judge was right that the ordinary meaning of Article 2(1) did not extend the right to limit to 
a claim for damage to the vessel by reference to the tonnage of which limitation was to be calculated. As we know 
most claims brought by a shipowner against a charterer, such as breach of promise that dangerous cargo will not be 
loaded will consist of a claim for damage to the vessel. Therefore in this case charterers’ appeal failed except to the 
extent that they would be entitled to limit their liability to indemnity the shipowners for the shipowners’ own liability 
for cargo claims, to the extent that that liability was discharged by shipowners in a sum exceeding the appropriate 
limit. 
360
 For detailed study of LLMC 1976 and its predecessors in respect of oil pollution, see Z. Oya Ozcayir, (1998) 
Liability for oil pollution and collisions, Part 4 Limitation of Liability, LLP London & Hong Kong, pp299-384; see 
also Anderson & De La Rue, Liability of Charterers and Cargo Owners for Pollution from Ships, 26 Tul. Mar. L.J.1, 
p.47. 
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(b) Claims in respect of loss resulting from delay in the carriage by sea of cargo, passengers or 
their luggage; 
(c) Claims in respect of other loss resulting from infringement of rights other than contractual 
rights, occurring in direct connection with the operation of the ship or salvage operations; 
(d) Claims in respect of the raising, removal, destruction or the rendering harmless of a ship 
which is sunk, wrecked, stranded or abandoned, including anything that is or has been on 
board such ship; 
(e) Claims in respect of the removal, destruction or the rendering harmless of the cargo of the 
ship; 
(f) Claims of a person other than the person liable in respect of measures taken in order to avert 
or minimise loss for which the person liable may limit his liability in accordance with this 
Convention, and further loss caused by such measures.361 
 
It will be seen that no reference is made in Article 2.1 to pollution. Claims for pollution 
damage may take different forms (e.g., clean-up expenses or economic loss), and only 
those which can be brought within one or other of the various sub-paragraphs of Article 
2.1 will be subject to limitation. For instance, in The Aegean Sea,362 it was confirmed 
that recourse claims in respect of pollution damage and clean-up costs fell within 
Art.2.1(a) and (c) and claims for pollution caused by bunkers and by a cargo of oil fell 
within Art. 2.1(d) and (e) respectively in so far as they relate to clean-up or pollution 
prevention costs. 
 
On the other hand, some types of claims may in some circumstances fall outside the 
right of limitation under the Convention.363 For example, in the CMA Djakarta,364 the 
English Court of Appeal held, in respect of a huge loss to the time charterers who had to 
accept responsibility for cargo, ship damage, salvage expenses and general average 
liabilities, the LLMC 1976 could only assist them in respect of the cargo liability, and 
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 LLMC, supra note 227, art. 2, para. 1. See De la Rue & Anderson, Shipping and the Environment, 1998, §4, at 
643.  
362
 [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep.39 
363
 See The Aegean Sea, [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. at 50. This case is about the extent to which different types of 
pollution claim may fall within article 2.1. A further discussion is set out in De la Rue & Anderson, Shipping and the 
Environment, 1998, pp. 270-274. 
364
 See The CMA Djakarta [2004] EWCA Civ. 114. 
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not for the other heads of damage. The decision in the CMA Djakarta was followed in 
The Darfur,365 where the shipowners were seeking to limit against claims brought by 
charterers in respect of claims subject to limitation under Article 2.1(a) and (f). It was 
held by David Steel J. that leaving aside the concessions agreed366 all the items of 
loss367 were consequential on damage to the vessel and, thus, not limitable. As the 
judge pointed out that the issue turned on the scope of the claims that were subject to 
limitation and not the class of persons (shipowners or charterers) entitled to limit. 
 
From what has been discussed above, we can see in general the benefit of limitation is 
granted for claims arising in connection with the operation of the ship and it may be 
invoked by any person who is operating the ship. Oil pollution liabilities were excluded 
from limitation under Article 3 (b) of the LLMC. But when claims for oil pollution are 
brought against parties other than the shipowner, or claims not governed by CLC, it is 
likewise not excluded from the ambit of LLMC in English Law under Section 153 of 
the 1995 Act. In addition, attention has been given to the nature of the claims and the 
scope of claims which are more important than the persons against whom the claims are 
made. Indeed, the persons who can invoke limitation are of minor importance, although 
a wide description of group of persons entitled to limit under Article 1 of the 
Convention. 
5.2.3.2 Limitation under Chinese Maritime Code 1992  
Closely following the 1976 Convention, 368  the Chinese Maritime Code 1992 369 
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 Blue Nile Shipping v Lguana Shipping & Finance Inc (The Darfur) [2004] EWHC 1506 (Admlty); [2004] 2 
Lloyd’s Rep 469 (QB: David Steel J). 
366
 By the time of hearing it had already been agreed that (1) cargo claims against the time charterer by various cargo 
interests; (2) costs of salvage and settlement of the salvage claims were limitable.  
367
 The claims included: (1) claims for off-hire during the period that the Darfur was out of service; (2) advance 
made for the payment of stevedoring expenses; (3) insurance against deviation claims and against claims arising 
while the vessel remained off-hire; (4) costs of transhipment of cargo; (5) costs of time chartering an alternative 
vessel; (6) claims for loss of profit arising out of loss liner business; (7) claims for management time. 
368
 Articles 3(c) and 3(d) of the 1976 Convention provides that the Convention shall not apply to nuclear damages: 
3(c) claims subject to any international convention or national legislation governing or prohibiting limitation of 
liability of nuclear damage; (d) claims against the shipowner of a nuclear ship for nuclear damage. Although there is 
no specific mention of any international convention under Article 3(d), it is generally agreed the pertinent convention 
is the 1962 Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships. Furthermore, this Article may also 
bring pertinent national legislation into play. For example, under English law, in respect of liability of nuclear damage 
and limitation of such liability, the Nuclear Installation Act 1965 shall apply. See generally, Hill, Maritime Law, 4th 
ed., 1995, p.406. 
369
 See also section 4.2.2. The Maritime Code was adopted at the 28th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the 
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unequivocally excludes claims for oil pollution and nuclear damage from the limitation 
regime by virtue of Article 208 (2)-(3). Since China is a party to the CLC 1969/ 1992 
Protocol,370 claims arising thereunder are expressly excluded.371 However, China is not 
a party to the Fund Convention 1971. Because of the limited scope of application of the 
Fund Convention, some of the advantages of the Convention are not available to 
Chinese claimants. For example, while Chinese claims for marine oil pollution damage 
are subject to the CLC limits, the claimants are without recourse to the Fund 
Convention for any unsatisfied claims because, in such cases, the fund can only be 
invoked when the oil pollution damage occurred on the land or territorial seas of a state 
contracting to the Convention.  
 
The lack of further recourse to the Fund Convention might not be a great disadvantage 
to Chinese claimants with the presence of the TOVALOP 372  and CRISTAL 373 
before.374 Now with the expiration of both of these voluntary instruments,375 a negative 
impact is real. With the 1992 Protocols in force,376 it remains to be seen whether China 
will decide to become party to the Fund Convention. 
 
So far as dangerous cargo liability is concerned, unseaworthiness is certainly regarded 
as conduct barring limitation liability under Chinese Maritime Code 1992. For example, 
in The M/V No.1 CHUNGMU,377 the claimant shipowner “M/V No.1 CHUNGMU” 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Seventh National People's Congress on November 7, 1992, promulgated by Order No. 64 of the President of the 
People's Republic of China on November 7, 1992, and effective as of July 1, 1993. See the Maritime Code (in 
English) at http://www.colaw.cn/findlaw/marine/maritime.htm 
370
 China joined the 1969 CLC on 30 January 1980 and the convention became operative to China on 30 April 1980. 
China ratified the 1992 Protocols on 5th January 1999 and became applicable to both China and Hong Kong on 5th 
January 2000. 
371
 See Article 208(2) of the Chinese Maritime Code of 1992. 
372
 TOVALOP stood for a shipping industry agreement entitled “Tanker Owners Voluntary Agreement concerning 
Liability for Oil Pollution” 
373
 CRISTAL – “Contract Regarding an Interim Supplement to Tanker Liability for Oil Pollution”. CRISTAL was 
conceived as an interim arrangement whilst awaiting the entry into force of the 1971 Fund Convention.  Despite the 
many advantages of the industries’ voluntary agreements (TOVALOP & CRISTAL), they were only temporary 
arrangements.  
374
 For discussion on China as a party to the TOVALOP and CRISTAL, see Chen, Maritime Oil Pollution Damage in 
the People’s Republic of China: the Legal Framework of the Liability System and Compensation Scheme, 6 U.S.F. 
Mar. L.J. 449 (1994). 
375
 With the increasing number of States ratifying either the old or the new CLC/Fund regimes (or a mixture of both), 
the voluntary agreements (TOVALOP & CRISTAL) became increasingly redundant and their final demise was on 20 
February 1997. 
376
 1992 CLC came into force on May 30, 1996. China adopted 1992 CLC on January 5, 2000. By April 2008, China 
has not adopted the Fund Convention/ Protocols. 
377
 (1996)Guangzhou Maritime Court (No. 76), The case was published (in Chinese) at the website of Chinese 
Commercial and Maritime Trial involving Foreign Elements (sponsored by Supreme People’s Court of PRC) 
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contracted to ship 3,865,508 k/l of styrene from a Korean Port of Deasan to the Port of 
Zhanjiang in China. The master on the claimant’s ship navigated erroneously and 
collided with “M/V Chon Stone No.1” (defendant)378 at the port of Zhanjiang on March 
9, 1995, thereafter there were 209.1 tons of styrene leaked out and contaminated the sea. 
The claimant argued he was entitled to limit his liability under Articles 207 and 208 of 
Maritime Code. It was held by the Maritime Court of Guangzhou379 that the claimant’s 
vessel was unseaworthy (with incompetent crew) and dismissing his claims to limit 
liability under Article 209 of Maritime Code. As to conduct barring limitation, 
following the principle of the 1976 Convention, Article 209 of the Chinese Maritime 
Code 1992 expressly provides that:380 
A person liable shall not be entitled to limit his liability in accordance with the provisions of 
this chapter, if it is provided that the loss resulted from his act or omission done with the intent 
to cause such loss or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss would probably result.  
 
To interpret this provision, the Civil law 1986 may give some help. Under the Civil 
law,381 in order to establish tort liability, fault on the part of the actor must be shown. 
Fault can be either intentional or negligent. Intentional conduct in committed by an 
actor who actually anticipates the adverse consequence of such conduct and intends for 
it to occur or is indifferent to its occurrence. Negligence refers to the conduct done by 
an actor who should have or could have known the adverse consequence of such 
conduct but did not actually foresee it.382 By analogy, an act or omission done with the 
intent to cause loss or damage or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss or 
damage would probably result can be regarded as an intentional fault under the Chinese 
civil law. 
 
Respecting Articles 204, 205 and 206 of Maritime Code 1992, “a person liable” could 
be the shipowner, manager, salvor or their servants or an insurer. It is clear that a person 
                                                                                                                                                                  
http://www.ccmt.org.cn/hs/case/index.php 
378
 The defendant shipowner was Hong’guang Shipping Company S.De. R.L. 
379
 (1996)Guangzhou Maritime Court (No. 76), the decision was given by Wu Weinan J., Xiong Shaohui J. and Lai 
Shangbin J. on June 23, 1998. 
380
 Maritime Code of P.R.C. 1992, Article 209. 
381
 See relevant discussion in section 3.2.1 
382
 See generally, Jones (ed.), Basic Principles of Civil Law in China, (1989) Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, Inc. 
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liable can limit liability automatically unless evidence produced proves the person is 
guilty of conduct barring limitation. If the party is guilty of conduct barring limitation 
he may lose the benefits of insurance as well as the benefits of limitation according to 
Article 242, which provides that the “insurer shall not be liable for the loss caused by 
the intentional act of the insured”. 
 
In addition, under Article 210(2) of Chinese Maritime Code 1992, “the limitation of 
liability for ships with a gross tonnage not exceeding 300 tons and those engaging in 
transport services between the ports of the People's Republic of China as well as those 
for other coastal works shall be worked out by the competent authorities of transport 
and communications under the State Council and implemented after its being submitted 
to and approved by the State Council.” 
 
On 15 November 1993, the MOC, in pursuance of Article 210(2) of the Maritime Code, 
approved by the State Council of the PRC, promulgated the Provisions Concerning 
Limitation of Liability for Small and Coastal Ships (Costal Provisions).383 That is to say, 
the limitation of liability for ships with different tonnage is different between the 
Maritime Code 1992 (only applicable to international sea-going ships384 exceeding 300 
gross tons) and the special regulation adopted by MOC (applicable to ships doing 
domestic transport below 300 gross tons). There may be a conflict of law, but the 
situation in China is that normally small ships doing domestic transport do not have 
enough economic strength to undertake limitation under the Maritime Code 1992, since 
the limitation amount of the Maritime Code is equal to that of the 1976 Limitation 
Convention. 
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 MOC (2003)-Order (No.5). It came into force on January 1, 1994. 
384
 An “international ship” means any sea-going ship sailing between a Chinese port or ports and a foreign port or 
ports, but does not include ships sailing on inland waterways. 
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5.2.3.3 The 1996 Protocol and Limitation of Liability 
under English Law385 
The 1996 Protocol to the 1976 Convention came into force on 13 May 2004.386 It 
greatly increases the limits of liability for all categorise and sizes of ships whenever 
they are involved in a maritime incident.387 The 1996 Protocol amends Article 18(1) so 
as to permit Convention states to exclude limitation in respect of claims arsing from the 
1996 HNS Convention when it enters into force. Nevertheless, the HNS Convention 
contains much higher limitation amounts than those under the 1976 Convention (with 
1996 Protocol).388  
In the U.K., the 1976 Convention was contained in Schedule 4 to the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1979 and was given the force of law on December 1, 1986.389 The 
provisions of the Convention, as applicable to the U.K., are now set out in the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1995 in Part I of Schedule 7 and provisions having effect in connection 
with the Convention are set out in Part II390 of the same Schedule. Both parts are given 
the force of law by s. 185 of the MSA 1995.  
The U.K. has ratified the 1996 Protocol, pursuant to the authority conferred by the 
Merchant Shipping Act 1995, section 185(2A).391 In addition, except for shipowner, 
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 The Merchant Shipping and Maritime Security Act 1997 amends the 1995 Act and provides powers which will 
enable the revisions made by the Protocol 1996 to become law in the UK. See Dockray, Martin, Cases and Materials 
on the Carriage of Goods by Sea, (2004: 3rd ed.), London : Cavendish Publishing, p. 338 
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gross tonnage is 2 million SDR. For larger ships, the following additional amounts are used in calculating the 
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property claims for ships not exceeding 2,000 gross tonnage is 1 million SDR. For larger ships, the following 
additional amounts are used in calculating the limitation amount. (1) For each ton from 2,001 to 30,000 tons, 400 
SDR; (2) For each ton from 30,001 to 70,000 tons, 300 SDR; (3) For each ton in excess of 70,000, 200 SDR 
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 For details about the shipowner’s limit of liability under the different instruments (LLMC 76, LLMC 96 AND 
HNS 1996), see “Consultation on UK Implementation and Ratification of the Hazardous and Noxious Substances 
(HNS) Convention” (Final stage) April 2005, Annex VIII, page 135, at 
http://www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/archive/2005/pchns/ (accessed on 4th June 2009). One example is under the 
LLMC Protocol 1996, a 40,000 gross ton vessel would give a limitation fund amounting to approximately $21.7 
million for property damage. Under the HNS Convention the same vessel would have a limitation amount of 
approximately $ 95.7 million.  
389
 See Merchant Shipping Act 1979, ss. 17, 52: Merchant Shipping Act 1979 (Commencement No. 10) Order 1986 
(SI 1986/1052). 
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 Merchant Shipping Act 1995, s. 185(2) 
391
 The insertion of subsection (2A) into section 185 of the MSA 1995 by the Merchant Shipping and Maritime 
Security Act 1997, U.K. 1997, c.28 section 15(1), allows amendments to be made in Parts I and II of Schedule 7 to 
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salvor, charterer and insurer, a right to limit liability also exists under specific statutes in 
respect of pilots392 and harbour, canal and dock authorities in the U.K.393 
The current situation is: before the HNS Convention is applicable to the UK, 
shipowners’ limitation of liability arising from an incident involving the carriage of 
HNS is governed by the general rules on limitation under the 1996 Protocol. Under 
LLMC 1996, the shipowner is entitled to limit his liability depending on the tonnage of 
the vessel and the type of damage.394  The shipowner must establish a Limitation Fund 
in the appropriate Court395 and all claims must be pursued against that Fund.396 
Nonetheless there is currently no requirement for shipowners of vessels carrying HNS 
to maintain insurance to meet the limit of liability under LLMC 1996.397 Although most 
shipowners do maintain insurance, there is no guarantee that insurance would be 
available to meet the costs arising from an incident. 
5.2.3.4 Concluding Remarks 
As we know, discussion of liability can not be isolated without limitation. The more 
strict the liability is, the more necessary to limit it. The LLMC 1976/ 1996 Protocol had 
great influence on national legislations, e.g. Chinese Maritime Code 1992 and Merchant 
Shipping Act 1995. Although China (except for Hong Kong) has not ratified the LLMC, 
the limitation amounts under Maritime Code 1992 are equal to those under the 1976 
Convention. The U.K. has ratified the 1996 Protocol with considerably higher limitation 
amounts. Nonetheless, the limitation amounts under the LLMC (with 1996 Protocol), 
are still much lower than the limit of the HNS Convention. 
                                                                                                                                                                  
the 1995 Act as may be required to give effect to such changes. The Merchant Shipping (Convention on Limitation of 
Liability for Maritime Claims) (Amendments) Order 1998, SI 1998/1258, implements the 1996 Protocol. This order 
was made on 19 May 1998 and came into force on 13 May 2004, to be notified in London, Edinburgh and Belfast 
Gazettes, on which the Protocol applicable to the United Kingdom. 
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 The Pilotage Act 1987, U.K. 1987, c. 21, section 22. 
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 MSA 1995, c. 21, section 191. See also Tetley, International Maritime and Admiralty Law, op. cit., p.280. 
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 Claims fall into two categories: lose of life or personal injury and all other claims (i.e. property damages). 
395
 In England and Wales this will be the Admiralty Court, in Scotland the Court of Session and in Northern Ireland 
the High Court, Queen’s Bench Division. 
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 For details see Section 2.5 of the UK consultant paper at 
http://www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/archive/2005/pchns/ion2ukratificationoftheh1812.pdf 
397
 Compulsory insurance under the CLC for vessels carrying persistent oil in bulk, but only provides cover for 
pollution damage. Non-pollution damages such as fire or explosion involving such cargoes will be covered under the 
HNS Convention. 
  298
 
From what has been discussed in this chapter, we can see no matter what substance is 
involved—oil, chemical or other noxious and hazardous substances—marine pollution 
is an international problem. The risk of a major tanker accident is greater in some areas 
than in others but pollution can happen almost anywhere and can affect coastlines which 
are often many miles away from the incident which caused it. 
 
In view of a whole structure of liability regime relating to the carriage of dangerous 
cargo, since the HNS Convention 1996 might never enter into force, it will be helpful to 
consider some international conventions under development, such as the Draft Protocol 
to the HNS Convention and the new UNCITRAL Convention,  the TOPIA and 
STOPIA agreements. 
5.3 EC Directive on Environmental Liability 
The Commission’s thinking on European environmental liability continued to evolve.398 
On 30 July 2001, following restructuring within the Directorate General Environment of 
the European Commission and consideration of many comments to the White Paper, the 
European Commission issued a brief Working Paper.399 The paper described an entirely 
public-law regime, dealing only with environmental damage.400 
 
Based on studies of different systems like the US Superfund and reports on EU Member 
States’ national environmental liability laws, the Commission proposed in 2002 a 
Directive on Environmental Liability.401 The purpose of the proposal was to establish 
environmental liability with regard to the prevention and remedying of environmental 
damage in accordance with the polluter-pays principle.402 It proposed a strict liability 
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 This resulted first in a working paper on environmental liability. For a comment see Bergkamp, The Commission 
July 2001 Working Paper on Environmental Liability: Civil or Administrative Law to Prevent and Restore 
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 Environment Directorate General Working Paper on Prevention and Restoration of Significant Environmental 
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 COM (2002) 17 final. Proposal for a Directive on Environmental Liability with Regard to the Prevention and 
Remedying of Environmental Damage, [2002] OJ C 151 E/132, 25 June 2002 
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regime for listed dangerous activities, and a fault liability regime for non-listed 
activities.  
 
With regard to EU Member States’ national legislation, although most Member States 
have liability rules concerning environmental liability,403 they are often incomplete, 
especially as far as biodiversity damage is concerned. The Commission thus justified 
legislation at Community level based on this argument.404 Surely, the author thinks it is 
an important step with positive fallout to stipulate environmental law at EU level. 
However, what is the real impact of the EU regime will depend significantly on how the 
member states implement it into national laws. 
 
Finally, EC Directive 2004/35 on environmental liability with regard to prevention and 
remedying of environmental damage was formally adopted on 21 April 2004 (hereafter 
ELD).405 The Member States were required to implement the Directive into national 
law by 30 April 2007. Unfortunately, only three Member States could transpose the 
Directive before the deadline (i.e. Italy, Lithuania and Latvia). 
 
The legal basis of the Directive is Article 175(1) of the EC Treaty.406 The Directive 
aims to establish a framework whereby significant environmental damage would be 
prevented or restored. Its transposition into English law will not be easy due to the 
overlapping environmental liability regimes that already exist.407 Not only will the 
transposition of the ELD mean that existing liabilities, some of which originated over 
150 years ago, will be supplemented; its transposition may mean revising some of the 
                                                       
403
 Except for Spain and Greece. 
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 Faure & Wang, op. cit., p63. 
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 [2004] OJ L143/56. The directive itself is not long: it contains 31 considerants (recital) which explain the reasons 
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England, Wales and Scotland, somewhat later for Northern Ireland. See “Implementation of the Environmental 
Liability Directive: Government Response to the Committee’s Sixth Report of Session 2006-2007” (published 17 Oct. 
2007) at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmselect/cmenvfru/1058/1058.pdf  See also 
Fogleman, The Environmental Liability Directive, (2004) 12(3) Environmental Liability, pp 101-115, at 103. 
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provisions that currently impose environmental liability under English law, including 
the Water Resources Act 1991,408 the Environmental Protection Act 1990 Part I, II and 
IIA,409 the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981410 and the Environmental Permitting 
(England and Wales) Regulations 2007. 
 
However, the good news is England has compiled by issuing the Environmental 
Damage (Prevention and Remediation) Regulations 2009 (EDPR England)411 which 
came into force on 1 March 2009. In Wales the EDPR Regulations 2009 (Wales)412 
came into force on 6th May 2009. There are separate regulations for Scotland413 which 
entered into force in June 2009, and for Northern Ireland414 which came into operation 
in July 2009. 
 
In response to criticism from industry, the final text of the European Directive differs 
substantially from the proposal in the White Paper and from the “traditional” liability 
conventions. 415  The commission changed policy and the proposed Directive on 
Environmental Liability is no longer based on civil liability, but public liability.416 
 
But the final wording of the Directive is, to a very large degree, similar to the 
Commission’s proposal, such as the exclusion of traditional damage (personal injury 
and damage to goods),417 the limitation of the notion of “environmental damage”, the 
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Book of European Environmental Law, Vol. 4, (2005) Oxford University Press, pp149-180, at 179. 
417
 The traditional damages are excluded from the scope of the Directive because they are, at least to a large extent, 
already recoverable under the liability laws of the Member States. 
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exclusion of oil pollution and nuclear damage,418 the activities covered, the provisions 
concerning remedial action, the watchdog role for environmental organisations, the 
absence of mandatory insurance, the exclusive of diffuse pollution, and numerous 
accessory provisions such as reporting, reviewing of the provisions, and definitions (see 
the comparison in the table419).  
 
Issue White Paper Commission 
proposal 
Directive 2004/35 
1.Traditional damage included not included not included 
2. Biotechnology damage included not included not included 
3. Water damage not included included included 
4. Permit defence left open included left to Member States 
5. Alleviating burden of proof included not included included 
6. Member States to restore included included not included 
7. Oil pollution, nuclear left open not included not included 
8. Compulsory insurance not included not included left to Member States 
9. NGO action against Member States included included hardly included 
10. Injunction rights for NGOs included not included not included 
 
The Directive will impose a strict or fault-based liability—depending on the type of the 
activities involved and the type of damage caused—for three categories of 
environmental damages:420 
(a) Biodiversity damage, i.e. damage to species and natural habitats which has significant 
adverse effects on reaching or maintaining the favourable conservation status of such 
habitats or species. This definition covers species and habitats mentioned in the EU 1992 
Habitats Directive (92/43/EEC)421 or the 1979 Birds Directive (79/409/EEC).422 Member 
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 Damages already covered by international agreements and instruments listed in Annex IV, e.g. including the 
marine pollution and oil spills are not covered insofar as the relevant international instrument is in force in member 
states concerned. 
419
 Kramer, Discussions on Directive 2004/35 Concerning Environmental Liability, Journal for European 
Environmental & Planning Law, 2005 (4), pp250-256, at 252 
420
 “Environmental damage” is defined in Article 2(1), Directive 2004/35. 
421
 Habitats Directive OJ L206/7 
422
 Conservation of Wild Birds, OJ L103/1 
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States are permitted to include other species or habitats in the protection. 
(b) Water damage, i.e. damages that significantly affect the ecological, chemical and/ or 
quantitative status or ecological potential of waters as defined in the Water Framework 
Directive (2000/60/EC).423 
(c) Land damage, i.e. land contamination insofar as it creates a significant risk of human 
health. 
 
From this list, the potential maritime scope of the ELD can be summarized as: it covers 
environmental damage to marine waters included in the Water Framework Directive’s 
scope of application and to protected species and natural habitats located at sea and 
covered by the relevant directive.424 Within the same geographical limits, which are 
mainly limited to coastal waters,425 it is immaterial whether the damage is caused by 
land or ships, provided that, in the latter case, no coverage is provided by existing 
international conventions.  
 
As mentioned above, there are two distinct liability regimes. For professional activities 
listed in Annex III of the ELD,426 liability is generally strict.427 The occupational 
activities listed in Annex III are all covered by EC environmental law and can be 
considered environmentally risky activities.428 The carriage by sea of certain dangerous 
substances is one of the activities in Annex III, i.e. paragraph 8.429 Considering the 
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 Water Framework Directive, OJ 2000 L327/1. 
424
 See Carbone, The environmental liability directive and liability for damage to the marine environment, Journal of 
International Maritime Law, (2007), Vol. 13 Part 5 pp. 341-355, at 350. 
425
 Coastal water bodies cover coastal waters up to 1 mile seaward from the baseline from which the breadth of UK 
territorial waters is measured. See Axel Klaphake, The assessment and restoration of biodiversity damages, Journal 
for European Environmental and Planning Law, vol. 2 (4), July 2005, at 268. 
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 For example, (1)waste management operations under Directive 75/442/EEC on waste and Directive 91/689/EEC 
on hazardous waste; (2) all discharges into the inland surface water under Directive 76/464/EEC on pollution caused 
by certain dangerous substances; (3) all discharges of substances into groundwater against pollution caused by certain 
dangerous substances under 80/68/EEC; (4) manufacture, use, storage, processing, filling, release into the 
environment and outside transport of dangerous substances under Directive 67/548/EEC, dangerous preparations as 
defined in Directive 1999/45/EC etc.; (5)transport by road, rail, inland waterways, sea or air of dangerous goods or 
polluting goods as defined either in Annex A to Council Directive 94/55/EC or 96/49/EC or 93/75/EEC and so on. 
427
 Directive 2004/35, Article 3(1)(a) 
428
 Annex III lists operators which are regulated by 12 EC directives or regulations or groups of such provisions. 
429
 Paragraph 8 of Annex III: Transport by road, rail, inland waterways, sea or air of dangerous goods or polluting 
goods as defined either in Annex A to Council Directive 94/55/EC of 21 November 1994 on the approximation of the 
laws of the Member States with regards to the transport of dangerous goods by road, or in the Annex to Council 
Directive 96/49/EC of 23 July 1996 on the approximation of the laws of the Member States with regard to the 
transport of dangerous goods by rail, or as defined in Council Directive 93/75/EEC of 13 September 1993 concerning 
minimum requirements for vessel bound for or leaving Community ports and carrying dangerous or polluting goods. 
As we can see that liability remains fault-based for goods outside this list, however hazardous- a potentially important 
limitation. 
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potential maritime scope of the ELD,430 there is a potential overlap with the CLC/Fund 
and HNS Conventions. The relationship between the ELD and the international 
conventions will be discussed later.431 
 
Regarding other activities (that is, those not listed in Annex III), operators are liable 
only if there is fault or negligence, and even they only in respect of biodiversity 
damage.432 In addition, where a defendant is liable under Art. 3(1), he must pay not 
only for damage caused but also for dealing with “imminent threat” of such damage.433  
 
Considering the operator’s obligation to carry out environmental restoration or 
preventive measures, if the operator cannot be found or will not or cannot act (e.g. in the 
case of damage where the polluter cannot be identified or is insolvent), the public 
authority may take the necessary measures itself434 or through a third party,435 and 
recover the cost of prevention, clean-up and restoration from the responsible polluter. 
This is according to the Commission, was to ensure that the necessary prevention or 
restoration were met in accordance with the polluter-pays principle.  
 
In the author’s view, this is good and bad. Good because it is definitely an efficient way 
to deal with pollution problem. Bad because the duty of public authority to perform 
remediation, while making the authority a surrogate liable party, financial burden for 
environmental damage still remains largely with the public as taxpayers in the case that 
the liable person cannot be found. This is link to the weakness of the Directive—an 
absence of compulsory insurance. 
 
Different from the international maritime conventions, the ELD does not require an 
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 See also Carbone, The environmental liability directive and liability for damage to the marine environment, 
Journal of International Maritime Law, (2007), Vol. 13 Part 5 pp. 341-355, at 350. 
431
 Section 5.3.2 
432
 Directive 2004/35, Article 3(1)(b) 
433
 Imminent threat is defined in Article 2(9) as a “sufficient likelihood that environmental damage will occur in the 
near future”. Under Article 5, where environmental damage has not yet occurred but there is an imminent threat of 
such damage occurring, in that case the operator has to take necessary measures in order to prevent the occurrence of 
damage. 
434
 As to the preventive action, see Article 5(4). Under the final text of the directive, the competent authority may 
itself take the necessary remedial measures (Article 6(2)(e)), but has no obligation whatsoever to do so, which is 
different from the commission’s proposal. 
435
 Directive 2004/35, [2004] OJ L143/56, see details in recital 18. 
  304
operator to have evidence of compulsory insurance, but leaves it to be decided by 
Member States and also encourages Member States to develop financial security 
instruments and markets under Annex III. In order to consider carefully the issue 
involved in the imposition of financial security requirements for ELD liabilities rather 
than introducing them immediately, the ELD directs the European Commission to 
submit a report before 30 April 2010.436 The Commission might then decide to submit 
proposals for a system of harmonized mandatory financial security.437 
 
Last but not least, the liability regime is non-retroactive; the ELD only applies to 
environmental damages caused after 30 April 2007.438 Consequently, the whole range 
of liability, restoration and financing issues relating to already existing contaminated 
and abandoned sites is not covered. Furthermore, the Directive does not include the 
traditional damage (personal injury and damage to property), because this is, to a large 
extent, already recoverable under the liability laws of the Member States. Thus the 
scope of the Directive is quite narrow. For example, there are over 30,000 cases of 
damage to environment every year in the UK, only about 1% will be covered by the 
Directive.439  
 
Since the focus of my thesis is liability issue involving the carriage of dangerous cargo, 
I am not going to comment on all of the core issues of this Directive, but will only give 
a brief presentation of the directive and then focus on the relationship between the ELD 
and the international regime, such as CLC/ Fund and HNS Conventions. 
5.3.1 Private Law vs. Public Law 
As noted above, the Directive does not deal with the relations between a victim and a 
private operator or polluter. Rather, it puts the emphasis on the environment: where 
environmental damage has occurred or is imminent, remedial or preventative action is 
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 Article 14(2) 
437
 For further discussion on the Review scheme of the Directive, see Malhorzata A Nesterowicz, The application of 
the environmental liability directive to damage caused by pollution from ships, [2007] LMCLQ 107, at 116.  
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 Klaphake, Axel, The Assessment and Restoration of Biodiversity Damages—Some remarks on environmental 
damage under the Directive 2004/35, J.E.E.P.L. 2005 (4), pp 268-276, at 269. 
439
 See “Implementation of the EC Directive on Environment Liability: the Environmental Damage (Prevention and 
Remediation) Regulations 2009”, [2009] Journal of Planning and Environmental Law, 823 
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necessary to restore the environment. By leaving compensation for “traditional damage” 
(personal injury and property damage) to the legislation of Member States, the Directive 
is based on the assumption that differences in the Member States’ legal provisions on 
these issues can be tolerated in an internal market and that these differences are not so 
important as to require EC-wide harmonisation.440 
 
Furthermore, one of the key lessons from national experience throughout the 
industrialised world was that civil liability alone, in the sense of private-law actions for 
cost recovery or injunctive relief, had proved insufficient to secure consistent 
environmental clean-up, not least because the civil courts had raised all sorts of 
principled objections to vigorous enforcement by this means, making civil-law rulings 
highly unpredictable and thereby putting public authority funds at risk. As a result, there 
was a clear trend at national level to rely extensively on administrative order powers and 
other public-law obligations to ensure that responsible parties born their share of the 
liability for repairing the damage they had caused or allowed happened.441 In the legal 
systems of the various Member States the role of public law is gradually being 
recognised, but in what situations and to what extent the public authority can and should 
intervene, particularly in case of biodiversity damage, is to a large extent still the subject 
of debate.442 
 
Nevertheless, the ELD centres on the state’s liability to intervene not only to restore but 
also to prevent environmental damage in the emphasis of EU environmental policy from 
civil liability in private law to public law. 
 
The Directive requires member states to set up an administrative system to require 
environmental restoration or preventive measures from an operator.443 The Directive 
recognises the right of a competent authority to take appropriate action. The basic 
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 Kramer, Directive 2004/35/EC on Environmental Liability, E.L.M. (2004) Vol. 16(1), pp5-13, at 7. 
441
 Clarke, Chris, The Proposed EC Liability Directive: Half-Way Through Co-Decision, (2003) 12 (3), RECIEL, 
pp254-268, at 259, for example the shift from Section 107 cost-recovery actions to Section 106 abatement orders in 
the history of CERCLA enforcement in the USA and the decision in the UK to supplement the cost-recovery 
provisions in the Water Resources Act 1991 by a works notice procedures, as well as the remedial notice powers 
under the Part IIA contaminated-land regime. See the UK’s Environmental Protection Act 1990, Part IIA. 
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 Faure & Wang, op. cit., p64 
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 Lee, Maria, The Changing Aims of Environmental Liability, (2002) 14 (4), E.L.M. pp189-196, at 190 
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scheme is that the competent public authority will require the operator who has caused 
the damage or the threat of damage to take preventive measures and to restore the 
environment at its own cost.444 The obligation placed on the operator to take remedial 
action was limited to “practicable” steps,445 which contains the notion of being limited 
to financially reasonable steps. Furthermore, the operator was entitled to discuss with 
the administration the remedial measures to be taken (Article 7(2)); and the 
administrative authorities were advised not to provide for remedial measures where they 
considered the costs to be disproportionate.446 
 
Overall, the discussions on environmental liability show, although the Directive still 
refers to “liability”, this is really a very different notion from that anticipated in the 
White Paper and Green Paper. In spite of the wording in the title and some of the 
provisions, the Directive is not a liability regime in the classical sense of the word since 
a right to compensation for private parties is expressly excluded.447 The Directive is 
essentially a public law instrument, putting monitoring and control by the competent 
authorities at the centre of things, dealing with clean-up costs and natural resources 
damages and excluding the possibility of recovery of economic damage by private 
parties.448  
 
Nonetheless, it is still arguable that such an administrative approach is more appropriate 
than the civil liability regime.449 Moreover, no guarantee that a public law regime is 
sufficient to deal with environmental liability and compensation.450 Thus there is still 
room for improvement in this area, such as within the so-called Erika III package in 
2005, a proposal for Directive451 “on the civil liability and financial guarantees of 
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 Directive 2004/35, Articles 6-8. 
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 Directive 2004/35, Article 6(1)(a). 
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 Directive 2004/35, Annex II, No. 1.3.3 (b). 
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 See Directive 2004/35, Article 3(3) and recitals 11 and 14. 
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449
 The Commission considered that the issue is not whether the liability regime is desirable, but rather if it is 
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justification for this approach. See Bergkamp, Lucas, The Proposed Environmental Liability Directive, [2002] 
European Environmental Law Review, pp 294-314. See also Faure & Wang, op. cit., p64 
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 Doc COM (2005) 593 final (23 November 2005).  
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shipowners” was introduced.452 A detailed analysis of the proposal is clearly beyond 
the scope of this thesis.  
5.3.2 Relationship with International Conventions 
Although the scope of the Directive 2004/35 is quite broad in respect of the activities 
which are regulated, there is one main exception which significantly undermines the 
effectiveness of the liability scheme, namely, the exclusion of accidents regulated by 
certain listed international conventions. Article 4(2) excludes from the scope of the 
Directive incidents falling within the scope of the international conventions listed in 
Annex IV.453 Furthermore, Article 4(4) provides that the same shall apply with respect 
to nuclear damage regulated by the Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy 
Community or by the international conventions listed in Annex V.  
 
All of these conventions are private (compensation) law regimes, allowing for (usually 
monetary) compensation for all types of “classical damage”. This includes 
environmental damage in so far as this constitutes damage in the sense of private law.454 
For example, the traditional damage (personal injury and damage to property) is 
regulated under the CLC/ Fund and HNS Conventions, while compensation for 
environmental damage under these conventions is limited to the costs of reasonable 
restoration measures. This includes preventive measures when there is threat of such 
damage.455 An interesting question is, of course, what the relationship is between the 
recent directive and the international conventions. 
 
                                                       
452
 The proposed directive aims to lay down a set of rules “applicable to certain aspects of the obligations on 
operators in the maritime transport chain as regards civil liability” (Article 1). It requests every Member State (i) to 
become a contracting party to the 1996 LLC (Article 4) and (ii) to ensure that every owner of a ship flying its flag or 
the flag of a third state which enters the waters under its jurisdiction has a financial guarantee for civil liability 
(Article 5). See also Carbone, Munari and Schiano di Pepe, The environmental liability directive and liability for 
damage to the marine environment, [2008] 1 Env. Liability, p.21. 
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 Article IV includes several conventions on oil pollution damage, transport of hazardous substances by sea and 
carriage of dangerous goods by road, rail and inland waterways. There are five international conventions listed in 
Annex IV, they are 1992 CLC, 1992 Fund, 2001 Bunker, 1996 HNS and 1989 CRTD conventions. All of them are in 
civil liability regimes but only the first two came into force. Article 4(2) provides that the Directive applies if the 
relevant conventions are not in force in the Member States (if they are not members of the 1992 CLC/ Fund) or the 
relevant international conventions haven’t been ratified by a sufficient number of states to enter into force (i.e. 
Bunker, HNS and CRTD). 
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 Oosterveen, Willem, Some Recent Developments Regarding Liability for Damage Resulting from Oil 
Pollution—form the perspective of an EU Member State, Environmental Law Review, 2004 6(4), pp223-239, at 234. 
455
 The very limited definition of pollution damage in the CLC 1992, HNS 1996 has been criticized inter alia, see the 
discussion in sections 5.2.1.3 and 5.2.2.3 
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First of all, it should be noted that the geographical ambit of ELD is very different from 
that of the international conventions (e.g. CLC456). For example, in the United Kingdom, 
for the purpose of water damage, the ELD will apply to the water out to 1 nautical mile 
seaward from the baseline around UK (consistent with the Water Framework Directive 
2000/60/EC,457 and “coastal wasters” is expressly included in the definition of “surface 
water” under the this Directive).458 In addition, the scope of application of negligence 
liability for damage to biodiversity is limited to species and habitats within the Natura 
2000 areas459 which have been established under the EU 1992 Habitats Directive 
(92/43/EEC) and the 1979 Birds Directive (79/409/EEC). For the purpose of protected 
species and natural habitats, the EDL will apply out to 12 nautical miles.460  In 
comparison, the application of 1992 CLC/ Fund conventions has further geographic 
scope into the sea. These international conventions covers pollution damage suffered in 
the territory, territorial sea or EEZ or equivalent area of a State Party to the 
Conventions.461 
 
At present, the EU Habitats Directive lists 229 habitat types, 1064 animal and plant 
species, and the Birds Directive identifies 193 vulnerable and threatened bird species.462 
The so called Natura 2000 network includes over 22,000 individual sites, which 
covering almost 17% of EU land area as well as 140,000 km2 of marine area. In 
contrast, the purely ecological damage is excluded from the scope of international 
conventions. That is to say the CLC/ Fund conventions and HNS Convention will not be 
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 Coastal water bodies cover coastal waters up to 1 mile seaward from the baseline from which the breadth of UK 
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460
 See the Draft Guidance for the ELD Regulations (Northern Island) at 
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 See discussion in section 5.2.1.3 
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 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/157&format=HTML (accessed 20/07/2010) 
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applied to pure environmental damage, such as biodiversity damage.463  
 
The Commission had proposed a complete exclusion of all incidents covered by these 
conventions and justified this proposal by arguing that, even though the conventions did 
not necessarily provide for the same liability regime and were not all ratified by all 
Member States, they “present the advantage of ensuring a global or regional 
harmonisation.”464 As we know, the Community legislation has managed to keep out of 
the Directive the most dangerous activities, in respect of which the Environmental 
Liability Directive was most needed. Particularly in relation to oil pollution damage, 
since it was arguably the occurrence of the Erika and Prestige incidents both along the 
European coast465 which gave impetus to get a liability directive moving at a time when 
the whole idea was drifting aimlessly around Brussels.466 However, the exception 
clauses in Article 4(2) and 4(4) are quite ambiguous in certain respects, which call into 
question just how far-reaching these provisions really are. 
 
The most important question concerns the scope of the exceptions in Article 4(2) and 
4(4)—does the Directive 2004/35 cease to apply altogether where the damaging activity 
is regulated by one of the listed conventions, or does it only become inapplicable in so 
far as the damage is regulated, whilst still applying to damage which falls outside the 
conventions? 
 
As we know many EU Member States (including UK) are parties to these existing 
regimes (e.g. CLC/Fund 1992) and therefore have treaty obligations accordingly. Article 
1(6) of CLC 1992 states “pollution damage… shall be limited to costs of reasonable 
measures of reinstatement of [the environment] actually undertaken or to be 
undertaken”. This is clearly a significantly less developed notion of environmental 
damage than that laid down in the ELD, in particular in respect of “biodiversity 
                                                       
463
 See discussions later in this section. For details of the Geographical Scope of CLC/ Fund, see section 5.2.1.3  
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 Commission explanatory memorandum, COM (2002) 17, no. 6.3 
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 The Erika accident in 1999 was actively used by the Commission to promote the need for a proposal, see 
Explanatory Memorandum to the Commission’s Proposal for an Environmental liability Directive (COM (2002) 17), 
whilst the Prestige catastrophe in November 2002 caused public outcry, which presumably alerted the Parliament and 
the Council to the need for inter alia a liability directive. 
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 Wenneras, A Progressive Interpretation of the Environmental Liability Directive, J.E.E.P.L. 2005 (4), pp257-267, 
at 258. 
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damage”. There is a question, for example in a case where oil tanker runs ashore on the 
European coast, whether Article 4(2)467 should be interpreted as completely excluding 
the applicability of the Directive, or whether the Directive complements the relevant 
conventions to the extent that the relevant damage is not covered, e.g. in respect of loss 
of biodiversity?  
 
As the author understands, Article 4(2) does not clearly exclude the application of ELD 
in this situation. Indeed, after reading the awkward phrase of Article 4(2) word for 
word,468 we can see the Directive still covering “biodiversity damage”, even if in the 
situation that other damages are regulated by CLC/ Fund Conventions. 
 
For example, the main sentence of Article 4(2) referring to “damage arising from an 
incident …[which]… falls within the scope of any of the International Conventions 
listed in Annex”, it seems that any damage caused by e.g. an oil pollution incident, and 
which thus fell within some of the conventions in Annex IV was sufficient to exclude 
the application of the Directive. However, the inclusion of the words “which liability or 
compensation falls within the scope” suggests that the Directive only becomes 
inapplicable to the extent that the international conventions actually impose liability for 
the damage caused. Therefore, considering “biodiversity damage” which falls outside of 
the scope of CLC/Fund Conventions, the Directive should still regulate it.  
 
Another question is: how do the channelling provisions of the 1992 CLC interact with 
the ELD public liabilities on parties connected with an oil spill other than the shipowner? 
The international regime channels liability to the shipowner. That means claims for 
pollution damage can be made only against the registered shipowner.469 He has strict 
liability for pollution damage caused by oil spilled from his tanker and he has very few 
possibilities to exonerate himself.470 The CLC prohibits claims against the servants or 
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 Article 4(2), “This Directive shall not apply to environmental damage or to any imminent threat of such damage 
arising from an incident in respect of which liability or compensation falls within the scope of any of the International 
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 Ibid., Article 4(2).   
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 The shipowner is entitled to take recourse action against third parties in accordance with national law. 
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 He is exempt from liability under the 1992 CLC only if he proves that: (a) the damage resulted from an act of war 
or a grave natural disaster, or (b) the damage was wholly caused by sabotage by a third party, or (c) the damage was 
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agents of the owner, members of the crew, the pilot, the charterer (including bareboat 
charterer), manager or operator of the ship, or any person carrying out salvage 
operations or preventive measures.471 However, this does not preclude victims from 
claiming compensation outside these Conventions from persons other than the 
shipowner, e.g. under their national civil liability laws.  
 
In addition, a more interesting question arises here: whether these persons (e.g. 
charterers) who are not liable under the CLC/Fund conventions, either by express 
exclusion or implicitly, might fall under the definition of “operator” under Article 2 para 
6 of the ELD,472 and thus face liability pursuant to the ELD? As discussed above, the 
Directive is essentially a public law instrument, putting monitoring and control by the 
public authorities at the centre of things, dealing with clean-up costs and natural 
resources damage and excluding the possibility of recovery of economic damage by 
private parties. In a case that the damage (e.g. biodiversity damage) falls in the scope 
and thus covered by the ELD, if the polluter is liable under the Directive, the public 
authorities need to identify liable polluter (e.g. a bareboat charterer) and determine 
which remedial measures to be taken. If the pollution has occurred or about to occur, 
they must require the polluter to take actions to remedy (or prevent) the damage in 
accordance with the polluter pays principle.473 Consequently, the charterer who is not 
liable under the channelling provisions of 1992 CLC, may fall under definition of 
“operator” and be held liable for preventing and remedying the pure environmental 
damage under the ELD. Moreover, the CLC departs partly from the polluter pays 
principle on which the Directive is based. Under the CLC/Fund regime, the shipowner 
still has strict liability for all types of “classical” damage474 caused by oil spilled from 
                                                                                                                                                                  
wholly caused by the negligence of public authorities in maintaining lights or other navigational aids. For details see  
discussion in section 5.2.1.3  
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 Article III para 4 of the 1992 CLC 
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 It provides as follow: “‘operator’ means any natural or legal, private or public person who operates or controls the 
occupational activity or, where this is provided for in national legislation, to whom decisive economic power over the 
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 “Polluter Pays Principle” is stipulated under Article 1 as well as in recitals 2 and 18 of Directive 2004/35. See also 
Malgorzata A Nesterowicz, The application of the Environmental Liability Directive to damage caused by pollution 
from ships, [2007] L.M.C.L.Q. 107. 
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 For example, claims involving personal injuries, damage to property or economic loss. According to the IOPC 
Fund, liability for environmental damage is limited to measures for reinstatement of the environment, preventive 
measures and loss of profit directly linked to this damage. 
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his tanker as a result of the same incident. 
 
In the author’s view, if Article 4(2) is interpreted as above, it will result in confusion and 
conflict between the application of ELD and international conventions, particularly 
considering the recovery of environmental damage from one single incident will be 
regulated by two different regimes at the same time. Obviously, this result is far from 
satisfactory. It is expected that European Court of Justice will solve the problem by case 
law. Otherwise, it will be left for the Commission to clarify during further reviews475 of 
the Directive by 2014.476   
  
In addition, in the case of chemical explosion or bunker pollution, the EU Directive will 
apply to damage to the marine environment in the EU states in which the maritime 
liability conventions are not in force (i.e. 1996 HNS and 2001 Bunker conventions). 
Under the Directive 2004/35, there is a way for the public authority to claim for the 
birds and flowers, but the public authorities will have difficulty to claim for economic 
damage threatening their livelihood. Moreover, if the protection of the Directive is 
chosen, at the same time the protection of the international regimes offered to claimants 
in respect of all other types of damage (i.e. classical damage) will be entirely lost. In 
this situation, one solution is that the public authorities can use their general private law 
regimes in their countries, i.e. sue the liable polluter under national civil liability laws. 
 
As we know, under the HNS Convention 1996, it is possible for claimants (both the 
authorities and private) to claim for replacement or repair cost for damaged property, 
loss of life and personal injury, and quantifiable economic losses such as loss of income 
due to restriction on fishing or reduced custom for hotelier.477  Therefore it was 
considered wiser to accept the existing international regimes in respect of environmental 
                                                       
475
 Article 18 (1), “Member States shall report to the Commission on the experience gained in the application of this 
Directive by 30 April 2013 at the latest. The reports shall include the information and data set out in Annex VI”. 
Article 18(2), “on that basis the Commission shall submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council 
before 30 April 2014, which shall include any appropriate proposals for amendment”. 
476
 Thus the States are free to indicate to the Commission all difficulties whatsoever encountered in the 
implementation of the Directive. We can see the Community legislator gave the commission the task of investigating 
certain, particular questions as a matter of routine. Accordingly, the Commission must, notably, examine the 
application of Article 4 (2) and (4) referring to the exclusion of directive in respect of certain pollutions and activities 
and the right of the operator to limit its liability in conformity with certain international conventions. 
477
 See details in section 5.2.2.3 
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damage (after they come into force), in order to preserve the benefits these regimes are 
offering to (both the authorities and private) claimants in respect of all other types of 
damage. 
5.3.3 Further Discussion and Analysis 
From the discussion above, we can see the ELD does not really offer a real civil liability 
regime, but mainly a public law regime to be enforced by competent authorities, 
combined with private law aspects as strict liability and fault-based liability. 
 
The approach of the ELD differs from most existing liability conventions in three main 
respects. Firstly, it does not cover “traditional” types of damage to persons and to 
property and various kinds of economic loss, but only “environmental” damage, 
including damage to biodiversity, comprising the cost of preventive measures, clean-up 
costs and restoration.478 Secondly, liability for damage caused by these “hazardous” 
activities will be strict, while liability for damage caused by other activities will be 
based on fault. Thirdly, the Directive requires the “operator” to take measures to prevent 
or to mitigate the damage, to clean up the pollution substance and to restore the 
environment.479 Moreover, the Directive imposes a duty on public authorities to require 
the operator take these measures.480 
 
The fundamental difference in focus regarding the environment leads to three specific 
differences in relation to natural resources damage. Firstly, contrary to the provisions of 
ELD, the introduction of equivalent components is not covered in the international 
maritime liability regime. Secondly, while the ELD encompasses compensation for loss 
of use of natural resources and for non-use values (such as “existence value”) during the 
period of rehabilitation or restoration (so-called “interim loss”), the international regime 
does not. Thirdly, where the original site is so badly damaged that it cannot be restored, 
the EU regimes provide for the creation or acquisition of an “equivalent” site in a 
                                                       
478
 The types of damage covered are damage to biodiversity protected at European and national levels; damage to 
waters as regulated under European legislation; and contaminated land posing a threat to human health, all resulting 
from occupational activities listed in Annex I 
479
 Article 5(1) 
480
 Article 5(2)(3)(4) 
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nearby area. In contrast, in the CLC/Fund regime, where the original environment 
cannot be restored, no compensation is available. Measures taken at a nearby area are 
only compensable if they contribute to the restoration of the damaged site. 
 
Considering the relationship between the Directive and international maritime 
conventions, the Directive does not apply to environmental damage within the scope of 
the CLC, Fund, HNS and Bunkers Conventions, except for the maritime liability 
conventions are not in force in the Member States. However, from the words in the 
Directive, it is unclear whether Article 4(2) should be interpreted as completely 
excluding the application of the Directive; or the Directive only becomes inapplicable in 
so far as the damage is regulated by international conventions listed in Annex IV, while 
still applying to damage which falls outside the conventions (e.g. biodiversity).  
 
The author is in favour of the former, given the ELD is intended to complement the 
international conventions. Otherwise, if both regimes are applicable to one incident, it 
will result in a conflict between EU members’ obligations under the Community law 
and those under international law. Presumably, for the unrecoverable damages under the 
international regimes, the claimants can pursue them in national laws. 
 
Unlike the international conventions (e.g. CLC/Fund or HNS), the ELD does not make 
it compulsory for operator take out insurance, but leaves it to member states to 
decide.481 Article 14(2) requires a review by 2010 and by then the commission might 
propose a system of financial security.482 In the author’s view, how the Directive affects 
the protection of environment in Europe, will depend on how the member states 
implement the Directive into national laws and how the Commission carrier out its 
review, including the issue of mandatory financial security.  
 
Obviously, the transposition of the Directive by member states has been cumbersome. 
                                                       
481
 Article 14(1) suggests that member states encourage the use and development of insurance products or other 
forms of financial security. 
482
 By the end of April 2010, the Member States are present reports to the Commission on the availability, prices and 
conditions of insurance and other types of financial security for the purpose of remedying environmental damage. 
The Commission might then decide to submit proposals for a system of harmonized mandatory financial security. By 
August 2010, the Commission has not made any formal decision regarding the financial security of ELD. 
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Until April 2007 (original deadline), only three states (Italy, Lithuania and Latvia) could 
transpose the Directive. England and Wales were very late to transpose it in March and 
May 2009.483 Separate regulations for Scotland entered into force in June 2009484 and 
for Northern Ireland in July 2009.485 Anyway, after the ELD is transposed into the 
domestic laws of Member states, we expect to see the environmental insurers will have 
developed policies to cover the risks imposed by it. 
5.4 A case study—the ECJ opinion arising from the 
Erika spill as to whether France had implemented 
the Waste Directive, in case C-188/07, June, 2008 
The Waste Directive 75/442/EEC486 established the fundamental principles for waste 
management in Europe and it applied horizontally487 and created liabilities.488 Unlike 
the Directive 2004/35/EC489 discussed above, the Waste Directive 75/442/EEC does not 
contain any provisions to exclude its application to incidents or activities in respect of 
which liability or compensation, that fall within the scope of the CLC/Fund regime. 
Moreover, Article 2(1)(b)(iv)490 of the Waste Directive does not exclude oil waste from 
                                                       
483
 The Environmental Damage (Prevention and Remediation) Regulations 2009 (SI 2009/153) came into force in 
March 2009. The Environmental Damage Regulations (Wales) came into force on 6th May 2009, SI 2009 No 995 (W. 
81), see the full text at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/wales/wsi2009/wsi_20090995_en_1. See also “Legislative 
Comment” at [2009] J.P.L. 7, 849-851 
484
 The Environmental Liability (Scotland) Regulations 2009 (SSI 266) came into form on 24th June 2009. See the 
full text at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/scotland/ssi2009/ssi_20090266_en_1 (accessed on 02/07/2010). The 
Executive note regarding the Regulatory Impact Assessment of Regulations 2009 (SSI 266) was given by Scottish 
Government Environmental Quality Directorate on 12th May 2009, see 
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/legislation/scotland/ssi2009/en/ssien_20090266_en.pdf (assessed on 02/07/2010). 
485
 The Environmental Damage (Prevention and Remediation) Regulations (North Ireland) 2009 (SR 252) came into 
operation on 24th July 2009. See the full text at http://www.opsi.gov.uk/sr/sr2009/nisr_20090252_en_1 (accessed on 
02/07/2010).  
486
 Council Directive 75/442/EEC of 15 July 1975 on Waste ( OJ 1975 L 194, p. 39) see the full text at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31975L0442:EN:HTML; and it was amended by 
Commission Decision 96/350/EC of 24 May 1996 (OJ 1996 L 135, p. 32). The codified version of Directive 
75/442/EEC is Directive 2006/12/EC, see the EU framework waste legislation at 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/waste/legislation/a.htm (accessed on 31/July/2009). The Directive 75/442 was 
implemented by the UK through the Environmental Protection Act 1990. 
487
 This legislation defines the different categories of waste and how waste should be managed and controlled. It also 
defines the duties of Waste Collection and Waste Disposal Authorities, and sets out the Duty of Care applicable to all 
those handling and disposing of waste. It applies from landfill to how to reuse and recycle wastes.  
488
 See further discussion about Directive 75/442/EEC at 
http://www.northlincs.gov.uk/NR/rdonlyres/B47A0E15-92B2-4D74-B212-C291E3A4AD95/29995/Appendix2Legisl
ation2.pdf 
489
 The Directive 2004/35 expressly provides in Article 4(2) that it is not to apply to an incident or activity in respect 
of which liability or compensation falls within the scope of any of the international conventions listed in Annex IV, 
which mentions the CLC and Fund Conventions 
490
 Under this provision, waste wasters, with the exception of waste in liquid form, are excluded from the scope of 
the Waste Directive where waste waters are already covered by other legislation. Oil waste does not constitute waste 
waters since it does not result from the use or consumption of water. In so far as it is (still) liquid at all, it is in fact 
liquid waste. Therefore, the heavy fuel oil is to be treated as waste for the purpose of the Waste Directive if it is 
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the scope of the directive. This results into some confusion as to the relationship 
between EU Waste Directive and international conventions. However, this problem was 
dealt with by the ECJ in the landmark case Commune de Mesquer v Total France SA.491 
 
The background to this case was concerning the responsibility for the cleanup costs to 
the environment after the Erika oil spill along the French coast. The municipality of 
Mesquer, one of the coastal regions directly impacted by the Erika oil spills, had 
brought proceedings in the French court against the companies in the Total group.492 
The municipality claimed for reimbursement of the cost of clean up and anti-pollution 
operations on its coastal territory, based on the Waste Directive 75/442/EEC.493 
 
The claimant argued that the hydrocarbons accidentally spilt at sea constituted waste 
within the meaning of the Directive. Therefore the companies Total International Ltd 
and Total France should be liable for the cost of disposal in their capacity as “previous 
holders” or “producer of the product from which the waste came” respectively.494 In 
order for a French court to give judgment on this matter, the Court de Cassation (France) 
referred the matter to the ECJ for its interpretation of the applicable provisions in EC 
law regarding the following issues. 
 
Firstly, whether the heavy fuel oil accidentally spilt at sea following a shipwreck could 
be classified as waste within the meaning of the Directive (or whether they were to be 
classified as heavy hydrocarbons within the meaning of the CLC/FUND conventions 
and so should be covered exclusively by those conventions)? 
 
The Court’s answer was that the heavy oil was spilt at sea must be classified as waste 
within the meaning of Directive 75/442,495 since it was discharged in a tanker accident 
                                                                                                                                                                  
discharged in a tanker accident and is mixed with water and sediment 
491
 Case C-188/07, European Court of Justice (Grand Chamber) made its decision on 24th June 2008. For details see 
[2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 672, [2009] Env. L.R. 9, at 109. 
492
 Commune de Mesquer v Total France SA, Total International Ltd, (under French Law No 75-633). 
493
 See footnote 491 
494
 Article 15 of Directive 75/442/EEC on waste provided that, in accordance with the “polluter pays” principle, the 
cost of disposing of “waste” should be borne by the “holder” and/or “the previous holders or the producer of the 
product from which the waste came”. 
495
 See ECJ Judgment, paras 57 to 59; see also [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 672, at 673 
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and was mixed with water and sediment.496 
 
Second question: whether the undertakings in the Total Group must bear the cost of oil 
pollution disposal because they produced the heavy fuel oil spill (the “producer”) and 
arranged its transportation in the tanker (the “seller” and “carrier”, can be regarded as 
the holder of waste within the meaning of Art.1(b) and (c) of the Waste Directive)?497 
In the author’s view, this is a more interesting and challenging question. The real issue 
is: France is a party to the CLC/ Fund Conventions, and if the ECJ decide the producer 
remains liability under the Waste Directive even if the spill is within the CLC, that will 
effectively exclude the application of the international Conventions. 
 
As we discussed previously, under Article III (4) of the CLC “no claim for 
compensation for pollution damage under this Convention or otherwise may be made 
against … any charterer (howsoever described, including a bareboat charterer), manager 
or operator of the ship… unless the damage resulted from their personal act or omission, 
committed with the intent to cause damage…” This means liability for oil pollution 
damage is “channeled” to the owner of the ship, whilst claims against others, in 
particular against a charterer like Total International Ltd, are precluded.  
 
In the author’s opinion, since the responsibility for costs in connection with oil pollution 
damage at sea is regulated by the CLC/FUND Conventions, which have been ratified by 
nearly all EU Member States, it makes common sense that international rules should 
take precedence over the application of regional legislation, such as art. 15 of the Waste 
Directive 75/442/EEC.498 Otherwise, if both schemes are applicable to the current case 
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 See ECJ Judgment, paras 63. Such hydrocarbons spilt at sea following a shipwreck, mixed with water and 
sediment and drifting along the coastline of a Member State until being washed up on shore, must be regarded as 
substances which their holder did not intend to produce and which he “discarded”, albeit involuntarily, while they are 
being transported, so that they must be classified as waste under Directive 75/442. See also [2009] Env. L.R. 9, at 
127. 
497
 We can specify the question as: Whether, in the event of the sinking of an oil tanker, the producer of the heavy 
fuel oil spilt at sea, the seller of the fuel or the charterer of the ship carrying the fuel could be required to bear the cost 
of disposing of the consequent waste, even where the substance spilt at sea was transported by a third party, namely 
the carrier by sea? See [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 672, at 673 
498
 Article 15 of the Waste Directive lays down rules governing responsibility for the cost of disposing of waste. 
Under the first indent, in accordance with the “polluter pays” principle it is the responsibility of the holder who has 
waste handled by a waste collector or by an undertaking as referred to in art.9. In addition, the second indent 
mentions the previous holders or the producer of the product from which the waste came. It is therefore possible that 
Total France is responsible for the costs as producer of the heavy fuel oil, i.e. as producer of the product from which 
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at the same time, it would result in a conflict between EU members’ obligations under 
the Community law and those under international law. 
 
However, the ECJ took a different view based on: firstly the community was not bound 
by the CLC/FUND Conventions;499 secondly the obligation of a member state to take 
all the measures necessary to achieve the result prescribed by the Waste Directive 
75/442 was a binding obligation.  
 
To begin with, The Court must determine whether in accordance with the “polluter 
pays” principle,500 Total France and possibly Total International Ltd must bear the cost 
of disposing the oil waste because they fall within the group of persons referred to in art. 
15 of the Waste Directive.501 From the following interpretation of the ECJ, the answer 
is presumably “Yes” and there is possibility for the Total Group to bear the costs.  
 
The Court considered that the Waste Directive does not preclude the Member States 
from providing, pursuant to the CLC/Fund Conventions, for limitation or exemption of 
liability for the benefit of the shipowner and the charterer, or from establishing a fund 
(IOPC Fund). If, however, the cost of disposing of the waste is not or cannot be borne 
by that fund502 and, in accordance with the limitations and/or exemptions of liability 
laid down, the national law of a member state, including the law derived from 
                                                                                                                                                                  
the waste came. This can apply to Total International Ltd, on the other hand, only if it was the holder or at least the 
former holder of the oil waste.  
499
 It should be noted that both CLC and FUND conventions have been ratified by most of the EU Member States, 
but not by the Community. Accordingly, they are not part of community law and not binding on the Community. For 
details see [2009] Env. L.R. 9, at 129. 
500
 Under Article 8 of Directive 75/442, any “holder of waste” is obliged to have it handled by a private or public 
waste collector or by an undertaking which carries out the operations listed in Annex II A or B to the Directive, or to 
recover or dispose of it himself in accordance with the provisions of the Directive (Commission of the European 
Community v Ireland Case C-494/01 [2005] ERC I-3331, para 179). Directive 75/442 distinguishes the actual 
recovery or disposal operations, which it makes the responsibility of any “holder of waste”, whether producer or 
possessor, from the financial burden of those operations, which, in accordance with the “polluter pays” principle, it 
imposes on the persons who cause the waste, whether they are holders or former holders of the waste or even 
producers of the product from which the waste came (Van de Walle, para 58). The application of the “polluter pays” 
principle within the meaning of the second sentence of the first subparagraph of article 174(2) EC and article 15 of 
Directive 75/442 would be frustrated if such persons involved in causing waste escaped their financial obligations as 
provided for by that Directive, even though the origin of the hydrocarbons which were spilt at sea, albeit 
unintentionally, and caused pollution of the coastal territory of a member state was clearly established. 
501
 In the circumstance of this case, the Waste Directive provides that costs must be borne by the “previous holders” 
or the “producer of the product from which the waste came” within the meaning of Art. 1(b) and (c). Under Art. 15 of 
the Directive, the producer and/or seller and carrier may be ordered to bear the cost of disposing the oil waste 
following a shipping accident if they can be accused of contributing personally to causing the leak of the heavy fuel 
oil. See also [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 672, at 682. 
502
 Alternatively cannot be borne by the fund because the ceiling for compensation for that accident has been 
reached. 
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international agreements, prevents that cost from being borne by the shipowner and the 
charterer, even though they are to be regarded as “holders” within the meaning of article 
1(c) of Directive 75/442. Such a national law will then, in order to ensure that article 15 
of that Directive is correctly transposed, have to make provision for that cost to be 
borne by the “producer of the product from which the waste came”. In accordance with 
the “polluter pays” principle, however, such a producer cannot be liable to bear that cost 
unless he has contributed by his conduct, to the risk that the pollution caused by the 
shipwreck will occur.503 
 
From the ECJ decision, we can draw the conclusion: First, spill oil is waste under the 
EU Waste Directive. Secondly, the producer of the substance from which the waste 
came has to pay for the clean-up. Finally, this liability remains in existence even if the 
spill is within the CLC, i.e. there is no implied exclusion from the Directive of spills 
covered by the CLC.  
 
Why this decision is so important? Surely it opens the way for the Commune of 
Mesquer to proceed with its suit for cleanup costs against Total as the producer of the 
waste,504 and will doubtless lead to many other such suits arising from the Erika 
disaster, and other serious oil spills in Europe such as the Prestige in 2002. However, it 
should be borne in mind that under Article III (4) of the CLC, liability for oil pollution 
damage is “channeled” to the shipowner, whilst claims against a charterer (i.e. Total) are 
precluded. Most EU member states have ratified the CLC/Fund.505 This means the ECJ 
decision, to certain extent, effectively excluded the application of CLC/ Fund in the EU. 
 
Frankly speaking, the author is not in favour of the ECJ decision. Firstly, the author 
does not think the court should answer the question relating to the responsibility for 
costs in connection with the leaked heavy fuel oil, particularly relating to issues of 
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 For details see ECJ, Press Release No 39/08; [2008] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 672, at 674 
504
 It endorses one of the key environmental principles—the “polluter pays principle”. Based on it, the financial 
liability should be imposed on the producer of the waste for the cost of disposing of waste caused by the sinking of an 
oil tanker. 
505
 By August 2009, the EU’s membership stands at 27, and with the exception of Austria, Czech Republic, Romania 
and Slovakia, 23 of them are parties to both 1992 CLC and 1992 Fund Conventions. 
http://www.imo.org/includes/blastDataOnly.asp/data_id%3D26103/status-x.xls 
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liability in the main proceedings. It must be noted that art.15 of the Directive does not 
establish any rules on liability,506 in particular because there are no rules therein 
governing the selection of the party responsible for bearing the cost.507 Secondly, for 
avoiding a conflict with international regime, the application of Directive 75/442 should 
be excluded because the CLC/Fund Conventions apply to the Erick.508 Thirdly, if 
possible, the Waste Directive should be revised to clarify that it would not apply to an 
incident or activity in respect of which liability or compensation fell within the scope of 
the CLC/FUND Conventions or the HNS Convention/ Protocol. 
5.5 Concluding remarks on EU law 
In Europe, the environment does not fare well under existing national schemes for civil 
liability. An enhanced public liability system can address some of these problems but 
will not, of itself, ensure that environmental damage does not occur nor that finance will 
always be available to restore the environment when damage does occur.  
 
The Environmental Liability Directive is considered to be one of the most controversial 
and potentially far-reaching pieces of environmental legislation negotiated by the EU. 
Considering the carriage of dangerous cargoes, the EU Directive will apply to damage 
to the marine environment in the EU states in which the international maritime liability 
conventions are not in force (e.g. HNS Convention 1996). In section 5.3, the author has 
discussed the relationship between the ELD and international regime and pointed out 
the scope of Art. 4(2)) should be clarified and need further interpretation. 
 
By July 2010, it is still too early to draw any conclusion as to which extent and what 
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 Article 15 designates only the group of those who may possibly be responsible for hearing the cost, from whom it 
is necessary to select the person who is to bear the costs, in accordance with the polluter pays principle. Unfortunately, 
the Waste Directive does not constitute clear and definitive rules on responsibility for costs. The polluter pays 
principle can and must be clarified further. This is a priority task for the legislature. For details see [2009] Env. L.R. 9, 
at 136. 
507
 This was maintained by the United Kingdom at the hearing and the author agrees with this argument.  
508
 Issues of liability and compensation for oil spills have already been covered by the CLC/Fund Conventions and 
France is party to them. In addition, there are several non-binding Community instruments cited by Total which state 
that oil pollution damage is subject to the CLC/Fund Conventions. For example, the First Environmental Action 
Programme [1973] OJ C112, p.1; the Commission proposal for Council directive on civil liability for damage caused 
by waste [[1989] OJ C251, p.3; the Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the 
Council on the safety of the seaborne oil trade COM(2000) 142 fin., p. 6; and answers to two Parliamentary questions 
given by the Commission. For details see [2009] Env. L.R. 9, at 132. 
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timeframe the provisions of ELD and the Directive 2005/35 can be fully transposed into 
Member States’ national laws. However, we have to admit that some positive actions 
have been taken by the UK as to implementation, e.g. the Environmental Damage 
(Prevention and Remediation) Regulations 2009 (England, Wales). And separate 
regulations came into force in Scotland and Northern Ireland in June and July 2009. 
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Chapter 6 An Important Approach of 
Establishing Liability—Causation and 
Remoteness 
 
Surely, liability and compensation will inevitably run into one another.1 The extent of 
liability can not be separated from the amount and type of damage recoverable. In the 
absence of international regulations on the compensation of damages caused by 
dangerous cargoes,2 it is suitable to apply the principles of the law of damages and to 
supplement them by the existing rules of maritime law. 
 
Once the claimant has established that their loss resulted from a tortious action or a 
breach of contract by the defendant, the amount of damages that will be recoverable will 
be assessed by reference to the general principles of causation and remoteness. These 
principles are applicable to claims both in tort and contract and many of the concepts 
are exactly the same. Where there are differences, I will deal with the distinct rules 
separately. 
 
There is a close interrelationship between the chain of causation and the remoteness of 
damages in English law. The rule of remoteness does not exist in China, so claims in 
respect of remoteness are not usually admitted, but Chinese maritime courts allow the 
award of damages for consequential losses on the basis of “proximate cause”.  
6.1 Causation in English Law 
Assuming the existence of a duty of care, liability will depend upon proof that the 
defendant’s tort or breach of contract has been a cause of the claimant’s loss.3 The 
approach of factual causation does not differ whether the claimant is suing for a tort or 
                                                       
1
 It is impossible to distinguish between the type of harm and the extent of the harm. See Ogus, The Law of Damages, 
1973, London: Butterworths, p. 247. 
2
 It is unlikely to see the, HNS Convention 1996/ Protocol come into force in near future, see 
http://www.imo.org/home.asp 
3
 As has been indicated, the question of causation arises both in statutory and common law claims (section 3.1).  
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breach of contract. Nevertheless, nearly all the important cases concern torts.4 In 
respect of the contractual liability, the same principles will apply, irrespective of 
whether the claim is made under a charterparty or a bill of lading, although the factual 
context may differ. 
 
As the leading authorities, Hart and Honore, point out,5 in practice causation is a 
disputed issue only when a number of separate actions by different people contributed 
to the harmful outcome, or where the harm occurred from an unusual set of 
circumstances. 
 
Casualties arising from the carriage of “dangerous” cargo can give rise to extremely 
difficult questions of causation.6 For example, in Royal Greek Government v. Minister 
of Transport,7 charterers ordered shipowners to load coal, admittedly a dangerous cargo 
because it gave off explosive gases. Subsequently, it proved necessary to carry out 
repairs to certain fresh-water tanks, during which, a flame or spark ignited the gas, 
damaging the ship. Was the damage attributed to the order to load the cargo (in which 
case the shipowner was entitled to be indemnified by the charterer) or did it result from 
the intervening creation of the spark or flame? The arbitrator held that it was the spark, 
and not the order, which caused the casualty. The Commercial Judge, after a very 
elaborate exposition of the legal doctrine of causation, held that since the arbitrator 
could not be shown to have misdirected himself, the owners’ claim indeed failed. Even a 
case of this kind, where there are only two rival contenders for the position of 
“proximate cause” can cause difficulties, but in practice one may find more than two 
competing causes for the loss. Thus, one may well have any combination of the 
following:8 
(1) “Fault” on the part of the shipper (e.g. failure to disclose the nature of the cargo, or to pack 
                                                       
4
 This is because of factual causation is usually a disputed issue only in respect of damages for personal injury or 
property damage, and such damages are generally sought in tort. Causation has plagued courts and scholars more than 
any other topic in the law of torts. See Fleming, op. cit. p 218. Burrows, Remedies for torts and breach of contract, 
3rd ed., op. cit, p. 45 
5
 Hart and Honore, Causation in the Law (1985: 2nd edition), chapters 6 and 8. 
6
 See Mustill, Carrier’s Liability and Insurance, in Gronfors (editor), Damage from Goods, (1978), 
Akademiforlaget-Gothenburg, p. 80. 
7
 (1949-1950) 83 Ll. L. Rep. 228 
8
 Mustill, Carrier’s Liability and Insurance, in Gronfors (editor), Damage from Goods, 1978, p. 81. 
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it properly); 
(2) Fault on the part of the carrier (e.g. failure to educate himself properly in the methods 
required to carry the cargo, or failure properly to use those methods of which he has 
knowledge); 
(3) “Non-faulty” acts or omissions of the carrier (e.g. ignorance of the special characteristics of 
the cargo in circumstances where he could not reasonably have been expected to know of 
them; this usually results from some breakdown of communication between the shipper and 
carrier); 
(4) The deliberate and wrongful act of a third party (e.g. sabotage); 
(5) The tortious act of a third party (e.g. simple negligence); 
(6) Bad luck (e.g. other events, unforeseeable and occurring without anyone’s fault at all). 
 
No doubt the list could be extended further. Ultimately, there is no philosophical or legal 
analysis which provides a reliable guide for ascertaining which of the competing causes 
is to be regarded as dominant. However the problem may be analysed in an elaborate 
language, but the decision is intuitive. Furthermore the intuitions of the Judges of 
different legal systems, or even of different Courts within the same legal systems, will 
not necessarily be the same.  
 
In this chapter, we will discuss issues particularly relevant to dangerous cargo in 
common law, including (a)joint causation, e.g. damage to the ship caused by a 
combination of collision and un-notified dangerous cargo, or partly by negligence on 
the part of stevedores, or by a storm at sea; (b) questions of proximate cause and 
foreseeability requirements in dangerous cargo cases; (c) the situation where damage 
would have occurred anyway but dangerous cargo made it worse; (d) the case where a 
ship is immobilised because of dangerous cargo on board, but there is some evidence 
that it might have been immobilised anyway by the decisions of the port authorities; and 
(e) proof of causation and recovery for loss of a chance.  
6.1.1 The Test of Causation: “but-for” 
Proof that a wrongful act caused injury or damage is an essential element of a cause of 
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action in both the contract and tort law.9 There must be a factual link between the 
negligence (or in breach of contract) and the injury (or damage). Normally it is decided 
by the application of the “but-for test”: but for the defendant’s breach of duty, would the 
claimant have suffered the loss concerned? 
 
If factual causation is satisfied, the claimant must then show that the defendant should 
be held legally responsible for the injury or damage. This is referring to proximate or 
legal causation, whether a superseding cause or a policy consideration should relieve the 
defendant of liability.  
 
The “but for” test is often entirely adequate in admiralty cases. It reflects the 
common-sense notion that if the harm would have been done even if the defendant had 
done no wrong, the defendant cannot be liable for it. But there is one case where it 
breaks down. This is where there are two concurrent events, each contributing to the 
harm, but each of which would have been sufficient on its own to cause it. For example, 
suppose dangerous inflammable cargoes belonging to two different shippers aboard the 
same vessel both ignite and cause the ship to sink. Logically under the “but-for” test 
both shippers will fail this test, since either shipper would have caused the damage in 
any event: this leads to a ridiculous result. 
 
A solution to this awkward situation is to use the substantial cause analysis.10 The 
analysis applies in a slightly different case: namely, where there are two events both 
satisfying the “but-for” test, but there is a need to determine which prevails. For 
example, in Royal Greek Government v. Minister of Transport,11 explosions were due to 
variety of causes (which included dangerous cargo), but the direct and proximate cause 
was the act which caused the spark and the explosive atmosphere. The arbitrator held 
that it was the spark, not the order to load the cargo, which caused the casualty.  
                                                       
9
 Schoenbaum, Admiralty and Maritime Law, (2001) 3rd ed., ST. Paul, Minn., p. 114. 
10
 It instructs to find the causation if the defendant’s act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about the 
injury. A pure “but for” test is insufficient to establish causation. See an American case, American River 
Transportation Co. v. Kavo Kaliakra SS, 148 F.3d 446, 450 (5th Cir. 1998). 
11
 (1949-1950) 83 Ll. L. Rep. 228 
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6.1.2 Proximate Cause 
“Proximate cause” places limits on liability for damage for which the defendant’s 
negligence has factually been a cause.12 In other words the “but-for” was not satisfied, 
but we allow liability, hence the “but-for” is satisfied, but nevertheless we deny liability. 
For example, if it is difficult to decide the damages caused by the negligence of the 
carrier or for undisclosed dangerous cargo, by a causation analysis, it may pinpoint 
which of the two competing breaches was the proximate cause of the loss. The 
defendant’s negligence has been established as a causal factor of the damage does not 
necessarily suffice for legal liability,13 unless his default is accounted as a “proximate” 
cause of the damage. 
 
Considering the carriage of dangerous cargo, there are often competing causes of a loss 
in a case where “but-for” is made out. In particular, the choice is most often between the 
dangerous cargo (whether arising from nondisclosure, improperly packing or warning, 
or whatever) and the carrier’s duties to care for the cargo. Here it needs to be clarified 
which is the substantial factor of the incident. In practice, if a carrier is in breach of the 
“care of cargo” provisions HR Art III.2,14 which are not said to have overriding status, 
the court is likely to fall back on the argument that the carrier must prove the loss was 
caused by the nature of dangerous cargo.15 Where damages are due to two competing 
causes, i.e. lack of due diligence on care for the cargo and misstated dangerous cargo, 
leads to the question of: which plays a substantial part in bringing in about the damage? 
By the substantial cause analysis, we will find the answer. 
 
In Islamic Investment Co Isa v. Transorient Shipping Ltd (The Nour),16 the vessel, MV 
Nour, was owned by Islamic, time-chartered to Transorient and voyage sub-contracted 
to Toepfer. The vessel carried fishmeal from Peru to Taiwan. A direct voyage would 
                                                       
12
 All systems of compensation, however ambitious, have their limits in respect of the class of beneficiaries and the 
type of relevant losses, in view of the practical need to draw a line somewhere so that the cost will not crush those 
who have to foot the bill. A practical task of drawing the line is by limiting the defendant’s default must be accounted 
as a “proximate” cause of the harm and the consequence must not be “remote”. 
13
 John G Fleming, The Law of Torts, 9th ed., p. 232. 
14
 See the discussion about Art. III 2 in section 4.2.1.5 
15
 For a more complex example, where two separate items of dangerous cargo were loaded at different places, one 
without consent and one with consent of carrier, and caused different damages, see The Kapitan Sakharov, above. 
16
 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 1; 1998 WL 1042536 (CA (Civ Div)).  
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have taken two months but the vessel deviated to load and discharge further cargo. The 
fishmeal overheated causing damage and delay so that the actual voyage took four 
months, including the delay caused by overheating.17 The shipowners claimed for the 
hire of the vessel against the time charterer, who joined the voyage charterer as third 
party.  
 
It was held by Evans L.J., the cause of the self heating of the cargo was inadequate 
treatment of the Peruvian fishmeal with anti-oxidant.18 The cause of the overheating 
was neither excessive ventilation nor the vessel’s deviation, but insufficient antioxidants 
in the cargo.19 The sub-charterer was responsible for the overheating and consequent 
damage and delay caused by the non-contractual cargo.20 The Court of Appeal also 
considered the question whether the sub-charterer was liable for delay in release of the 
vessel from arrest after discharge of the cargo. It was held, contrary to the judge’s 
decision,21  the sub-charterer did prove that there was unreasonable delay by the 
shipowner,22 so the shipowner was not entitled to recover damages for detention or 
delay in respect of that period.23 
6.1.3 Joint Causation 
When damages are brought in by two causes but are not easy to be separated, this leads 
to joint causation. Suppose, a ship was registered under the Kampuchean flag, carrying 
                                                       
17
 It took one month to deal with the overheating caused by the fishmeal. 
18
 The evidence of owners' and Transorient's experts was accepted that the cause of its self heating was inadequate 
treatment of the Peruvian fishmeal with anti-oxidant. It had not been effectively treated with anti-oxidant and, 
specifically, at the time of shipment, significant quantities of fishmeal did not have an anti-oxidant concentration of 
100 ppm, but something less than this. The fishmeal did not comply with the IMO Regulations, IMDG Code and the 
relevant part of the regulations dealing with anti-oxidant treated fishmeal (Class 9: miscellaneous dangerous 
substances) 
19
 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 1, at 14. 
20
 Transorient have shown that the cargo shipped by Toepfer did not conform to the contractual description, so 
Toepfer were in breach of the voyage charter and this breach has resulted in Transorient's losses. 
21
 On July 31, 1996, the judgment of Mr. Justice Tuckey held that the breach of the charterers in shipping Peruvian 
fishmeal which did not conform with the charterers' obligation caused the overheating of the cargo and consequent 
damages and delay. He also held that Transorient were liable to Toepfer for breach of the voyage charter by reason of 
wrongful deviation from the contractual route which extended the voyage by about a month, but that three months 
was no longer than the voyage might have taken if Transorient had made permitted use of the liberty to deviate. 
(Toepfer appealed arguing that a period after discharge when the vessel remained under arrest was caused by the 
shipowners’ unreasonable delay for which Toepfer was no liable.) 
22
 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 1, at 19, The findings of fact to the effect that the vessel was detained after Jan. 2, not by the 
cargo breaches but by the shipowners' failure to act reasonably to obtain her release from arrest.  
23
 [1999] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 1, at 19, The factual situation as we have found it was that from Jan. 2 she was no longer 
detained in consequence of having loaded non-contractual cargo, but by the owners' representatives' failure to act 
reasonably to obtain her release from arrest. Shipowner and time charterer had been responsible for significant delay 
in obtaining the release of the vessel from arrest and the liability of sub-charterer for damages due to detention or 
delay would determine at midnight on January 2, 1993. 
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undisclosed dangerous cargo on board. When the ship visited the Port of Yokohama to 
discharge 15 containers of shoes and clothes, during the inspection, the Japanese port 
authority found 3 containers of “Potassium Monopersulfate”24 were under the name of 
“flour” in the documentation, so the ship was immobilised. Later on, evidence showed 
that the ship’s crews did not have proper certificates and the defective propellers 
rendered the vessel unseaworthy, the port authority imobilised the ship under the flag of 
convenience was not fit to leave the port.25 We can see that there were two joint causes: 
(1) the cargo wrongly labelled as flour and (2) the unseaworthiness, which resulted in 
the ship being detained. 
 
In theory, there are two types of joint causation. The first is neither event of itself is 
sufficient to cause the claimant’s loss, but the combination of different causes are 
sufficient. The second is when two causes are combined, each will be sufficient to cause 
the claimant’s loss.26 The latter is less common in dangerous cargo incidents. In 
practice there is little difference and normally the results are the same. The combination 
of different causes aggravated the damage and each party would be liable accordingly. 
6.1.3.1 Neither Cause Itself is Sufficient to Cause the 
Damage 
Joint causation exists in the situation, for example, where the damage to the ship is 
caused by a combination of un-notified dangerous cargoes and the negligence on the 
part of stevedores. If the only cause of the damage was that the carrier was never 
informed of the danger from the cargo, the shipper would be liable to the carrier for 
damages caused by the dangerous cargo. However, if the accident took place during 
embarkation or during the discharge of the goods and the fault of the stevedore triggered 
the damage, e.g. dropping a container of dangerous cargo on the deck and causing an 
explosion, the shipper and the stevedore should be jointly and severally liable for all 
damage. The result will be the same for the case of the packer of the containers, if the 
                                                       
24
 UN Number: UN3260, Hazard Class:8, Labels:8 (corrosive), packing group: II. 
25
 The SOLAS Convention gives the right to port authorities to retain the ship in the harbor till the danger is set aside 
by appropriate measures, if by inspection the port authorities find the situation is dangerous. 
26
 Tettenborn, The Law of Damages, op. cit., p. 157. 
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negligence in packing aggravated the fault of the shipper. The packer and shipper are 
jointly and severally liable for damages caused by the dangerous cargo. 
 
In the event of collision, if the damage arises from circumstances for which the carrying 
ship is liable, but aggravated by the dangerous cargo, i.e. the carrier’s negligence and 
shipper’s undisclosed dangerous cargo are joint causation of the damage, if the damage 
is not reasonably separable based on the degree of fault of each party, the shipper and 
carrier should be jointly and severally liable for all damage. Otherwise the carrier pays 
the damage first and then has a recourse action against the shipper.  
 
Consider a situation where ship A is at fault because she is carrying dangerous cargo on 
board with inadequate precautions. Later, ship A collides with ship B (which is free of 
fault); the dangerous cargo catches fire which spreads to ship B. No doubt the carrier of 
dangerous cargo must pay for the fire damage within the framework of his statutory 
limitation liability.27 However if the shipper of the dangerous cargo is liable to the 
carrier for damage caused by his cargo, e.g. the carrier was never informed of the 
danger and did not know of it, the carrier should be able to claim for an indemnity from 
the shipper.28 This means while ship A is relieved of part of her burden, the limitation 
prevents the owner of ship B from fully recovering his loss. In other words, the 
aggravation of damage caused by the dangerous cargo falls upon the non-carrying 
vessel B more than upon the carrying vessel A. How can this result be avoided?29 In the 
author’s opinion, one way of avoiding this is to have ship B sue the shipper directly in 
tort of negligence, then the shipper cannot limit his liability.  
 
With regard to the issue of joint causation, this case may be more interesting if the 
                                                       
27
 In most countries, collision damage is determined according to uniform, convention-based rules, under which each 
owner is liable to the extent that he has been at fault for the damage his ship causes the other ship and her cargo (See 
1910 Brussels Convention, para.1). The limitation of liability rules are then applied, either to the balance that most 
deeply indebted of parties must pay to the other (“single liability”), or to each of the liability amounts calculated to be 
due from each of the parties separately (“cross liability”, as in English law). 
28
 Tiberg Huho, Legal Survey, in Gronfors (editor), Damage from Goods, op. cit., p.23. This article mainly covers the 
relevant legal issues in Norway. 
29
 When two ships are involved in a collision and the HNS Convention applies, the vessel owners are held jointly and 
severally liable for damages resulting from the release of the hazardous and such damage is not reasonably separable 
(art. 8 para.1). Nothing in this article shall prejudice any right of recourse of an owner against any other (art.8 para3). 
But this rule is mainly covering liability to third parties. 
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carrier of ship A sues for indemnity, the shipper argues that the cause of the loss is really 
the carrier’s fault for not taking adequate precautions. Also the shipper may make the 
same plea if sued directly in tort by the owners of ship B. In the author’s opinion, the 
fact that the combination of both shipper’s undisclosed dangerous cargo and carrier’s 
negligence aggravated the damage, each party should be liable accordingly. For ship B’s 
damage, they should be jointly liable and the shipper’s plea can not be used for against 
ship B’s claims in tort. 
 
There is a slightly different issue with regards to the initial fire. There was no issue of 
joint causation. With regards to the later fire, it was a case of joint causation but the 
original defendant was not liable. Why not? In the situation of the later fire, see 
discussions in the following paragraph.  
 
It often happens in practice that damages caused by the separate actions of different 
people, for each party that is partly liable for the damage, each party must pay part of 
the damage according to his own fault.30 In The Kapitan Sakharov,31 undisclosed 
dangerous goods were shipped in a container and ignited during the voyage. The 
resultant fire spread to inflammable cargo that had been wrongfully stowed under deck, 
in a breach of Article III rule 1.32 The shipper was held liable for the part of the damage 
caused solely by the initial fire but not for the consequent damage that resulted once the 
fire spread to the inflammable cargo stowed below deck. The Court of Appeal 
confirmed that for such a defence to operate the shipper need not prove that the carrier’s 
negligence was the dominant cause. Furthermore, such negligence need not be a 
concurrent cause of the damage, provided it is a co-operating cause. It is enough if it can 
shown that it is an effective cause, as would be the case where a claim is made against 
the carrier for breach of its duty under Article III r.1.33 
                                                       
30
 See Fleming, The Law of Torts, 9th ed., p. 230. In respect of “apportionable damage”, where each of several 
defendants caused only part of the total damage and it is practically feasible to split up the aggregate of loss and 
attribute identifiable parts to each of them, liability will ordinarily be confined to that portion for which each is 
separately responsible.  
31
 [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 255. 
32
 The shipment of dangerous goods also rendered the ship unseaworthy under Article III R.1. However, 
unsurprisingly, the Court of Appeal held that the shipowner was able to establish a due diligence defence in respect of 
this breach. 
33
 Baughen & Campbell, Apportionment of Risk and Carriage of Dangerous Cargo, (2001) 1 International Maritime 
Law, p.6. 
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6.1.3.2 One Cause Regarded as Exclusive 
In some cases two simultaneous causes contributed to the claimant’s loss, but one cause 
may be regarded as overwhelmingly more significant. If so the loss may be attributed to 
that cause exclusively. This can be particularly important where one of the contributing 
factors is the fault of the claimant himself.34 
 
In an American case of United States v. M/V Santa Clara,35 the shipper offered for 
shipment a cargo of magnesium phosphide, a hazardous substance regulated under the 
HMR.36 The freight forwarder hired by the shipper properly labelled the container and 
paid the carrier the hazardous material surcharge, but failed to note the cargo’s 
hazardous nature on the bill of lading.37 During heavy weather, approximately 800 
pounds of magnesium phosphide spilled in the hold of the vessel. The stevedores 
unloaded the drums in Baltimore without comment (suggesting negligence on their part), 
and it was not until the vessel reached Charleston on the next leg of its voyage that the 
crew learned of the spillage. By then, the magnesium phosphide had reacted with 
moisture in the hold to create dangerous phosphine gas. Ultimately, the cleanup cost, 
along with personal injury, cargo claims, and government fines, totalled approximately 
$2.2 million.38 
 
The carrier’s bill of lading included a strict liability provision relating to violations of 
the HMR, the basis on which the carrier sought complete indemnification from the 
shipper. The shipper, however, argued it could not be held liable as a matter of law for 
its violation of the HMR unless its failure to warn was a proximate cause of claimed 
damage. 39  While the Court found that the shipper breached its “warranty of 
                                                       
34
 Tettenborn, The Law of Damages, op. cit., p. 160. 
35
 United States v. M/V SANTA CLARA I, 887 F. Supp 825, 829, 1996 AMC 910 (D.S.C. 1995). 
36
 Hazardous Materials Regulations, 49 C.F.R. §§171-180 (1994). The HMR specify requirements for the safe 
transport of hazardous materials in commerce by rail car, aircraft, vessel, and motor vehicle. 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Ibid., 830. 
39
 In the United States, a shipper that fails to meet its duties under the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) 49 
C.F.R. §§171-180 (1994), the COGSA 1936, and general maritime law, with regard to a hazardous material cargo, 
will not be held liable for the damage associated with that cargo unless its breach of duty proximately caused some or 
all of the damage. See also Edgcomb, The Trojan Horse Sets Sail: Carrier Defences against HAZMAT Cargoes, 13 
University of San Francisco Maritime Law Journal (U.S.F. Mar. L.J.), 2000-01, p. 32 
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compliance” in the bill of lading, the court rejected the carrier’s claim that the shipper 
should be held strictly liable. Instead, the Court found the test to be “whether the 
damages were in fact foreseeable at the time of the contract considering the remoteness 
in time and the number of intervening events”.40 Specifically, the court held that41: 
It is foreseeable that the failure to label a cargo as dangerous could result in some type of 
monetary damage to the ship as a result of that failure; however, this court finds that under the 
circumstances, the number of intervening events is too many and precludes a finding that 
[shippers] are strictly liable for all damages associated with the magnesium phosphide. 
 
Although the Court denied the carrier’s motion for summary judgment, it did not 
absolve the shipper from liability. Rather, the court concluded only that the shipper was 
entitled to present evidence as to whether any intervening negligence by the carrier or 
stevedores caused or contributed to the release.42 If so, the shipper could not be held 
strictly liable.43 
 
This holding places a continuing duty on carriers to exercise at least ordinary care in 
properly loading, stowing and carrying cargo, even if it is undisclosed hazardous 
material.44 If damage results from hazardous material cargo due to the negligence of the 
carrier that is unrelated to the shipper’s failure to warn, the carrier cannot expect to be 
indemnified by the shipper and will likely be held liable himself. The court should, 
however, broadly construe a shipper’s duty to warn of the consequences of the 
hazardous cargo, specifically when the carrier is unaware of the cargo’s hazardous 
nature. Only if the shipper’s failure to clearly warn the carrier is not related to the 
damages in any event, the shipper can escape liability.45  
 
In The Fiona,46 the shipper had shipped a cargo that was dangerous because of its 
tendency to give off light hydrocarbon gases, and was one of the causes of a subsequent 
                                                       
40
 Ibid., at 834. 
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Ibid., at 835. 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Ibid., at 836. 
45
 Ibid. 
46
 [1993] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 257, affirmed by the Court of Appeal at [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 506. 
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explosion on board. The other cause was due to the failure of the owner to remove 
condensate residues from the vessel and in particular failed to carry out a proper line 
and duct wash before loading commenced. This constituted a breach of their duty under 
Article III, r.1 to exercise due diligence to make the ship seaworthy. Since the owner’s 
negligence in failing to remove the condensate residues not only had materially 
contributed to the accident, but more importantly was held to have been the dominant 
cause of the explosion. Thus the shipowner could not claim his indemnity against the 
shipper under Article IV r6.47 
 
In Derby Resourse A.G. v. Blue Corinth Marine Co. Ltd (The Athenian Harmony) 
(No.1),48 the plaintiff cargo receivers sued the shipowner in tort for damage to a cargo 
of kerosene by contamination.49 The shipowners accepted that they were in breach of 
their duty of care in failing to provide a ship whose lines and tanks were fit to receive 
the cargo. However they claimed that the plaintiff had failed to show that the loss was 
caused by that breach of duty, as opposed to the negligence of the surveyors who had 
failed to stop loading pending the results of a sample analysis.50 In fact, the surveyors 
were misled in their sampling as a result of being given false information by the master 
about the previous cargoes which had been shipped.51 It was held that the surveyors 
could not be blamed. Also loading was not stopped and was not causative of any loss 
because the composite sample was within specification. There was an unbroken chain of 
causation from the breach of shipowner's duty of care to the entire damage to the cargo. 
The cargo damage was therefore caused solely by the shipowner and not by the 
surveyors or shipper.52 
6.1.4 Intervening Cause 
The question of causation may involve the consideration of the effect of intervening 
                                                       
47
 There is under English Law an approach whereby a breach of an overriding obligation is not made subject to 
Article IV of Hague/ Hague-Visby Rules. The right to an indemnity in Art. IV r.6 considered to be subject to the 
performance of the carrier’s overriding obligation set out in Art.III r.1. 
48
 [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 410. 
49
 It is assumed that the receivers never become, or chose not to become, holders of any bill. 
50
 When the tanks were loaded to a depth of one foot samples were taken for quality analysis by the surveyors but 
loading did not stop. 
51
 The vessel's master told the surveyors that the vessel had carried two cargoes of gas oil since fuel oil was last 
carried, but that the tanks had been washed according to good practice. This was untrue. 
52
 Although this case is not a dangerous cargo case, it is worthy to be discussed in the joint causation analysis. 
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acts,53 whether by a claimant or by a third party, occurring between the defendant’s 
breach of duty and the claimant’s damage.54 The claimant may not recover damages 
from the defendant where an intervening cause is far more responsible for the damage 
than is the defendant’s breach of duty.55 
6.1.4.1 Intervening Acts by Claimant 
Generally, the novus actus56 is alleged to break the chain of causation in some 
subsequent negligence of the claimant vessel in failing to take proper care to prevent, or 
limit damage.57 Some intervening causes are likely to arise in dangerous cargo cases, 
for instance where the deliberate or reckless act of the claimant (captain’s wrong 
decision) may amount to a new cause relieving the defendant from liability.58 
 
Suppose, for example, that on a voyage from Hong Kong to India, a ship is loaded with 
dangerous chemicals misdescribed by the shipper as cooking materials. In the Malacca 
Channel, a seafarer notices the relevant container leaking chemicals, but the captain, 
despite realising that something is wrong, decides to keep it on board until the vessel 
reached its destination, rather than offloading it at the next port of call. In addition, his 
owners keep quiet about the incident and do not notify their underwriters or the other 
cargo owners. The cargo subsequently explodes, causing severe damage. The 
shipowner’s claim to be indemnified by the shipper will, it is suggested, fail: the crass 
risks taken by the former and his failure to take emergency measures to deal with the 
leaking chemicals or discharge them in a proper place to prevent further damage 
constitutes a novus actus interveniens.59 
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 An intervening force is one that actively operates in producing the harm after the actor’s negligence act or 
omission has been committed. See Restatement of Torts 2d §441, see also Fleming, op. cit., p246. 
54
 Lunney & Oliphant, Tort Law—Text and Materials, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, p. 188 
55
 Burrows, Andrew, Remedies for torts and breach of contract, (2004: 3rd ed.), Oxford University Press, p. 97. 
56
 See foot note 59 
57
 See details at Marsden on Collisions at Sea, 13th ed., 2003, p. 512. For examples see The Metagama 1928 S.C. 
(H.L) 22; The Spontaneity [1962] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 460; The Hendrik [1964] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 371; The Fritz Thyssen 
[1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 199; The Djerada [1976] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 50; The Zaglebie Dobrowskie (No. 2) [1978] 1 
Lloyd’s Rep. 573. 
58
 Tettenborn, Andrew, The Law of Damages, p. 166. 
59
 Latin: a new intervening act (or cause). An act or event that breaks the causal connection between a wrong or 
crime committed by the defendant and the subsequent happenings and therefore relieves the defendant from 
responsibility for these happenings. 
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It should be noted, however, the mere fact that the claimant has acted negligently is not, 
without more evidence, enough to break the chain of causation.60 According to Lord 
Wright in the well-known case of The Oropesa,61 “to break the chain of causation it 
must be shown that there is something which is extraueous, something unwarrantable, a 
new cause which disturbs the sequence of events, something which can be described as 
either unreasonable or extraneous or extrinsic.” We can see that if it is an entirely 
unreasonable behaviour e.g. shipowner’s failure to take reasonable steps after noticing 
the leaking chemicals, there is no doubt it can be regarded as a break in the chain of 
causation. In short, to satisfy the definition of novus actus interveniens, the test of a 
claimant’s behaviour includes two aspects:62 (1) those on board the claimant vessel 
must have acted voluntarily and with knowledge of the likely consequence; (2) their act 
must not have been such as should have been foreseen by the defendant as a likely 
consequence of his own fault.63 
6.1.4.2 Intervening Negligence of Third Parties 
Sometimes the deliberate or negligent act of a third party may act as a novus actus 
interveniens in the same way as that of the claimant himself,64 i.e. the defendant’s 
negligence forms part of a sequence of events leading to harm of the claimant, but is not 
the essential cause of it. Where the act of another person, without which the damage 
would not have occurred, intervenes between the defendant’s negligence and the 
damage, the court has to decide whether the defendant remains responsible or whether it 
can be regarded as breaking the causal connection between the act of negligence and the 
damage. 65  Clearly, if the intervention was both reasonable and foreseeable the 
defendant will be liable. If it was both unreasonable and unforeseeable it will constitute 
a novus actus interveniens and it can be regarded as breaking the causal connection 
between the negligence and the damage.66 Thus if the negligence of the defendant 
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 Although it may amount to contributory negligence leading to apportionment under s. 187 of the Merchant 
Shipping Act 1995. For example, The Kazimah [1967] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 163 and The Calliope [1970] p. 172. 
61
 [1943] P 32, at 39. 
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 Marsden on Collisions at Sea, 13th ed., 2003, p. 512. 
63
 The intervening force must not be a normal result of the defendant’s negligence. 
64
 See Marsden on Collisions at Sea, 13th ed., 2003, p. 516; see also Tettenborn, The Law of Damages, p. 164. 
65
 Jones, Textbook on Torts, 8th ed. (2002), Oxford University Press, p255. 
66
 Michael A. Jones, Textbook on Torts, 8th ed. (2002), Oxford University Press, p256. 
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merely forms part of the historical background for an entirely independent tortious act 
on the part of a third party, the defendant will escape liability.67  
 
Suppose some dangerous cargo is loaded onto a ship, but its packaging (provided by the 
shipper) is substandard. During the voyage, a group of pirates attacked and rob the ship, 
and start a fire on the deck before running away. The fire causes in an explosion in the 
hold of the dangerous cargo which sinks the ship. In this case, it must be arguable that 
the subsequent pirates’ attack broke the causal connection between the insufficiency of 
packing by the shipper and the total loss. Thus, the carrier’s claim to be indemnified by 
the shipper will (it is submitted) fail: the third parties’ act amounted to recklessness 
sufficient to count as an overriding cause.68 
6.1.5 The Proof of Causation 
With regard to the carriage of dangerous cargo, the claimant69 (e.g. shipowner, injured 
third party or other cargo owners on the same ship) bears the burden of proving that a 
given loss was the result of the defendant’s wrongful acts. However, this point must be 
qualified where a single loss results from two or more concurrent causes. For example, 
if the loss and damage is due to the combination of dangerous cargo (not properly 
notified) and the negligent discharging of cargo by the carrier (e.g. at an intermediary 
port in order to repair the vessel), the claimant shipper must prove that the defendant 
carrier’s negligence on discharging of cargo contributed to his damage, even if it was 
not the only cause.70 
 
In a slightly different issue, loss has been occasioned by two possible causes of which 
one involves the defendant’s wrong doing, but it is not clear from the evidence which is 
active. In the author’s opinion, it is up to the claimant to prove that that wrong doing is 
the cause of his damage, rather than the other cause. Without such proof, his claim will 
fail. 
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 Knightley v. Johns 1982 1 W.L.R. 349. 
68
 See the general discussion about the third party intervening act in Tettenborn, op. cit., p.165. 
69
 The general proposition was finally established in the industrial injury case of Bonnington Castings Ltd v. Wardlaw 
[1956] AC 613, Lord Reid regarding it as “obvious in principle that a pursuer or plaintiff must prove not only 
negligence or breach of duty but also that such fault caused, or materially contributed to, his injury”, at p. 620. 
70
 See the general discussion in Tettenborn, The Law of Damages, p. 170. 
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Suppose drums of chemicals which were badly stowed (a carrier’s failure to comply 
with Art. III r.2 of HR/HVR), break adrift in a storm and were damaged (exception of 
peril of the sea under Art. IV r. 2(c)). The claimant shipper must prove his loss could 
have been avoided by the carrier exercising reasonable care in stowing the cargo. There 
is no peril of the sea, given the fact that the bad weather, though severe, is not 
unforeseeable. So the two possible causes were not of equal effectiveness and the 
inadequate stowage is the active cause. 
 
It should be noted that the standard for proof of causation adds another variable, which 
can be exploited to overcome at least some of the uncertainties. To start with, the law 
does not demand proof of causation, but only proof of probable causation (more 
probably than not).71 For example, if the claimant’s loss was consequential damage 
caused by the defendant shipper’s undisclosed dangerous cargo and the causation had 
been shown on the balance of probabilities, the shipper should be liable for the carrier’s 
loss of chance of avoiding the damage. However, the claimant will not succeed simply 
on proof that the defendant’s act increases the risk of what happened without showing 
an actual causal link. So the connection between the undisclosed dangerous cargo and 
the damage to his vessel must be positively shown by the carrier. 
6.2 Causation in Chinese Law 
6.2.1 Introduction 
In Chinese law, the issue of causation is the principal factor in determining liability in 
both tort and contract law. Causation proves a direct link between the defendant’s fault 
(or breach of contract) and the claimant’s loss and damage.72 The general rule is that 
the claimant bears the burden of proving his claim (fault, causation, damage), unless the 
law imposes a reverse burden of proof, e.g. under Article 4 of the Supreme Court’s 
                                                       
71
 Fleming, The Law of Torts, 9th ed., p. 232. See also Gregg v Scott, [2005] 2 A.C. 176, [2005] Lloyd’s Rep. Med. 
130, in  the appeal of this case (House of Lords), held even if the qualification of future losses was conventionally 
decided on the evaluation of risks and chances, the plaintiff had to show that the loss was consequential on injury 
caused by the defendant’s negligence. Causation had to be shown on the balance of probabilities. 
72
 Song Chunfeng, Study on the tort liability in oil pollution incidents, in Guo Yu (editor), (2006) Maritime Law 
Review (in Chinese), Vol. 12, 47, Peking University Press, at, 57. 
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Interpretations on Valid Evidences under Civil Procedure Law.73 
 
If a dangerous cargo liability claim based on strict tort liability, the claimant does not 
need to prove the defendant’s fault. However, it is required to prove that: (1) damage 
has occurred; and (2) causation between the defect and the damage. The defendant has 
the burden of proving any statutory defence available to it. For a claim for fault-based 
tort liability, the claimant bears the burden of proving: (1) the fault of the tortfeasor; 
(2) damage or injury; (3) causation between the tortious act and the damage. For a claim 
based on the breach of contractual obligations, the claimant bears the burden of proving: 
(1) the contract (B/L or Charterparty) between the claimant and the defendant; (2) the 
plaintiff has to prove a causal connection between the breach of contract and the 
damage; (3) the defendant’s inadequate packing and labelling of dangerous cargo; or his 
improper notice of dangerous cargo; or carrying dangerous cargo in lack of care etc was 
in breach of contract. 
6.2.2 Chinese Cases 
Chinese law does not provide specific tests for proof of causation. From a few decided 
cases relating to personal injury claims,74 it appears the courts require the claimant to 
show the defendant’s conduct was both the proximate cause and the cause in fact, of the 
claimant’s injuries. It is not clear whether the courts applied the "but-for" test in these 
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 It was promulgated by the Supreme Court Adjudgment Committee’s No. 1201 meeting on 6 December 2001 and 
came into force on 1 April 2002. It has 83 Articles in total. Under Article 4, there are eight types of specific cases, in 
which the claimant was exempted from proving fault or causation. For example, Article 4 (2) provides, with regard to 
ultra-hazardous activity, the defendant has the burden of proving damages caused by the claimant’s intentional act 
ultra-hazardous activity. Article 4(3) provides, with regard to environmental liability, the defendant has the burden of 
proving any statutory defence available for him, or there is no causation between his wrongful act and damages. 
74
 For example, in Gao Kequan v. Sheyang Ocean Fishery Company Ltd., the claimant was injured on board the 
vessel of the defendant but recovered soon without going to the hospital. After 40 days, he felt the left leg was painful 
and went to see a doctor. It was found his left artery near abdomen was blocked. He spent RMB 1,2000 yuan to do 
the operation and claimed for compensation from the defendant. It was held by Maritime Court of Shanghai-(2001), 
since the claimant could not prove the defendant’s negligence was the proximate cause of his illness, the claim was 
failed.  The claimant appealed. The Provincial Supreme Court of Shanghai dismissed the appeal. This case was 
reported in Zheng Zhaofang (editor), (2006) Casebook on Maritime Tort Liability(in Chinese), Shanghai People’s 
Press, p. 95. See also Article 11(4) of “The Interpretation of Several Issues Relating to the Application of Law in 
Trials of Personal Injury Claim Cases”, issued by the Supreme Court on May 1, 2004 (It provides the employee’s 
burden of proof of causation). In Yuan Caiyun etc v. Jiangsu Jingjiang Fishery Company Ltd, the defendant was 
falling into water and died soon after. It was claimed the collision between the claimant’s vessel and the defendant’s 
vessel was caused by the negligence of dropping anchor by the defendant, and it resulted the death of the claimant. 
Held by Maritime Court of Shanghai, there was no ‘cause in fact’ in this case. The claimant’s evidence was 
insufficient to prove the collision was caused by the defendant’s negligence or due to heavy weather (force majeure). 
Under Article 167 of Maritime Code, Neither of the parties shall be liable to the other if the collision is caused by 
force majeure or other causes not attributable to the fault of either party or if the cause thereof is left in doubt. The 
claim was therefore failed. This case was reported in Zheng Zhaofang (editor), op. cit., p. 131. 
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cases to determine cause in fact. With respect to proximate cause, it appears the courts 
applied the foreseeability test (e.g. conduct is not a proximate cause of an injury or 
damage unless the injury or damage was foreseeable at the time). Based on this, the 
courts may not hold the defendant liable for exposing the claimant to increased risk if 
they consider the injury was not foreseeable at the time of exposure. 
 
In Shan Dong Wei Fang International Shipping Company Ltd. and Prosperity Ocean 
International Shipping Company Ltd. v. Fu Yun Iron Pyrites Company Ltd. (The Xing 
Yun Hai),75 the claimants (shipowner and demise charterer) agreed to carry 5,783 
tonnes of zinc concentrate from China to Korea on 22 August 1997. The defendant 
shipper did not produce a certificate of moisture content, but presented a rough estimate 
of the zinc concentrate’s moisture to the claimant. After departing from the load port of 
Huang Pu, the cargo shifted during heavy weather and the vessel sank with its cargo 
near Shenzhen. Consequently, bunker oil and lubricating oil escaped and contaminated 
sea water. The claimants paid for clean-up operation and other relevant fees, then 
claimed for damages and losses from the defendant on the basis that shipper had not 
properly disclosed the dangerous cargo before shipment. The defendant argued the 
claimants could not prove the direct link between the dangerous cargo and the sinking 
of the vessel and that the real cause of the casualty was the heavy weather.  
 
It was held by the Maritime Court of Guangzhou that the claims failed since there was 
insufficient evidence to prove the causation between the damages and the defendant’s 
fault. The claimants appealed but the Provincial Supreme Court of Guangdong 
dismissed the appeal.  
 
It might be thought odd that only one case should be given, but China is not a case-law 
country and binding value is not given to judicial decisions. The courts have discretion 
to determine what test should be applied for proof of causation. They are not required to 
follow another courts’ test unless they wish to. 
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 The first instance before Guangzhou Maritime Court, (1999) Guangzhou-maritime-No.115; on appeal before 
Guangdong People’s High Court, (2001) Commercial Court- No. 92. 
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6.3 Remoteness of Damage in English Law 
The question of legal causation may entail a decision as to what is the appropriate limit 
to place on the defendant’s liability as a matter of policy. The defendant may have 
factually caused the damage, but the decision may be that the defendant should not have 
to pay for the full extent of the damage because it is considered too remote.76 
 
A principal restriction on compensatory damages is that the loss must not be too remote 
from the breach of duty.77 The tests formulated for deciding this have centred on 
whether the loss was (in contract) reasonably contemplated or (in tort) reasonably 
foreseeable by the defendant.78 
6.3.1 Introduction 
The rule of remoteness can be said to be the law’s attempt to limit compensatory 
damages.79 A defendant’s negligence creates certain risks. If the claimant’s damage 
falls within the risk that is created, it might be seen as appropriate to make the defendant 
liable for that damage. Conversely, if the damage suffered bears no relation to the risk 
created or is simply unforeseeable, why should the defendant be liable?80 In many cases, 
there is no substantial difference in the rules of remoteness in contract and tort.81 The 
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 Lunney & Oliphant, Tort Law—Text and Materials, 2nd ed., Oxford University Press, p. 188. 
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 Remoteness of damage is one of the principles to limit compensatory damages. There can be said to be five 
principles limiting compensatory damages (ie which reduce the damages that full adherence to the compensatory 
aims would dictate) for both torts and breach of contract, and the role played by each can be briefly described as: (1) 
intervening cause—a claimant cannot succeed it an intervening cause is so much more responsible for the loss than 
the defendant’s breach of duty that it breaks the chain of causation between the breach of duty and the loss; (2) 
remoteness—a claimant cannot succeed if the loss was too remote from the breach of duty. The tests for remoteness 
centre on reasonable foreseeability or contermplation of the loss; (3) The SAAMCO principle—in the case of South 
Australia Asset Management Corpn v. York Montague Ltd, held that the lender’s loss consequent on a fall in the 
property market was not recoverable from the valuer. This exclusion was justified on the SAAMC principle that the 
loss was outside the scope of the duty; (4) duty of mitigate—a claimant cannot succeed if subsequent to the tort or 
breach of contract he or she could reasonably have avoided the loss; (5) contributory negligence—damages may be 
reduced where the claimant’s negligence has contributed to. i.e. been a particle cause of, his loss. But this principles 
is not applicable to some torts and is inapplicable to breach of contract (other than of a contract duty of care where 
there is concurrent liability in tort). 
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 See details at Burrows, Torts and Breach of Contract, 3rd ed., 2004, pp. 73-143 
79
 Ibid. 
80
 Recent years have seen the development of a new concept—the scope of the duty of care—to limit the defendant’s 
liability. See Lunney & Oliphant, Tort Law—Text and Materials, 3rd. (2003), p. 236. 
81
 The law must be such that in a factual situation where all have the same actual or imputed knowledge. The amount 
of damages recoverable does not depend on whether, as a matter of legal classification, the plaintiff’s cause of action 
is breach of contract or tort. It may be that the necessary reconciliation is to be found, notwithstanding the strictness 
of Lord Reid in Heron II, in holding that the difference between “reasonable foreseeability” (the test in tort) and 
“reasonably contemplated” (the test in contract) is semantic not substantial. Certainly Asquith LJ in Victoria Laundry 
v Newman Industries, Lord Pearce in Heron II and Scarman LJ in Parson v Uttley Ingham & Co Ltd thought so. 
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formal rules are distinct,82 and have been traditionally regarded as having significant 
differences. This section deals with contract and tort separately. 
 
Generally, the damage arising from carriage of dangerous cargo can be divided into 
three categories. 
(1) Damage caused to the ship or to other merchandise; 
The dangerous cargo may cause damage to other merchandise on board as well 
as to the ship itself. According to the general law of torts, the owners of the other 
goods may raise contractual claims against the carrier, who is bound to deliver 
the cargo in the sense in which he received them.83 They might also raise a 
claim in tort against the owner of the dangerous cargo. 
(2) Damage caused to third parties outside the ship 
The cargo may also cause damage to third parties unrelated to the cargo or the 
voyage: an explosion may injure persons in the vicinity of the vessel. 
(3) Navigation damage aggravated by the nature of the cargo 
The nature of the dangerous cargo may aggravate damage arising from the 
navigation of the vessel: collision or the stranding of a ship may cause a 
discharge of containers of chemicals or start a fire and result in an explosion. 
 
So far as the amount and type of damage are concerned, the chain of causation and 
remoteness of damage are fundamental issues. The principles applied are those of the 
common law although particular questions might arise in the context of dangerous cargo 
incidents.84  
 
Since the HNS Convention has not come into force and the oil conventions only apply 
to a limited category of cargoes, without a powerful international regime, damages and 
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 There are different formal rules between contract and tort. For example, there is a single contract test of 
remoteness which lays down that losses are too remote if, at the time the contract was made, the defendant did not 
contemplate and could not reasonably have contemplated that type of loss as a serious possibility. The normal tort test, 
applicable in standard tort claims where the parties are not in a contractual relationship, is that losses are too remote if 
at the time of the breach of duty the defendant did not foresee and could not reasonably have foreseen that type of 
loss as a slight possibility. In addition, where the parties are in a contractual relationship, the above contract test 
applies even where the claim is being has had to inform the other party of unusual risks. See Burrows, Torts and 
Breach of Contract, 3rd ed., 2004, p. 94. See also Tettenborn, The Law of Damages, p. 127. 
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 But the carrier may be protected by an exemption under (say) the HR/ HVR. 
84
 Marsden on Collisions at sea, 13th ed., at 435. 
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compensation arising from dangerous cargo incidents are still covered by national laws. 
Even if (where HNS Convention will apply in the future) principles regarding causation, 
remoteness of damage and recoverable losses may be governed by the applicable 
principles of common law85 (or relevant provisions of civil law). Therefore, this section 
will focus on the extent of liability, referring to recoverable damages in common law, i.e. 
remoteness of damage in contract and in tort. A relevant discussion on remoteness under 
Chinese law will be given, but before this we need to analyse which types of damages 
are recoverable. 
6.3.2 Recoverable Damages  
The types of damages that may be caused by dangerous cargo incidents are varied. The 
question of the extent to which they may be compensated in common law and in 
statutory claims,86 depends substantially upon the application of rules of remoteness of 
damage. It is first desirable to discuss the types of damage that may be suffered as a 
result of dangerous cargo incidents. 
 
Firstly, there is physical damage. Leaking chemicals or other hazardous cargoes may 
erode containers and vessels, or foul other vessels and their gear, or damage harbours 
and harbour equipment, or contaminate beaches and coastlines. Commonly, there may 
be cases of personal injury, such as skin conditions affected by toxic fumes, respiratory 
problems brought out by contact with poisonous chemicals, the result of fire or 
explosion caused by dangerous cargo. 
 
Secondly, there is environmental damage. It includes the contaminated beaches and 
coastlines referred to above. Wild birds, fish and all types of marine flora and fauna may 
be killed and the stocks seriously depleted.87 Such damage may well be regarded as the 
most important, but it is also extremely difficult to quantify and presents substantial 
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 Ibid., at 433 where discuss the relationship between CLC 1992 and common law, which is same as the relationship 
between HNS Convention 1996 and common law. 
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 For example relevant provisions of the HNS Convention and national legislations. 
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 Abecassis & Jarashow, Oil Pollution from Ships—International, United Kingdom and United States Law and 
Practice, 2nd ed. (1985), London: Stevens & Sons, §15-100, p. 391. 
  343
problems of locus standi88 to common law. 
 
Thirdly, the main type of damage may be described as economic loss: for example, loss 
of amenities (such as beaches, marinas, even harbours which must be closed for 
cleaning and repair), loss of profits by hoteliers, publicans and those in the tourism 
industry generally, as well as loss of holiday value by holidaymakers themselves. In 
addition, much of the environmental damage referred to above can have an economic 
effect:89 for instance, fishermen may be unable to fish where they intended to fish or 
they may find that their catch is less saleable because of its actual or possible tainted 
condition. 
 
Fourthly, the type of damage is strictly only a subpart of the third: the costs of 
reinstatement of the environment. The costs of preventive measures and the costs of 
cleaning the sea and the coast: the use of mechanical means for the retention or removal 
of spilled oil, the cost of detergent, the expenses of recovering and cleaning affected 
seabirds, etc., can all be regarded as economic consequences of contamination caused 
by dangerous cargo. It is noticeable that these expenses may be incurred by a variety of 
different persons or bodies acting under a variety of powers, obligations and motives, 
from clean-up expenses incurred by national government acting under statutory powers, 
to the costs of voluntary organisations devoted to the protection of some aspect of the 
environment.90 The differing types of damages have been a matter for discussion in the 
international debate for many years. Our concern at this point is to consider how far the 
common law rules address these matters. 
6.3.3 Remoteness of Damage in Contract 
Losses suffered by the claimant will be recoverable only if they satisfy the relevant test 
of remoteness. Although the amount of damages recoverable does not depend on 
whether, as a matter of legal classification, the plaintiff’s cause of action is in breach of 
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 [Latin]: a place to stand] The right to bring an action or challenge some question. Questions of locus standi most 
often arise in processing for judicial review. 
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.Abecassis & Jarashow, op. cit., p. 391. 
90
 Ibid. 
  344
contract or tort, there are important differences in the formulation of the two doctrines.91 
If the action is brought in contract, the rule of remoteness is for limiting damages and 
avoiding open-ended and disproportionate liability.92 Generally, it limits consequences 
to those of the breach of contract that are reasonably foreseeable. 
6.3.3.1 Contractual Measures of Damages 
For many years the principle for assessing damages for breach of contract in common 
law was to be found in Hadley v. Baxendale.93 The delivery of a broken mill shaft was 
delayed and consequently the whole mill was shut down. Loss of profits was not 
awarded for the following reasons:94 
Such loss would neither have flowed naturally from the breach of this contract in the great 
multitude of such cases occurring under ordinary circumstances, nor were the special 
circumstances, which, perhaps, would have made it a reasonable and natural consequence of 
such breach of contract, communicated to or known by defendants. 
 
Two rules have evolved from this dictum by Alderson B. in the above case.95 First, 
damages in breach of contract are only those which flow naturally from the breach. 
Secondly, damages which normally would be too remote may be recovered, if (a) there 
were special facts surrounding the contract that were brought to the attention of the 
defendant or (b) the terms of the contract provided for the situation in question. 
 
The two rules were also expressed in another way in Hadley v. Baxendale. The damages 
must be those which arise naturally or are in the reasonable contemplation of the 
parties:96 
Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the damages which the 
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 Baughen, Shipping Law, 2nd ed., p.247. See also Ogus, The Law of Damages, op. cit., p. 62. In tort, the question is 
whether the harm was reasonably foreseeable as at the time of the tort. In contract, the test is applied against the 
background of circumstances existing not at the time of the breach but at the time of making of the contract. It would 
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 Tettenborn, The law of damages, op. cit., § 6.03 
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 (1854) 9 Ex. C.R. 341, 156 E.R. 145. 
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 Ibid., (1854) 9 Ex. C.R. at 356, 156 E.R. at 151. 
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 Tetley, Damages and Economic Loss in Marine Collision: Controlling the Floodgates, J.M.L.C. Vol. 22, No. 3, 
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other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such as may fairly 
and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e., according to the usual course of 
things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as may fairly and reasonably be supposed to 
have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the time they made the contract, as the 
probable result of the breach of it. 
 
As time went on, “reasonable contemplation” became the primary test. In Koufos v. C. 
Czarnikow Ltd.(The Heron II),97 loss of profits was awarded in the case of a breach of 
contract (a charterparty) against a vessel owner whose deviation brought about a delay 
in delivery of a cargo of sugar. The House of Lords held that the vessel owner should 
have known that the price of the sugar could have fallen due to delay. 
 
Lord Reid held that the remoteness test in tort (reasonable foreseeability) “imposes a 
much wider liability”98 than the remoteness test in contract (probability) for the very 
good reason that in contract, the plaintiff has an opportunity to bargain with the 
defendant and can thereby protect himself against risks which might otherwise appear 
unusual. In tort, on the other hand: 
There is no opportunity for the injured party to protect himself in that way, and the tortfeasor 
cannot reasonably complaint if he has to pay for some very unusual but nevertheless 
foreseeable damage which results from his wrongdoing. 
 
Lord Reid, referring to Hadley v. Baxendale, narrowed the remoteness test for contract 
by holding:99 
A type of damage which was plainly foreseeable as a real possibility but which would only 
occur in a small minority of cases cannot be regarded as arising in the usual course of things or 
be supposed to have been in the contemplation of the parties: the parties are not supposed to 
contemplate as grounds for the recovery of damage any type of loss or damage which on the 
knowledge available to the defendant would appear to him as only likely to occur in a small 
minority of cases. 
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Indeed, the decision by Lord Reid in the Heron II was reaffirmed in a recent case The 
Achilleas,100 where time charterers were late in redelivery of a vessel. The shipowners 
had re-chartered the vessel and when it was not redelivered on time the shipowners had 
new charterers who had agreed an extension of the cancelling date under the new 
charter, but only on the basis that the new charterers received a reduction in the daily 
rate of hire. What mattered in this case was whether the types of loss101 claimed by the 
shipowners were foreseeable? The common intention of reasonable parties to a 
charterparty of this sort, in the event of a relatively short delay in redelivery, regarding 
an extraordinary loss, measured over the whole term of the renewed fixture entered into 
by the shipowner where the charterer had no knowledge of, or control of it, such loss 
should be regarded as unforeseeable.  
 
It was held102 by Lord Hoffman that when assessing damages for the late redelivery of 
a chartered vessel, the court should in the usual case restrict the charterer’s liability to 
the difference between the market rate and the charter rate for the overrun period of 9 
days. The shipowners were not entitled to damages calculated by reference to their 
dealings with the new charterer over the whole period of renewed fixture. 
6.3.3.2 Applying the Rule of Remoteness to Dangerous 
Cargo Cases 
In practice, most contractual obligations affecting goods (e.g. the carrier’s duties) are 
duties to take reasonable care. The carrier is bound to deliver the cargoes in the state in 
which he received them and his liability is based on fault. Under the contract of carriage, 
the dangerous cargo owner or the owner of other goods on the same vessel may raise 
contractual claims against the carrier. Most commonly, cargo claims arising from breach 
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 Transfield Shipping Inc v Mercator Shipping Inc (The Achilleas), [2008] UKHL 48; [2009] 1 A.C. 61, on appeal 
from [2007] EWCA Cir 901; [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 555; [2007] 2 C.L.C. 400 
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 I.e. the difference between that they would have got from the new charter had the ship been returned in time and 
what it in fact got with reduced rate of hire 
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 [2009] 1 A.C. 61, at 90 
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of contracts of carriage may arise from non-delivery, damaged delivery, late delivery,103 
or a combination of any of these factors.104 How the damage or loss is felt will depend 
on how the claimant intends to use the dangerous cargoes. The claimant will either want 
to resell them105 or to use them for his own purposes.106 The general rules about cargo 
claims will apply to dangerous cargo cases. 
 
Suppose, some undisclosed107 dangerous cargo is shipped and causes damage. The 
cause of damage was due to the carrier’s lack of due diligence to care for cargo and it is 
not related to the nature of the cargo in any event. In calculating damages on the value 
of dangerous cargo, it should be based on the invoice value of the goods, even if it is 
much lower than the real value of the cargo. 
 
On the other hand, if the shipper does not disclose to the carrier the dangerous nature of 
the goods and it causes the carrier loss or damage, the carrier may sue the shipper for 
shipping dangerous cargo. As to the extent of shipper’s liability of shipping dangerous 
cargo under Article IV r.6 of HR/ HVR, it is determined in accordance with the normal 
principles of remoteness of damage in contract discussed above.108 Examples have 
included cost of disinfestation and delay,109 loss of or damage to the vessel,110 and loss 
of other cargo and loss of life.111 It has been suggested that the words “directly and 
indirectly” extend the rules of causation and hence by implication those of remoteness 
of damage,112 but no case has applied such an interpretation, for which it is difficult to 
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see justification. 
6.3.4 Remoteness of Damage in Tort 
When one passes from the subject of remoteness of damage in contract to remoteness in 
tort, a number of difficulties arise.113 For example, in contract a clear distinction is 
made between whether the claimant has suffered a breach of contract and what losses he 
ought to be able to recover; only the latter is determined by foreseeability of loss. 
However, there is no such uniformity in torts, particularly in tort of negligence, where 
many of the problems of remoteness arise and no such clear line can be drawn. 
 
In order to claim damages for negligence, the claimant must show that he was 
reasonably foreseeable as likely to be affected by the defendant’s actions,114 and his 
damage should be a foreseeable result of the defendant’s action.115 It should be noted 
here foreseeability of damage plays a dual role in negligence, determining both whether 
the defendant is liable at all, and if he is, for how much damage.116 In other words the 
extent of loss. Remoteness for torts has been primarily discussed judicially in relation to 
the tort of negligence; but it seems that with the exception of deceit and other torts that 
have been committed dishonestly or intentionally, the test applied to negligence applies 
to all other torts.117 
6.3.4.1 The Polemis: Proximate Cause or Direct 
Consequence 
It is a general principle of the law of tort that entitlement to the recovery of damages 
depends on how proximate the damage had been to the tortious act, or the “proximate 
cause” of the damage.118 This evolved into the “direct consequences” test, which arose 
from Re Polemis & Furness Withy & Co Ltd119, where the dropping of a plank into a 
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hold by a stevedore caused a spark, ignited gasoline vapour and resulted in the 
destruction of the ship by fire.120 The Court of Appeal held that this damage was 
foreseeable and the stevedores were liable for the loss of the ship. Warrington L.J. 
held:121  
The presence or absence of reasonable anticipation of damage determines the legal quality of 
the act as negligent or innocent. If it be thus determined to be negligent, then the question 
whether particular damages are recoverable depends only on the direct consequence of the act. 
6.3.4.2 Foreseeability by the Reasonable Man 
The wide ambit of recoverability allowed in Polemis was questioned in The Wagon 
Mound (No. 1.,122 Oil negligently spilt in Sydney harbour unexpectedly caught fire, and 
the fire damaged the plaintiffs’ wharf. This case was upheld by the Privy Council, and 
Viscount Simonds declared: “the essential factor in determining liability is whether the 
damage is of such a kind as the reasonable man should have foreseen.”123  The 
defendant escaped liability on the ground that what was foreseeable as a result of the 
defendant’s conduct was damage by fouling, not by fire; in other words, although the 
damage suffered by the plaintiff was the direct result of the defendant’s negligence, 
nevertheless the defendant escaped because it was a different kind of damage and can 
not be foreseeable by a reasonable man. 
 
The limitation on liability contained in The Wagon Mound (No. 1), that damage of an 
essentially unforeseeable kind cannot be recovered in negligence, indubitably forms part 
of the English law of tort in general,124 and hence of damages arising from carriage of 
dangerous cargoes. If this rule is applied to dangerous cargo cases, it will relate to how 
wide a class of damage a court is prepared to regard as “foreseeable” in certain 
circumstances; and to what extent the court is prepared to regard one sort of damage as 
essentially different from another. 
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6.3.4.3 Foreseeability Depends on the Evidence 
The Wagon Mound (No. 2),125 however, arguably recalls the Polemis test, where a ship 
in the same harbour was successful in its claim for damages caused by the same burning 
oil. However, the evidence presented here was slightly different. The plaintiffs’ 
attorneys seemed to have obtained better proof and were able to deduce that the fire was 
foreseeable to some degree, because the officers on board the Wagon Mound testified 
that they believed the oil could be ignited, albeit with difficulty. Thus the defendant was 
liable to these plaintiffs. We can see The Wagon Mound (No. 2) softened the seeming 
strictness of The Wagon Mound (No. 1) by showing that it was possible to prove 
foreseeability. The two cases together provide an instructive example supporting the 
principle that reasonable foreseeability and therefore remoteness, is a question of fact in 
any particular case.126 
 
With regard to the damage from dangerous cargo, physical damage and personal injury 
caused by the dangerous cargo is in practice always foreseeable and always 
recoverable. 127  For example, the cost of cleaning, repair or replacement of 
contaminated vessels and the cost of cleaning up the harbour and coastline will be 
recoverable. If profit-earning vessels are affected, then the loss of profits reasonably 
attributable to them will also be recoverable.128 However, pure environmental loss 
presents particular problems. The basis of the damage suffered is physical: injury to 
flora and fauna in the wild state. The problem is there is no property associated with 
wild animals, plants, etc., until they are reduced to possession. Then they become the 
property of the possessor.129  Therefore no tort claim based upon damage to the 
environment alone can be based upon physical damage caused by dangerous cargo. The 
plaintiff has no legal grounds to file for pure environmental loss. It therefore follows 
that any such claim can at best be regarded as a type of claim for economic 
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loss—although in most cases such a loss will be hard to quantify.130 
6.3.4.4 Foreseeability as to the Type of Damage 
In Hughes v. Lord Advocate,131 kerosene from unattended lamps had spilled, forming a 
gas which exploded, burning a young boy. The House of Lords held that it did not 
matter that burning by explosion was not foreseeable, in as much as personal injury 
caused by fire was foreseeable. Hence, Hughes stands for the proposition that 
foreseeability need only be to the type of damage and not to the “precise concatenation 
of circumstances which led to the accident”.132 
 
With respect to the consequences of a dangerous cargo incident, presumably, the 
foreseeable damages include: (a) damage to the ship and other cargos on board; (b) loss 
of life or personal injury to those on board and outside the ship; (c) losses or damage by 
contamination to the environment caused by dangerous cargoes, limited to reasonable 
measures of reinstatement and (d) costs of preventive measures and further losses or 
damage caused by the preventive measures. 
6.3.4.5 Vacwell v BDH Chemicals Ltd: The Extent to 
which Loss is Unforeseeable 
Another interpretation on the rule that damage must be foreseeable is that only its type 
needs to be expected. Its extent need not be.133 In Vacwell v BDH Chemicals Ltd.,134 
the defendant (the chemical manufacturers) negligently failed to warn the plaintiff (the 
users) that the dangerous cargo was likely to catch fire if it came into contact with water. 
A person working in the plaintiffs’ premises dropped an ampoule of it into a bath of 
water which resulted in a tremendous explosion that destroyed the whole of the 
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plaintiffs’ premises. The plaintiffs recovered the whole of their loss, even though the 
explosion was freakish and unforeseeably severe. Some damage due to combustion was 
foreseeable, and that was enough. 
 
This principle is significant in dangerous cargo disasters. Any dangerous cargo incident, 
however slight, is clearly likely to cause some damage (fire, explosion, pollution, etc.). 
It follows that, prima facie, a liable party will be responsible for all the damage. Indeed, 
it is not necessary to have a serious incident such as CMA Djakarta.135 A simple 
smoking freight container on board can cost the shipowner (and hence any wrongful 
shipper, forwarders/ NVOCC) hundreds of thousands of pounds in terms of emergency 
handling, fire fighting, re-routing and cleaning expenses. No matter how serious the 
incident is and how extensive the damage is, according to the principle in Vacwell v 
BDH Chemicals Ltd, the responsible person has to indemnify the whole loss caused by 
dangerous cargoes. 
6.3.5 Whether Statutory Liability is Subject to 
Remoteness? 
The HNS Convention136 generally covers the loss of life or personal injury on board or 
outside the ship carrying hazardous and noxious substances, loss of or damage to 
property outside the ship including other ships and their cargoes (damage to own cargo 
is not covered), loss or damage caused by contamination of the environment,137 loss of 
income in fishing and tourism and the costs of preventive measures.138 
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In practice, the most recurrent issue in relation to dangerous cargo claims is the question 
of whether, and if so, to what extent, different types of claims are eligible for 
compensation in accordance with the definition above. There is considerable scope in 
this area for divergent decisions by national courts, although most cases have normally 
been resolved by negotiation.139 This is the same for oil pollution claims. Here a 
question arises: whether HNS and other statutory liability (e.g. pollution under CLC), is 
subject to remoteness considerations at all? Certainly, the answer is yes in the following 
case. 
 
In Alegrete Shipping Co Inc v. International Oil Pollution Compensation Fund 1971 
(The Sea Empress),140 the vessel grounded and 72,000 tonnes of crude oil spilled into 
sea, which lead to the imposition of a fishing ban. The total claims arising from the 
incident was substantially in excess of the owner’s limitation fund; and by virtue of the 
top up provisions in s. 175 of the MSA 1995, the 1971 Fund was responsible for all 
claims above the owner’s limit subject to the Fund’s own limit.  
 
The processors claimed for losing the profit that would have made from processing 
whelks supplied by the fishermen. While the fishermen had a direct economic interest in 
the contaminated waters, the position of the claimant processors is very different. The 
latter’s interest was in landed whelks and they were not engaged in a local activity in the 
physical area of the contamination. It was held,141 the processors’ loss was not caused 
indirectly by oil pollution and this lack of proximity rendered the claim too remote; the 
claim failed. As we can see the rule of remoteness is applicable to the statutory liability. 
6.4 The Rules on Remoteness of Damage in Chinese 
Law 
Chinese law does not have the rule of remoteness, while the recoverable damage is 
generally governed by the rule of proximate cause. In the author’s view, the specific 
scope of recompense for damages according to the “proximate cause” rule is not as clear 
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as the rule of remoteness in English Law. Because there is no case law in China, and 
different courts usually have different interpretations of “proximate cause”. This issue 
should be clarified during the revision of Maritime Code and also in the Civil Code 
Draft. 
 
The general rules contained in the Civil Law 1986 provide for the restoration of 
damaged property to its original condition or for the payment of compensatory 
damages.142 The law also allows for compensation for other serious losses.143 Personal 
injury requires payment of medical expenses, lost earnings, and if the victim dies, 
contribution to the necessary living expenses of the deceased’s dependents.144 We can 
see these are far too general provisions, and not particularly applicable to dangerous 
cargo cases. 
 
Moreover, no particularly rule in tort referring to “consequential damages”. Also there is 
no specific legislation to consequential damages in China. The author worried to which 
level they can be recoverable in practice. Nonetheless, some Chinese scholars believe 
the language of the law is sufficiently broad to require consequent damages. For 
example a Chinese scholar states:145 “complete compensation includes both direct and 
indirect losses”. The one causing the damage must compensate for the reduction in 
value of the property. This is direct loss. He must also make compensation for benefits 
that could actually have been obtained under normal circumstances. This is an indirect 
loss. Theoretically, the rule of economic loss does not exist in Chinese law and it is 
unlikely that pure economic loss will be recoverable in practice.146 
 
In China, no particular legislation refers to compensation for damages caused by 
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dangerous cargo.147 Theoretically, the compensation in respect of dangerous cargo can 
be claimed in tort and in contract, which include all direct and indirect damages and 
expenses resulting from the shipment of dangerous cargoes,148 such as the loss of life or 
personal injury, loss of or damage to property, demurrage fees, costs for destroying or 
discharging of dangerous cargoes, the carrier’s recourse for compensation paid to third 
parties. With regards to the contamination of the environment caused by dangerous 
cargoes, clean-up costs, preventive measures and further loss or damage caused by the 
preventive measures should be recoverable. In any event, damages shall be foreseeable 
by the defendant at the time of the incident. In respect to the damage of natural 
resources, theoretically, the scope of compensation should be limited to reasonable 
measures of reinstatement, but Chinese maritime courts do not regularly admit claims 
on this type. Although China does not have definition of “economic loss”, based on the 
rule of “proximate cause”, it is unlikely to see Chinese maritime courts to allow e.g. 
pollution damage to fishing ponds to be recovered. 
6.5 Concluding Remarks 
With regard to the damages or costs caused dangerous cargoes and whether the amount 
and type of damage recoverable, the chain of causation and remoteness of damage are 
fundamental issues. Although they have been discussed separately in this chapter, in 
practice, however, the distinction between remoteness and intervening cause is often not 
drawn and both principles are dealt with under the one head, whether labelled 
“remoteness” or “legal causation” or “proximate cause”.149 
In order to establish dangerous cargo liability, the criterion of proximate cause is 
foreseeability; the injury or damage must be a reasonably probable consequence of the 
defendant’s act or omission. The rule of remoteness places limits on liability for damage 
caused by the defendant’s breach of duty. All legal systems agree in placing some 
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limitations on the recoverability of damages for both tort and breach of contract. A 
principal restriction on compensatory damages is that the loss must not be too remote 
from the breach of duty. The tests formulated for deciding on this have centred on 
whether the loss (in contract) was reasonably contemplated or (in tort) reasonably 
foreseeable by the defendant.150 Although the formal rules are distinct, in many cases 
there is no substantial difference in the rules of remoteness in contract and tort. 
The issue of causation is the principal factor for determining liability in both Chinese 
and English law. Although China does not have the rule of remoteness, the rules on 
damages seem to be as extensive as those applied in the UK. In Chinese law, the 
recoverable damage is based on the rule of “proximate cause” is not as clear as the rule 
of remoteness in English Law. Without specific legislation on recoverable damages 
caused by dangerous cargoes, it is expected that Chinese maritime courts can use the 
relevant legislation on prevention of marine pollution (e.g. oil) for reference. 
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Chapter 7 Reform of Contractual Liability 
—the Rotterdam Rules 
 
7.1 Introduction 
The United Nations General Assembly adopted Convention on Contracts for the 
International Carriage of Goods Wholly or Partly by Sea on 11 December 2008 and 
authorised a signing ceremony for the Convention to be held in Rotterdam on 23 
September 2009. The new Convention is known as the “Rotterdam Rules” (hereafter 
RR).1  
 
Uniformity is the goal of this convention. It is intended to supersede the Hague, 
Hague-Visby and Hamburg Rules,2  by establishing uniform international rules to 
allocate liability for the risk of the loss of or damage to goods carried by sea. By August 
2010, 21 countries had signed “subject to ratification”3 and it remains to be seen 
whether any of them will ratify the convention. It should be noted that a signatory to 
this Convention is not under any obligation to ratify it and may refuse ratification for 
any reason.4 The important question is whether this convention will come into force 
internationally in order to promote uniformity (i.e. ratification by 20 countries is 
required). 
 
The content of the Convention is comprehensive and complicated, which is outside the 
scope of this thesis. This Chapter will focus on the shipper’s liability under Chapter 7 of 
the convention in relation to the carriage of dangerous cargo, as well as dealing with the 
mechanism for proportionate allocation of liability between the shipper and the carrier, 
also whether the transfer of obligations from shipper to third parties is possible under 
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the Convention will be discussed. In addition, effort will be spent on comparing the 
shipper’s obligations under the Rotterdam Rules with existing English and Chinese law.  
 
The shipper’s obligations to the carrier are set up in considerable detail in Chapter 7, 
which are more extensive than in the previous cargo conventions, such as HR/ HVR and 
Hamburg Rules, although the substance is not especially novel.5 Chapter 7 includes 
Articles 27-34. Shipper’s obligations are stipulated in Articles 27-29 and 31-32. The 
liability regime is to be found in Articles 30 and 33-34. More specifically, two types of 
liabilities will be discussed below. The first is fault-based liability relating to the 
preparation and delivery for carriage of goods (Article 27) and in respect of shipper’s 
obligation to provide information, instructions and documents (Article 29). The second 
is strict liability for losses arising out of the carriage of dangerous cargo (Article 32) and 
failure to provide timely and accurate contract particulars (Article 31.2). 
 
It should be noted that the obligations imposed on the shipper are mandatory (Article 
79).6 In contrast the carrier’s right to limitation of liability (Article 59), the shipper’s 
liability is not subject to any monetary limitation. Regarding the shipper’s obligations 
incurred under Article 29 or 32, he is not able to limit his liability and no derogations 
are permitted. An interesting point is that carriers can always defend their right to 
limitation of liability by arguing that limitation is required so that their liability insurers 
can assess the risk they are assuming.7 Why does this valid argument not apply to the 
shipper? This will be discussed in section 7.3. Nonetheless, the period of time for suit 
does apply both to shippers (claims against the carrier) and carriers (claims by the 
carrier) under Article 62,8 unlike the corresponding provision of the Hague-Visby 
Rules. 
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In addition, both “shipper” (Article 1.89) and “documentary shipper” (Article 1.9), i.e. a 
party who is not the contracting shipper but who “accept to be named as “shipper” in 
the transport document”, such as a FOB seller, are liable for breach of the obligations in 
Chapter 7. Moreover, regarding the mechanism for transfer of obligations from the 
shipper (Article 58.2), I will discuss whether a third party consignee becomes liable for 
breach of the shipper’s obligations in respect of undisclosed dangerous cargo. 
7.2 Obligations of the shipper 
Articles 27, 28 and 29 set out general obligations with regard to the delivery of goods 
for carriage, cooperation with the carrier and the provision of information, instructions 
and documents. Under these rules, a shipper will be subject to fault based liability as 
follows: 
 
Article 27 Delivery for carriage 
1. Unless otherwise agreed in the contract of carriage, the shipper shall deliver the goods ready for 
carriage. In any event, the shipper shall deliver the goods in such condition that they will withstand the 
intended carriage, including their loading, handling, stowing, lashing and securing, and unloading, and 
that they will not cause harm to persons or property. 
2. The shipper shall properly and carefully perform any obligation assumed under an agreement made 
pursuant to article 13, paragraph 2. 
3. When a container is packed or a vehicle is loaded by the shipper, the shipper shall properly and 
carefully stow, lash and secure the contents in or on the container or vehicle, and in such a way that they 
will not cause harm to persons or property. 
 
Article 28 Cooperation of the shipper and the carrier in providing information and instructions 
The carrier and the shipper shall respond to requests from each other to provide information and 
instructions required for the proper handling and carriage of the goods if the information is in the 
requested party’s possession or the instructions are within the requested party’s reasonable ability to 
provide and they are not otherwise reasonably available to the requesting party. 
 
Article 29 Shipper’s obligation to provide information, instructions and documents 
1. The shipper shall provide to the carrier in a timely manner such information, instructions and 
documents relating to the goods that are not otherwise reasonably available to the carrier, and that are 
reasonably necessary: 
(a) For the proper handling and carriage of the goods, including precautions to be taken by the carrier or a 
performing party; and 
(b) For the carrier to comply with law, regulations or other requirements of public authorities in 
connection with the intended carriage, provided that the carrier notifies the shipper in a timely manner of 
                                                       
9
 Under Article 1.8, “shipper” is defined as “a person that enters into a contract of carriage with a carrier.”  
  360
the information, instructions and documents it requires. 
2. Nothing in this article affects any specific obligation to provide certain information, instructions and 
documents related to the goods pursuant to law, regulations or other requirements of public authorities in 
connection with the intended carriage. 
 
 
Articles 27-29 are stipulated reasonably clear and very comprehensively. They can be 
expressed as a big improvement on previous Conventions (i.e the HR/HVR and 
Hamburg Rules). Also these rules seem much more extensive than the relevant 
provisions under the Chinese Maritime Code (MC).  
 
Under Article 66 of the MC (which follows the approach adopted by Article 17 of the 
Hamburg Rules), the shipper’s responsibility is simply described as “shall have the 
goods properly packed and shall guarantee the accuracy of the description, mark, 
number of packages or pieces, weight or quantity of the goods at the time of shipment 
and shall indemnify the carrier against any losses resulting from inadequacy of packing 
or inaccuracies in the above mentioned information”. Moreover, under Article 67 of the 
MC, the shipper must perform all necessary procedures at the port, customs, quarantine, 
inspection or other competent authorities with respect to the shipment of the goods. The 
shipper shall be liable for any damage to the interests of the carrier resulting from the 
inadequacy or inaccuracy or delay in the delivery of such documents. There is no doubt 
that Article 67 is detailed and very specific, but mainly relates to procedural issues 
required by the competent authority at the port of loading. It is stipulated in a very 
narrow way.  
 
In comparison, the wording of Article 29 of the RR seems to have a broader meaning 
and will be applied in certain circumstances where the shipper is required to provide 
information, instructions and documents relating to the goods that are not otherwise 
reasonably available to the carrier. The information, instructions and documents include 
precautions to be taken by the carrier or a performing party and also for the carrier’s 
compliance with legal requirements connected with the intended carriage, subject to 
timely notification by the carrier of what it requires. Accordingly, if Chinese legislators 
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want to revise and improve Articles 66 and 67 of the Maritime Code, they can use 
Article 29 as a reference. 
 
In addition, Article 27.2 refers to FIOST clause in Article 13.2, where a shipper has 
agreed to be subject to the obligations of loading, stowing, trimming or discharging, 
must perform it “properly and carefully”. It is generally accepted that Article 13.2 has 
overcome the problems with FIOST terms under previous cargo Conventions and it 
appears to be successful and satisfactory. As discussed in section 4.3.2.3, at present, it is 
uncertain in Chinese law whether the parties to the contract of carriage are free to agree 
to transfer some or all of the carrier’s duties to the shipper or consignee. Chinese 
legislators should draw their attention on how to stipulate the FIOST term in the 
Maritime Code. Thus Article 13.2 together with Article 27.2 can be used as references 
for Chinese legislators while revising the Maritime Code. 
 
Article 31 relates to the obligation of the shipper to provide the information required for 
the compilation of the contractual particulars. It requires the shipper to provide the 
specified information, including the names of the shipper, the consignee and “the person 
to whose order the transport document or electronic transport record is to be issued”. 
Under Article 31.2, the shipper must indemnify the carrier against loss or damage 
resulting from inaccurate information. In respect to the breach of this obligation, the 
shipper will be subject to a strict liability (Article 30.2). 
  
Article 31 Information for compilation of contract particulars 
1. The shipper shall provide to the carrier, in a timely manner, accurate information required for the 
compilation of the contract particulars and the issuance of the transport documents or electronic transport 
records, including the particulars referred to in article 36, paragraph 1; the name of the party to be 
identified as the shipper in the contract particulars; the name of the consignee, if any; and the name of the 
person to whose order the transport document or electronic transport record is to be issued, if any. 
2. The shipper is deemed to have guaranteed the accuracy at the time of receipt by the carrier of the 
information that is provided according to paragraph 1 of this article. The shipper shall indemnify the 
carrier against loss or damage resulting from the inaccuracy of such information. 
 
The equivalent provision of Article 31 is Article III r. 5 of the Hague Rules, but Article 
31 is much wider in respect of the obligation to provide information for the contract 
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particulars.10 Under the HV, there is no obligation for the shipper to provide any 
particulars, instead it is required to provide information as to “marks, numbers, quantity 
and weight”; the shipper guarantees the accuracy of such information and must 
indemnify the carrier against all “loss, damage and expenses” caused by that inaccuracy.  
 
Article 32 deals specifically with the shipper’s responsibilities in relation to dangerous 
goods. A shipper’s duties established under Article 32 are subject to strict liability. The 
absolute liability of shippers who ship undisclosed dangerous cargo was developed 
under common law such as in Brass v Maitland.11 Subsequently, it was absorbed into 
the international conventions, namely Article IV r6 of the Hague-Visby Rules which is 
applied in the UK and Article 13 of the Hamburg Rules which is incorporated into 
Article 68 of the Chinese Maritime Code. Both at common law and under HR/HVR/ 
Hamburg Rules, the shipper is strictly liable for any losses and damages caused by the 
shipper’s failure to notify the carrier of the dangerous nature of the cargo. Obviously, 
Article 32 of the RR embodies some similar strands of policy,12 but it is drafted quite 
differently in its wording and there are some differences in its meaning. 
 
Article 32 Special rules on dangerous goods 
When goods by their nature or character are, or reasonably appear likely to become, a danger to persons, 
property or the environment: 
(a) The shipper shall inform the carrier of the dangerous nature or character of the goods in a timely 
manner before they are delivered to the carrier or a performing party. If the shipper fails to do so and the 
carrier or performing party does not otherwise have knowledge of their dangerous nature or character, the 
shipper is liable to the carrier for loss or damage resulting from such failure to inform; and 
(b) The shipper shall mark or label dangerous goods in accordance with any law, regulations or other 
requirements of public authorities that apply during any stage of the intended carriage of the goods. If the 
shipper fails to do so, it is liable to the carrier for loss or damage resulting from such failure. 
 
Dangerous goods are defined as goods which “by their nature or character are, or 
reasonably appear likely to become, a danger to persons, property and the environment”. 
Noticeably, the concept of danger is extended to include danger to the environment. The 
                                                       
10
 Baughen, Obligations owed by the shipper to the carrier, in Thomas D.R., (2009) A new Convention for the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea—The Rotterdam Rules, op. cit., p. 182 
11
 (1856) 26 LJQB 49 
12
 Thomas D. R., An analysis of the liability regime of carriers and maritime performing parties, p. 79 and Baughen 
S., Obligations owed by the shipper to the carrier, in Thomas D.R., (2009) A new Convention for the Carriage of 
Goods by Sea—The Rotterdam Rules, op. cit., p. 183 
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reference to the environment will bring in cargo which is “legally dangerous” in respect 
of public liability that the carrier may incur in carrying it due to the threat it poses to the 
environment. 13  In this aspect, Article 32 is an improvement on previous cargo 
conventions, given legally dangerous cargo is left to common law, and not covered by 
HR/HVR and Hamburg rules. 
 
Under Article 32, there are two duties owed by the shipper. One is to inform the carrier 
of the dangerous nature of the goods in a “timely manner” before they are delivered to 
the carrier or a performing party. If the shipper is in breach of this duty, provided that 
the carrier or performing party is not aware of the dangerous nature of the cargo, the 
shipper is liable for all resulting damage (Article 32(a)). This paragraph is phrased 
similarly to the indemnity provision in Article IV 6 of the HVR, but neither this 
paragraph nor Article 30.1 contains reference to “directly and indirectly” (expenses and 
damages caused by dangerous cargo) which appears in Article IV r6. Suppose after the 
RR has come into force, this will be left to national laws. In England, regarding the 
recoverable damages caused by dangerous cargo, the rules of causation and remoteness 
will apply. In China, the situation is unclear. It is expected the court to apply the rule of 
proximate causation. Unfortunately, there is no relevant rule of remoteness in Chinese 
law. 
 
In addition, Article 32.1 has specified that not only the carrier, but also the “maritime 
performing party”14 where he is different from the carrier who contracts with the 
shipper, are entitled to receive notice of the dangerous nature of the cargo from the 
shipper. This, again follows the Hamburg precedent (Article 13), which has clarified 
that the shipper’s notice is required to be given to the actual sea carrier. It should be 
noted that the shipper is not obliged to give notice to the “actual carrier” under Article 
68 of Chinese Maritime Code, although Article 68 is effectively Article 13 of the 
                                                       
13
 Baughen, Obligations owed by the shipper to the carrier, in Thomas D.R., (2009) A new Convention for the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea—The Rotterdam Rules, op. cit., p. 183 
14
 It is defined in Article 1.7. Under Article 19.1 of the RR, “a maritime performing party is subject to the obligation 
and liabilities imposed on the carrier under this Convention and is entitled to the carrier’s defences and limit of 
liability as provided for in this Convention”. 
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Hamburg Rules,15 the wording of “actual carrier” is omitted. This omission may result 
in some confusion in practice, since the shipper may escape from liability for 
non-disclosure of dangerous cargo to the actual carrier. Accordingly, the author suggests 
to insert the words “actual carrier” into Article 68. Alternatively, the Chinese legislators 
may consider redrafting Article 68 in accordance with Article 32 of the RR, if they 
intend to widen the shipper’s obligations in respect of dangerous cargo. 
 
The other duty owed by the shipper under Article 32 of the RR is to mark or label 
dangerous goods in accordance with any applicable legal or regulatory requirement 
relating to any stage of the intended carriage, not just at the port of discharge. Breach of 
this duty again renders the shipper liable for any resulting damage (Article 32(b)). This 
paragraph follows the approach adopted by Article 13.1 of the Hamburg Rules in 
respect of shipper’s responsibility for “marking and labelling” (it is incorporated into 
Article 68 of the Chinese Maritime Law), but makes it clear that the regime for 
dangerous cargo extends to compliance with legal requirements. However, as Mr. 
Baughen pointed out,16 this provision does not cover the case such as in Mitchell Cotts 
& Co Ltd v Stell Brothers & Co Ltd,17 where legal requirements that prevent the cargo 
being unloaded due to lack of permission from the British Government to import cargo, 
because it was not relating to labelling or marking of the cargo. Presumably, this kind of 
“legally dangerous” cargo would fall in Article 29 which is subject to fault based 
liability rather than a strict liability under Article 32. 
 
As we discussed in Chapter 5, during the development of the international conventions, 
the definition of dangerous cargo has evolved and extended from danger to ship and 
cargo (property damage), to include danger to life (personal injury), and finally to 
include danger to the environment (environmental damage). We can see based on 
Article 32, a carrier who is liable for pollution damage may consequently have a right of 
recourse against a shipper in respect of damages caused by undisclosed dangerous 
                                                       
15
 See discussion in section 4.2.2.2. The “actual carrier” is defined in the Maritime Code and the shipper’s 
obligations under Maritime Code are largely Hamburg-based. 
16
 Ibid. 
17
 [1916] 2 KB 610 
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cargo. 
 
From what has been discussed above, we can see the shipper’s existing duty under HR/ 
HVR/Hamburg rules not to load undeclared dangerous cargo is widened by Article 32 of 
the RR. Moreover, the shipper effectively has a duty to load cargo in a safe and sound 
condition (Article 27.1) and to provide information at any time on request relating to the 
goods and their proper handling (Article 28). This will have a significant economic 
impact for countries that heavily depend on export (e.g. China), where the majority of 
cases involve the shippers’ responsibilities relating to the shipment of dangerous cargo. 
This will be one of the major issues of concern the Chinese legislation authorities will 
have in respect to the ratification of the RR.  
7.3 The liability regime 
The liability regime is to be found in Articles 30 and 33-34. In respect to a claim by the 
carrier against the shipper, Article 30 is the central provision which sets out the basis of 
the shipper’s liability to the carrier, including provisions to deal with the apportionment 
of liability (Article 30.3) and the burden of proof (Article 30.1 and 30.2).  
 
Article 30 Basis of shipper’s liability to the carrier 
1. The shipper is liable for loss or damage sustained by the carrier if the carrier proves that such loss or 
damage was caused by a breach of the shipper’s obligations under this Convention. 
2. Except in respect of loss or damage caused by a breach by the shipper of its obligations pursuant to 
articles 31, paragraph 2, and 32, the shipper is relieved of all or part of its liability if the cause or one of 
the causes of the loss or damage is not attributable to its fault or to the fault of any person referred to in 
article 34. 
3. When the shipper is relieved of part of its liability pursuant to this article, the shipper is liable only for 
that part of the loss or damage that is attributable to its fault or to the fault of any person referred to in 
article 34. 
 
Article 30.1 establishes the basic rules that the shipper is liable if the carrier proves that 
the shipper was in breach of its obligations under the Convention. As discussed above, 
the shipper’s main obligations are set out in Articles 27, 29, 31 and 32. Article 30.2 sets 
out the rules for the shipper to be “relieved of all or part of its liability”, “if the cause or 
one of the causes of the loss or damage is not attributed to its fault”. However, this does 
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not apply to the two obligations based on strict liability under Articles 31.2 (accurate 
contract particulars) and Article 32 (dangerous cargo). Although Article 30.2 does not 
say so expressly, the burden of proof is on the shipper18 to prove the absence of fault. 
 
An interesting situation arises: whether the shipper’s liability for “loss or damage” 
under Article 30.1 including economic loss due to delay suffered by the carrier can be 
claimed under the Convention? As the author understands, it is very unlikely that the 
meaning of “loss or damage” extends so far as to include “delay”. Actually, the word 
“delay” was purposely deleted from the previous draft, as part of the compromised 
package agreed at the 19th session of the Working Group III. The reason was: 
considering the shipper’s potentially very high exposure to liability for economic loss 
due to delay, it would be necessary to introduce a limit of liability to the shipper. In 
view of the difficulty of finding an appropriate limit for the shipper, a decision was 
made to simply delete the word “delay”.19 As we can see the RR specifically provides 
for the carrier’s liability for delay (Articles 17, 20) and his limitation of liability for loss 
caused by delay (Article 60), but not for the shipper. Accordingly, the shipper’s liability 
for delay is left to be governed by national laws. In respect to whether a carrier’s 
economic loss due to delay would be recoverable, in England the ordinary rules on 
causation and remoteness would be applied; in China, the rule of proximate causation 
would apply. 
 
Article 30.3 provides for proportionate allocation of liability in cases where “the shipper 
is relived of part of its liability” under Article 30.2. The shipper is only liable for the 
part of the loss attributed to his fault. The wording of Article 30.3 mirrors Article 17.6 
(carrier’s liability).20 An interesting situation arises here: if there are two contributory 
causes of the carrier’s loss: (1) a breach by the shipper regarding undisclosed dangerous 
cargo under Article 32; (2) unseaworthiness of the vessel, can the carrier recover his 
                                                       
18
 See relevant discussion in Diamond, The Rotterdam Rules, L.M.C.L.Q. 2009 4(Nov.) pp. 445-536, at 494; see also 
Baughen, Obligations owed by the shipper to the carrier, op. cit. 185. 
19
 See paragraph 180 (b) of Working Group III 19 A/CN.9/621, and paras 177-184 and 233-243. See also Baughen, 
op. cit. 184, Diamond, op. cit. 493.  
20
 Article 30.3 refers part of the loss attributed to “fault” of the shipper, whereas Article 17.6 refers to part of the loss 
attributed to the “event or circumstances” on which the carrier relies. See also Asariotis R., Loss due to a combination 
of causes: burden of proof and commercial risk allocation, op. cit, p. 162.  
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loss? 
 
In England, following the decisions in The Fiona21 and The Kapitan Sakharov,22 it has 
been established: where both a breach of the carrier’s seaworthiness obligation and a 
breach of the shipper’s obligation relating the shipment of dangerous goods contribute 
to a loss, the shipowner will only be entitled to rely on the indemnity provided in Article 
IV r.6 to the extent that damage is clearly attributable to the dangerous nature of the 
goods. Where the unseaworthiness was at least a necessary contributing factor to the 
loss, the carrier will have to bear the whole responsibility in the absence of evidence 
identifying dangerous goods as the sole cause for (part of ) the loss.  
 
Regarding the burden of proof in relation to the cause of loss in the above cases, it rests 
with the carrier under Hague-Visby rules. In The Kapitan Sakharov, where a carrier who 
has sustained losses in connection with the carriage of dangerous cargo brings a claim 
against cargo interests under Art IV r 6, the burden of proof was on the carrier to 
establish that a specific part of the damage or loss was caused by the dangerous cargo. 
In the absence of evidence on the relevant proportion of loss due to dangerous cargo and 
unseaworthiness, the carrier cannot claim indemnity and will be held liable for the 
whole loss such as in The Fiona. 
 
Finally, it is interesting to see how the new Rotterdam Rules deal with the issue of 
contributing fault between the shipper and carrier. In cases where the damage and loss is 
due to a combination of causes, the carrier (based on Art 17(6)) and the shipper (based 
on Art 30(2)) can be relieved of part or all of the liability if the cause or one of the 
causes of the loss is not attributable to one or both parties.23 To relieve part or all of the 
liability, the shipper or the carrier has the burden of proving the apportionment of loss 
he is not responsible for. If the shipper’s liability is not based on fault (e.g. strict liability 
under Art 32), the above analysis is not applicable. 
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 The Fiona [1994] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 506 
22
 The Kapitan Sakharov [2000] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 255. 
23
 See Asariotis, Burden of proof and allocation of liability for loss due to a combination of causes under the new 
Rotterdam Rules, (2008)14 JIML, p 537; see also Baughen, Obligations of the shipper to the carrier, (2008)14 
JIML,563; and Diamond, The next sea carriage Convention, [2008] LMCLQ 135 
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It should be noted, in contrast to HR/HVR, the carrier’s seaworthiness obligation is a 
continuous one, applying throughout the carriage.24 Moreover, the initial burden is on 
the claimant25 to prove the unseaworthiness of the ship under Art 17 (5) of RR. 
Accordingly, if the cargo claimant can make a prima facie case of unseaworthiness as a 
cause and the carrier is unable to disprove either causality or negligence, the carrier 
would be liable, but for only part of the loss, with proportional liability assessed by a 
court under Art 17(6).26  
 
In addition, Art 17(6) simply provides for proportional liability of the carrier in cases 
where courts find the carrier partly liable under Art 17 (2)-(5), but it is silent on the 
burden of proof in relation to establishing the respective proportions of loss due to 
different contributory causes. Actually, Art 17(6) does not provide any clear guidance on 
how to justify apportionment and how to assess proportional liability. As a result, courts 
in different jurisdictions are likely to adopt their own methods and practices in making 
the relevant allocation, which is not good to the legal certainty. It is suggested27 to 
redraft Art 17 (6) to include the method of apportionment of the loss.      
 
We can see the RR is remarkably different from the HR/HVR where the carrier is liable 
in full for a breach of Art III r1, unless he can prove the relevant proportion of loss due 
to a different cause (e.g. shipper’s liability under Art IV r6). Furthermore, under HR/ 
HVR, the carrier bears the initial burden of proving the exercise of due diligence, 
otherwise he will be liable for unseaworthiness.  
 
Compared with HR/HVR, although there is a considerable improvement on the 
obligations of the shipper to the carrier under RR,28 the apportionment of liability under 
Art 30(3) will not apply to the shipper if his liability is strict (e.g. dangerous cargo 
                                                       
24
 Article 14 of Rotterdam Rules. 
25
 See also Tetley, Some general criticisms of the Rotterdam Rules, (2008)14 JIML, p628. 
26
 See Asariotis, op. cit., p. 546. 
27
 See Tetley, A critique of and the Canadian response to the Rotterdam Rules, in Thomas D. R. (editor) (2009) A 
new convention for the carriage of goods by sea—the Rotterdam Rules, Lawtext Publishing Limited, p. 293, see also 
Diamond, op. cit., 152 and Asariotis, op. cit., p. 543 
28
 See chapter 7 of the RR Obligations of the shipper to the carrier of the Rotterdam Rules, see also Diamond, op. cit., 
159 and Baughen, op. cit., 559. 
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liability under Art 32). Considering a combination of causes (dangerous cargo and 
unseaworthiness), there are no special rules in the RR that allow the shipper to be 
relieved of part of his liability in dangerous cargo incidents. Presumably, the shipper is 
liable in full under Art 32.  
 
Obviously, after the RR has come into force, it will depend on the courts to interpret and 
apply Articles 17(5), 30(2) and 32. A possible interpretation is where loss is due to a 
combination of causes (unseaworthiness and dangerous cargo) and so the shipper is 
liable in full, unless he can prove that unseaworthiness and lack of due diligence by the 
carrier is a contributing cause. However, without a specific rule included in RR, it is not 
easy to justify an apportionment of loss between the shipper and the carrier. 
7.4 Whether a shipper’s liability can be transferred to a 
third party 
The Rotterdam Rules regulate transfer of liability under Article 58, but only applies to 
negotiable transport documents and negotiable electronic transport records. Under 
Article 58, r.2,29 the B/L holder assumes the liabilities if he “exercise any right under 
the contract of carriage”. However, it does not then assume the same liabilities as if it 
had been the original party (i.e. shipper) to the contract. It only assumes any liabilities 
“imposed on it under the contract of carriage” and then only “to the extent that such 
liabilities are incorporated in or ascertainable from” the bill of lading.  
 
The obligations under Article 32 in respect of undisclosed dangerous cargo are imposed 
only on the shipper and the documentary shipper. The only way to impose the liability 
on other parties (e.g. a B/L holder) would be through an express clause in the negotiable 
transport document or its electronic equivalent. However, such a clause would be 
regarded as an attempt to increase the obligation under the convention of the “consignee, 
controlling party, holder” and would be rendered void under Article 79.2.30 Accordingly, 
                                                       
29
 Article 58.2 provides: “A holder that is not the shipper and that exercises any right under the contract of carriage 
assumes any liabilities imposed on it under the contract of carriage to the extent that such liabilities are incorporated 
in or ascertainable from the negotiable transport document or the negotiable electronic transport record”. 
30Article 79.2 provides: “Unless otherwise provided in this Convention, any term in a contract of carriage is void to 
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a shipper’s obligations regarding undisclosed dangerous cargo would not be transferred 
to a third party, and a B/L holder would not be liable to the carrier for damages for 
shipping a dangerous cargo under Articles 58.2 and 79.2. 
 
In England it is clear that the shipper’s liability under Article IV rule 6 does not transfer 
to a third party under COGSA 1992, although the Law Commission thought it did. The 
Law Commission specifically rejected any provision preventing the transmissibility of 
this liability to third party at 3.22 of Law Com No. 196 (1991). Nonetheless, from the 
following case law, we can see that neither the intermediate bill of lading holder nor 
their sub buyer would undertake the liability transferred from the original shipper. 
 
In The Aegean Sea,31 Thomas J expressly indorsed the same view given by the authors 
of Scrutton that “shipper” in Article IV rule 6 cannot be read as including a lawful 
holder of the bill of lading to whom rights and liabilities are transferred under COGSA 
1992, and that therefore such a holder is not subject to the shipper’s Hague Rule 
liabilities in respect of dangerous cargo.32 In the appeal in The Giannis NK, Hirst L.J. 
noted that at common law the shipper would have remained liable, notwithstanding 
endorsement of the bill of lading. 
 
In The Berge Sisar,33 where the liability of an intermediate party who had called for 
samples from the cargo prior to delivery and on the basis of their analysis had decided 
not to take delivery but to resell the cargo. In due course they obtained the bill of lading 
which they then passed on to their sub-buyer. This temporary possession of the bill gave 
the intermediate buyer rights of suit under section 2(1) of COGSA 1992, of which they 
                                                                                                                                                                  
the extent that it: 
(a) Directly or indirectly excludes, limits or increases the obligations under this Convention of the shipper, consignee, 
controlling party, holder or documentary shipper; or 
(b) Directly or indirectly excludes, limits or increases the liability of the shipper, consignee, controlling party, holder 
or documentary shipper for breach of any of its obligations under this Convention”.  
See also Baughen, Obligations owed by the shipper to the carrier, in Thomas D.R. (editor), (2009) A new Convention 
for the Carriage of Goods by Sea—The Rotterdam Rules, op. cit., p. 188. 
31
 [1998] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 39, 70. 
32
 Mildon, David & Scorey, David, Liabilities of Transferees of Bills of Lading, The International Journal of Shipping 
Law (IJSL), part 2, 1999, pp94-104, at 96. 
33
 Sub nom. Borealis AB v. Stargas Limited and others and Bergesen [2001] 2 WLR 1118; [2002] 2 AC 205; Treitel, 
Bills of Lading: Liabilities of Transferee-The Berge Sisar [2001] LMCLQ 344 
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were divested under section 2(5) when they passed on the bill to their sub-buyer.  
 
The House of Lords held that at the time the intermediate buyer made the request they 
were not in a position to make a “demand” for delivery as they lacked the bill of lading 
and so lacked the authority to make such a demand. It would be preferable to have been 
that a request for samples prior to delivery could not amount to a “demand for 
delivery”.34 The decision given by the House of Lords in The Berge Sisar is clear that 
neither the intermediate bill of lading holder nor their sub buyer would undertake the 
liability transferred from the original shipper. 
 
In China, there is no particular provision in dealing with the “transfer of rights and 
liabilities” to a bill of lading holder, who is not an original party to the contract of 
carriage under the Maritime Code. The starting point is simply freedom of contract: as 
the Maritime Code, Art.78 r.1 states: “The relationship between the carrier and the 
holder of the bill of lading with respect to their rights and obligations shall be defined 
by the clauses of the bill of lading”. Here the B/L holder includes transferees, and Art. 
78 r.235  refers to certain responsibilities (i.e. demurrage, dead freight and other 
expenses) might be transferred from the shipper under specific clause of B/L. But, the 
provision does not help us to understand, with regard to the shipment of dangerous 
cargo, whether the shipper’s liability can be transferred to a third party (e.g. consignee). 
Nonetheless, some general legislation might help, such as the General Principles of 
Civil Law and the Contract Law 1999.36 
 
Under Contract Law 1999, Article 88 “Upon consent by the other party, one party may 
concurrently transfers his/her rights and obligations under a contract to a third person”. 
This means the obligations under a contract can be transferred under Chinese law, but 
there are strict conditions to do it.  
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 Baughen & Campbell, op. cit. p. 9. 
35
 Article 78 rule 2, Neither the consignee nor the holder of the bill of lading shall be liable for the demurrage, dead 
freight and all other expenses in respect of loading occurred at the loading port unless the bill of lading clearly states 
that the aforesaid demurrage, dead freight and all other expenses shall be borne by the consignee and the holder of the 
bill of lading” 
36
 Contract Law of People’s Republic of China was adopted at the Second Session of the Ninth National People's 
Congress on March 15, 1999. See the English version of Contract Law at 
http://www.chinaiprlaw.com/english/laws/laws2.htm 
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Firstly, there must be an agreement from the transferee. Some Chinese scholars37 think 
it is necessary to have a contract between the third party and the original contracting 
party with an express agreement by the third party to take the responsibility under the 
contract. Although there is a lack of Chinese legislation on this issue, surely this must be 
necessary as a matter of logic. Secondly, according to Article 84 of Contract Law,38 it is 
subject to the carrier’s consent that the shipper’s obligation can be transferred to a B/L 
holder. Thirdly, according to Article 86,39 if the obligation is exclusively personal to the 
original shipper, it cannot be transferred to a B/L holder. Fourthly, according to Articles 
79 and 89,40 in light of the nature of the contract, some rights and obligations cannot be 
transferred.  
 
In the light of what I have said above, none of the conditions can be satisfied in the case 
of dangerous cargo. For instance, it is very unlikely to see the B/L holder would agree 
on taking all shipper’s obligations on dangerous cargo, before knowing the exactly 
amount of damages could occur. Moreover, it is impossible to get the consent from the 
carrier in advance as to which transferee will take the responsibility (instead of the 
shipper) since the B/L can be transferred many times while the cargo on board during 
the voyage. Furthermore, considering the nature of the carriage contract, it is not 
realistic for the transferee to get hold of all information about the dangerous nature of 
cargo before cargo’s delivery. Accordingly, the obligation to notify the carrier, as 
discussed in English law, can be regarded as an exclusively personal duty of the original 
shipper and a third party cannot substitute for the shipper.  
 
In China, as a general proposition, a shipper’s duty of notice cannot be transferred and 
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 Zhang junhao, Liu xinwen & Yao xinhua (ed.) Civil Law Principle (in Chinese), (2000: 3rd edition) China 
University of Political Science and Law Press, p. 701. 
38
 Under Article 84 of the Contract Law “Where the obligor delegates its obligations under a contract in whole or in 
part to a third person, such delegation is subject to consent by the obligee”. 
39
 Under Article 86, “Where the obligor delegates an obligation, the new obligor shall assume any incidental 
obligation associated with the main obligation, except where such incidental obligation is exclusively personal to the 
original obligor”. 
40
 Article 79 of the Contract Law, The obligee may assign its rights under a contract in whole or in part to a third 
person, except where such assignment is prohibited: (i) in light of the nature of the contract; (ii) by agreement 
between the parties; (iii) by law. Article 89, Where a party concurrently assigns its rights and delegates its obligations, 
the provisions in Article 79, Articles 81 to 83, and Articles 85 to 87 apply 
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the transferees will not become liable with regard to the shipment of dangerous cargo,41 
same as that in England. However, the general rules in the Contract Law and the Civil 
law are not specifically designed for applying to maritime cases, and cannot be 
construed as “transfer the shipper’s contractual rights and liabilities to a B/L holder” 
particularly in the case of dangerous cargo. There is no doubt that the Chinese 
legislators have not touched the topic on transfer of rights and liabilities under the 
Maritime Code. This issue should be clarified during the revision of the Code, but how 
to stipulate it? When and how the consignee assumes liability is a very difficult question, 
and was not answered satisfactorily either in the UK Bill of Lading Act 1855 or in the 
UK Carriage of Goods by Sea Act 1992.   
 
In addition, to what extent should the liabilities of the B/L holder be subject to? The 
author believes the extent should at least be narrowed down to “such liabilities have to 
be incorporated in or ascertainable from the B/L”. The relevant issue is regulated under 
Article 58, r.2 of the RR, and it can be used as a reference for Chinese legislators during 
the revision of Maritime Code. 
7.5 Conclusion 
 
From what has been discussed above, we can see the Convention has set out some 
extremely comprehensive rules in regard to the obligations of the shipper to the carrier. 
Most of them are reasonably clear and can be regarded as a big improvement on 
previous cargo conventions, such as Articles 27, 28 and 29 covering a shipper’s general 
obligations as regards delivery of the goods for carriage, cooperation with the carrier 
and the provision of information, instruction and documents. There is no doubt that 
liability for breach of Article 32 and Article 31.2 is strict, whereas the shipper’s other 
liabilities in Chapter 7 are based on fault. Moreover, the obligations imposed on the 
shipper are mandatory. Article 79.2 (a) renders void any term that directly or indirectly 
excludes, limits or increase them; this is quite different from the position under Article 
V of the Hague-Visby rules. Finally, Article 13.2 (FIOST term) appears to be 
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 See Zhouchao, Shipper’s duty of notice and related liability in shipment of dangerous goods by sea (in Chinese), 
[2005] Journal of Political Science and Law, Vol. 22, Issue 4, p. 32. 
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satisfactory and successful, and the shipper’s obligations relating to FIOST term are 
referred in Article 27.2. These provisions can be incorporated into Chinese law or used 
as references for Chinese legislators during the revision of the Maritime Code.  
 
However, some provisions are far from clear, particularly in respect of the rules dealing 
with the allocation of liability for loss due to a combination of causes (e.g. dangerous 
cargo and unseaworthiness), there are no special rules in the RR that allow the shipper 
to be relieved of part of his liability in dangerous cargo incidents. In this respect, the RR 
is remarkably different from the HR/HVR where the carrier is liable in full for a breach 
of Art III r1, unless he can prove the relevant proportion of loss due to a different cause. 
In the event that the Rotterdam Rules become law in the United Kingdom and China, it 
will depend on the courts to interpret and apply Articles 17(5), 30(2) and 32.  
 
In addition, it is still uncertain whether claims for economic loss due to delay suffered 
by the carrier fall under the convention. If it does not, presumably it will be left to be 
governed by national law. In England the ordinary rules on causation and remoteness 
would apply; in China, the rule of proximate causation would apply. 
 
Finally, the author must admit that the unnecessary complexity has in many cases been 
introduced in the Rotterdam Rules. In the near future, it is unlikely to see China to ratify 
the Convention, although it may well be ratified by the US, then followed by the UK. 
Only if it has been ratified by a great majority of the UN member states, it is possible to 
achieve the goal of “uniformity” and supersede the Hague, Hague-Visby and Hamburg 
Rules. 
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Chapter 8 Final Conclusions 
This thesis started from the point that the danger in dangerous cargoes was not 
necessarily something in the goods themselves, but might well lie in the way they were 
packaged, looked after or transported (1.2), thus the problem of various parties’ 
liabilities arising from the carriage of dangerous cargo is unclear. Given the degree of 
complexity of transport law is unusually high, it is necessary to sort and organise the 
materials in a suitable manner that is the basis for further research. Considering the 
multi-dimensional nature of this problem (in contract, tort and statute law), I will 
summarise the conclusions from the comparative analyses of the following issues: (1) 
the substance, the packing and handling; (2) the scheme of liability; (3) the channelling 
of liability; and (4) the type of recoverable damage. 
8.1 Dangerous Cargo, the Packing and Handling 
In this thesis, we have used a broader definition for dangerous cargo (1.1). Although 
English and Chinese law have different approaches (1.1.1 & 1.1.2), the concept of 
dangerous cargo is effectively the same (1.2.1.4), except for “legally” dangerous 
cargoes (4.2.1.1) which is only covered by English common law. In practice, for a 
carrier to enquire about information on dangerous cargoes, whether they are in China or 
in England is to refer to the IMDG Code. 
 
In the U.K., the restrictions on goods which a charterer or cargo-owner may ship are 
imposed by the common law, the terms of contract and statute. At common law, the 
shipper has strict liability, unless the shipowner knew or should have known of the 
danger. However, common law or contractual provisions must obviously give way to 
overlapping statutory provisions (e.g. Hague-Visby Rules). If the statutory provision is 
inapplicable, the common law indemnity will continue to apply, thus the shipper may be 
strictly liable for the shipment of “legally” dangerous cargo at common law (4.2.1.1). 
Moreover, the common law indemnity may be implied into charterparty (4.5.4) 
depending on the specific terms of the particular charterparty.  
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In China, dangerous cargoes are regarded as a category, the extent of which is 
developed by statutory regulation based on a substantial list (e.g. national standards 
under GB 6944/GB12268) or the IMDG Code. Unlike English common law, China does 
not recognise stare decisis and generally the strict liability is not applicable to “legally” 
dangerous cargoes, given Article 68 of Maritime Code is limited to physically 
dangerous cargoes. 
 
Under the HNS Convention, the definition of HNS is by reference to existing lists of 
substances in seven separate IMO instruments (5.2.2.3). Many countries are reluctant to 
ratify this convention. To remove the obstacles of ratification, the IMO approved a draft 
Protocol to the 1996 HNS Convention in early 2009 (5.2.2.5). The Protocol simplifies 
the HNS Convention and makes it easier to identify contributors to the HNS Fund.  
 
Neither China nor the U.K. has ratified the HNS Convention (5.2.2.6), due to different 
reasons. The UK had strong intentions to ratify the Convention, but was concerned over 
the details of certain aspects of the compensation scheme. Currently the UK is in the 
process of waiting for the Protocol to address those concerns (5.2.2.5). In contrast, 
China has so far not had much interest in the HNS Convention, but this may change. 
China still needs to see whether the ratification of the Convention/ Protocol would as a 
whole, be beneficial to China. Nonetheless, if it would cause undue costs or competitive 
disadvantages, then the Convention would not be ratified by China. In any case China, 
like the UK, will do nothing until the Protocol is finalised. 
8.2 Scheme of Liability 
With regard to the liability scheme for the carriage of dangerous cargo by sea, China 
and England adopt different approaches, but the practical results are the same so far as 
the decision on who is liable is concerned. China relies heavily on statute, particularly 
the Maritime Code, and is supplemented by limited application of tort law (e.g. Articles 
106, 123 of the Civil law). In England, it is mainly contract law, plus fairly rigorous 
application of tort law. As a common law country, legislation is less important except 
for claims for compensation for pollution. 
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It should be noted that the shipper must use reasonable care to warn all those who assist 
in the transportation of dangerous cargo (3.1.2.2), and this liability is strict at English 
common law, Chinese Maritime Code and HR/ HVR/Hamburg Rules/ Rotterdam Rules. 
It is extremely important for the carrier to get all information regarding characteristics 
of dangerous cargoes and their handling. Such information, if effective, must be 
presented in an intelligible way to the right persons (e.g. the ship’s master) and at the 
right time (before shipment). In essence, the object of giving notice is to provide the 
carrier with the opportunity to either refuse to carry the cargo, or to take necessary 
precautions to protect his vessel and other cargoes on board. The methods of precaution 
include supplying a seaworthy vessel, proper handling and care for the cargoes (4.3). 
The carrier’s duties of care on cargo increase somewhat proportionally to the notice 
given by shippers of the dangers associated with the shipment of dangerous cargoes 
(3.1.2.3). 
 
In addition, there are significant differences of tort law between England and China. In 
England, “duty of care” is an important issue in negligence. With the restriction of the 
extent of duty, it is unlikely to impose a duty of care on the defendant, to not cause 
pollution-related loss in the absence of physical damage (pure economic loss). In 
contrast, China knows no concept of “duty of care”. Therefore there is no relevant 
restriction on the “extent of duty”. Theoretically, for pure economic loss, recovery is 
possible under Article 106 of Civil Law where the defendant’s negligence causes the 
damages. In practice, to avoid a deluge of potential claims for compensation, Chinese 
maritime courts would require the defendant’s fault is a proximate cause of the 
economic loss (3.2.1, 6.2). Therefore, the practical result is the same; both countries 
have difficulties with regard to awarding damages for “pure economic loss”. 
 
Both China and England have a potential strict liability rule under general law (tort or 
strict product liability), but it is not very important since it is not often applied to 
dangerous cargo cases. As a result, the strict liability is still most likely to be based on 
the HNS convention and oil pollution conventions. 
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At English common law, the application of strict liability in Rylands is restricted to 
foreseeable damage and “escape” from defendant’s property (or control). If a shipowner 
is unaware of any dangerous cargoes on his ship, it is unlikely for him to foresee any 
resulting damage. Therefore in the majority of cases, the Rylands rule1 effectively does 
not apply to dangerous cargo incidents. Moreover, the Law Commission has rejected the 
approach to extend the rule in Rylands to ultra-hazardous activities. The author argued 
that the rule in Rylands should be extended to ultra-hazardous activities, particularly 
considering the environmental legislation is not yet integrated and sufficient (3.1.3). 
 
In contrast, Article 123 of the Chinese Civil Law is clearly applicable to ultra-hazardous 
activities. Theoretically, if the carriage of dangerous cargo is regarded as an 
“ultra-hazardous activity”, the shipowner has strict liability for any resulting damages. 
The disadvantage is that this provision is far too general and is very difficult to be 
applicable in real maritime cases, given that the Chinese Maritime Code does not have 
any specific provisions regarding strict liability for ultra-hazardous activities. Also there 
is no relevant principle of remoteness of damage in Chinese tort law. 
 
Moreover, both China and England have legislations on product liability. In practice, 
however, they are rarely to be applied to marine claims for damage and pollution caused 
by dangerous cargo, given their regulatory restrictions. Under Chinese Product Quality 
Law (PQL), the strict product liability is not applicable to sellers, unless the seller fails 
to identify the producer.2 Otherwise, a seller will only be liable for injury or damage 
caused by a defective product if his fault contributed to the defect. This is the same as 
English law. However, an important difference is the commercial property is 
recoverable under PQL but not in the Consumer Protection Act 1987 (3.1.4, 3.2.5). 
 
Furthermore, there is a big difference of vicarious liability in two countries. In England, 
a carrier could be liable in tort of negligence for lack of due care of the dangerous cargo 
                                                       
1
 The requirement of “foreseeable damage” was discussed in the case of Cambridge Water in section 3.1.3 
2
 Article 42 of the PQL 
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himself, his agents or his servants (3.1.5.2), or he has an overriding obligation if 
unseaworthiness caused the damage. In contrast, Chinese law has not introduced an 
occupant’s or vicarious liability. That means it is uncertain what liability the carrier has 
with regard to the tortious actions that its employees commit during the course of 
employment but outside of the navigation and management of the vessel.3 Nor is it 
clear what the carrier’s liability is with regard to any tortious action of a third party 
committed against the navigation and management of the vessel. It is expected that 
Chinese court would somehow hold the carrier liable to any tortious action that its 
employees commit during the course of employment. 
 
From what has been discussed in Chapter 3, we can see tort rules on liability are not 
clear-cut or easy to apply. They often lead to complicated legal questions and the 
solutions are often doubtful. The need for an all-embracing solution is strong, but the 
need for differentiation is stronger and inevitably leads to considerable difficulties. 
Conversely, freedom of contract seems to be meaningful and may offer a method of 
keeping a reasonable degree of flexibility. The terms of contract of carriage not only 
clarify the responsibilities between the carrier and the shipper, but also ensures they are 
under the protection of exceptions and limitations of liability provisions (4.3.1.5; 5.2.3). 
In certain circumstances, in England it even extends the protection to third party 
beneficiaries (4.6). A comparison of the contractual liability between Chinese and 
English law has been evaluated in sections 4.2.2.3 and 4.3.2.4. 
 
In China, the liability of the carrier to the shipper under the Maritime Code is 
HVR-based, which is the same as in England. However, considering the liability of the 
shipper to the carrier, the relevant provisions under the Maritime Code are largely 
Hamburg-based which have made more specific provisions, but haven’t fundamentally 
changed the scheme of liability for dangerous cargoes under HR/ HVR. They all have 
very similar provisions in dealing with dangerous cargoes, which largely supersede the 
                                                       
3
 Under Article 51 of the Maritime Code 1992, negligence of the shipmaster, seamen, pilot or other employees of the 
carrier in the navigation and management of ship is a common ground for the carrier to claim exemption. This 
exemption has at least two elements: first, the person committing the negligent act must be a pilot or an employee of 
the carrier; and secondly, the negligence which has caused loss or damage to goods must be committed for the 
purpose of, or in the process of, navigating and managing the vessel. 
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common law rules related to shipper’s obligation to give notice. 
 
Nevertheless there are still differences between the two countries. For example, unlike 
English law, there is not any equivalent provision of the Maritime Code to Article III r8 
of the HR/HVR (prohibiting the carrier from reducing certain liabilities). Also, whether 
the carrier is relieved of liability based on the FIOST clause inserted in B/L has been 
interpreted in different way. In China, the FIOST term has not been stipulated or 
clarified by Chinese Maritime Code (4.3.2.3). In England, it is clearly interpreted in 
case law that the parties to the contract of carriage are free to agree to transfer some or 
all of the carrier’s duties to the shipper or consignee. 
 
In addition, the legal term of “actual carrier” under Chinese Maritime Code,4 which is 
largely Hamburg based, has resulted in confusion relating to the shipper’s notice to the 
carrier. It is not clear whether the shipper’s notice to the “carrier” also includes the 
actual carrier. The author suggests the wording of “actual carrier” should be added to 
Article 68. Also in practice, the shipper’s agent or carrier’s agent often act for their 
principal while dealing with the transportation of dangerous cargo. These persons are 
usually involved in the day-to-day business near the harbour. Unfortunately, in the 
Maritime Code, there is a lack of clarification of the status of the agent’s rights and 
liability relating to the carriage of dangerous cargo, and as such Article 68 needs to be 
clarified. In comparison, in England the shipper’s liability to notify the carrier is under 
Article IV r6 of HVR, which is specified to apply to “the carrier, master or agent of the 
carrier”, and this provision is very clearly promulgated. 
 
Frankly, the author admits that there is a lack of coherence among the different chapters 
of the Maritime Code. This is due to the fact that the Chinese legislative authority tried 
to “pick and mix” all the good aspects of the HR/HVR and Hamburg Rules. A negative 
impact of this attitude is real. The author suggests during the revision of the Maritime 
Code, different chapters need further coordination and it would be better to have the 
                                                       
4
 Under Article 42 of Maritime Code, "Actual carrier" means the person to whom the performance of carriage of 
goods, or of part of the carriage, has been entrusted by the carrier, and includes any other person to whom such 
performance has been entrusted under a sub-contract. This definition is same as that in Article 1 of Hamburg Rules. 
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revised Code based on one of the above international conventions or the new Rotterdam 
Rules. Compared with HR/HVR, there is a considerable improvement on the obligations 
of the shipper to the carrier under the Rotterdam Rules (Chapter 7).  
8.3 Channelling of Liability 
Neither England nor China makes particular effort to channel liability under its national 
law. Most commonly, “channelling of liability” would be found in the international 
liability conventions such as HNS Convention 1996, CLC Convention/ 1992 Protocol 
and the Bunker Convention 2001. 
 
How to “channel the liability” is always a tough question, given the many difficulties 
that arise from the variety of liability systems in the world. Furthermore, the various 
parties involved in the transportation of dangerous cargo may have potential liabilities, 
e.g. where dangerous cargo caused damages to other cargoes on board is more 
complicated than the basic shipper-carrier relation; or damage from the dangerous cargo 
affects longshoremen or other employees (3.1.5); or where dangerous cargo damage has 
a wide area of impact to the environment, there is the possibility for many parties to be 
involved, such as the owners of contaminated fishing ponds, hotel owners’ loss of 
income due to pollution, owners of the polluted coasts (3.1.2.4), people injured by 
explosions of dangerous cargo, damaged to a harbour by a burning tanker (3.1.4). 
Therefore, it is extremely difficult to single out one responsible party for all damages. 
 
One way to create order is to use the method of recourse actions (4.7) and channel the 
liability either by so-called legal channelling or by economic channelling. This means it 
would be governed by the application of adequate criteria such as the achievement of an 
economically adequate distribution of loss; the securing of prompt distribution of 
compensation; the victim’s access to an effective jurisdiction. One condition is that the 
liability has to be strict, not based on fault (5.2.2.2). Following these guidelines, there is 
a possibility to channel all liabilities to either to the shipper, carrier or manufacturer. It is 
argued that the shipowner is the sensible all-embracing solution for the problem of 
recoverable damages both under the CLC (5.2.1) and HNS Convention (5.2.2.3), but 
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saving the recourse action against the responsible parties. 
8.4 The Type of Recoverable Damage  
Chapter 8 addressed the issue of the recoverable damage (6.3.2) which is closely 
connected to the liable person who caused the damage. The rule relating to recoverable 
damage has become far more important than ever. In the past, on the occasions where 
dangerous cargo disasters have occurred, the types of recoverable damages in focus 
were explosions or fire. Later on, other damages attracted the interests of courts and 
practical lawyers, especially for the more unusual types of damage that involve huge 
sums of money in compensation. For example, damage caused by seizure and delay 
(4.2.1.1), like contraband, or when a whole business is affected e.g. a contaminated 
seaside resort. While dangerous cargo incidents result in much damage, the effect is not 
only to a few persons but in fact to the whole environment (6.3.2). This leads us to the 
discussion of economic loss (3.1.2.4), which is used as a necessary limiting factor to 
avoid “opening the floodgates” to a deluge of potential claims.  
 
In England, with regards to the damages caused by the inherent nature of dangerous 
cargoes, the amount and type of damage recoverable will be assessed by reference to the 
general principles of causation and remoteness of damage applicable to claims in tort 
and contract. Although, in practice the distinction between remoteness and causation is 
often not drawn and both principles are dealt with under the one head, either labelled as 
“remoteness”, “legal causation” or “proximate cause”. Casualties involving the carriage 
of “dangerous” cargo can give rise to extremely difficult questions of causation. In 
practice one may find more than two competing causes for the resulting damage (6.1). It 
is important to provide a reliable guide for ascertaining which can be regarded as the 
dominant cause. Moreover, the defendant may have factually caused the damage, but 
the decision may be that he should not pay for the full extent of the damage because it is 
considered too remote. Therefore, the rule of remoteness is a way for the law to attempt 
to limit compensatory damages (6.3).  
 
In contrast, China does not have the rule of remoteness, but the recoverable damages 
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under the rule of “proximate cause” and also damages shall be foreseeable by the 
defendant at the time of the incident. With respect to the damage of natural resources, 
theoretically the scope of compensation should be limited to reasonable measures of 
reinstatement, but Chinese maritime courts do not regularly admit claims of this type. In 
short, although very different rules are applied in England and China, theoretically the 
recoverable damages in China are as extensive as those applied in England. However, 
frankly speaking, there is still a big gap regarding the type of damages recoverable, 
given that the economic strengths of China and England are very different. 
 
In conclusion, the various parties’ liabilities in respect of the carriage of dangerous 
cargoes are complex. There is no all-embracing solution to the legal problems in this 
field. Compared with the not clear-cut tort rules in China and England, the freedom of 
contract seems to be more meaningful and applicable in practice. However, neither 
England nor China makes particular effort to channel liability under its national laws, 
instead the “channelling of liability” would be found in the HNS Convention 1996 and 
oil pollution conventions. For different reasons, neither China nor the U.K. has ratified 
the HNS Convention. Both countries are waiting for the Draft Protocol which is 
expected to be finalised in 2010.  
 
This thesis analyses and evaluates the liability regime for the carriage of dangerous 
cargo in English and Chinese law by providing suggestions for existing problems in 
each country. Further research on this topic should be conducted along the new 
development of international conventions and other difficult issues discussed in this 
thesis. 
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Appendix I Examples of incidents involving 
HNS1 
 
Location 
and year 
Vessel HNS Quantity 
involved 
Incident 
consequences 
Halifax, 
Canada, 1917 
Montblanc Explosives 2,600 tons Explosion, 3000 killed 
9000 injured 
Texas City, 
1947 
Grandcamp Ammonium Nitrate 2,200 tons Fire and explosion, 468 
killed, 2nd vessel caught 
fire and exploded  
Italian Coast, 
1974 
Cavtat Tetraethyl lead 
Tetramethyl lead 
150 tons in 
drums 
120 tons in 
drums 
Collision and sinking 
 
Landskrona 
Sweden, 1976 
Rene 16 Ammonia 180 tons Hose rupture, 2 dead 
showered by ammonia 
North Sea, 
1979 
Sindbad Chlorine 52 one ton 
flasks 
Flasks lost at sea due to 
rough weather 
Adriatic coast, 
1984 
Brigitta 
Montanari 
Vinyl chloride 1300 tons Sinking 
Mogadishu 
port, 
1985 
Ariadne 62 IMDG-classed 
chemicals 
Over 750 
tons in 
teus 
Grounded, fires, local 
population at risk. Sunk 
North Sea, 
1987 
Herald of 
Free 
Enterprise 
Undeclared ro-ro 
freight packages 
Over 500 
tons 
Capsized, hazards to 
salvage divers 
Cape 
Finisterre, 
1987 
Cason Mixed dangerous 
cargo in packages 
1,000 tons Fire and grounding, 23 
crew members perished 
Dutch Coast, 
1988 
Anna Boere Acrylonitrile, 
Dodecylbenezene 
547 tons 
500 tons 
Collision and sinking 
 
Italian Coast, 
1991 
Alessandro 
Primo 
Acrylontrile, 
Dichloroethane 
550 tons 
1000 tons 
Sinking 
 
Greek Islands 
1994 
Tus Sodium hydroxide 
 
4,200 tons Grounding 
Chinese coast 
1995 
Chung Mu 
No.1 
Styrene 310 tons Collision 
                                                       
1
 Table has been compiled by the author from various sources, including Internet such as 
http://www.dft.gov.uk/consultations/archive/2005/pchns/; 
http://folk.uio.no/erikro/WWW/HNS/correspondence/UK3.doc; conference papers e.g. 
http://www.hnsconvention.org/en/2%20Incidents%20involving%20HNS%20-%20Karen%20Purnell.pdf; 
http://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/shisaku/bousai/em_hns/ch1.pdf; Books such as Xu Guoping, (2006), Study on 
Compensation Law of Oil Pollution Damage (in Chinese), Peking University Press; Journal papers such as 
Peermohamed, Faz and Emery, Renaud Barbier, Dangerous Cargo, (2002), 16(7) P & I International. For 
comprehensive list see bibliography. 
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English 
Channel, 1995 
Grape 1 Xylene 4000 tons Sinking 
North Scottish 
Coast, 1999 
Multitank 
Ascania 
Vinyl acetate 1750 tons Fire, left abandoned, 
threat to villages 
Thames 
Estuary, 
1999 
Ever Decent Sodium cyanide, 
potassium cyanide 
Various teus 
in vicinity  
Collision with pax ship, 
fire, extensive fire 
fighting, coastal threat 
English 
Channel, 
2000 
Iveoli Sun Styrene, methyl 
ethyl ketone, 
isopropylic 
alcohol 
4000 tons, 
1027 tons, 
997 tons 
Sank under tow, 
sunken cargo recovered 
following year 
North Sea, 
2001 
AB Bilbao Ferro silicon 3300 tons Cargo hold explosion 
Parangua, 
Brazil, 2001 
Norma Naphtha 1800m3 Grounding, escape of 
part of cargo 
Farne Islands, 
UK 2001 
Rosebank Fertilizer  1326 tons Fire broke out in the 
paint store 
Bristol 
Channel, 
2001 
Dutch 
Navigator 
 
Hydrofluorosilicic 
acid 
 
Two 
damaged 
ISO tanks 
Damaged in hold 
during storm 
South Africa, 
Sept 2002 
Jolly Rubino Fungicides, phenol, 
voronate, ethyl 
acetate, methyl 
isobutyl ketone 
Various tons 
in 
containers 
Eng room fire spread to 
ship, abandoned, then 
grounded. Fire, oil and 
chemical incident 
Japan, 
October 2002 
Eiwa Maru Xylene 500 tons Sank after collision 
with container ship 
Yangtze River, 
China, Oct. 
2002 
Accord Poly-glycol 
mono-methyl ether 
acetate, methyl 
methacrylate 
300,950 tons Stranding 
Karachi, 
Pakistan, 2003 
Tasman 
Spirit  
Iranian light crude 
oil vapour 
30,000 tons Grounding 
Virginia, USA, 
Feb. 2004 
Bow 
Mariner 
Methyl tertiary butyl 
ether/crude ethanol 
Methanol 
Vapours+ 
11,571 (CIE) 
Explosion/ sinking 
Paranagua, 
Brazil  
Vicuna Methanol 4,000 tons Explosion 
Ho Chi Minh 
Vietnam2005 
Kasco Gas oil 350 tons Collision 
 
Off Shanghai, 
China, 2005 
GG Chemist Toluene 64 tons Collision 
Hsinchu, 
Taiwan, 2005 
Samho 
Brother 
Benzene 3,136 tons Collision 
Cherbourg, 
France, 2006 
ECE Phosphoric acid 10,361 tons Collision 
 
  386
Appendix II Maritime Code of the People’s 
Republic China 
 
(Adopted at the 28th Meeting of the Standing Committee of the Seventh National People's Congress on 
November 7, 1992, promulgated by Order No. 64 of the President of the People's Republic of China on 
November 7, 1992, and effective as of July 1, 1993). 
  
See the full text of Maritime Code at http://www.colaw.cn/findlaw/marine/maritime.htm (in English, 
accessed on 18th August 2010). 
 
Chapter IV Contract of Carriage of Goods by Sea 
 
Section 1 Basic Principles 
 
Article 41 A contract of carriage of goods by sea is a contract under which the carrier, against payment of 
freight, undertakes to carry by sea the goods contracted for shipment by the shipper from one port to 
another. 
 
Article 42 For the purposes of this Chapter:  
(1) "Carrier" means the person by whom or in whose name a contract of carriage of goods by sea has 
been concluded with a shipper;  
(2) "Actual carrier" means the person to whom the performance of carriage of goods, or of part of the 
carriage, has been entrusted by the carrier, and includes any other person to whom such performance has 
been entrusted under a sub-contract;  
(3) "Shipper" means:  
a) The person by whom or in whose name or on whose behalf a contract of carriage of goods by sea has 
been concluded with a carrier;  
b) The person by whom or in whose name or on whose behalf the goods have been delivered to the carrier 
involved in the contract of carriage of goods by sea;  
(4) "Consignee" means the person who is entitled to take delivery of the goods;  
(5) "Goods" includes live animals and containers, pallets or similar articles of transport supplied by the 
shipper for consolidating the goods. 
 
Article 43 The carrier or the shipper may demand confirmation of the contract of carriage of goods by sea 
in writing. However, voyage charter shall be done in writing. Telegrams, telexes and telefaxes have the 
effect of written documents. 
 
Article 44 Any stipulation in a contract of carriage of goods by sea or a bill of lading or other similar 
documents evidencing such contract that derogates from the provisions of this Chapter shall be null and 
void. However, such nullity and voidness shall not affect the validity of other provisions of the contract or 
the bill of lading or other similar documents. A clause assigning the benefit of insurance of the goods in 
favour of the carrier or any similar clause shall be null and void. 
 
Article 45 The provisions of Article 44 of this Code shall not prejudice the increase of duties and 
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obligations by the carrier besides those set out in this Chapter. 
 
Section 2 Carrier's Responsibilities 
 
Article 46 The responsibilities of the carrier with regard to the goods carried in containers covers the 
entire period during which the carrier is in charge of the goods, starting from the time the carrier has 
taken over the goods at the port of loading, until the goods have been delivered at the port of discharge. 
The responsibility of the carrier with respect to non-containerized goods covers the period during which 
the carrier is in charge of the goods, starting from the time of loading of the goods onto the ship until the 
time the goods are discharged therefrom. During the period the carrier is in charge of the goods, the 
carrier shall be liable for the loss of or damage to the goods, except as otherwise provided for in this 
Section. 
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall not prevent the carrier from entering into any agreement 
concerning carrier's responsibilities with regard to non-containerized goods prior to loading onto and after 
discharging from the ship. 
 
Article 47 The carrier shall, before and at the beginning of the voyage, exercise due diligence to make the 
ship seaworthy, properly man, equip and supply the ship and to make the holds, refrigerating and cool 
chambers and all other parts of the ship in which goods are carried, fit and safe for their reception, 
carriage and preservation. 
 
Article 48 The carrier shall properly and carefully load, handle, stow, carry, keep, care for and discharge 
the goods carried. 
 
Article 49 The carrier shall carry the goods to the port of discharge on the agreed or customary or 
geographically direct route. 
 
Any deviation in saving or attempting to save life or property at sea or any reasonable deviation shall not 
be deemed to be an act deviating from the provisions of the preceding paragraph.  
 
Article 50 Delay in delivery occurs when the goods have not been delivered at the designated port of 
discharge within the time expressly agreed upon. 
 
The carrier shall be liable for the loss of or damage to the goods caused by delay in delivery due to the 
fault of the carrier, except those arising or resulting from causes for which the carrier is not liable as 
provided for in the relevant Articles of this Chapter. 
 
The carrier shall be liable for the economic losses caused by delay in delivery of the goods due to the 
fault of the carrier, even if no loss of or damage to the goods had actually occurred, unless such economic 
losses had occurred from causes for which the carrier is not liable as provided for in the relevant Articles 
of this Chapter. 
 
The person entitled to make a claim for the loss of goods may treat the goods as lost when the carrier has 
not delivered the goods within 60 days from the expiry of the time for delivery specified in paragraph 1 of 
this Article. 
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Article 51 The carrier shall not be liable for the loss of or damage to the goods occurred during the period 
of carrier's responsibility arising or resulting from any of the following causes:  
(1) Fault of the Master, crew members, pilot or servant of the carrier in the navigation or management of 
the ship;  
(2) Fire, unless caused by the actual fault of the carrier;  
(3) Force majeure and perils, dangers and accidents of the sea or other navigable waters;  
(4) War or armed conflict;  
(5) Act of the government or competent authorities, quarantine restrictions or seizure under legal process;  
(6) Strikes, stoppages or restraint of labour;  
(7) Saving or attempting to save life or property at sea;  
(8) Act of the shipper, owner of the goods or their agents;  
(9) Nature or inherent vice of the goods;  
(10) Inadequacy of packing or insufficiency or illegibility of marks;  
(11) Latent defect of the ship not discoverable by due diligence;  
(12) Any other causes arising without the fault of the carrier or his servant or agent. 
The carrier who is entitled to exoneration from the liability for compensation as provided for in the 
preceding paragraph shall, with the exception of the causes given in sub-paragraph (2), bear the burden of 
proof. 
 
Article 52 The carrier shall not be liable for the loss of or damage to the live animals arising or resulting 
from the special risks inherent in the carriage thereof. However, the carrier shall be bound to prove that he 
has fulfilled the special requirements of the shipper with regard to the carriage of the live animals and that 
under the circumstances of the sea carriage, the loss or damage has occurred due to the special risks 
inherent therein. 
 
Article 53 In case the carrier intends to ship the goods on deck, he shall come into an agreement with the 
shipper or comply with the custom of the trade or the relevant laws or administrative rules and 
regulations.  
 
When the goods have been shipped on deck in accordance with the provisions of the preceding paragraph, 
the carrier shall not be liable for the loss of or damage to the goods caused by the special risks involved in 
such carriage.  
 
If the carrier, in breach of the provisions of the first paragraph of this Article, has shipped the goods on 
deck and the goods have consequently suffered loss or damage, the carrier shall be liable therefor. 
Article 54 Where loss or damage or delay in delivery has occurred from causes from which the carrier or 
his servant or agent is not entitled to exoneration from liability, together with another cause, the carrier 
shall be liable only to the extent that the loss, damage or delay in delivery is attributable to the causes 
from which the carrier is not entitled to exoneration from liability; however, the carrier shall bear the 
burden of proof with respect to the loss, damage or delay in delivery resulting from the other cause. 
Article 55 The amount of indemnity for the loss of the goods shall be calculated on the basis of the actual 
value of the goods so lost, while that for the damage to the goods shall be calculated on the basis of the 
difference between the values of the goods before and after the damage, or on the basis of the expenses 
for the repair. 
The actual value shall be the value of the goods at the time of shipment plus insurance and freight. 
From the actual value referred to in the preceding paragraph, deduction shall be made, at the time of 
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compensation, of the expenses that had been reduced or avoided as a result of the loss or damage 
occurred.  
 
Article 56 The carrier's liability for the loss of or damage to the goods shall be limited to an amount 
equivalent to 666.67 Units of Account per package or other shipping unit, or 2 Units of Account per 
kilogramme of the gross weight of the goods lost or damaged, whichever is the higher, except where the 
nature and value of the goods had been declared by the shipper before shipment and inserted in the bill of 
lading, or where a higher amount than the amount of limitation of liability set out in this Article had been 
agreed upon between the carrier and the shipper. 
 
Where a container, pallet or similar article of transport is used to consolidate goods, the number of 
packages or other shipping units enumerated in the bill of lading as packed in such article of transport 
shall be deemed to be the number of packages or shipping units. If not so enumerated, the goods in such 
article of transport shall be deemed to be one package or one shipping unit. 
 
Where the article of transport is not owned or furnished by the carrier, such article of transport shall be 
deemed to be one package or one shipping unit. 
 
Article 57 The liability of the carrier for the economic losses resulting from delay in delivery of the goods 
shall be limited to an amount equivalent to the freight payable for the goods so delayed. Where the loss of 
or damage to the goods has occurred concurrently with the delay in delivery thereof, the limitation of 
liability of the carrier shall be that as provided for in paragraph 1 of Article 56 of this Code. 
 
Article 58 The defence and limitation of liability provided for in this Chapter shall apply to any legal 
action brought against the carrier with regard to the loss of or damage to or delay in delivery of the goods 
covered by the contract of carriage of goods by sea, whether the claimant is a party to the contract or 
whether the action is founded in contract or in tort. 
 
The provisions of the preceding paragraph shall apply if the action referred to in the preceding paragraph 
is brought against the carrier's servant or agent, and the carrier's servant or agent proves that his action 
was within the scope of his employment or agency. 
 
Article 59 The carrier shall not be entitled to the benefit of the limitation of liability provided for in 
Article 56 or 57 of this Code if it is proved that the loss, damage or delay in delivery of the goods resulted 
from an act or omission of the carrier done with the intent to cause such loss, damage or delay or 
recklessly and with knowledge that such loss, damage or delay would probably result. 
 
The servant or agent of the carrier shall not be entitled to the benefit of limitation of liability provided for 
in Article 56 or 57 of this Code, if it is proved that the loss, damage or delay in delivery resulted from an 
act or omission of the servant or agent of the carrier done with the intent to cause such loss, damage or 
delay or recklessly and with knowledge that such loss, damage or delay would probably result. 
 
Article 60 Where the performance of the carriage or part thereof has been entrusted to an actual carrier, 
the carrier shall nevertheless remain responsible for the entire carriage according to the provisions of this 
Chapter. The carrier shall be responsible, in relation to the carriage performed by the actual carrier, for the 
act or omission of the actual carrier and of his servant or agent acting within the scope of his employment 
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or agency. 
 
Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding paragraph, where a contract of carriage by sea provides 
explicitly that a specified part of the carriage covered by the said contract is to be performed by a named 
actual carrier other than the carrier, the contract may nevertheless provide that the carrier shall not be 
liable for the loss, damage or delay in delivery arising from an occurrence which takes place while the 
goods are in the charge of the actual carrier during such part of the carriage. 
 
Article 61 The provisions with respect to the responsibility of the carrier contained in this Chapter shall 
be applicable to the actual carrier. Where an action is brought against the servant or agent of the actual 
carrier, the provisions contained in paragraph 2 of Article 58 and paragraph 2 of Article 59 of this Code 
shall apply. 
 
Article 62 Any special agreement under which the carrier assumes obligations not provided for in this 
Chapter or waives rights conferred by this Chapter shall be binding upon the actual carrier when the 
actual carrier has agreed in writing to the contents thereof. The provisions of such special agreement shall 
be binding upon the carrier whether the actual carrier has agreed to the contents or not. 
 
Article 63 Where both the carrier and the actual carrier are liable for compensation, they shall jointly be 
liable within the scope of such liability. 
 
Article 64 If claims for compensation have been separately made against the carrier, the actual carrier and 
their servants or agents with regard to the loss of or damage to the goods, the aggregate amount of 
compensation shall not be in excess of the limitation provided for in Article 56 of this Code. 
 
Article 65 The provisions of Article 60 through 64 of this Code shall not affect the recourse between the 
carrier and the actual carrier. 
 
Section 3 Shipper's Responsibilities 
 
Article 66 The shipper shall have the goods properly packed and shall guarantee the accuracy of the 
description, mark, number of packages or pieces, weight or quantity of the goods at the time of shipment 
and shall indemnity the carrier against any loss resulting from inadequacy of packing or inaccuracies in 
the abovementioned information. 
 
The carrier's right to indemnification as provided for in the preceding paragraph shall not affect the 
obligation of the carrier under the contract of carriage of goods towards those other than the shipper. 
 
Article 67 The shipper shall perform all necessary procedures at the port, customs, quarantine, inspection 
or other competent authorities with respect to the shipment of the goods and shall furnish to the carrier all 
relevant documents concerning the procedures the shipper has gone through. The shipper shall be liable 
for any damage to the interest of the carrier resulting from the inadequacy or inaccuracy or delay in 
delivery of such documents. 
 
Article 68 At the time of shipment of dangerous goods, the shipper shall, in compliance with the 
regulations governing the carriage of such goods, have them properly packed, distinctly marked and 
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labelled and notify the carrier in writing of their proper description, nature and the precautions to be taken. 
In case the shipper fails to notify the carrier or notified him inaccurately, the carrier may have such goods 
landed, destroyed or rendered innocuous when and where circumstances so require, without 
compensation. The shipper shall be liable to the carrier for any loss, damage or expense resulting from 
such shipment. 
 
Notwithstanding the carrier's knowledge of the nature of the dangerous goods and his consent to carry, he 
may still have such goods landed, destroyed or rendered innocuous, without compensation, when they 
become an actual danger to the ship, the crew and other persons on board or to other goods. However, the 
provisions of this paragraph shall not prejudice the contribution in general average, if any. 
  
Article 69 The shipper shall pay the freight to the carrier as agreed. 
The shipper and the carrier may reach an agreement that the freight shall be paid by the consignee. 
However, such an agreement shall be noted in the transport documents. 
 
Article 70 The shipper shall not be liable for the loss sustained by the carrier or the actual carrier, or for 
the damage sustained by the ship, unless such loss or damage was caused by the fault of the shipper, his 
servant or agent. 
 
The servant or agent of the shipper shall not be liable for the loss sustained by the carrier or the actual 
carrier, or for the damage sustained by the ship, unless the loss or damage was caused by the fault of the 
servant or agent of the shipper. 
 
Section 4 Transport Documents 
 
Article 71 A bill of lading is a document which serves as an evidence of the contract of carriage of goods 
by sea and the taking over or loading of the goods by the carrier, and based on which the carrier 
undertakes to deliver the goods against surrendering the same. A provision in the document stating that 
the goods are to be delivered to the order of a named person, or to order, or to bearer, constitutes such an 
undertaking. 
 
Article 72 When the goods have been taken over by the carrier or have been loaded on board, the carrier 
shall, on demand of the shipper, issue to the shipper a bill of lading. 
 
The bill of lading may be signed by a person authorized by the carrier. A bill of lading signed by the 
Master of the ship carrying the goods is deemed to have been signed on behalf of the carrier. 
 
Article 73 A bill of lading shall contain the following particulars:  
(1) Description of the goods, mark, number of packages or pieces, weight or quantity, and a statement, if 
applicable, as to the dangerous nature of the goods;  
(2) Name and principal place of business of the carrier;  
(3) Name of the ship;  
(4) Name of the shipper;  
(5) Name of the consignee;  
(6) Port of loading and the date on which the goods were taken over by the carrier at the port of loading;  
(7) Port of discharge;  
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(8) Place where the goods were taken over and the place where the goods are to be delivered in case of a 
multimodal transport bill of lading;  
(9) Date and place of issue of the bill of lading and the number of originals issued;  
(10) Payment of freight;  
(11) Signature of the carrier or of a person acting on his behalf. 
 
In a bill of lading, the lack of one or more particulars referred to in the preceding paragraph does not 
affect the function of the bill of lading as such, provided that it nevertheless meets the requirements set 
forth in Article 71 of this Code. 
 
Article 74 If the carrier has issued, on demand of the shipper, a receivedforshipment bill of lading or other 
similar documents before the goods are loaded on board, the shipper may surrender the same to the carrier 
as against a shipped bill of lading when the goods have been loaded on board. The carrier may also note 
on the received-for-shipment bill of lading or other similar documents with the name of the carrying ship 
and the date of loading, and, when so noted, the receivedforshipment bill of lading or other similar 
documents shall be deemed to constitute a shipped bill of lading. 
 
Article 75 If the bill of lading contains particulars concerning the description, mark, number of packages 
or pieces, weight or quantity of the goods with respect to which the carrier or the other person issuing the 
bill of lading on his behalf has the knowledge or reasonable grounds to suspect that such particulars do 
not accurately represent the goods actually received, or, where a shipped bill of lading is issued, loaded, 
or if he has had no reasonable means of checking, the carrier or such other person may make a note in the 
bill of lading specifying those inaccuracies, the grounds for suspicion or the lack of reasonable means of 
checking. 
 
Article 76 If the carrier or the other person issuing the bill of lading on his behalf made no note in the bill 
of lading regarding the apparent order and condition of the goods, the goods shall be deemed to be in 
apparent good order and condition. 
 
Article 77 Except for the note made in accordance with the provisions of Article 75 of this Code, the bill 
of lading issued by the carrier or the other person acting on his behalf is prima facie evidence of the 
taking over or loading by the carrier of the goods as described therein. Proof to the contrary by the carrier 
shall not be admissible if the bill of lading has been transferred to a third party, including a consignee, 
who has acted in good faith in reliance on the description of the goods contained therein. 
 
Article 78 The relationship between the carrier and the holder of the bill of lading with respect to their 
rights and obligations shall be defined by the clauses of the bill of lading. 
 
Neither the consignee nor the holder of the bill of lading shall be liable for the demurrage, dead freight 
and all other expenses in respect of loading occurred at the loading port unless the bill of lading clearly 
states that the aforesaid demurrage, dead freight and all other expenses shall be borne by the consignee 
and the holder of the bill of lading. 
 
Article 79 The negotiability of a bill of lading shall be governed by the following provisions:  
(1) A straight bill of lading is not negotiable;  
(2) An order bill of lading may be negotiated with endorsement to order or endorsement in blank;  
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(3) A bearer bill of lading is negotiable without endorsement. 
 
Article 80 Where a carrier has issued a document other than a bill of lading as an evidence of the receipt 
of the goods to be carried, such a document is prima facie evidence of the conclusion of the contract of 
carriage of goods by sea and the taking over by the carrier of the goods as described therein. 
Such documents that are issued by the carrier shall not be negotiable. 
 
Section 5 Delivery of Goods 
 
Article 81 Unless notice of loss or damage is given in writing by the consignee to the carrier at the time of 
delivery of the goods by the carrier to the consignee, such delivery shall be deemed to be prima facie 
evidence of the delivery of the goods by the carrier as described in the transport documents and of the 
apparent good order and condition of such goods. 
 
Where the loss of or damage to the goods is not apparent, the provisions of the preceding paragraph shall 
apply if the consignee has not given the notice in writing within seven consecutive days from the next day 
of the delivery of the goods, or, in the case of containerized goods, within 15 days from the next day of 
the delivery thereof. 
 
The notice in writing regarding the loss or damage need not be given if the state of the goods has, at the 
time of delivery, been the subject of a joint survey or inspection by the carrier and the consignee. 
 
Article 82 The carrier shall not be liable for compensation if no notice on the economic losses resulting 
from delay in delivery of the goods has been received from the consignee within 60 consecutive days 
from the next day on which the goods had been delivered by the carrier to the consignee. 
 
Article 83 The consignee may, before taking delivery of the goods at the port of destination, and the 
carrier may, before delivering the goods at the port of destination, request the cargo inspection agency to 
have the goods inspected. The party requesting such inspection shall bear the cost thereof but is entitled to 
recover the same from the party causing the damage. 
 
Article 84 The carrier and the consignee shall mutually provide reasonable facilities for the survey and 
inspection stipulated in Article 81 and 83 of this Code. 
 
Article 85 Where the goods have been delivered by the actual carrier, the notice in writing given by the 
consignee to the actual carrier under Article 81 of this Code shall have the same effect as that given to the 
carrier, and that given to the carrier shall have the same effect as that given to the actual carrier. 
 
Article 86 If the goods were not taken delivery of at the port of discharge or if the consignee has delayed 
or refused the taking delivery of the goods, the Master may discharge the goods into warehouses or other 
appropriate places, and any expenses or risks arising therefrom shall be borne by the consignee. 
 
Article 87 If the freight, contribution in general average, demurrage to be paid to the carrier and other 
necessary charges paid by the carrier on behalf of the owner of the goods as well as other charges to be 
paid to the carrier have not been paid in full, nor has appropriate security been given, the carrier may have 
a lien, to a reasonable extent, on the goods. 
  394
 
Article 88 If the goods under lien in accordance with the provisions of Article 87 of this Code have not 
been taken delivery of within 60 days from the next day of the ship's arrival at the port of discharge, the 
carrier may apply to the court for an order on selling the goods by auction; where the goods are perishable 
or the expenses for keeping such goods would exceed their value, the carrier may apply for an earlier sale 
by auction. 
 
The proceeds from the auction sale shall be used to pay off the expenses for the storage and auction sale 
of the goods, the freight and other related charges to be paid to the carrier. If the proceeds fall short of 
such expenses, the carrier is entitled to claim the difference from the shipper, whereas any amount in 
surplus shall be refunded to the shipper. If there is no way to make the refund and such surplus amount 
has not been claimed at the end of one full year after the auction sale, it shall go to the State Treasury. 
Section 6 Cancellation of Contract 
 
Article 89 The shipper may request the cancellation of the contract of carriage of goods by sea before the 
ship sails from the port of loading. However, except as otherwise provided for in the contract, the shipper 
shall in this case pay half of the agreed amount of freight; if the goods have already been loaded on board, 
the shipper shall bear the expenses for the loading and discharge and other related charges. 
 
Article 90 Either the carrier or the shipper may request the cancellation of the contract and neither shall 
be liable to the other if, due to force majeure or other causes not attributable to the fault of the carrier or 
the shipper, the contract could not be performed prior to the ship's sailing from its port of loading. If the 
freight has already been paid, it shall be refunded to the shipper, and, if the goods have already been 
loaded on board, the loading/discharge expenses shall be borne by the shipper. If a bill of lading has 
already been issued, it shall be returned by the shipper to the carrier. 
 
Article 91 If, due to force majeure or any other causes not attributable to the fault of the carrier or the 
shipper, the ship could not discharge its goods at the port of destination as provided for in the contract of 
carriage, unless the contract provides otherwise, the Master shall be entitled to discharge the goods at a 
safe port or place near the port of destination and the contract of carriage shall be deemed to have been 
fulfilled. 
 
In deciding the discharge of the goods, the Master shall inform the shipper or the consignee and shall take 
the interests of the shipper or the consignee into consideration. 
 
Section 7 Special Provisions Regarding Voyage Charter Party 
 
Article 92 A voyage charter party is a charter party under which the shipowner charters out and the 
charterer charters in the whole or part of the ship's space for the carriage by sea of the intended goods 
from one port to another and the charterer pays the agreed amount of freight. 
 
Article 93 A voyage charter party shall mainly contain, interalia, name of the shipowner, name of the 
charterer, name and nationality of the ship, its bale or grain capacity, description of the goods to be loaded, 
port of loading, port of destination, laydays, time for loading and discharge, payment of freight, 
demurrage, dispatch and other relevant matters. 
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Article 94 The provisions in Article 47 and Article 49 of this Code shall apply to the shipowner under 
voyage charter party.  
 
The other provisions in this Chapter regarding the rights and obligations of the parties to the contract shall 
apply to the shipowner and the charterer under voyage charter only in the absence of relevant provisions 
or in the absence of provisions differing therefrom in the voyage charter. 
 
Article 95 Where the holder of the bill of lading is not the charterer in the case of a bill of lading issued 
under a voyage charter, the rights and obligations of the carrier and the holder of the bill of lading shall be 
governed by the clauses of the bill of lading. However, if the clauses of the voyage charter party are 
incorporated into the bill of lading, the relevant clauses of the voyage charter party shall apply. 
 
Article 96 The shipowner shall provide the intended ship. The intended ship may be substituted with the 
consent of the charterer. However, if the ship substituted does not meet the requirements of the charter 
party, the charterer may reject the ship or cancel the charter. Should any damage or loss occur to the 
charterer as a result of the shipowner's failure in providing the intended ship due to his fault, the 
shipowner shall be liable for compensation. 
 
Article 97 If the shipowner has failed to provide the ship within the laydays fixed in the charter, the 
charterer is entitled to cancel the charter party. However, if the shipowner had notified the charterer of the 
delay of the ship and the expected date of its arrival at the port of loading, the charterer shall notify the 
shipowner whether to cancel the charter within 48 hours of the receipt of the shipowner's notification. 
Where the charterer has suffered losses as a result of the delay in providing the ship due to the fault of the 
shipowner, the shipowner shall be liable for compensation. 
 
Article 98 Under a voyage charter, the time for loading and discharge and the way of calculation thereof, 
as well as the rate of demurrage that would incur after the expiration of the laytime and the rate of 
dispatch money to be paid as a result of the completion of loading or discharge ahead of schedule, shall 
be fixed by the shipowner and the charterer upon mutual agreement. 
 
Article 99 The charterer may sublet the ship he chartered, but the rights and obligations under the head 
charter shall not be affected. 
 
Article 100 The charterer shall provide the intended goods, but he may replace the goods with the consent 
of the shipowner. However, if the goods replaced is detrimental to the interests of the shipowner, the 
shipowner shall be entitled to reject such goods and cancel the charter.  
 
Where the shipowner has suffered losses as a result of the failure of the charterer in providing the 
intended goods, the charterer shall be liable for compensation. 
 
Article 101 The shipowner shall discharge the goods at the port of discharge specified in the charter party. 
Where the charter party contains a clause allowing the choice of the port of discharge by the charterer, the 
Master may choose one from among the agreed picked ports to discharge the goods, in case the charterer 
did not, as agreed in the charter, instruct in time as to the port chosen for discharging the goods. Where 
the charterer did not instruct in time as to the chosen port of discharge, as agreed in the charter, and the 
shipowner suffered losses thereby, the charterer shall be liable for compensation; where the charterer has 
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suffered losses as a result of the shipowner's arbitrary choice of a port to discharge the goods, in disregard 
of the provisions in the relevant charter, the shipowner shall be liable for compensation. 
 
Section 8 Special Provisions Regarding Multimodal Transport Contract 
 
Article 102 A multimodal transport contract as referred to in this Code means a contract under which the 
multimodal transport operator undertakes to transport the goods, against the payment of freight for the 
entire transport, from the place where the goods were received in his charge to the destination and to 
deliver them to the consignee by two or more different modes of transport, one of which being sea 
carriage. 
 
The multimodal transport operator as referred to in the preceding paragraph means the person who has 
entered into a multimodal transport contract with the shipper either by himself or by another person acting 
on his behalf. 
 
Article 103 The responsibility of the multimodal transport operator with respect to the goods under 
multimodal transport contract covers the period from the time he takes the goods in his charge to the time 
of their delivery. 
 
Article 104 The multimodal transport operator shall be responsible for the performance of the multimodal 
transport contract or the procurement of the performance therefor, and shall be responsible for the entire 
transport.  
 
The multimodal transport operator may enter into separate contracts with the carriers of the different 
modes defining their responsibilities with regard to the different sections of the transport under the 
multimodal transport contracts. However, such separate contracts shall not affect the responsibility of the 
multimodal transport operator with respect to the entire transport. 
 
Article 105 If loss of or damage to the goods has occurred in a certain section of the transport, the 
provisions of the relevant laws and regulations governing that specific section of the multimodal transport 
shall be applicable to matters concerning the liability of the multimodal transport operator and the 
limitation thereof. 
 
Article 106 If the section of transport in which the loss of or damage to the goods occurred could not be 
ascertained, the multimodal transport operator shall be liable for compensation in accordance with the 
stipulations regarding the carrier's liability and the limitation thereof as set out in this Chapter. 
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Appendix III General Principles of the Civil 
Law of the People’s Republic of China 
 
 
Adopted on April 12, 1986; See the full text of Civil Law at 
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2696 (accessed on 18th August 2010) 
 
Chapter VI Civil Liability  
 
Section 1 General Stipulations  
 
Article 106 Citizens and legal persons who breach a contract or fail to fulfil other obligations shall bear 
civil liability. Citizens and legal persons who through their fault encroach upon state or collective 
property or the property or person of other people shall bear civil liability. Civil liability shall still be 
borne even in the absence of fault, if the law so stipulates.  
 
Article 107 Civil liability shall not be borne for failure to perform a contract or damage to a third party if 
it is caused by force majeure, except as otherwise provided by law.  
 
Article 108 Debts shall be cleared. If a debtor is unable to repay his debt immediately, he may repay by 
installments with the consent of the creditor or a ruling by a people's court. If a debtor is capable of 
repaying his debt but refuses to do so, repayment shall be compelled by the decision of a people's court.  
 
Article 109 If a person suffers damages from preventing or stopping encroachment on state or collective 
property, or the property or person of a third party, the infringer shall bear responsibility for compensation, 
and the beneficiary may also give appropriate compensation.  
 
Article 110 Citizens or legal persons who bear civil liability shall also be held for administrative 
responsibility if necessary. If the acts committed by citizens and legal persons constitute crimes, criminal 
responsibility of their legal representatives shall be investigated in accordance with the law. 
  
Section 2 Civil Liability for Breach of Contract  
 
Article 111 If a party fails to fulfil its contractual obligations or violates the term of a contract while 
fulfilling the obligations, the other party shall have the right to demand fulfillment or the taking of 
remedial measures and claim compensation for its losses.  
 
Article 112 The party that breaches a contract shall be liable for compensation equal to the losses 
consequently suffered by the other party.  
The parties may specify in a contract that if one party breaches the contract it shall pay the other party a 
certain amount of breach of contract damages; they may also specify in the contract the method of 
assessing the compensation for any losses resulting from a breach of contract. 
  
Article 113 If both parties breach the contract, each party shall bear its respective civil liability.  
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Article 114 If one party is suffering losses owing to the other party's breach of contract, it shall take 
prompt measures to prevent the losses from increasing; if it does not promptly do so, it shall not have the 
right to claim compensation for the additional losses.  
 
Article 115 A party's right to claim compensation for losses shall not be affected by the alteration or 
termination of a contract.  
 
Article 116 If a party fails to fulfil its contractual obligations on account of a higher authority, it shall first 
compensate for the losses of the other party or take other remedial measures as contractually agreed and 
then the higher authority shall be responsible for settling the losses it sustained.  
 
Section 3 Civil Liability for Infringement of Rights  
 
Article 117 Anyone who encroaches on the property of the state, a collective or another person shall 
return the property; failing that, he shall reimburse its estimated price. Anyone who damages the property 
of the state, a collective or another person shall restore the property to its original condition or reimburse 
its estimated price. If the victim suffers other great losses therefrom, the infringer shall compensate for 
those losses as well.  
 
Article 118 If the rights of authorship (copyrights), patent rights, rights to exclusive use of trademarks, 
rights of discovery, rights of invention or rights for scientific and technological research achievements of 
citizens or legal persons are infringed upon by such means as plagiarism, alteration or imitation, they 
shall have the right to demand that the infringement be stopped, its ill effects be eliminated and the 
damages be compensated for.  
 
Article 119 Anyone who infringes upon a citizen's person and causes him Physical injury shall pay his 
medical expenses and his loss in income due to missed working time and shall pay him living subsidies if 
he is disabled; if the victim dies, the infringe shall also pay the funeral expenses, the necessary living 
expenses of the deceased's dependents and other such expenses.  
 
Article 120 If a citizen's right of personal name, portrait, reputation or honour is infringed upon, he shall 
have the right to demand that the infringement be stopped, his reputation be rehabilitated, the ill effects be 
eliminated and an apology be made; he may also demand compensation for losses.  
The above paragraph shall also apply to infringements upon a legal person's right of name, reputation or 
honour.  
 
Article 121 If a state organ or its personnel, while executing its duties, encroaches upon the lawful rights 
and interests of a citizen or legal person and causes damage, it shall bear civil liability.  
Article 122 If a substandard product causes property damage or physical injury to others, the 
manufacturer or seller shall bear civil liability according to law. If the transporter or storekeeper is 
responsible for the matter, the manufacturer or seller shall have the right to demand compensation for its 
losses.  
 
Article 123 If any person causes damage to other people by engaging in operations that are greatly 
hazardous to the surroundings, such as operations conducted high aboveground, or those involving high 
pressure, high voltage, combustibles, explosives, highly toxic or radioactive substances or high-speed 
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means of transport, he shall bear civil liability; however, if it can be proven that the damage was 
deliberately caused by the victim, he shall not bear civil liability. 
  
Article 124 Any person who pollutes the environment and causes damage to others in violation of state 
provisions for environmental protection and the prevention of pollution shall bear civil liability in 
accordance with the law.  
 
Article 125 Any constructor who engages in excavation, repairs or installation of underground facilities in 
a public place, on a roadside or in a passageway without setting up clear signs and adopting safety 
measures and thereby causes damage to others shall bear civil liability.  
 
Article 126 If a building or any other installation or an object placed or hung on a structure collapses, 
detaches or drops down and causes damage to others, its owner or manager shall bear civil liability, unless 
he can prove himself not at fault.  
 
Article 127 If a domesticated animal causes harm to any person, its keeper or manager shall bear civil 
liability. If the harm occurs through the fault of the victim, the keeper or manager shall not bear civil 
liability; if the harm occurs through the fault of a third party, the third party shall bear civil liability. 
  
Article 128 A person who causes harm in exercising justifiable defence shall not bear civil liability. If 
justifiable defence exceeds the limits of necessity and undue harm is caused, an appropriate amount of 
civil liability shall be borne.  
 
Article 129 If harm occurs through emergency actions taken to avoid danger, the person who gave rise to 
the danger shall bear civil liability. If the danger arose from natural causes, the person who took the 
emergency actions may either be exempt from civil liability or bear civil liability to an appropriate extent. 
If the emergency measures taken are improper or exceed the limits of necessity and undue harm is caused, 
the person who took the emergency action shall bear civil liability to an appropriate extent.  
 
Article 130 If two or more persons jointly infringe upon another person's rights and cause him damage, 
they shall bear joint liability.  
 
Article 131 If a victim is also at fault for causing the damage, the civil liability of the infringe may be 
reduced.  
 
Article 132 If none of the parties is at fault in causing damage, they may share civil liability according to 
the actual circumstances.  
 
Article 133 If a person without or with limited capacity for civil conduct causes damage to others, his 
guardian shall bear civil liability. If the guardian has done his duty of guardianship, his civil liability may 
be appropriately reduced.  
 
If a person who has property but is without or with limited capacity for civil conduct causes damage to 
others, the expenses of compensation shall be paid from his property. Shortfalls in such expenses shall be 
appropriately compensated for by the guardian unless the guardian is a unit.  
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Section 4 Methods of Bearing Civil Liability  
 
Article 134 The main methods of bearing civil liability shall be:  
(1) cessation of infringements;  
(2) removal of obstacles;  
(3) elimination of dangers;  
(4) return of property;  
(5) restoration of original condition;  
(6) repair, reworking or replacement;  
(7) compensation for losses;  
(8) payment of breach of contract damages;  
(9) elimination of ill effects and rehabilitation of reputation; and  
(10) extension of apology.  
The above methods of bearing civil liability may be applied exclusively or concurrently. When hearing 
civil cases, a people's court, in addition to applying the above stipulations, may serve admonitions, order 
the offender to sign a pledge of repentance, and confiscate the property used in carrying out illegal 
activities and the illegal income obtained therefrom.  
It may also impose fines or detentions as stipulated by law.  
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Appendix IV The Marine Environmental 
Protection Law of the People’s Republic of 
China 
 
(Adopted at the 24th Session of the Standing Committee of the Fifth National People's 
Congress on August 23, 1982 and effective as of March 1, 1983, and revised at the 13th 
Session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People's Congress on 
December 25, 1999)  
 
See the full text of MEPL 1999 at 
http://www.chinamining.org/Policies/2006-07-18/1153190362d5.html (In English; 
accessed on 10-08-2010) 
 
 
Chapter4 Prevention and Control of pollution Damage to the Marine Environment by Land-based 
Pollutants 
 
Article39 It is prohibited to transport and transfer dangerous wastes through the internal waters and 
territorial sea of the People's Republic of China. The transportation and transfer of dangerous wastes 
through other sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China shall be consent in written 
by the competent authorities being in charge of environment protection under the State Council in 
advance 
 
Chapter7 Prevention and Control of Pollution Damage to the Marine Environment by Dumping of Wastes 
  
Article55 No unit is permitted, without approval of the State competent authority being in charge of 
marine affairs, to dump any wastes into the sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People¡¯ s Republic of 
China. Units that need to dump wastes may conduct dumping wastes into the sea only after they have 
submitted an application in written form to the State competent authority being in charge of marine affairs, 
and the State competent authority being in charge of marine affairs has examined and approved the 
application and issued a permit. Wastes outside the boundaries of the People’s Republic of China are 
prohibited to dump into the sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People¡¯ s Republic of China 
 
Article56 The State competent authority being in charge of marine affairs shall, in accordance with the 
toxicity of the wastes, the content of poisonous substances and the degree of impact on marine 
environment, formulate assessing procedures and standards regarding dumping of wastes into the sea. 
Dumping of wastes into the sea shall be managed in accordance with the categories and quantities of the 
wastes. The list of wastes permitted to dump into the sea shall be work out by the State competent 
authority being in charge of marine affairs, and commented by the competent authority being in charge of 
environment protection directly under the State Council, and then submit to the State Council for approval 
 
Article57 The State competent authority being in charge of marine affairs shall, in accordance with 
scientific, rational, economic and safety principles, select and map out ocean dumping zones and submit it 
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to the competent authority being in charge of environmental protection directly under the State Council 
for comment, and then submit to the State Council for approval. Temporary ocean dumping zones any be 
approved by the State competent being in charge of marine affairs and shall be submit to the competent 
authority being in charge of environmental protection directly under the State Council for registration. 
The State competent authority being in charge of marine affairs must, in selecting and mapping out ocean 
dumping zones, and before approving temporary ocean dumping zones, ask the State competent authority 
being in charge of maritime affairs and fisheries for comment 
 
Article58 The State competent authority being in charge of marine affairs shall supervise and manage the 
use of ocean dumping zones, and organize environmental monitoring of the ocean dumping zones. Upon 
Confirming that a dumping zone is no longer suitable to be used, the State competent authority being in 
charge of marine affairs shall close it down to stop all dumping activities in the ocean dumping zone and 
report to the State Council for the registration 
 
Article59 Units granted to dump wastes must carry out in accordance with the time limit and conditions 
set down in the permit and carry out dumping in the designated area. After the wastes have been loaded, 
the department issuing a grant shall check and verify 
 
Article60 Units granted to dump wastes shall record down the details of dumping and submit a written 
report to the department issuing a grant after dumping. The vessels loading wastes must report to the 
competent authority being in charge of maritime affairs of the departure port 
 
Article61 The incineration of wastes at the sea is forbidden. Disposal of wastes with radioactivity and 
other substances that are radioactive at the sea is forbidden. Exemption density of radioactivity in the 
waste shall be determined by the State Council  
 
Chapter 8 Prevention and Control of Pollution Damage to the Marine Environment by Vessels and Their 
Related Operations 
  
Article62 No vessels and their related operations shall, in the sea areas under the jurisdiction of the 
People¡¯ s Republic of China, discharge pollutants, wastes, ballast water, vessel garbage and other harmful 
substances into the sea in violation of the provisions of this law. Those who engage in the business of 
collection of pollutants, wastes, garbage from vessel, and the operation of vessel cabin cleaning and 
washing must possess corresponding capacities of pollutant collection and treatment. 
 
Article63 Vessels must, in accordance with relevant regulations, possess certificates and documents for 
the prevention of pollution to marine environment and make factual records in conducting pollutant 
discharging and other operations. 
 
Article64 Vessels must be equipped with corresponding pollution prevention facilities and equipment. For 
vessels loaded cargoes containing pollution damages, its structures and equipment shall be able to prevent 
or reduce pollution to the marine environment by the loaded cargoes. 
 
Article65 Vessels shall comply with the provisions provided in the marine traffic law and regulations and 
prevent maritime accidents of collision, running on rocks, stranding, fire or explosion, etc. To cause 
pollution to the marine environment 
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Article66 The State shall perfect and put into practice responsibility system of civil liability compensation 
for oil pollution by vessel, and shall establish insurance system of oil pollution by vessel, compensation 
fund system of oil pollution by vessel in accordance with the principles of sharing of owners of the vessel 
and the cargo of the compensation liabilities for oil pollution by vessel. Specific measures for the 
implementation of insurance of oil pollution by vessel, and the system of compensation fund of oil 
pollution by vessel shall be formulated by the State Council respectively 
 
Article67 For vessels loaded cargoes with pollution damage sailing in and out of the port, the carrier, 
owner of the cargo or his agent must apply and report to the competent authority being in charge of 
maritime affairs in advance. The vessels may sail in and out of the port, and transit berthing or conduct 
loading and unloading operations only after obtaining approval 
 
Article68 Vouchers, packages, marks and limits of quantity etc. Of cargoes with pollution damage 
delivered to the vessels for shipping must be in conformity with relevant regulations governing the 
cargoes to be shipped. In case it is necessary for shipping cargoes without distinct pollution danger, 
assessment should be made in advance in accordance with relevant regulations. In loading and unloading 
oil, toxic and harmful cargoes, the parties of the vessel and the port should comply with relevant 
operation rules and regulations of safety and pollution prevention 
 
Article69 Ports, docks, loading and unloading spots and shipyards must, in accordance with relevant 
regulations, are fitted with enough facilities to accommodate and deal with vessel-induced pollutants and 
wastes, and shall keep these facilities in good conditions. Ports, docks, loading and unloading spots and 
shipyards must draw up contingency plans foe oil-spill pollution and shall be equipped with 
corresponding contingency equipment and devices to deal with oil-spill pollution 
 
Article70 The following operation shall, in accordance with relevant regulations, be submitted to relevant 
department for approval or consent in advance: 1. Vessels using incinerators in the port waters; 2. Vessels 
conducting such operations as cabin washing, cabin cleaning, gas discharging, ballast water and residual 
oil discharging, oily water collecting, gunwale rust-eradicating and painting, etc. In the port waters; 3. 
Use of oil eliminating chemicals in the vessels, docks and facilities; 4. Vessels cleaning decks 
contaminated by pollutants, toxic and harmful substances; 5. Vessels undertaking operations of 
ship-to-ship transfer of bulk liquid cargoes with pollution damages; 6. Engaging in ship dismembering in 
the sea, ship salvaging, ship repairing and other surface and under-water operations 
 
Article71 If vessels occur maritime incidents causing or being likely to result in major pollution damages 
to the marine environment, the State competent authority being in charge of maritime affairs shall have 
the power to take compulsory measures to avoid or decrease pollution damage. If vessels and facilities 
occur maritime incidents at the high sea resulting in consequences of major pollution damage or threat to 
the sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China, the State competent authority being 
in charge of maritime affairs shall have the power to take corresponding measures necessary for pollution 
damages which have caused or are likely to cause 
 
Article72 Any vessels shall have the obligation to supervise pollution at the sea and, upon discovering 
pollution accidents at the sea, or act of violation of the provisions of this law, must immediately report to 
the departments invested by this law with power of marine environment supervision and administration 
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near. Civil aviation vehicles, upon discovering discharging of pollutants or pollution accidents at the sea, 
must report to the civil aviation air traffic control unit in the vicinity in time. The unit shall, upon 
receiving such report, immediately notify the departments invested by this law with power of marine 
environment supervision and administration 
 
Chapter9 Legal Liabilities  
 
Article73 Those who, in violation of the provisions of this law, commits any of the following acts, shall 
be ordered to remedy the damage within a fixed time and be fined by the competent authorities invested 
with the power of marine environment supervision and administration in accordance with this law; (1) 
Discharging pollutants or other substances into the sea to be prohibited to discharge by this law into sea 
areas; (2) Discharging pollutants into the sea not in conformity with the provisions of this law, or 
discharging pollutants in excess of standards; (3) Dumping wastes in the sea without permit of dumping; 
(4) Failing to take proper treatment measures immediately in case an accident or any other contingent 
event causes pollution to the marine environment; Those who commits any of the following acts in the 
above (1) and (3), shall be fined not less than RMB30,000 yuan but no more than RMB200,000 yuan, in 
the above (2) and (4), not less than RMB20,000 yuan but no more than RMB100,000 yuan;  
 
Article74 Those who, in violation of the provisions of this law, commits any of the following acts, shall 
be warned or fined by the competent authorities invested by law with the power of marine environment 
supervision and administration in accordance with this law: (1) Failing to report in accordance with 
relevant provisions, or even refusing to report on matters relating to the discharge of pollutants or 
resorting to trickery and fraud in filing a report; (2) Failing to report in accordance with relevant 
provisions in case an accident or any other incident occurs; (3) Failing to make records of dumping in 
accordance with relevant provisions or failing to submit a report of dumping in accordance with relevant 
provisions; (4) Refusing to report of filing a false report on matters relating to the transportation of 
cargoes with pollution damages by vessels. Those who commits any of the following acts in the above (1) 
and (3), shall be fined no more than RMB20,000 yuan, in the above (2) and (4), no more than 
RMB50,000 yuan. 
 
Article75 Those who, in violation of the provisions of Paragraph 2 of Article 19 of this law, refuses an 
inspection on the spot or resorts to trickery and fraud on inspection, shall be warned and find no more 
than RMB20,000 yuan by the departments invested with the power of marine environment supervision 
and administration in accordance with this law. 
 
Article76 Those who, in violation of the provisions of this law, causes damage to marine ecosystems such 
as coral reefs, mangroves, etc., marine fishery resources and marine protected areas, shall be ordered to 
remedy the damage within a fixed time and take remedial measures, and be fined not less than 
RMB10,000 yuan but no more than RMB100,000 yuan by the departments invested with the power of 
marine environment supervision and administration in accordance with this law. In case those who has 
benefited from such illegal activity the income shall be confiscated by the departments concerned. 
 
Article77 Those who, in violation of the provisions of Paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article30 of this law, installs 
pollutant discharging outlet into the sea, shall be ordered to have the outlet shut down and fined not less 
than RMB20,000 yuan and no more than RMB100,000 yuan by the competent authorities in charge of 
environment protection under the local People’s Government at or above the County level 
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Article78 Those who, in violation of the provisions of Paragraph 3 of Article32 of this law, dismantles or 
sets aside environment protection installations without authorization, shall be ordered to have the 
installations rebuilt and put into use, and fines not less than RMB10,000 yuan and no more than 
RMB100,000 yuan by the competent authorities in charge of environment protection under the local 
People’s Government at or above the County level 
 
Article79 Those who, in violation of the provisions of Paragraph 2 of Article39 of this law, transfers 
dangerous wastes through the sea areas under the jurisdiction of the People¡¯ s Republic of China, shall be 
ordered to have the vessel illegally transporting dangerous wastes withdrawn and sailed outside the sea 
areas under the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China, and fined not less than RMB50,000 yuan 
and no more than RMB500,000 yuan by the State competent authority being in charge of maritime affairs. 
 
Article80 Those who, in violation of the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article 43 of this law, builds coastal 
construction project without examined and approved environmental impact assessment, shall be ordered 
to stop such illegal construction and take remedial measures by the competent authorities in charge of 
environment protection under the local People¡¯ s Government at or above the County level, and fined not 
less than RMB50,000 yuan and no more than RMB200,000 yuan, or be ordered to have it removed within 
a fixed time by the local People¡¯ s Government at or above the County level in the light of the limits of 
authorization of administration. 
 
Article81 Those who, in violation of the provisions of Article 44 of this law, puts into operation or use of 
coastal construction project, if failing to complete the construction of environment protection installations 
or environment protection installations failing to be up to the requirements, shall be ordered to stop the 
production and use of the project and fined not less than RMB20,000 yuan and no more than 
RMB100,000 yuan by the competent authorities in charge of environment protection. 
 
Article82 Those who, in violation of the provisions of Article 45 of this law, builds new industrial 
construction project that causes serious pollution to the marine environment, shall be ordered to have such 
project shut down by the People¡¯ s Government at or above the County level in the light of the limits of 
authorization of administration. 
 
Article83 Those who, in violation of the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article 47 and Article 48 of this law, 
builds marine construction project, or put marine construction project into operation and use if failing to 
complete the construction of environment protection installations or environment protection installations 
failing to be up to the requirements, shall be ordered to stop construction or stop the production and use of 
the project, and fined not less than RMB50,000 yuan and no more than RMB200,000 yuan by the 
competent authorities in charge of marine affairs. 
 
Article84 Those who, in violation of the provisions of Article 49 of this law, uses materials containing 
radioactive substance in excess of standards or toxic and harmful substances easy to dissolve in the water, 
shall be fined no more than RMB50,000 yuan and be ordered to stop the operation of the construction 
project until pollution damage in eliminated by the competent authorities in charge of marine affairs 
Article85 Those who, in violation of the provisions of this law, undertakes offshore oil exploration and 
exploitation to cause pollution damage to the marine environment, shall be warned and fined not less than 
RMB20,000 yuan and no more than RMB200,000 yuan by the State competent authority being in charge 
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of marine affairs. 
 
Article86 Those who, in violation of the provisions of this law, conducts dumping of wastes, failing to 
comply with the stipulations of permit, or conducts dumping of wastes in the ocean dumping zone already 
closed down, shall be warned and fined not less than RMB30,000 yuan and no more than RMB200,000 
yuan by the competent authorities in charge of marine affairs. In case a serious circumstance occurs, the 
permit may be suspended or revoked by the competent authorities in charge of marine affairs. 
 
Article87 Those who, in violation of the provisions of Paragraph 3 of Article55 of this law, transports 
wastes from outside the boundaries of the People’s Republic of China to be dumped in the sea areas under 
the jurisdiction of the People’s Republic of China, shall be warned and be fined not less than 
RMB100,000 yuan and no more than RMB1,000,000 yuan, in the light of the consequences of pollution 
damage caused or being likely to cause, by the State competent authority being in charge of marine 
affairs. 
 
Article88 Those who, in violation of the provisions of this law, commits any of the following acts, shall 
be warned or fined by the departments invested by this law with the power of marine environment 
supervision and administration: (1) Ports, docks, loading and unloading spots and vessels failing to be 
equipped with pollution prevention facilities and devices; (2) Vessels failing to obtain pollution 
prevention certificate and pollution prevention document, or failing to take records of pollutant discharge 
in accordance with relevant provisions; (3) Engaging in ship dismantling at water surface and port water 
area, refitting of old vessel, salvaging, and other surface and underwater operations, which cause 
pollution damage to the marine environment; (4) Cargoes carried by vessels failing to meet pollution 
prevention and transportation requirements. Those who commits any of the following mentioned in the 
above (1) and (4), shall be fined not less than RMB20,000 yuan and no more than RMB100,000 yuan, in 
the above (2), no more than RMB20,000 yuan, in the above (3), not less than RMB50,000 yuan and no 
more than RMB100,000 yuan. 
 
Article89 Vessels, oil platforms as well as ports, docks, loading and unloading spots, if failing to 
formulate contingency plans for oil-spill in violation of the provisions of this law, shall be warned or be 
ordered to remedy within a fixed time by the departments invested with the power of marine environment 
supervision and administration in accordance with the provisions of this law. 
 
Article90 Those who causes pollution damage to the marine environment shall eliminate the damage and 
compensate the losses; in case of pollution damage to the marine environment resulting entirely from the 
intentional act or fault of a third party, third party shall eliminate the damage and be liable for the 
compensation. If the State suffers heavy losses from the damages to marine ecosystems, marine aquatic 
resources and marine nature reserves, the departments invested by this law with the power of marine 
environment supervision and administration shall, on behalf of the State, put forward compensation 
demand to those who are responsible for the damages. 
 
Article91 Any unit, in violation of the provisions of this law, causes pollution accident to the marine 
environment, shall be fined in accordance with the damage and losses incurred by the department 
invested by this law with the power of marine environment supervision and administration. If the 
manager and other staff directly responsible for such accident are personnel employed by the 
governmental departments, they shall be imposed administrative penalties by law. The amount of fine 
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mentioned in the above clause shall be determined according to 30 per cent of the direct losses, but no 
more than RMB300,000 yuan. Those who causes serious consequences of heavy losses of public and 
private property or human injuries and deaths of persons by major marine environment pollution accident, 
shall be investigated and imposed upon criminal responsibility by law 
 
Article92 Those who causes pollution damage may be exempted from the liability if the pollution damage 
to the marine environment by any of the following circumstances can not be avoided, despite of prompt 
and reasonable measures taken: (1) War; (2) Natural calamities of force majeure; (3) Negligence of other 
wrongful acts in the exercise of functions of competent authorities responsible for the maintenance of 
light-towers or other navigational aids 
 
Article93 In the violation of the provisions of Articles21 and 22 of this law, administrative penalties 
relating to the payment of pollutant discharge fees, and dumping fees, and pollution removal within a 
fixed time shall be formulated by the State Council 
 
Article94 Any person in charge of marine environment supervision and administration who abuses his 
power, neglects his duty or engaged in malpractice for personal gains to result in pollution damage to the 
marine environment, shall be given administrative penalties by law. If the circumstance constitutes a 
crime, he shall be investigated and affixed for criminal responsibility by law 
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